The prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods.
We test the price responsiveness of the demand for punishment by randomly varying the cost of reducing the earnings of other group members following laboratory ...
The prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods.
Do Non-Strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for ...
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Aug 30, 2003 · The prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods.
"Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, ...
Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Christopher M. Anderson and Louis ...
The prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods. We ask whether the impulse to punish ...
We analyze the interplay between cooperation norms and people's punishment behavior in a social‐dilemma game with multiple punishment stages.
Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism ; doi. 10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.007 ; endingPage.
Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior,. 54, 1–24 ...