Béla Pokol
Professor of law and sociology, member of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (2011-2023)
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Books by Béla Pokol
In the course of the historical development of human societies, significant transformations have taken place, especially in European civilization and other parts of the world, where social activities were previously strongly normative and often determined by divine commands. As history progressed, these normative determinations gradually faded into the background and were replaced by cognitive, rational, and secularized thinking. Many authors have been engaged in the analysis of these processes, examining social, economic and cultural changes from different perspectives.
In addition to the official ban on state censorship, internal, ownership and editorial influence of media companies in Western democracies is a widely researched phenomenon. Many media researchers, sociologists, communication theorists and publicists have addressed the question of how media owners, editors-in-chief and managers controlled by them, guide the content production process of editorial offices, thereby shaping or restricting journalists' freedom of expression.
Az állami cenzúra hivatalos tiltása mellett a nyugati demokráciákban a médiavállalatok belső, tulajdonosi és szerkesztői befolyásolása széles körben kutatott jelenség. Számos médiakutató, szociológus, kommunikációelméleti szakember és publicista foglalkozott azzal a kérdéssel, hogy a médiatulajdonosok, valamint az általuk irányított főszerkesztők és menedzserek miként terelik a szerkesztőségek tartalomgyártási folyamatát, s ezzel hogyan alakítják vagy korlátozzák az újságírók véleménynyilvánítási szabadságát.
The question of evaluation and reward mechanisms in the intellectual sphere of modern societies is also an important topic in many disciplines, such as sociology, economics and management theory. Several authors have theoretically and comparatively addressed these mechanisms, with special regard to the objective and effective comparison of participants' performance, ranking and reward systems.
Regierungsform neben des Parlamentarismus und Präsidialsystems als eine neuere Regierungsform entworfen werden. Aber im weiteren Sinne kann es nur als die Ersetzung des Rechtsstaats durch den juristokratischen Staat formuliert werden.
die konstitutionellen Grundrechten und -Grundsätzen sowie die konstitutionellen Werten der Verfassung auf Schichten des subkonstitutionellen
Rechtssystems. Diese Rechtsschichten entwickelten sich über einen
langen Zeitraum im frühmittelalterlichen Europa vom Status des bloßen
Gewohnheitsrechts, als das Recht lediglich in Gerichtsentscheidungen
verankert war. Mit der Entdeckung der Digesta um 1050 begann die
italienische juristische Ausbildung in Italien, und mit der Verbreitung
dieser Ausbildung verbesserte die Rezeption des römischen Rechts in
Westeuropa und später in Osteuropa allmählich das Gewohnheitsrecht
mit einer rationaleren Rechtsauffassung. Das von der Theologie emanzipierte philosophische Denken und dem geometrisch-mathematischen
Denken führte das abstrakte Denken in den 1500er und 1600er Jahren
allmählich ins Rechtsdenken hinein und damit wurde der jahrhundertelange römische Rechtskasuismus und die Rechtsbildung in Richtung auf
die Rechtskodize verlagert, die in einem logischen System entworfen
wurden. Ab dem frühen 18. Jahrhundert stützten Leibniz und Christian
Wolff ihre Arbeiten auf solche konzeptuell strukturierten Rechtsnormen
und die Rechtsbestrebungen der zentralisierten absoluten Monarchien
nahmen später in Anspruch diese Rechtssystematik für ihre bewusste
Zwecke und ersetzten durch die Rechtskodizes die frühere gewohnheitsrechtlichen Zusammenstellungen und damit wurde das Recht allmählich
auf die begriffliche Rechtsdogmatik umgestellt. Aus evolutionärer Sicht
ermöglichen diese Änderungen die Errichtung von zwei neuen Rechtsstufen über dem ehemals üblichen gerichtlichen Gewohnheitsrecht.
This imperial power machine, unlike the happily extinct Soviet, is not primarily based on physical violence, at least not within the Reich, but on deliberate distortions of originally noble ideas and their encirclement with institutions. This left democracy based on mass elections, albeit weakened and gutted by a series of transformations, but gradually built a parallel political and legal system over its institutional system. If mass democracy then threatens its rule, it strikes in its parallel, superior legal-political institutions and cuts off the threat posed by the forces of democracy.
The basis for all this was the reactivation of human rights/natural law after this naivety disappeared in Europe from the mid-1800s – these are wonderful moral values, but its conflicting principles are unfit for law – but at the height of their influence they survived in the late 1700s and were included in the US Constitution and proved useful in occasional power struggles. It was brought to Europe after 1945 by the victorious and occupying American military forces, first to convict the leaders of the losing Germans as war criminals, since under positive law only a very narrow German military leadership could have been sentenced to death, but most of the German state elite would have had to be left unharmed, since they obeyed only the instructions of positive law. The Nuremberg Tribunals, which judged on the basis of unwritten natural law and human rights, and the subsequent purges led to the removal of the entire German elite, and the national feeling as literally "Nazi" was wiped out of the Germans for generations. But the purposeful elevation of human rights was also good for transforming them into sacred "fundamental constitutional rights" and creating a huge constitutional court for the Germans to subdue the entire legislature and majority government. Packed, of course, with trusted lawyers coming home from the USA and England with the occupying American troops. In addition, a European Court of Human Rights was established in Strasbourg to control the majority legislatures of European democracies in general, but this only really played a role after the accession of Eastern Europe in 1990.
I wrote a little book about this six years ago called "European juristocracy, and I've been working on the details ever since, having recently summarized the EU's top power structure in a nutshell here. The essence of this is that formally the supreme power over the organs of the EU is the Court of Justice of the EU, seated in Luxembourg, which can annul the decisions of all other EU bodies, but no one can annul its decisions anymore, because there is no longer any decision-making authority over it. Even the top leaders of the Member States, who have a unanimous rule over the Treaty, cannot affect the Court of Justice by possibly amending the Treaty, because it implies that the Court's regulation can only be amended if it initiates it or, if it is different, it requires its consent. However, the actual peak power of this supreme power is basically in the hands of the president of the court, since the regulation of judicial case allocation has been established here since the 1960s – openly contrary to the requirements of the rule of law – in such a way that the president, elected every three years by the majority of judges from among themselves, can decide with the greatest arbitrariness without any limit to whom to give the preparation of draft decisions in incoming cases. Empirical surveys have shown that, for example, the current president, who has already been re-elected three times, always gives all important cases to only 10-12 judges out of 27 judges, and the other judges only receive simple rejection cases at hen trial level, and thus this narrow judicial oligarchy dominates all important decisions. And yet, every three years, this judicial oligarchy elects a president from among their narrow circle. Thus, in fact, the Court of Justice of Luxembourg, with its 27 judges seconded here by the Member States for six years, is itself only a front body, because within it there is a narrow judicial oligarchy that has stabilized for many years, with an almighty court president who grew out of them and is always renewed by them, and the new judges of the day are indoctrinated by those who have been in this position by those who have been in the old one, and those who accept their rule are co-opted among themselves after a while. Those who resist are excluded and condemned to chicken trials through their president's unlimited allocation of cases.
Суть этого в том, что формально верховной властью над органами ЕС является Суд ЕС, расположенный в Люксембурге, который может аннулировать решения всех других органов ЕС, но никто не может отменить свои, потому что над ним больше нет полномочий по принятию решений. Даже высшие руководители государств-членов, которые единогласно вынесли решение по Договору, не могут повлиять на Суд путем возможного внесения поправок в Договор, поскольку это подразумевает, что регламент Суда может быть изменен только в том случае, если он инициирует его, или, если он иной, требует его согласия. Однако фактическая вершина этой верховной власти в основном находится в руках председателя суда, поскольку с 1960-х годов здесь установлено регулирование распределения судебных дел – откровенно вопреки требованиям правового государства – таким образом, что председатель, избираемый большинством судей из своей среды каждые три года, может решать с величайшим произволом без всякого ограничения, кому отдавать подготовку проектов решений по поступающим делам. Эмпирические опросы показали, что, например, действующий президент, который уже трижды переизбирался, всегда отдает все важные дела только 10-12 судьям из 27 судей, а остальные судьи получают только простые дела об отказе на уровне судебного разбирательства, и таким образом эта узкая судебная олигархия доминирует над всеми важными решениями. И тем не менее, каждые три года эта судебная олигархия избирает президента из своего узкого круга. Таким образом, на самом деле Суд Люксембурга, 27 судей которого были прикомандированы сюда государствами-членами на протяжении шести лет, сам по себе является лишь подставным органом, потому что внутри него существует узкая судебная олигархия, которая стабилизировалась в течение многих лет, с всемогущим председателем суда, избираемым из их числа и всегда обновляемым ими. И новые нынешние судьи подвергаются идеологической обработке со стороны старых заключенных, пользующихся этим положением, и через некоторое время те, кто признает их правление, кооптируются между собой, сопротивление исключается и, благодаря неограниченному распределению дел их председателем, обречены только на ничтожные судебные процессы.