Apr 20, 2017 · Higher priorities are charged higher admission prices. Customers make two choices - time of arrival and priority of service. We show that the ...

Feb 22, 2019 · We consider strategic arrivals to a FCFS service system that starts service at a fixed time and has to serve a fixed number of customers.

Higher priorties are charged higher admission prices. Customers make two choices—time of arrival and priority of service. We show that the Nash equilibrium ...

Higher priorities are charged higher admission prices. Customers make two choices—time of arrival and priority of service. We show that the Nash equilibrium ...

Higher priorities are charged higher admission prices. Customers make two choices - time of arrival and priority of service. We show that the Nash equilibrium ...

In this paper, we develop a framework to study such strategic arrivals into queueing networks. We study the population game wherein users strategically choose ...

A framework to study the population game wherein users strategically choose when to arrive at a parallel queueing network and upon arrival, which of the ...

We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service ...

Queueing networks are typically analyzed assuming that the arrival process is exogenous, and unaffected by admission control, scheduling policies, etc.

Aug 16, 2023 · This paper shows how to account for arrival rate uncertainty in the analysis of queueing models with strategic customer behavior.