We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto ...
[PDF] Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
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We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying. Pareto ...
We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto ...
Nov 7, 2017 · We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences ...
We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. ... Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto. Games ...
Downloadable (with restrictions)! Following Mongin [12, 13], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework.
We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 and incompatible with the Strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto ...
Soc. Choice Welf. 2019. This article reconsiders the issue of Bayesian aggregation by pointing at a conflict that may arise between two logically independent ...
We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto ...
We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto ...