The second-best auction — i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free environment — can be made collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are multiple bidding cartels, or the second-best outcome involves a non-trivial probability of the object not being sold.
We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation.
Aug 12, 2008 · Abstract: We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environ- ment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but ...
Oct 4, 2019 · We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their ...
Aug 1, 2023 · So long as there is more than one bidder for every bundle of goods, such collusion is impossible. This is trivially satisfied by having the ...
Oct 1, 2018 · We characterize auctions that are collusion-proof in the sense that no such coordination opportu- nities exist, and show that the efficient and ...
Jan 7, 2025 · Abstract: We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on ...
To address the problem of multiplicity of equilibria we show how the optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. Keywords: ...
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Dec 4, 2007 · Abstract: We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environ- ment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but.
To address the problem of multiplicity of equilibria we show how the optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. K .