Dec 1, 2023 · We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular.

Abstract:We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, ...

We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, assuming a basic ...

We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, assuming a basic ...

We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, assuming a basic ...

No Ascending Auction can find Equilibrium for SubModular valuations ... We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free ...

Abstract. The Vickrey and ascending package auctions are found to have identical equilibrium performance in the case where goods are substitutes. In.

Apr 16, 2024 · In this paper, we present a combinatorial network flow algorithm to compute buyer-optimal Walrasian prices in a multi-unit matching market with truncated ...

When all traders have GS valuations, a Walrasian equilibrium exists and can be found efficiently using an ascending auction [Gul and Stacchetti, 2000; Ben-Zwi ...

Apr 22, 2008 · This paper identifies two notions of substitutes for auction and equilibrium anal- ysis. Weak substitutes, which is the usual price-theory ...