Unlike the homogeneous case, these equilibria allow for inefficient trades and for trade at non-uniform prices. The non-competitive equilibrium may be unique.

The theory of competitive equilibrium provides an elegant and simple account of how markets work. By contrast, the strategic analysis of markets tends to be ...

However, a refinement of the Markov property, which we call monotonicity, does suffice to guarantee perfectly competitive equilibria, if, and only if, it is ...

However, a refinement of the Markov property, which we call monotonicity, does suffice to guarantee perfectly competitive equilibria, if, and only if, it is ...

Apr 9, 2003 · Markov strategies play an important role in the analysis of dynamic games because of their simplicity and recursive structure and because the ...

Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games. Bibliographic Details. Author, Gale, D. Sabourian, H. Issue Date, 2006. Source, Games and economic ...

Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games · Douglas Gale, H. Sabourian · Published in Games Econ. Behav. 1 February 2006 · Economics · Games Econ.

However, a refinement of the Markov property, which we call monotonicity, does suffice to guarantee perfectly competitive equilibria, if, and only if, it is ...

We study a related phenomenon of asymmetric equilibria in a dynamic market where agents enter and search for a mate for at most n rounds before exiting again.

Unlike the homogeneous case, these equilibria allow for inefficient trades and for trade at non-uniform prices. The non-competitive equilibrium may be unique.