We also provide an axiomatization of the Myerson value on the class of all union stable systems by replacing the superfluous support property by the new strong ...
May 15, 2012 · In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions in a cooperative game is given by a union stable system. Well-known examples of such systems ...
We also provide an axiomatization of the Myerson value on the class of all union stable systems by replacing the superfluous support property by the new strong ...
In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions which models the partial cooperation will be given by a union stable system. These systems contain, as particular ...
In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions in a cooperative game is given by a union stable system. Well-known examples of such systems are communication ...
The Myerson Value and Superfluous Supports in Union Stable Systems
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In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions in a cooperative game is given by a union stable system. Well-known examples of such systems are communication ...
Sep 9, 2011 · In this paper, the goal is to make clear that there exists a close relationship between the Myerson value and the so-called conference game.
In: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 2012 ; Vol. 155, No. 2. pp. 650-668. ... The Myerson Value and Superfluous Supports in Union Stable Systems.
May 15, 2012 · Abstract In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions in a cooperative game is given by a union stable system. Well-known examples of such ...
The Myerson Value and Superfluous Supports in Union Stable Systems. / Algaba, E.; Bilbao, J.M.; van den Brink, J.R. et al. Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute, 2011.