Dec 1, 2022 · We find that firms with distracted shareholders are associated with a higher cost of debt. This effect is stronger for firms with more powerful CEOs.
Aug 22, 2021 · To validate our institutional shareholder setting, we examine the relation between inattention and the cost of debt financing at the retail ...
Further testing suggests that the inattention-cost of debt relation is driven primarily by dual holders directly observing shareholder distraction. Our results ...
Further testing suggests that the inattention-cost of debt relation is driven primarily by dual holders directly observing shareholder distraction. Our results ...
Overall, our evidence suggests that institutional shareholder inattention has an incrementally negative effect on bond pricing. This paper was accepted by Brian ...
We find that firms with distracted shareholders are associated with a higher cost of debt. This effect is stronger for firms with more powerful CEOs.
Feb 12, 2020 · We document a positive and significant relation between firms with distracted institutional shareholders and the cost of debt financing.
People also ask
What is the agency problem of institutional investors?
What is agency cost and agency conflict?
Hypothesis: Short-term institutional investors can shift the balance of power between creditors and shareholders and exacerbate shareholder-creditor conflicts.
We conjecture that the presence of short-term institutional investors exacerbates agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.
Institutional Investor Attention, Agency Conflicts, and the Cost of Debt, Management Science. Driss, H., El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O. and Wald, J. K. ...