Pilihan pajak: Perbedaan antara revisi

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Revisi per 14 Maret 2023 03.31

Dalam teori pilihan publik, pilihan pajak (terkadang disebut juga sebagai kedaulatan pembayar pajak,^[1] pengalokasian, atau subsidiaritas fiskal^[2]^{[Verifikasi gagal]}) adalah keyakinan bahwa pembayar pajak individu harus memiliki kendali langsung atas bagaimana pajak mereka dibelanjakan. Para pendukungnya menerapkan teori pilihan konsumen pada keuangan publik. Mereka mengklaim pembayar pajak bereaksi positif ketika mereka diizinkan untuk mengalokasikan sebagian dari pajak mereka untuk pengeluaran yang lebih khusus.^[3]^[4]^[5]

Referensi

^ Brown, Daniel J. (Fall 1979). "The Case for Tax-Target Plans". Journal of Education Finance. University of Illinois Press. 5 (2): 215–224. JSTOR 40703229. For educators, these "new" values reflect a demand for taxpayer sovereignty, greater choice among educational programs, and more responsiveness on the part of educational systems.
^ Buchanan 1963.
^ Lamberton, Cait (4 March 2011). "Your Money, Your Choice". Democracy: A Journal of Ideas.
^ Sherry Xin Li; Catherine Eckel; Philip J. Grossman; Tara Larson Brown. "Do Earmarks Increase Giving to Government?".
^ Alm, James; Jackson, Betty R.; McKee, Michael (1993). "Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 22 (3): 285–303. doi:10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8.

Bacaan lebih lanjut

Baker, Russell – Taxpayers' Choice The New York Times. 1990
Binowski, Brittany – Why Mandatory Taxes Are Bad – And How The Government Should Fix Them (But Probably Won't). Forbes. 18 June 2012
Blinder, Alan S. – The Economics of Public Finance: Essays 1989
Buchanan, James M. – Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice 1967
Buchanan, James M. (1963). "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes". Journal of Political Economy. 71 (5): 457–469. doi:10.1086/258794. JSTOR 1829016.
Le Grand, Julian - The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition 2007

[brown-1] Brown, Daniel J. (Fall 1979). "The Case for Tax-Target Plans". Journal of Education Finance. University of Illinois Press. 5 (2): 215–224. JSTOR 40703229. For educators, these "new" values reflect a demand for taxpayer sovereignty, greater choice among educational programs, and more responsiveness on the part of educational systems.

[FOOTNOTEBuchanan1963-2] Buchanan 1963.

[3] Lamberton, Cait (4 March 2011). "Your Money, Your Choice". Democracy: A Journal of Ideas.

[4] Sherry Xin Li; Catherine Eckel; Philip J. Grossman; Tara Larson Brown. "Do Earmarks Increase Giving to Government?".

[5] Alm, James; Jackson, Betty R.; McKee, Michael (1993). "Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 22 (3): 285–303. doi:10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8.

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@@ Baris 1: / Baris 1: @@
-Dalam [[teori pilihan publik]], '''pilihan pajak''' (terkadang disebut juga sebagai '''kedaulatan pembayar pajak''',<ref name=brown>{{cite journal|last=Brown|first=Daniel J.|title=The Case for Tax-Target Plans|journal=Journal of Education Finance|date=Fall 1979|volume=5|issue=2|pages=215–224|jstor=40703229|publisher=University of Illinois Press|quote=For educators, these "new" values reflect a demand for taxpayer sovereignty, greater choice among educational programs, and more responsiveness on the part of educational systems.}}</ref> '''pengalokasian''', atau '''subsidiaritas fiskal'''{{sfn|Buchanan|1963}}{{failed verification|date=February 2013}}) adalah keyakinan bahwa pembayar pajak individu harus memiliki kendali langsung atas bagaimana pajak mereka dibelanjakan. Para pendukungnya menerapkan teori [[pilihan konsumen]] pada [[keuangan publik]]. Mereka mengklaim pembayar pajak bereaksi positif ketika mereka diizinkan untuk mengalokasikan sebagian dari pajak mereka untuk pengeluaran yang lebih khusus.<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Lamberton |first=Cait |title=Your Money, Your Choice | magazine=Democracy: A Journal of Ideas | date=4 March 2011 | url=https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/20/your-money-your-choice/}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author1=Sherry Xin Li |author2=Catherine Eckel |author3=Philip J. Grossman |author4=Tara Larson Brown |title=Do Earmarks Increase Giving to Government? |url=https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Do-earmarks-increase-giving-to-government-Li-Eckel/6d621de6f591b75c1b026f84b2f4d481a78c2c15 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal| doi=10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8 | volume=22 | issue=3 | title=Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance | year=1993 | journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | pages=285–303 | last1 = Alm | first1 = James | last2 = Jackson | first2 = Betty R. | last3 = McKee | first3 = Michael}}</ref>
+Dalam [[teori pilihan publik]], '''pilihan pajak''' (terkadang disebut juga sebagai '''kedaulatan pembayar pajak''',<ref name=brown>{{cite journal|last=Brown|first=Daniel J.|title=The Case for Tax-Target Plans|journal=Journal of Education Finance|date=Fall 1979|volume=5|issue=2|pages=215–224|jstor=40703229|publisher=University of Illinois Press|quote=For educators, these "new" values reflect a demand for taxpayer sovereignty, greater choice among educational programs, and more responsiveness on the part of educational systems.}}</ref> '''pengalokasian''', atau '''subsidiaritas fiskal'''{{sfn|Buchanan|1963}}{{failed verification|date=February 2013}}) adalah keyakinan bahwa pembayar pajak individu harus memiliki kendali langsung atas bagaimana pajak mereka dibelanjakan. Para pendukungnya menerapkan teori [[pilihan konsumen]] pada [[keuangan publik]]. Mereka mengklaim pembayar pajak bereaksi positif ketika mereka diizinkan untuk mengalokasikan sebagian dari pajak mereka untuk pengeluaran yang lebih khusus.<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Lamberton |first=Cait |title=Your Money, Your Choice | magazine=Democracy: A Journal of Ideas | date=4 March 2011 | url=https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/20/your-money-your-choice/}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author1=Sherry Xin Li |author2=Catherine Eckel |author3=Philip J. Grossman |author4=Tara Larson Brown |title=Do Earmarks Increase Giving to Government? |url=https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Do-earmarks-increase-giving-to-government-Li-Eckel/6d621de6f591b75c1b026f84b2f4d481a78c2c15 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal| doi=10.1016/0167-2681(93)90003-8 | volume=22 | issue=3 | title=Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance | url=https://archive.org/details/sim_journal-of-economic-behavior-organization_1993-12_22_3/page/285 | year=1993 | journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | pages=285–303 | last1 = Alm | first1 = James | last2 = Jackson | first2 = Betty R. | last3 = McKee | first3 = Michael}}</ref>
 ==Referensi==
@@ Baris 9: / Baris 9: @@
 * Blinder, Alan S. – [https://books.google.com/books?id=L2AhEMv7qeoC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=voluntary+exchange+theory&source=bl&ots=aMM3-gy-0I&sig=nGPmNutUa-TJeEERqazRNud8Ne0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YXzoUKatLOitiAKX_4B4&ved=0CEEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=voluntary%20exchange%20theory&f=false The Economics of Public Finance: Essays] 1989
 * Buchanan, James M. – Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice 1967
-* {{cite journal |last=Buchanan |first=James M. |jstor=1829016 |title=The Economics of Earmarked Taxes |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=71 |issue=5 |pages=457–469 |year=1963 |doi=10.1086/258794 |s2cid=153517472 }}
+* {{cite journal |last=Buchanan |first=James M. |jstor=1829016 |title=The Economics of Earmarked Taxes |url=https://archive.org/details/sim_journal-of-political-economy_1963-10_71_5/page/457 |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=71 |issue=5 |pages=457–469 |year=1963 |doi=10.1086/258794 |s2cid=153517472 }}
 * Le Grand, Julian - [https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Other_Invisible_Hand.html?id=CAXQMkL0H_8C The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition] 2007