We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k = k 1 + k 2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement.
Thus, revenue is greater in a single- round, uniform auction for k = k1 + k2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the ...
We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, ...
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We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces first-round revenue. Thus, revenue is greater in a single-round, ...
We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, ...
We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are ...
It is demonstrated that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price, and total revenue is greater in a ...
We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces first-round revenue. Thus, revenue is greater in a single-round, ...
Aug 31, 2004 · We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which ...
We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces first-round revenue. Thus, revenue is greater in a single-round, ...