The optimal contest allocates the positive prize to agent 1 with a probability that is increasing in the ratio of observed signals s 1 / s 2 . More precisely, agent 1 receives the prize when s 1 / s 2 is larger than a log-normally distributed random number, and conversely for agent 2.
We study the optimal design of contests for 'simple' agents, where potential contestants strategically reason about whether or not to participate in the ...
Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior.
Jun 6, 2014 · In this paper, we explore this question in the context of optimal contest design for simple agents---agents who strategically reason about ...
We study the optimal design of contests for 'simple' agents, where potential contestants strategically reason about whether or not to participate in the ...
The main result here is that the winner-take-all contest is a 3-approximation of the optimal contest when the principal's objective is to maximize the ...
6 days ago · We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the ...
Missing: simple | Show results with:simple
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2024. Much of the work on multi-agent contests is focused on determining the equilibrium behavior of contestants. This ...
Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior.
Another possible objective of contest design is the selection of best agents. For examples of such selection contests see Meyer (1991), and Fang and Noe.