Jun 30, 2009 · This paper studies Nash implementation in the job-matching market where each worker works for only one firm and a firm hires as many workers ...
This paper studies Nash implementation in the job-matching market where each worker works for only one firm and a firm hires as many workers as it wishes.
"Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), ...
Abstract: This paper studies Nash implementation in the job-matching market where each worker works for only one firm and a firm hires as many workers as it ...
Dive into the research topics of 'Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market'. Together they form a unique fingerprint. Sort by ...
This note describes a non-cooperative auction market game in a two-sided 'marriage' economy and provides a characterization of its Nash equilibria.
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Takashi Hayashi and Toyotaka Sakai, Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market, International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 38, ...
May 23, 2023 · In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability.
Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market · Takashi HayashiToyotaka Sakai. Economics. Int. J. Game Theory. 2009. TLDR. It is ...
In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker.
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