In this note we show that this appealing property of the core no longer holds even for the class of hyperplane games, an immediate generalization of TU games.

Oct 22, 2024 · We introduce the class of games with cohesion index and propose an allocation rule, which is characterized by using reasonable properties. The ...

In this note we show that this appealing property of the core no longer holds even for the class of hyperplane games, an immediate generalization of TU games ...

The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note. Anindya Bhattacharya and Abderrahmane Ziad · Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, vol.

In this note we show that this appealing property of the core no longer holds even for the class of hyperplane games, an immediate generalization of TU games ...

Bhattacharya, A ; Ziad, A. / The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note. In: Games and Economic Behaviour. 2006 ; Vol. 54, No. 1. pp. 25-30.

The set of stable matchings is equal to the core defined by weak domination. [Roth (1985b)]. So it is a subset of the core. To see why an outcome which is not ...

always nonempty (see Le Breton 1990, Theorem 5). Our result about stability set and quota games is exactly in the spir results concerning the core. If the ...

GS used this deferred acceptance algorithm to prove not only that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty for all preferences of the kind they considered, but ...

The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note. Bhattacharya, Anindya, (2006). On conservative stable standard of behaviour in situations with ...