Dec 20, 2014 · In the multi-player case, we find that dominated strategies become extinct and we show that strict Nash equilibria are stochastically stable and ...

We examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and random disturbances.

Abstract. Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where.

Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust ...

We study a general class of game-theoretic learning dynamics in the presence of random payoff disturbances and observation noise, and we provide a unified ...

In the multi-player case, we find that dominated strategies become extinct and we show that strict Nash equilibria are stochastically stable and attracting; ...

Nov 18, 2015 · On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations. The model. Notation. A finite game in normal form is ...

Abstract. We study a general class of game-theoretic learning dynamics in the presence of random payoff disturbances and observation noise, and we.

On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations. Mario Bravo, Panayotis Mertikopoulos. PII: S0899-8256(16)30046-X. DOI ...

On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations ; Year of publication: May 2017 ; Authors: Bravo, Mario ; Mertikopoulos, ...