ABSTRACT. Sponsored search is one of the most successful applications of economic mechanisms in real life. A crucial issue is the.
In the present paper, we provide a number of results when the most famous externality model, the cascade model, is adopted: we design the first exact algorithm ...
May 11, 2014 · Abstract page for arXiv paper 1405.2484: Truthful Learning Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions with Externalities.
Which mechanism for sponsored search auctions with externalities? Computing methodologies · Artificial intelligence · Distributed artificial intelligence ...
In particular, we adopt the cascade model, one of the most popular models for sponsored search auctions, and we prove a number of novel upper bounds and lower ...
In an auction with externalities, a buyer's type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of theN+1 possible outcomes.
For the FSE model with externalities there is no standard mechanism that is AE, ex–post IC, ex–interim. WBB, and ex–interim IR. Proof. We prove the theorem by ...
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Bibliographic details on Which mechanism for sponsored search auctions with externalities?
Which mechanism for sponsored search auctions with externalities? N. GattiM. Rocco. Computer Science, Economics. Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 2013.
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of \emph{microeconomic mechanisms}. In mechanism design, auctions are usually ...