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We show that a randomized strategy equilibrium does exist and that it converges to the simultaneous-move outcome when the cost of leading converges to zero. Our ...
Oct 22, 2024 · We investigate a price competition model and show that randomized strategy equilibria exist and any of them converges to the Bertrand ...
ABSTRACT We investigate a two-player action commitment game where one simultaneous-move and two sequential-move pure strategy equilibria exist when the cost ...
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ABSTRACT We investigate a two-player action commitment game where one simultaneous-move and two sequential-move pure strategy equilibria exist when the cost of ...
Article "Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading" Detailed information of the J-GLOBAL is an information service ...
Aug 17, 2023 · In my understanding a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium which exists if my strategy makes my opponent's strategy useless, he ...
Missing: commitment costs
We investigate a two-player action commitment game where one simultaneous-move and two sequential-move pure strategy equilibria exist when the cost of ...
Aug 16, 2023 · A Dominant strategy equilibrium, where every player is playing his/her dominant strategy is always a unique equilibrium. So there is no question ...
Oct 13, 2022 · We have two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, TL and BR. Mathematically, I understand that row player in both games plays top 1/3 of the time, ...
The idea is that if the players choose strategies that are best responses to each other, then no player has an incentive to deviate to an alternative strategy — ...