We show how queueing systems can be regulated by imposing an entry fee, a holding fee (based on time in the system), or a service fee (based on the required ...

Customers do not necessarily join a queue at a socially optimal rate. Hence, queueing systems may call for regulation. For customers in an M/G/1 ...

When customers know their demand. M/G/1, g(x) density of service time customers know their demand and decide whether to join or not. Wx (y)= mean time for a y ...

Customers know their demand and need to decide irrevocably whether or not to ... If n = m + 1, either all customers are in queue 1, or m are in queue. 1 ...

If the expected demand for service is smaller than the capacity of the service system, then in a deterministic model the resource is not considered scarce.

Jan 1, 2009 · Hence, these studies focus on congestion control algorithms without explicitly incorporating queue-length based admission control. On the other ...

Jan 21, 2020 · To overcome inefficiency in a single-server first-come-first-served M/G/1 queue, an efficient method to compute a price function is included ...

Naor (1969) was the first to observe that in observable queues, customers' joining behavior may not coincide with the socially optimal one.

Haviv, Moshe: Regulation of an M/G/1 queue when customers know their demand. Perform. Eval. 77, 57–71 (2014) 12. Haviv, Moshe, Oz, Binyamin: Regulating an ...