In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from ...
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In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from ...
In this paper we introduce an equilibrium concept for finite normal form games, called random belief equilibrium (RBE), based upon players having uncertainty ...
In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from ...
Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2005. "Random belief equilibrium in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol.
Nov 22, 2014 · First, each player chooses her action according to the model of rational choice, given her beliefs about the other players' actions.
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games. James Friedman and Claudio Mezzetti · Games and Economic Behavior, 2005, vol. 51, issue 2, 296-323. Date: 2005
May 19, 2021 · A mixed strategy is a probability measure over a set of pure strategies (also called actions). If the set of actions is finite, we can represent the ...
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We define Random Belief Equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games. We assume that a player's beliefs about the strategy choices of others are randomly ...