Obviously Strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms. Roughly speaking, a mechanism is OSP if whenever it requires an agent to take an action, the worst outcome that she ...

This tutorial will survey the recent work in economics and computer science focussing on mechanism design when agents have imperfect rationality.

Vol-3537/paper2⫷Vol-3537/paper3⫸Vol-3537/paper4. Diodato Ferraioli Carmine Ventre. Mechanism Design: (Ir)Rationality and Obvious Strategyproofness.

Aug 9, 2022 · A rule : RN → X is strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement monotonic if and only if is a sequential allotment rule. Moreover, a rule : RN → X ...

general, rationality implies that the agents report their types according to a strategy suggested ... This motivated mechanism design researchers to look for ...

Mechanism Design: (Ir)Rationality and Obvious Strategyproofness · Diodato FerraioliCarmine Ventre. Computer Science, Economics. DP@AI*IA. 2023. TLDR. This paper ...

Jul 22, 2023 · Conceptually, our results are along the line of research on stronger notions of robustness against strategic behavior in mechanism design.

Missing: (Ir) Rationality

Abstract. Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has recently found widespread appli- cations in modeling and solving decentralized design ...

Notably, in an insightful paper, Li (2017) proposed Obviously Strategy-Proof (OSP) Mechanism which has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategy (ODS). Li ( ...