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## Part X

# Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

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## **Introductory note**

### *Article 29*

*The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.*

### *Rule 28*

*The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.*

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2021. These field-based subsidiary organs can be divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, featuring the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peacekeeping operations and special political missions covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor missions are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each mission (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the missions are presented in those tables according to 21 categories of mandated tasks which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not

reflect any practice or position of the Council. The introduction to section I also features an overview table of changes to the composition of peacekeeping operations during the reporting period (table 3).

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each mission, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous supplements to the *Repertoire*.

## I. Peacekeeping operations

### Note

Section I focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

### Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2021

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 12 peacekeeping operations.<sup>1</sup> Six of the operations were in Africa, three in the Middle East, two in Europe and one in Asia. The Council did not establish or terminate any operations in 2021.

#### *Extensions of mandates*

The Council extended the mandates of the following peacekeeping operations:

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
- United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

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<sup>1</sup> For Council decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, see part I, sect. 22. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) remained open-ended.

*Mandates of peacekeeping operations: differences in scope*

In 2021, the mandates of peacekeeping operations continued to vary considerably based on their content and complexity. In this regard, the Council re-authorized the four largest missions, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to use all necessary means to implement their mandates which covered a broad array of mandated tasks.<sup>2</sup> The mandates of all four missions continued to feature tasks related to the protection of civilians, the protection and promotion of human rights, facilitating humanitarian assistance and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment. The Council also retained the implementation of peace agreements and political transitions as priorities for MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNMISS, while MINUSCA, MINUSMA and MONUSCO remained focused on support for stabilization and the extension of State authority.

The remaining eight peacekeeping operations maintained relatively narrower mandates. UNIFIL and UNISFA, as interim security forces, remained focused on observing the redeployment of forces and maintaining security within their areas of responsibility and were reauthorized to use force in fulfilling only specific tasks such as the protection civilians, United Nations personnel and equipment, the protection of their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, and the protection of the mission's area of responsibility.<sup>3</sup> UNFICYP continued to support the maintenance of the ceasefire and bicomunal contacts in Cyprus, while longstanding observer missions such as MINURSO, UNDOF, UNMOGIP and UNTSO concentrated on the monitoring of ceasefires and the implementation of armistice and disengagement agreements.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 20; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 33; and, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), paras. 27 and 29 (i)(a).

<sup>3</sup> In connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 22; and, in connection with UNISFA, resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 14.

<sup>4</sup> In connection with UNDOF, resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 15; and, in connection with MINURSO, resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. See also, in connection with UNGMOGIP, resolutions [47 \(1948\)](#) and [91 \(1951\)](#); and, in connection with UNTSO, resolution [48 \(1948\)](#).

*Mandates of peacekeeping operations: modifications*

During the period under review, the Council modified the mandates of six of the 12 existing peacekeeping operations, with most of the changes affecting MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS. The most common changes by the Council concerned provisions on the protection of civilians and early warning, support to political processes and the participation of women and other marginalized groups therein, and tasks related to addressing sexual and gender-based violence.

With respect to the protection of civilians, the Council requested MONUSCO and UNMISS to adjust their postures and geographic focus based on the changing security situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.<sup>5</sup> The Council requested MINUSMA to implement a politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State presence, State authority and basic social services in Central Mali and to promote the understanding of and to strengthen its mission-wide early warning and response mechanisms.<sup>6</sup> UNMISS was tasked with implementing a mission-wide early warning and response strategy that drew upon regular interaction with civilians in areas at high risk of conflict.<sup>7</sup> Also as part of its protection of civilians mandate, MINUSCA was requested to deter the use of schools by parties to the conflict and to facilitate the continuation of education.<sup>8</sup>

Adding to their support to the implementation of existing peace agreements, the Council requested MINUSMA to support the realization of the political transition in Mali and MINUSCA to support a newly announced ceasefire in the Central African Republic.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the political support role of UNMISS in South Sudan was expanded to include the provision of technical assistance for the implementation of the peace agreement and to coordinate the use of its good offices with regional actors.<sup>10</sup> The Council also provided additional detail in the electoral support mandates of MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNMISS in preparation for

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<sup>5</sup> In connection with UNMISS, resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (a)(iii); and, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), paras. 29 (i)(a) and (e).

<sup>6</sup> Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 30 (b)(i) and (c)(ii).

<sup>7</sup> Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (a)(ii).

<sup>8</sup> Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 34 (a)(v).

<sup>9</sup> In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 30 (a)(i); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 34 (b).

<sup>10</sup> Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), paras. 3 (c)(i) and (iv).

elections, respectively, in the Central African Republic, Mali and South Sudan, envisaged for 2022 and 2023.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding political inclusivity, the Council requested UNISFA to integrate women into peace discussions, including through the provision of gender advisers.<sup>12</sup> UNMISS was mandated to assist all parties in the full, effective and meaningful participation of women, youth, faith groups, and civil society in the peace process, transitional Government bodies and institutions, and all conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.<sup>13</sup> MINUSMA was requested to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women in the political transition.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, UNIFIL's assistance to the Lebanese authorities in ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women was clarified to also include the Lebanese security sector.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, the Council introduced new elements to the sexual and gender-based violence mandates of MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNIFIL and UNMISS. Specifically, MINUSCA and MONUSCO were requested to include risks of sexual violence in conflict in their data collection, threat analysis and early warning systems, while UNMISS was requested to respond to sexual and gender-based violence, in addition to deterring and preventing its occurrence.<sup>16</sup> The Council requested MINUSMA to support the provision of medical, sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial, mental health, legal and socioeconomic services to survivors of sexual violence.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, UNIFIL was mandated to support the implementation of the action plan on Women and Peace and Security, including to prevent and respond to sexual and gender based violence, and requested to enhance its reporting to the Council on this issue.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> In connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 30 (a)(vi); in connection with UNMISS, [S/PRST/2021/20](#), third paragraph (taking note of the letter of the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, [S/2021/661](#)); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 35 (b).

<sup>12</sup> Resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 21.

<sup>13</sup> Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (c)(ii).

<sup>14</sup> Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 53.

<sup>15</sup> Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 26.

<sup>16</sup> In connection with UNMISS, resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (a)(iv); in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 34 (a)(vi); and, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 29 (i)(h).

<sup>17</sup> Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 55.

<sup>18</sup> Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 26.



*Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations*

As a means of enhancing effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to implement specific capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of operations and within the existing mandates and capacities of five peacekeeping operations.<sup>19</sup>

Notwithstanding some differences between the missions, these capacities included, among others, the implementation of early warning and response strategies, confidence-building and mission mobility, protection against sexual and gender-based violence, the implementation of the women and peace and security and youth and peace and security agendas, and taking child protection into account as a cross-cutting issue. In addition, as operational priorities, the Council listed improving peacekeeping intelligence and analysis, providing training, knowledge and equipment to counter explosive devices, implementing effective casualty and medical evacuation procedures, prioritizing mandated protection activities in decisions about the use of capacities and resources, implementing peacekeeping performance requirements, and implementing the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

The Council requested several missions, the Secretary-General, Member States and host governments to take all appropriate measures to enhance the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel in line with resolution [2518 \(2020\)](#)<sup>20</sup> and implement resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#) for establishing accountability for crimes against peacekeepers.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries were requested to implement the relevant provisions of resolution [2538 \(2020\)](#) on the removal of barriers and improving the participation of women in peacekeeping.<sup>22</sup> Further to the rollout of the Comprehensive Planning and

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<sup>19</sup> In connection with UNMISS, resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 18 (a)-(n); in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 47; in connection with MINUSCA, [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 42; in connection with UNISFA, resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 30; and, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 42.

<sup>20</sup> In connection with UNMISS, resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 18 (k); in connection with UNDOF, resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), paras. 8; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 45; in connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 17; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 41; in connection with UNISFA, resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 8-9; and, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 41.

<sup>21</sup> In connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 41; in connection with UNISFA, resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 9; and, in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 41.

<sup>22</sup> In connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2561 \(2021\)](#), para. 14 and [2587 \(2021\)](#), para. 16; in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), paras. 18 (h) and 23; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 46; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 47; in connection with UNISFA, resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 31; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 46; in connection with UNDOF, resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), paras. 13; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 27.

Performance System (CPAS) as part of the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative to strengthen peacekeeping operations, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report utilizing data from this and other strategic planning and performance measurement tools to describe the impact of missions, to facilitate as necessary, a re-evaluation of their composition and mandates based on realities on the ground.<sup>23</sup>

### *Peacekeeping transitions*

Recalling resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated the importance of adequately resourcing United Nations peace operations during mission transitions to support the long-term stability and continuity of peacebuilding activities.<sup>24</sup> In this regard, in connection with the future drawdown and exit of MONUSCO, the Council welcomed the Transition Plan developed based on the Joint Strategy on the Progressive and Phased Drawdown of MONUSCO and underscored that this exit should be based upon progress towards satisfying the benchmarks and indicators set out in the plan and taking into consideration the situation on the ground.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, in a presidential statement issued on 2 August 2021, marking the completion of the drawdown of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation of Darfur (UNAMID), the mandate of which was terminated on 31 December 2020, the Council expressed its intention to consider the lessons learned from UNAMID in its ongoing work to enhance the overall effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, including its approach to peacekeeping transitions.<sup>26</sup>

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2021, showing the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during the period under review. The tables also include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions of previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only

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<sup>23</sup> In connection with UNMISS, resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 29; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 62 (ii); in connection with UNFICYP, resolution [2587 \(2021\)](#), para. 19; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 57; and, in connection with UNISFA, resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 34.

<sup>24</sup> Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 48 and 53.

<sup>26</sup> [S/PRST/2021/14](#), second paragraph. For more information on the mandate and termination of UNAMID, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

Table 1  
**Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2021: Africa**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force		X	X	X	X	X
Ceasefire monitoring	X			X	X	X
Civil-military coordination		X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral assistance	X			X	X	X
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>		X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X	X	X	X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mission impact assessment		X			X	X
Political process		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X
Public information		X		X	X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X	X	X	X
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence		X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform		X			X	X
Support to military		X			X	X
Support to police	X	X	X	X	X	X
Support to sanctions regimes		X		X	X	X
Support to State institutions		X		X	X	X

*Abbreviations:* MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan; MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

Table 2  
**Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2021: Asia, Europe and Middle East**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Chapter VII			X			
Authorization of the use of force						X
Ceasefire monitoring	X	X		X	X	X
Civil-military coordination			X			
Demilitarization and arms management						X
Electoral assistance						
Human rights-related <sup>b</sup>		X	X			X
Humanitarian support		X	X			
International cooperation and coordination		X	X	X	X	X
Political process		X	X			
Protection of civilians						X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment						X
Public information						
Rule of law/judicial matters						
Security monitoring-patrolling-deterrence						X
Security sector reform						
Support to military						X
Support to police		X	X			
Support to sanctions regimes						
Support to State institutions			X			X

*Abbreviations:* UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

### *Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations*

As illustrated in table 3, during the review period, the Council modified the composition of three peacekeeping operations. While the Council decided to increase the number of authorized military personnel in MINUSCA, it decided to reduce that component in MONUSCO and UNISFA.

Table 3  
**Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2021**

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
MONUSCO	The Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 14,000 to 13,500 military personnel, while maintaining 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units and continued to agree to a temporary deployment of up to 360 personnel of formed police units	Resolution <a href="#">2612 (2021)</a>
UNISFA	The Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 3,550 to 3,250 military personnel until 15 May 2022 and to maintain the authorized police ceiling at 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units	Resolution <a href="#">2609 (2021)</a>
MINUSCA	The Council decided to increase the Mission's military component by 2,750 (from 11,650 to 14,400) personnel and police component by 940 (from 2,080 to 3,080) personnel	Resolution <a href="#">2605 (2021)</a>

*Abbreviations:* MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

## Africa

### United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The Council established the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by resolution [690 \(1991\)](#) of 29 April 1991, in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). MINURSO was mandated to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the repatriation of refugees and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.<sup>27</sup>

In 2021, by resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#) of 29 October 2021, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until 31 October 2022.<sup>28</sup> The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and two abstentions (Russian Federation and Tunisia).<sup>29</sup> The Council did not modify the mandate or composition of MINURSO during the period under review.

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<sup>27</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINURSO, see previous supplements covering the period 1991-2020.

<sup>28</sup> Resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>29</sup> See [S/PV.8890](#). Explaining the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the resolution did not reflect the objective picture of what happened on the issue of Western Sahara following the military escalation in November 2021 and would probably not be helpful in the efforts of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara to resume direct negotiations. He added that, in recent years, Council resolutions to extend MINURSO's mandate included wording that replaced internationally agreed parameters for the settlement of the Western Sahara issue with general wording on the need to abide by "realistic" approaches or to make some compromises which lead to ambiguity, undermined trust in the Council's work and made it more difficult to resume a direct dialogue. For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 1, "The situation concerning Western Sahara".

## **United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The Council established the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) by resolution [1925 \(2010\)](#) of 28 May 2010 under Chapter VII of the Charter, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). MONUSCO was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection mandate as set out in the resolution and tasked with, inter alia, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with stabilization and peace consolidation.<sup>30</sup>

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#) of 20 December, extending the mandate of MONUSCO for one year, until 20 December 2022.<sup>31</sup>

By resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), the Council strongly urged Congolese political stakeholders to spare no efforts in implementing the critical governance, security and economic reforms outlined in the Government's programme of action 2021-2023 and encouraged MONUSCO to continue to support, through its good offices, peaceful, transparent, inclusive and credible political processes and the presidential and legislative elections scheduled in 2023 as well as future elections.<sup>32</sup>

In this context, the Council reiterated the strategic priorities of MONUSCO to protect civilians and support the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms and decided that the Mission's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks, with the protection of civilians to be given priority in decisions about the use of availability of capacity and resources.<sup>33</sup> By resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), the Council largely reiterated the priority tasks of MONUSCO, adding new language regarding the protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security

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<sup>30</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MONUSCO, see previous supplements covering the period 2010-2020. For more information on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part I, sect. 4.

<sup>31</sup> Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 22.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 1-2.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 24 and 25.



sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It also elaborated upon the Mission's exit strategy and transition plan, as detailed below.

In connection with the protection of civilians, the Council decided that MONUSCO should take all necessary measures to ensure effective, timely, dynamic and integrated protection of civilians under threat of physical violence within its current provinces of deployment, with a specific focus on Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, including the use of good offices.<sup>34</sup> The Council also decided that targeted offensive operations would be carried out through a reconfigured and effective Force Intervention Brigade including combat units from additional troop-contributing countries functioning as quick reaction forces, including through a mobile, flexible and robust posture.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, working with the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Mission was requested to leverage the capacities and expertise of the technical assistance team deployed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to strengthen and support the country's judicial system in order to investigate and prosecute all those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in the country.<sup>36</sup>

Concerning sexual and gender-based violence, the Council called on MONUSCO to continue to work closely with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at both strategic and operational levels and requested the Mission to accelerate the coordinated implementation of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations.<sup>37</sup>

In addition to reiterating the Mission's mandate on security sector reform, the Council requested MONUSCO to continue its support, via the United Nations Mine Action Service, to the Government in enhancing the capacities of the Congolese security forces, including through advice, training and capacity development in weapons and ammunitions management, counter improvised explosive devices and explosive ordnance disposal.<sup>38</sup>

Concerning the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mandate of MONUSCO, the Council expanded it to include the provision of good offices, advice and

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., paras. 29 (i)(a).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., para. 29 (i)(e).

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., para. 29 (i)(f).

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., paras. 33 and 34.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., para. 29 (ii)(f).

assistance, particularly in North and South Kivu and Ituri provinces, in close cooperation with the United Nations country team, for the implementation of the *Programme de désarmement, démobilisation, relèvement communautaire et stabilisation* of the Government.<sup>39</sup>

Outside the scope of the Mission's priorities, the Council urged MONUSCO to work with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes to seek political solutions to stop the cross-border flows of natural resources, in addition to armed combatants and arms.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, regarding the effectiveness of the Mission, the Council set out 16 substantive and operational activities for the Secretary-General to implement in the planning and conduct of its operations within the limits of the mandate and area of operation and in line with existing United Nations guidelines and regulations.<sup>41</sup>

Concerning the exit strategy, the Council welcomed the transition plan developed based on the Joint Strategy on the Progressive and Phased Drawdown of MONUSCO,<sup>42</sup> endorsed in resolution [2556 \(2020\)](#), and requested the Mission to withdraw from Tanganyika by mid-2022 and to consolidate its footprint in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, the three provinces where active conflict persisted, while pursuing its work on good offices and institutional strengthening at the national level, including the continuation of an early warning and rapid response system.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the Council encouraged the Secretary-General where appropriate to discontinue tasks related to support to stabilization and the strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms, which could be responsibly and sustainably assumed by other stakeholders and to streamline MONUSCO accordingly.<sup>44</sup>

By resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), the Council reduced the Mission's authorized troop ceiling from 14,000 to 13,500 military personnel and maintained the ceiling of 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units.<sup>45</sup> The Council further maintained its agreement for a temporary deployment of up to 360 personnel of formed police units provided that they were deployed in replacement of military personnel, as proposed by the Secretary-General and approved by the Council in

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., para. 29 (ii)(g).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., para. 26.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., para. 42.

<sup>42</sup> See [S/2020/1041](#) and [S/2021/807](#).

<sup>43</sup> Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 48.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., para. 51.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., para. 23.

2019,<sup>46</sup> and invited the Secretariat to consider further reductions of military deployment and area of operations based on the evolution of the positive situation on the ground, in particular in the regions where the threat posed by armed groups was no longer significant, in line with the Joint Strategy.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> See [S/2019/905](#). See also resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), para. 23.

<sup>47</sup> Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 23.

## **United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei**

The Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution [1990 \(2011\)](#) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area of 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary, inter alia, to protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and ensure security in the Abyei Area. By resolution [2024 \(2011\)](#) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.<sup>48</sup>

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#) of 11 May 2021, [2606 \(2021\)](#) of 15 November 2021 and [2609 \(2021\)](#) of 15 December 2021 concerning UNISFA. By resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#) and [2606 \(2021\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of UNISFA for periods of six and one month, respectively.<sup>49</sup> By resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), UNISFA's mandate was extended for a further period of six months until 15 May 2022 with some modifications.<sup>50</sup>

By resolution [2575 \(2021\)](#), the Council took note of the letter dated 1 April 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council which included a report on the joint consultations between the United Nations, the Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as other relevant stakeholders, to discuss an exit strategy for UNISFA and develop

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<sup>48</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNISFA, see previous supplements covering the period 2011-2020. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>49</sup> Resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1-2 and [2606 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>50</sup> Resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1-2.

options for its responsible drawdown and exit as requested by resolution [2550 \(2020\)](#).<sup>51</sup> In terms of the way forward, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct and provide to the Council, no later than 30 September 2021, a strategic review of UNISFA assessing recent political developments between and within the Sudan and South Sudan and providing detailed recommendations for further reconfiguration of the Mission and establishing a viable exit strategy, which should prioritize the safety and security of civilians living in Abyei, account for stability of the region, and include an option for an exit strategy not limited by the 2011 agreements.<sup>52</sup>

By resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), the Council took note of the letter dated 17 September 2021 from the Secretary-General presenting the findings of the strategic review,<sup>53</sup> and decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling of UNISFA from 3,550 to 3,250 military personnel until 15 May 2022 and to maintain the authorized police ceiling at 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units.<sup>54</sup> The Council expressed its intention to keep under review the recommendations in the letter from the Secretary-General.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, while reiterating the existing tasks of UNISFA, the Council requested the Mission to collaborate with the United Nations country teams in the Sudan and South Sudan, in consultation with the host Governments and the local communities, to engage with the local communities on peacebuilding initiatives, including conflict prevention and mitigation and rule of law.<sup>56</sup> In this regard, the Council welcomed the development of an integrated rule of law support strategy in close coordination with the host Governments and communities, and strongly encouraged all parties to cooperate with UNISFA for the establishment of the

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<sup>51</sup> Resolution [2575 \(2021\)](#), para. 6. As part of the observations in the letter, the Secretary-General noted that the consultation was inconclusive and that, given the separate engagements with the parties and their different positions on the future of UNISFA, no options that would be minimally acceptable to the parties could be formulated (see [S/2021/322](#)).

<sup>52</sup> Resolution [2575 \(2021\)](#), para. 7. See also resolution [2550 \(2020\)](#), para. 31.

<sup>53</sup> Resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), eleventh preambular paragraph. The strategic review proposed a reconfiguration of UNISFA in three main areas: (i) gearing the operation towards fostering the conditions for the final stage of negotiations on the political settlement; (ii) establishing a new, lighter and more responsive posture that was consolidated around the areas of the security challenges; and (iii) having an enhanced focus on peacebuilding with a view to facilitating a rapprochement between the communities. The Secretary-General further recommended two options for the reconfiguration of the Mission's military component (see [S/2021/805](#)).

<sup>54</sup> Resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 4-5.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 19.

Abyei Police Service.<sup>57</sup> The Council expressed concern that women remained absent from the leadership of local peace committees and requested UNISFA to integrate women into peace discussions and to assist these efforts through, inter alia, the provision of gender advisers to Abyei where their expertise was urgently needed.<sup>58</sup>

Regarding the Mission's effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to implement 16 substantive and operational activities in the planning and conduct of UNISFA's operations within the limits of the mandate and area of operation and in line with existing United Nations guidelines and regulations.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., para. 21.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., para. 30.

## United Nations Mission in South Sudan

By resolution [1996 \(2011\)](#) of 8 July 2011, the Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and to protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law and strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection of civilians mandate.<sup>60</sup>

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2567 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March and [2577 \(2021\)](#) of 28 May 2021 and issued a statement by the President on 27 October 2021 in connection with UNMISS.<sup>61</sup> By resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year, until 15 March 2022.<sup>62</sup>

By the resolution, the Council took note of the findings of the independent strategic review of UNMISS,<sup>63</sup> requested by the Council in resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#),<sup>64</sup> and decided that the Mission's mandate would be designed to advance a three-year strategic vision to prevent a return to civil war in South Sudan, build durable peace at the local and national levels, and support inclusive and accountable governance and free, fair and peaceful elections in accordance with the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMISS, see previous supplements covering the period 2011-2020. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I., sect. 7.

<sup>61</sup> See [S/PRST/2021/20](#).

<sup>62</sup> Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>63</sup> See [S/2020/1224](#). In its report, the independent strategic review of UNMISS concluded that the four pillars of the UNMISS mandate remained valid overall but recommended a number of adjustments within them to enhance the Mission's impact. Given developments in the country, the review noted that there was an increased need for UNMISS to focus its political engagement on supporting the implementation of the peace process and extend its technical assistance to the creation or strengthening of the governance bodies outlined in the Revitalized Agreement, as well as the creation of bodies and legislation that would support credible elections. Furthermore, in the implementation of the four pillars of its mandate, UNMISS would have to ensure that it accompanied its activities with political engagement. The review further recommended a decrease in the authorized military strength from 17,000 to 15,000.

<sup>64</sup> Resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#), para. 39.

<sup>65</sup> Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

In this context, the Council introduced several modifications to the tasks of UNMISS mainly related to the protection of civilians and its support for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the peace process. Concerning the protection of civilians, the Council added a new task for UNMISS to use technical assistance and capacity-building to support the Government to restore and reform the rule of law and justice sector, in order to strengthen the protection of civilians, combat impunity and promote accountability, including investigation and prosecution of gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, and human rights violations and abuses.<sup>66</sup> To deter violence against civilians, the Council added that the work of UNMISS should include the implementation of a mission-wide early warning and response strategy that drew upon regular integration with civilians including with community liaison assistants.<sup>67</sup> While reiterating the Mission's responsibility to maintain the public safety and security of and within protection of civilians sites, the Council added that, where such sites were re-designated, UNMISS would maintain a flexible posture linked to threat analysis, contingency plans and the ability to scale up presence and protection if the security situation deteriorated.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, the Council requested UNMISS to promptly and effectively engage any actor that was credibly found to be preparing attacks or engaged in attacks against civilians and in internally displaced persons camps.<sup>69</sup> In addition to deterring and preventing as provided for in resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#), by resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), UNMISS was also requested to respond to sexual and gender-based violence within its capacity and areas of deployment.<sup>70</sup>

Regarding the role of UNMISS in supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the peace process, the Mission was requested to use technical assistance to support mechanisms of the Revitalized Agreement and to coordinate the use of its good offices with relevant regional actors.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, the Council requested UNMISS to assist all parties in the full, effective and meaningful participation of women, youth, faith groups and civil society in the peace process, transitional Government bodies and institutions, and all conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (a)(vii).

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (a)(ii).

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (a)(iii).

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (a)(x).

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (a)(iv).

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., paras. 3 (c)(i) and (iv).

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (c)(ii).



In addition to the role of UNMISS relating to the protection of civilians and the political process, by resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#) the Council decided that the support by the Mission for the delivery of humanitarian assistance should be conducted in accordance with international law, including applicable international humanitarian law and consistent with United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance.<sup>73</sup>

With respect to the Mission's effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to fully implement 14 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of UNMISS operations.<sup>74</sup> The Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct and provide the Council, no later than 15 July 2021, a needs assessment, including security, procedural and logistical requirements to create an enabling environment for elections in South Sudan.<sup>75</sup>

In the presidential statement issued on 27 October 2021, the Council took note of the conclusion of the needs assessment mission and requested the Secretary-General to establish an integrated electoral assistance team led by UNMISS, consistent with resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), to implement electoral assistance activities set forth in the assessment in support of the elections roadmap detailed in the Revitalized Agreement.<sup>76</sup>

By resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#), in connection with the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan and its Panel of Experts, the Council reiterated its request for UNMISS to assist the Committee and the Panel, within its mandate and capabilities.<sup>77</sup>

Regarding the Mission's configuration, by resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), the Council decided to maintain the overall force levels of UNMISS and expressed its readiness to consider adjustments to those levels and capacity-building tasks based on security conditions on the ground and the implementation of priority measures related to the protection of civilians,

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., para. 3 (b)(i).

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., paras. 18 (a)-(n).

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., para. 27.

<sup>76</sup> [S/PRST/2021/20](#), third paragraph. In his letter dated 15 July 2021 (see [S/2021/661](#)), the Secretary-General transmitted a summary of the key findings and recommendations of the needs assessment team and noted that the United Nations assistance should be provided in two phases. In the first or immediate term phase, the United Nations would continue to support the peace process through awareness-raising, engagement, good offices and technical advice and assistance for the establishment of an electoral framework for credible elections whose results would be accepted. The second or medium to long term phase (until end of December 2023), could include technical assistance on legal and procedural matters, operations, electoral security, information technology and database management, external relations, media training, and vote and civic education.

<sup>77</sup> Resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#), para. 21.

security sector reform, ending obstructions to UNMISS, the establishment of the Hybrid Court of South Sudan, the reconstitution of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States, and the initiation of a constitution-making process by the Government and all relevant actors, as outlined in paragraph 7 of the resolution.<sup>78</sup>

Furthermore, by an exchange of letters dated 4 and 10 February 2021 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, as a temporary request under emergency circumstances, the Council approved the final extension of two months of the temporary redeployment of two infantry companies and two military utility helicopters from UNMISS to MINUSCA which continued to be counted against the authorized ceiling on military and civilian personnel of UNMISS.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), paras. 4 and 7.

<sup>79</sup> [S/2021/126](#) and [S/2021/127](#). The Council initially approved the temporary redeployment for a two-month period by an exchange of letters dated 22 and 23 December 2020 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council to assist MINUSCA in reinforcing security in critical areas, while maintaining the security of Bangui ([S/2020/1290](#) and [S/2020/1291](#)). See *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

## **United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali**

The Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution [2100 \(2013\)](#) of 25 April 2013, under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, and support humanitarian assistance, national and international justice, and cultural preservation.<sup>80</sup>

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2584 \(2021\)](#) of 29 June 2021 and [2590 \(2021\)](#) of 30 August 2021 concerning MINUSMA. By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of MINUSMA by one year, until 30 June 2022.<sup>81</sup>

By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council amended the primary strategic priority of MINUSMA by adding support for the political transition in Mali to the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, while also reiterating the Mission's second strategic priority to facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of a comprehensive politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence, and re-establish State authority, State presence and basic social services in Central Mali.<sup>82</sup>

While stressing that the mandate of MINUSMA should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks, the Council made several adjustments to the Mission's priority and other tasks as defined in the resolution. Specifically, the Council expanded the Mission's existing priority task to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement to include supporting the full realization of the political transition.<sup>83</sup> The Council also requested MINUSMA to assist the authorities in ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and

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<sup>80</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2012-2020. For more information on the situation in Mali, see part I, sect. 14.

<sup>81</sup> Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 17.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 21.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, paras 30 (a)-(e).

representation of women in the political transition.<sup>84</sup> The Council specified that the electoral assistance role of MINUSMA would now include assisting the Malian authorities in the holding of presidential elections which were scheduled to take place on 27 February 2022, and with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, and inclusion of youth, refugees and internally displaced persons.<sup>85</sup>

With regard to the priority task to support to the stabilization and restoration of State authority in the Centre, MINUSMA was requested to support Malian authorities in agreeing on and implementing a politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence, and re-establish State presence, State authority and basic social services in Central Mali, ensuring strengthened coordination between civilian and military components of the Mission, and with local and regional communities, groups and military and civilian authorities.<sup>86</sup> The Mission was also requested to support the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces to Central Mali on the basis of clear, coherent and dynamic planning, strengthened information and intelligence sharing.<sup>87</sup> Additionally, MINUSMA was requested to increase efforts to improve coordination between its civil, military and police components.<sup>88</sup> Regarding the protection of civilians, MINUSMA was requested to promote the understanding of and to strengthen the mission-wide early warning and response mechanisms as part of its support for Malian authorities to anticipate, deter and respond to threats to civilians, notably in the north and center.<sup>89</sup>

Beyond the priority tasks, as part of the Mission's other tasks, the Council requested MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management, a task which the Mission was last requested to undertake in resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#).<sup>90</sup> By resolutions [2584 \(2021\)](#) and [2590 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to MINUSMA to assist and exchange information with the

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., para. 53.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., para. 30 (a)(vi).

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., paras. 30 (b)(i) and 30 (b)(ii).

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., para. 27.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., para. 30 (c)(ii).

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., para. 31 (c). See also resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 39 (b).

Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#).<sup>91</sup> By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council also requested the Mission to assist in raising awareness on the Committee and Panel's role and mandate.<sup>92</sup>

Concerning the other security presences in Mali and the Sahel, by resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to ensure adequate coordination between MINUSMA and the European partners, including Task Force Takuba, and to use the convening of regular meetings of the *Instance de Coordination au Mali* as a platform to assist Mali in getting an encompassing view of the actions undertaken by the various security presences in the country.<sup>93</sup> In terms of cross-cutting issues, the Council reiterated its request to MINUSMA to support efforts in preventing sexual violence related to the conflict in Mali, while emphasizing that this should include supporting the provision of medical, sexual and reproductive health, psychological, mental health, legal and socioeconomic services to all survivors of sexual violence.<sup>94</sup> The Council maintained all other Mission tasks without modification.

With regard to the effectiveness of MINUSMA, the Council outlined 15 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations for the Secretary-General to implement in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations.<sup>95</sup>

The Council decided to maintain the composition of MINUSMA during the reporting period.<sup>96</sup> In light of the growing level of insecurity and physical violence against civilians in Central Mali, however, by resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide no later than 15 July 2021, a report on the progress of the implementation of the 2019 Force Adaptation Plan and recommendations on the force levels and ceiling of MINUSMA uniformed personnel and expressed its intent to discuss the Mission's force level based on this proposal.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 31 (b) and resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

<sup>92</sup> Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 31 (b).

<sup>93</sup> Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 32.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 55.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 47.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 18.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 19. In his report dated 16 July 2021, the Secretary-General recommended an increase of 2,069 uniformed personnel, consisting of 1,730 military personnel, 300 formed police unit personnel and 39 individual police officers with the aim of enhancing the Mission's ability to protect civilians in Central Mali and create further space for the peace process in the north (see [S/2021/657](#)).

## **United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic**

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) by resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#) of 10 April 2014 under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSCA was authorized to take all necessary means to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation strategies.<sup>98</sup>

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2566 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March 2021, [2588 \(2021\)](#) of 29 July 2021 and [2605 \(2021\)](#) of 12 November 2021 concerning MINUSCA. By resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of MINUSCA for one year, until 15 November 2022.<sup>99</sup>

At the beginning of 2021, expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the situation in the Central African Republic, by resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), the Council decided to increase the mission's military component by 2,750 personnel (from 11,650 to 14,400) and police component by 940 personnel (from 2,080 to 3,020), taking note of the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his report of 16 February 2021.<sup>100</sup> The Council stressed that the reinforcements were aimed at enhancing the ability of MINUSCA to perform its priority tasks in the evolving context, in particular to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian access, and to enhance the mission's capacity to prevent and reverse a further deterioration of the security situation while creating space for the political process to advance.<sup>101</sup> The Council noted further that these reinforcements should be sequenced through a phased approach and requested the Secretary-General to review implementation, performance and necessity ahead of each phase as part of his reports to the

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<sup>98</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2014-2020. For more information on the situation in the Central African Republic, see part I, sect. 5.

<sup>99</sup> Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 29.

<sup>100</sup> Resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), second preambular paragraph and para. 1. See also [S/2021/146](#).

<sup>101</sup> Resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

Council and to include in the report of 11 October 2021 a proposal on the overall reconfiguration of MINUSCA's Force.<sup>102</sup> The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and one abstention (Russian Federation).<sup>103</sup>

On 29 July 2021, the Council adopted resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), amending the mandate of MINUSCA. Like resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), this resolution was also adopted non-unanimously, in this instance, with 13 votes in favour (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and two abstentions (China and the Russian Federation).<sup>104</sup> By the resolution, the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA was designed to advance a multiyear strategic vision to create the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to national reconciliation and durable peace through the implementation of the Political Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic of 6 February 2019 and the elimination of the threat posed by armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping.<sup>105</sup> The Council recalled that MINUSCA's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks.<sup>106</sup> The priority tasks to protect civilians; provide good offices and support to the peace process and the Political Agreement; facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> See [S/2021/258](#). Explaining the abstention, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed disappointment that the authors of the resolution decided not to mention in the text the United Nations guiding principles for emergency humanitarian assistance in accordance with General Assembly resolution [46/182](#) and stressed that, in the selection of contingents to be part of the Mission's force, the Secretariat had to coordinate closely with Bangui and listen to the views of the people of the Central African Republic. For more information on the Council discussions under the item entitled "The situation in the Central African Republic", see part I, sect. 5.

<sup>104</sup> See [S/PV.8902](#). The representative of the Russian Federation indicated that a number of fundamental points expressed by the Government of the Central African Republic were not reflected in the resolution. She added that, although the adoption of the resolution, was a token of trust in the Mission, unfortunately the Russian Federation could not consider the work that MINUSCA had done satisfactory or competent and affirmed that her delegation would monitor how it would take advantage of the support expressed by the Council. The representative of China regretted that the reasonable suggestions of the Central African Republic had not been afforded full consideration in the resolution.

<sup>105</sup> Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 31.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., para. 32.

assistance; and protect United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods were largely reiterated in paragraph 34 of the resolution with a few modifications.<sup>107</sup>

In terms of modifications concerning the protection of civilians, the Council decided that MINUSCA's mandate would include supporting the Central African Republic authorities in the prevention, mitigation and response to the threat posed by explosive ordnance.<sup>108</sup> Moreover, the Council expanded the Mission's mandate for the protection of women and children, requesting it to provide assistance to women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of protection advisers, child protection advisers, women protection advisers and civilian and uniformed gender advisers and focal points, as well as through consultations with women's organizations and by providing support to women's participation in early warning mechanisms.<sup>109</sup> The Council also mandated MINUSCA to take concrete measures to mitigate and avoid the use of schools by armed forces and deter the use of schools by parties to the conflict, and to facilitate the continuation of education in situations of armed conflict.<sup>110</sup> While reiterating its request to MINUSCA to take fully into account child protection as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the authorities in ensuring that the protection of children's rights was taken into account, the Council decided further that this would include the provision of quality education in a safe environment in conflict areas in order to end and prevent violations and abuses against children.<sup>111</sup> The Council requested MINUSCA to support the implementation of the United Nations and the Government of the Central African Republic joint communiqué to prevent and respond to sexual violence in conflict and to take into account these specific concerns throughout the activities of all Mission components, and to ensure, in cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, that risks of sexual violence in conflict were included in the Mission's data collection, threat analysis and early warning system.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., para 34.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (a)(iii).

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (a)(iv).

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (a)(v).

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., para. 46.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (a)(vi).



With regard to the provision of good offices and support to the peace process, the Council requested MINUSCA to continue its role, including in support of the implementation of the Political Agreement and the ceasefire, and to take active steps in support of the authorities in the creation of conditions conducive to the full implementation of the Political Agreement via the roadmap adopted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in Luanda on 16 September 2021.<sup>113</sup> The Council further specified that the Mission would need to ensure that its political and security strategies promoted a coherent process, particularly in support of the Political Agreement, that connected national peace efforts with the ongoing efforts to monitor the ceasefire, and to promote the participation of women and gender equality.<sup>114</sup> MINUSCA was additionally tasked with providing technical expertise to the authorities of the Central African Republic in their engagement with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.<sup>115</sup>

In terms of the other tasks, the Council decided that the assistance of MINUSCA to the Republican Dialogue and the 2022 elections, would include good offices, as well as security, operational, logistical and, as appropriate, technical support, and coordination with the United Nations Development Programme regarding international electoral assistance.<sup>116</sup> In addition, MINUSCA was tasked with supporting the authorities of the Central African Republic in safeguarding State institutions and addressing the cross-border illicit trade in natural resources.<sup>117</sup> The Council also requested appropriate oversight in the progressive redeployment of vetted Central African Republic Armed Forces or Internal Security Forces engaged in joint operations with MINUSCA and the restoration and maintenance of public safety and the rule of law, and further emphasized that this would be carried out in strict compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and contingent on a determination by MINUSCA of the compliance by the recipients with the Status of Forces Agreement, human rights and international humanitarian law.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (b)(i).

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (b)(iii).

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., para. 34 (b) (vii).

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (b).

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (c) (i).

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (c)(iii).

The Council reiterated its call on MINUSCA to support the authorities of the Central African Republic in implementing an inclusive and progressive programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, adding that such a programme would need to be gender-sensitive.<sup>119</sup> The Council further requested the Mission to support, in consultation and coordination with international partners, temporary and voluntary cantonment sites in support of community-based socioeconomic reintegration, while paying specific attention to the needs of children associated with armed forces and groups and women combatants.<sup>120</sup> In addition to the World Bank, MINUSCA was also tasked with coordinating the support provided by the Peacebuilding Commission on disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.<sup>121</sup> Regarding the support to national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law and as part of the urgent temporary measures, on an exceptional basis, without creating a precedent and without prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations, the Mission was authorized to arrest and detain in order to maintain basic law and order and fight the impunity of those violating the ceasefire or the Political Agreement.<sup>122</sup>

While re-authorizing MINUSCA to assist the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, by resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), the Council also requested the Mission to provide support to the authorities of the Central African Republic in their efforts to achieve progress on the key benchmarks for the review of the arms embargo measures, established in the presidential statement of 9 April 2019.<sup>123</sup> This was additional to the Council's decision by resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#), to reiterate the request to MINUSCA to report on the contribution to the security sector reform of the exemption for supplies of non-lethal equipment and provision of assistance intended solely for support of or use in the country's process of security sector reform.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (e)(i).

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (e)(iv)

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., para. 35 (f)(iii).

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., paras. 36 (a) and 49. See also [S/PRST/2019/3](#), seventh paragraph. For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic, see part IX, sect. I.

<sup>124</sup> Resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#), para. 1(b).

Regarding the effectiveness of MINUSCA, by resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to fully implement 16 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations.<sup>125</sup>

By an exchange of letters dated 4 and 10 February 2021 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, as a temporary request under emergency circumstances brought about by the election-related violence in the Central African Republic since mid-December 2020, the Council approved the final extension of two months of the temporary redeployment of two infantry companies and two military utility helicopters from UNMISS to MINUSCA which continued to be counted against the authorized ceiling on military and civilian personnel of UNMISS.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 42.

<sup>126</sup> [S/2021/126](#) and [S/2021/127](#). The Council initially approved the temporary redeployment for a two-month period by an exchange of letters dated 22 and 23 December 2020 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council to assist MINUSCA in reinforcing security in critical areas, while maintaining the security of Bangui (see [S/2020/1290](#) and [S/2020/1291](#)). See *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

## Asia

### United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution [47 \(1948\)](#) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution [39 \(1948\)](#). Following the termination of the Commission, the Council, by resolution [91 \(1951\)](#), decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. In 2021, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMOGIP, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1946-1951*, and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952-2020.

## Europe

### United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution [186 \(1964\)](#) of 4 March 1964. In the interest of preserving international peace and security, UNFICYP was mandated to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.<sup>128</sup>

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2561 \(2021\)](#) of 29 January 2021 and [2587 \(2021\)](#) of 29 July 2021 in relation to UNFICYP. The Council extended the mandate of the Mission twice for a period of six months, the second time until 31 January 2022.<sup>129</sup>

During the period under review, the Council did not modify the mandate or composition of UNFICYP. By resolution [2561 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its request for UNFICYP to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, while requesting the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the number of women in UNFICYP and ensure their full, equal and meaningful participation in all aspects of its operations including senior leadership positions, and to implement other relevant provisions of resolution [2538 \(2020\)](#). This was also reiterated in resolution resolution [2587 \(2021\)](#).<sup>130</sup>

By resolution [2587 \(2021\)](#), the Council regretted the lack of progress on an effective mechanism for direct military contacts between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides and the relevant involved parties, and urged engagement by the sides and parties, facilitated by UNFICYP, to develop a suitably acceptable proposal on the establishment of such a mechanism, and its timely implementation.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> For further information on the history of the mandate of UNFICYP, see previous supplements covering the period 1964-2020. For more information on the situation in Cyprus, see part I, sect. 16.

<sup>129</sup> Resolutions [2561 \(2021\)](#), para. 9 and [2587 \(2021\)](#), para. 10.

<sup>130</sup> Resolutions [2561 \(2021\)](#), para. 14 and [2587 \(2021\)](#), para. 16.

<sup>131</sup> Resolution [2587 \(2021\)](#), para. 6.

## **United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo**

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Council on 10 June 1999, by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.<sup>132</sup> In 2021, the Council did not adopt any decisions relating to UNMIK and made no change to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIK, see previous supplements covering the period 1996-2020.

<sup>133</sup> For more information on Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#), see part I, sect. 17 B.

## **Middle East**

### **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution [50 \(1948\)](#), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment of UNTSO, the Council has assigned it different tasks without formally changing its mandate, including the supervision of the General Armistice, the supervision of the armistice following the Suez war, the supervision of the armistice between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai, and the supervision of the truce between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, in collaboration with the United Nations Interim Security Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), respectively.<sup>134</sup>

In 2021, the Council did not make changes to the composition or mandate of UNTSO, which remained open-ended. By resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) of 29 June 2021 and [2613 \(2021\)](#) of 21 December 2021 concerning the mandate of UNDOF, the Council again encouraged the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on recommendations from the 2018 independent review of UNDOF to improve mission performance and implementation of the mandate of UNDOF.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNTSO, see *Repertoire 1946-1951* and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952-2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

<sup>135</sup> Resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 12.

## United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution [350 \(1974\)](#), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.<sup>136</sup>

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) of 29 June 2021 and [2613 \(2021\)](#) of 21 December 2021 concerning UNDOF. The Council extended the mandate of the Mission twice for a period of six months each, the second time until 30 June 2022.<sup>137</sup>

The Council did not make changes to the mandate or composition of UNDOF during the period under review. By resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), taking into account the impact of COVID-19 pandemic, the Council reiterated its request to UNDOF to take all appropriate steps to protect the safety, security and health of all UNDOF personnel, in line with resolution [2518 \(2020\)](#), within existing capacities and resources.<sup>138</sup> The Council also reiterated its request for the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries to seek to increase the number of women in UNDOF, and ensure the full, equal, and meaningful participation of uniformed and civilian women at all levels, and in all positions, including senior leadership positions, and to implement other relevant provisions of resolution [2538 \(2020\)](#).<sup>139</sup> By resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its encouragement to the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF, and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to continue relevant discussions on the recommendations from the 2018 independent review to improve mission performance and the implementation of the mandate of UNDOF.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNDOF, see previous supplements covering the period 1972-2020.

<sup>137</sup> Resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 15. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

<sup>138</sup> Resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 8.

<sup>139</sup> Resolution [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 13.

<sup>140</sup> Resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 12. See the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force of 6 December 2018 (see [S/2018/1088](#)), which provides an overview of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mission's mandate.



## United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions [425 \(1978\)](#) and [426 \(1978\)](#), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. By resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), to address the continuing hostilities in Lebanon, the Council expanded the mandate of UNIFIL to include monitoring the cessation of hostilities; accompanying and supporting the Lebanese armed forces; extending its assistance to help to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; and assisting the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel.<sup>141</sup>

In 2021, by resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#) of 30 August 2021, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNIFIL for one year, until 31 August 2022.<sup>142</sup> The resolution was adopted further to the letter of the Secretary-General dated 4 August 2021 to the President of the Council recommending the extension of the mandate of the Mission.<sup>143</sup>

By resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated the overall mandate of UNIFIL, with several additions. While expressing concern about the strong negative impact of the social, economic and humanitarian crises in Lebanon on the capacities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces, the Council requested UNIFIL, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), to take temporary and special measures, without prejudice to the mandate and its implementation and the concept of operations and rules of engagement, to support and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces with the provision of relevant additional non-lethal material (fuel, food and medicine) and logistical support.<sup>144</sup> The support would be provided for a limited period of six months, within the existing resources and without implications to the increase of the budget level, in the framework of the Lebanese Armed Forces-UNIFIL joint activities and in compliance with the

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<sup>141</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIFIL, see previous supplements covering the period 1975-2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question and the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sects. 19 and 20.

<sup>142</sup> Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, sixth preambular paragraph. See also [S/2021/707](#).

<sup>144</sup> Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), thirtieth preambular paragraph and para. 11.

United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.<sup>145</sup> The Council added that this support should not be considered as a precedent in the future, fully respect Lebanese sovereignty, be provided at the request of the Lebanese authorities, and be subject to appropriate and immediate oversight and scrutiny.<sup>146</sup>

Reiterating the request to UNIFIL to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and the task to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring the full, equal, effective and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, the Council added that this would include the security sector.<sup>147</sup>

Welcoming the constructive role played by the Tripartite Mechanism in facilitating coordination and in de-escalating tensions, the Council reiterated its encouragement for UNIFIL, in close coordination with the parties, to implement measures to further reinforce the capacities of the Mechanism, and urged the parties to make a systematic, constructive and expanded use of the Tripartite Mechanism, including the sub-committee on the marking of the Blue Line and additional ad hoc sub-committees, as recommended in the assessment report of the Secretary-General of 1 June 2020.<sup>148</sup>

The Council maintained the composition of UNIFIL during the reporting period.

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid., para. 11.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., para. 26.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., para. 13 and penultimate preambular paragraph.

## II. Special political missions

### Note

Section II focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions,<sup>149</sup> as well as the changes to their mandates.<sup>150</sup>

### Overview of special political missions during 2021

In 2021, the Council oversaw 12 special political missions considered in this part of the supplement to the Repertoire. Five were based in Africa, three in the Middle East, and two each in the Americas and Asia. Their nature varied from regional offices such as the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), missions with limited mandates to monitor and support the implementation of ceasefires and peace agreements such as the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), to larger assistance missions such as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

#### *Newly established special political missions, terminations and extensions of mandates*

The Council did not establish new or terminate existing special political missions during the period under review. The Council extended the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), UNAMA, UNAMI, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), UNOCA, UNMHA, UNSMIL, UNSOM and the United

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<sup>149</sup> Special political missions described in the present part include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions, such as offices of special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities and mechanisms, are covered in parts VII and IX of the present Supplement.

<sup>150</sup> For information on the envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping operations or special political missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. The mandates of BINUH, UNAMA, UNSMIL and UNSOM, were extended for shorter periods of time compared to previous years without any modification or specific listing of their tasks. While the duration of the mandate of UNSOM was also shortened, the Council did modify its content. The mandate of UNOWAS was renewed in 2020 for a period of three years, until 31 January 2023,<sup>151</sup> while the mandates of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) and the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) remained open-ended.

*Mandates of special political missions: differences in scope*

In 2021, for most special political missions, the Council prioritized mandate tasks related to the provision of good offices and technical support for the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and national and local-level reconciliation, as well as political transitions involving elections and constitutional review processes. The Council also underlined the importance of strengthening good governance and the capacity of national institutions to deliver basic services and implement reform agendas, justice and security sector reform, as well as support for the promotion and protection of human rights and ensuring accountability. As part of these priorities, most missions were mandated to coordinate and support the mobilization of humanitarian and development assistance among a broad spectrum of United Nations, international, regional and sub-regional partners and stakeholders. Moreover, gender mainstreaming, including ensuring the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women in political-decision making, as well as the protection of children, were the most common cross-cutting element of mandates.

Regional offices, such as UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to monitor and analyze emerging threats to peace and security, support the strengthening of local capacities for conflict prevention and management and early warning, promoting inclusive political dialogue and reform processes and improving governance, providing electoral support, and helping address cross-border and cross-cutting issues and challenges such as transnational organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism, illicit trafficking, transhumance and conflicts between farmers and herders, and the security implications of climate change. The mandates of BINUH and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia placed particular emphasis on, respectively,

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<sup>151</sup> See [S/2019/1009](#) and [S/2020/85](#). See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. II.

capacity-building of national justice and rule of law institutions and the political, economic and social reincorporation of former armed group members. UNMHA further retained its relatively narrow mandate to oversee and facilitate the implementation of ceasefire arrangements.

*Mandates of special political missions: modifications*

In 2021, the Council modified the mandates of seven missions, namely UNAMI, UNITAMS, UNOCA, UNOWAS, UNSMIL, UNSOM and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. Specifically, the Council expanded the roles of UNITAMS, UNSMIL and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia to support the implementation of peace and ceasefire agreements in the Sudan, Libya and Colombia. In this regard, after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and several Sudanese armed groups on 3 October 2020, the Council requested UNITAMS to support its implementation, including the ceasefire arrangements and monitoring mechanisms and to provide expanded advisory and capacity-building support to the Joint Security Peace-Keeping Force envisaged thereunder.<sup>152</sup> UNSMIL was tasked to support the implementation of the Libyan ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020, including its monitoring mechanisms and through the deployment of ceasefire monitors.<sup>153</sup> At the request of the Government of Colombia, the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia was expanded to include the verification of compliance with and implementation of the sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace as provided in the Colombian peace agreement.<sup>154</sup>

The Council strengthened the electoral support mandates of UNAMI and UNSOM in preparation for the presidential and parliamentary elections which took place, respectively, in Somalia and Iraq in 2021. Specifically, UNSOM was tasked with supporting the conduct of elections in accordance with the framework agreed by the Somali parties on 27 May 2021, and to continue efforts towards inclusive and transparent one-person, one-vote elections at the federal member state and district levels, in preparation for holding such elections in 2025.<sup>155</sup> In preparation for the Iraqi national election scheduled for 10 October 2021, the Council requested UNAMI to provide a strengthened, robust and visible United Nations election monitoring team

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<sup>152</sup> Resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), paras. 3 (ii) and (iii)(b).

<sup>153</sup> Resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), paras. 15-16.

<sup>154</sup> Resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>155</sup> Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (c).

to monitor Iraq's election day and to continue to assist with the election, in a manner that respected Iraqi sovereignty.<sup>156</sup> This also included launching a strategic messaging campaign to educate, inform and update Iraqi voters on election preparations and United Nations activities in that regard.<sup>157</sup>

*Mandates of special political missions: cross-cutting issues*

The Council further placed significant emphasis on the inclusion and participation of women, youth and other marginalized groups in political and decision-making processes. For example, UNSOM was requested to engage with the Somali Federal Government and federal member states to ensure the participation of all stakeholders, including women, youth and all Somali clans in Somali-led politics.<sup>158</sup> UNAMI, as part of its priority task to provide advice, support and assistance for inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation, was tasked to take into account civil society input, with the full, equal meaningful participation of women.<sup>159</sup> As part of broader subregional efforts in Central Africa, UNOCA was requested to develop, in consultation with Member States, regional partners, civil society networks and local communities, including women and young people, integrated strategies for supporting national efforts to sustain peace and prevent conflicts in the region, as well as to undertake early warning and analysis, including from a gender perspective.<sup>160</sup>

Several missions were given new tasks related to emerging peace and security issues such as the impact of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, among others. For example, UNAMI was requested to advise, support and assist the Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, including on the adverse impact of climate change and to promote, support, and facilitate the coordination and delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance, notably to respond to the pandemic.<sup>161</sup> Similarly, the Council added an additional element to UNSOM's role in promoting cooperation to maximize use of development financing in Somalia to include climate change, drought and the safe, effective and equitable distribution of

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<sup>156</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 2 (a).

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2 (c).

<sup>158</sup> Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (a).

<sup>159</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 4 (a).

<sup>160</sup> [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#), annex, objective 1 (b) and (c).

<sup>161</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), paras. 4 (b)(iv) and (c)(i).

COVID-19 vaccines.<sup>162</sup> Furthermore, UNOCA was requested to support United Nations, regional and subregional efforts to address the impact of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security such as those related to terrorist groups, the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes and natural disasters, illicit trafficking in natural resources and wildlife, and farmer-herder dynamics.<sup>163</sup> More broadly on peacebuilding, the Council specified that UNITAMS and UNSOM were to work with international financial institutions in the mobilization and coordination of development assistance,<sup>164</sup> while UNOCA was requested to support subregional efforts to implement the Sustainable Development Goals and UNOWAS to work with all elements of the system in headquarters including continued engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission and the Regional Collaborative Platform in West Africa and the Sahel.<sup>165</sup>

#### *Mandate reviews*

Regarding the future of special political missions, the Council requested the Secretary-General to review the mandates of four special political missions, namely BINUH, UNAMA, UNMHA and UNSOM, and to submit recommendations on, how to adjust the mandate to the situation on the ground, benchmarks to track progress on mandate implementation and how to increase mission effectiveness, depending on the mission.<sup>166</sup>

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2021, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any

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<sup>162</sup> Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (m).

<sup>163</sup> [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#), annex, objective 3 (a).

<sup>164</sup> In connection with UNITAMS, resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (iv)(a); and, in connection with UNSOM, resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (n).

<sup>165</sup> In connection with UNOWAS, see [S/PRST/2021/3](#), seventeenth paragraph; and, in connection with UNOCA, [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#), annex, objective 4 (e).

<sup>166</sup> In connection with UNMHA, resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), para. 8; in connection with UNSOM, resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 18; in connection with UNAMA, resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 5; and, in connection with BINUH, resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), paras. 2-3.

position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.



Table 4  
**Mandates of special political missions, 2021: Africa**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNSMIL</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>UNOWAS</i>	<i>UNITAMS</i>
Chapter VII					
Ceasefire monitoring		X			X
Civil-military coordination					
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X		X
Electoral assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support		X		X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security	X		X	X	
Mission impact assessment					
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians					X
Public information				X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform			X	X	X
Support to military			X		X
Support to police			X		X
Support to sanctions regimes		X			X
Support to State institutions		X	X		X

*Abbreviations:* UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNITAMS, United Nations Integrated Technical Assistance Mission.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

Table 5  
**Mandates of special political missions, 2021: Americas, Asia and Middle East**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>BINUH</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>UNRCCA</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>	<i>UNSCOL</i>	<i>UNMHA</i>
Chapter VII							
Ceasefire monitoring	X						X
Civilian-military coordination			X				
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X			X		X
Electoral assistance		X	X		X		
Human rights-related <sup>a</sup>		X	X		X		
Humanitarian support			X		X		
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Protection of civilians			X				
Public information					X		
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X		X		
Security monitoring – patrolling – deterrence							X
Security sector reform					X		
Support to police		X					
Support to sanctions regimes							
Support to State institutions			X		X		

*Abbreviations:* BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNRCCA, United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; UNMHA, United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement.

<sup>a</sup> Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth, peace and security.

## **Africa**

### **United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa**

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.<sup>167</sup> The functions of UNOCA included to cooperate with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance. UNOCA was subsequently mandated to promote efforts to address emerging security and cross-border threats, incorporate gender perspectives in the implementation of its mandate and to take into consideration climate and ecological change and natural disasters on the stability of the Central African region in its activities.<sup>168</sup>

In 2021, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council dated 3 and 6 August 2021, the Council extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years, until 31 August 2024.<sup>169</sup>

In extending the mandate of UNOCA, the Council adjusted the Office's objectives and mandate tasks. Specifically, the Council took note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General, including the amended objectives to be pursued by UNOCA in close collaboration with relevant subregional and regional partners and relevant United Nations entities, which were the following: (1) monitor political and security developments in Central Africa and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General in order to prevent and resolve conflicts, to help sustain peace and advise the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on sustaining peace issues in Central Africa; (2) enhance subregional capacities for conflict

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<sup>167</sup> [S/2009/697](#) and [S/2010/457](#).

<sup>168</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2008-2020. For more information on the situation in the Central African region, see part I, sect. 6.

<sup>169</sup> [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#).

prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion, with due attention to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including human rights and gender dimensions; (3) support and enhance United Nations efforts in the subregion, as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, including from human rights and gender perspectives; and (4) enhance coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security.<sup>170</sup>

Within the framework of the first objective, the mandate of UNOCA would continue to include performing good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General, adding the objective of preventing and resolving conflicts and undertaking regular early warning and analysis of, and reporting on, the situation in the countries of the subregion and regional trends, including from a gender perspective.<sup>171</sup> In addition, UNOCA was newly tasked to develop, in consultation with Member States, regional partners, civil society networks and local communities, including women and young people, integrated strategies for supporting national efforts to sustain peace and prevent conflicts in the region, and rally international and regional support for such strategies.<sup>172</sup>

Under the second objective, UNOCA's efforts to enhance the capacity of subregional actors, in particular ECCAS, for conflict prevention, mediation and peace consolidation, would now include advancing human rights and inclusive peace and democratic processes.<sup>173</sup> Furthermore, the mandate of UNOCA would include building partnerships with civil society, including women and youth groups, and supporting subregional civil society networks, in particular the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa.<sup>174</sup> In addition to other regional and subregional organizations and mechanisms, the mandate of UNOCA was modified to specifically include cooperation with the African Union and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.<sup>175</sup>

Regarding the third objective to support United Nations efforts in the subregion and regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, UNOCA was tasked with rallying subregional support for the peace process in the Central African Republic, in close cooperation

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<sup>170</sup> [S/2021/719](#), annex, objectives 1-4.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, annex, objectives 1 (a)-(b).

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, annex, objective 1 (c).

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, annex, objective 2 (a).

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, annex, objective 2 (c).

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, annex, objective 2 (d).

with MINUSCA.<sup>176</sup> The mandate of UNOCA was also expanded to include promoting good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, management and resolution initiatives in Central Africa.<sup>177</sup> The mandate of UNOCA was adjusted with respect to the Office's role in promoting, supporting and advocating United Nations, regional and subregional efforts to address the impact of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security to include those related to terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel region, the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes and natural disasters, illicit trafficking in natural resources and wildlife, and farmer-herder dynamics.<sup>178</sup> The mandate was also modified to include the promotion and support, as appropriate, of regional and subregional efforts to address the root causes of and achieve solutions to forced displacement.<sup>179</sup>

Finally, with regard to UNOCA's existing fourth priority to enhance coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security, UNOCA was tasked with supporting United Nations' country teams in helping to address structural conflict prevention efforts at the country level, including through contributions to common country assessments, United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks and relevant sustaining peace strategies.<sup>180</sup> The mandate of UNOCA was further adjusted to include enhancing collaboration and coordination with UNOWAS in strengthening United Nations, regional and international efforts to address cross-cutting and cross-border challenges to peace and security and to establish a clear division of labour between its work and other United Nations entities in the subregion.<sup>181</sup> Finally, UNOCA was tasked with advocating for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, and helping to leverage the role of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States and other regional actors to that effect.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Ibid., annex, objective 3 (c). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see sect. I above.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., annex, objective 3 (d).

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., annex, objective 3 (a).

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., annex, objective 3 (b).

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., annex, objective 4 (c).

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., annex, objective 4 (a) and (d).

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., annex, objective 4 (e).

## United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.<sup>183</sup>

In 2021, the Council adopted resolutions [2570 \(2021\)](#) and [2571 \(2021\)](#) of 16 April 2021, [2595 \(2021\)](#) of 15 September 2021 and [2599 \(2021\)](#) of 30 September 2021 concerning UNSMIL. The Council also addressed the mandate of UNSMIL by an exchange of letters dated 29 December 2020 and 4 February 2021 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,<sup>184</sup> and a statement by the President issued on 15 July 2021.<sup>185</sup> Departing from the prior practice of one-year extensions, by resolutions [2595 \(2021\)](#) and [2599 \(2021\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL for periods of 15 days and four months, respectively, the second time until 31 January 2022.<sup>186</sup>

During the period under review, the Council expanded the mandate of UNSMIL to include the provision of support for the ceasefire agreement that was concluded on 23 October 2020. Further to the exchange of letters dated 29 December 2020 and 4 February 2021 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, as they examined the Secretary-General's recommendations for an amended mandate for UNSMIL on ceasefire support, Council members requested the Secretary-General to establish and deploy swiftly an advance team to Libya, security conditions and COVID-19 pandemic requirements permitting, as proposed by the Secretary-General.<sup>187</sup> Council members stated that they would further welcome reporting on the preparations undertaken by the advance team, as well as practical proposals, following coordination with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, for amending the Mission's mandate, including with regard to the tasks and scale of the ceasefire monitoring mechanism, as soon as

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<sup>183</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, see previous supplements covering the period 2010–2020. For more information on the situation in Libya, see part I, sect. 10.

<sup>184</sup> [S/2020/1309](#) and [S/2021/110](#).

<sup>185</sup> [S/PRST/2021/12](#).

<sup>186</sup> Resolutions [2595 \(2021\)](#) and [2599 \(2021\)](#), para.1.

<sup>187</sup> [S/2020/1309](#) and [S/2021/110](#).

possible and no later than 45 days from the date of the letter.<sup>188</sup> On 19 March 2021, as requested by the Council, the Secretary-General submitted a progress report outlining the latest developments since his report of 19 January 2021,<sup>189</sup> covering developments regarding the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, and containing an update on the work of the advance team deployed to Libya, including its mandate and terms of reference and the consultations undertaken with Libyan and international stakeholders.<sup>190</sup>

By resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), the Council took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General, and approved his proposals on the composition and operational aspects of the ceasefire monitoring component as set out in his letter of 7 April 2021.<sup>191</sup> Accordingly, the Council recalled resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) and its decision that UNSMIL should help achieve a ceasefire and provide appropriate support to its implementation, and requested the Mission to provide support to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism including through the facilitation of confidence-building measures and the scalable and incremental deployment of ceasefire monitors once conditions allowed.<sup>192</sup> Also, recalling resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#), the Council underscored the Mission's role in supporting the 24 December 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections.<sup>193</sup>

The Council expressed its intention to review the progress towards the deployment of UNSMIL ceasefire monitors ahead of the renewal of the Mission's mandate on 15 September 2021 and requested that the independent strategic review of UNSMIL, previously requested by the Council in resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#), consider the ceasefire monitoring component of the Mission and that the Secretary-General consult the Council on any increase to the initial maximum number of ceasefire monitors as set out in his letter of 7 April 2021.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> See [S/2021/62](#).

<sup>190</sup> See [S/2021/281](#).

<sup>191</sup> See [S/2021/353](#).

<sup>192</sup> Resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), paras. 15-16.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., para. 6.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., para. 20. See also the letter dated 6 August 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the report on the independent strategic review of UNSMIL ([S/2021/716](#)). The independent strategic review recommended, inter alia, an intensification of the good offices of the Mission, that the Head of Mission be relocated to Tripoli from Geneva, a return to the previous configuration of the Mission, wherein a Special Representative of the Secretary-General instead of a Special Envoy would be supported by two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, and the immediate staff surge capacity for the Mission, including the swift deployment of women and child protection advisers.

In the presidential statement issued on 15 July 2021, the Council welcomed efforts by UNSMIL to encourage the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum to develop proposals for a free, fair and inclusive electoral process and its role in supporting the ceasefire.<sup>195</sup>

By resolutions [2595 \(2021\)](#) and [2599 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of UNSMIL as set out in resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) and paragraph 16 of resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#) without reiterating its content or further modification.<sup>196</sup> After the vote on resolution [2595 \(2021\)](#), the representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States exchanged views regarding the ongoing discussions on the future mandate of UNSMIL in light of the findings of the independent strategic review and the elections scheduled for 24 December 2021.<sup>197</sup> In their statements following the vote on resolution [2599 \(2021\)](#), several Council members expressed differing views on whether the recommendations from the review should be implemented before or after the elections.<sup>198</sup>

Beyond the Mission's support to the ceasefire, by resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the mandate of UNSMIL to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya and its Panel of Experts and called on the Mission and the Government of Libya to support the Panel's investigatory work inside Libya.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> [S/PRST/2021/12](#), eighth and tenth paragraphs.

<sup>196</sup> Resolutions [2595 \(2021\)](#) and [2599 \(2021\)](#), para.1.

<sup>197</sup> See [S/PV.8858](#).

<sup>198</sup> See [S/PV.8870](#). For more information on the discussions after the vote on resolutions [2595 \(2021\)](#) and [2599 \(2021\)](#), see part I, sect. 10.

<sup>199</sup> Resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), para. 14. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya and its Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.



## United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

By resolution [2102 \(2013\)](#) of 2 May 2013, the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) with the mandate, inter alia, to provide good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and state building; assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; help build the capacity of the Federal Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the strengthening of justice institutions; and to monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.<sup>200</sup>

In 2021, the Council adopted resolutions [2568 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March 2021 and [2592 \(2021\)](#) of 30 August 2021 concerning UNSOM. By resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNSOM for a period of nine months, until 31 May 2022, shortening the duration compared to the twelve-month extension provided in resolution [2540 \(2020\)](#).<sup>201</sup>

By resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), while extending its authorization for the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council called on the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, AMISOM, UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), and international partners to increase coordination and collaboration, including by establishing a joint fusion cell to plan and deliver integrated strategic operations led by the Somali Government to conduct joint analysis, joint integrated planning, operational coordination and joint performance assessment, and further called on them to extend the joint fusion cell into the AMISOM sectors.<sup>202</sup>

By resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), the Council renewed the existing mandate of UNSOM as set out in resolution [2158 \(2014\)](#) with some modifications. With regard to the political process, the Council reiterated the Mission's task to support the Federal Government and federal member states in accelerating Somali-led inclusive politics, adding that this support had to ensure the

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<sup>200</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSOM, see previous supplements covering the period 2013-2020. For more information on the situation in Somalia, see part I, sect. 2.

<sup>201</sup> Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>202</sup> Resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), para. 4(b). For more information on the African Union Mission in Somalia, see part VIII, sect. III.

participation of all stakeholders, including women, youth and all Somali clans.<sup>203</sup> Furthermore, the Mission's support for inter- and intra-clan reconciliation at the local, regional and national level was to include working through the National Reconciliation Framework.<sup>204</sup> The Council also expanded the tasks related to electoral assistance to also involve supporting the newly-established Technical Electoral Support Team, Federal Electoral Implementation Team, State Electoral Implementation Team and Election Dispute Resolution Committee, in addition to the Federal Government, federal member states, the Somali Parliament and any other stakeholders with an agreed role in election delivery for the conduct of elections in accordance with the implementation framework agreed upon by the Federal Government and federal member states on 27 May 2021.<sup>205</sup> In preparation for holding elections at the federal level in 2025, the Council further requested the Mission to continue to support efforts to make progress towards the objective of universal suffrage elections, provide good offices, technical and operational support to the constitutionally mandated electoral management bodies for the conduct of free, fair, inclusive and transparent one-person, one-vote elections at the federal member state and district levels.<sup>206</sup> In addition, the Council decided that UNSOM would provide technical advice and capacity-building to support the Federal Government and federal member states in their efforts to enable the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making, in the context of elections and peacebuilding and reconciliation processes, as envisaged in the Somali Women's Charter.<sup>207</sup> The Mission was also requested to continue its advocacy for increased investment in the Women and Peace and Security agenda and to support the Federal Government and federal member states in their efforts to enable the full, equal and meaningful participation of all Somalis, including among other groups, all Somalia clans in peace and reconciliation efforts, conflict prevention, peacebuilding elections, and increasing participation and empowerment of civil society, minority communities and other marginalized groups at all decision-making levels.<sup>208</sup>

Regarding the support of UNSOM for security sector reform, the Council decided that it would include the integration of regional forces, the transition of the Somali Police Force to a

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<sup>203</sup> Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (a).

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 6 (b).

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 6 (c).

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 6 (d).

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 6 (d)-(e).

Federal Police Service and the development of a supporting legal framework and support for the military, police and civilian components of AMISOM in enabling Somalia to take full responsibility for its security in the future, with the aim of taking the lead in 2021 and achieving full responsibility by the end of 2023.<sup>209</sup> By resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), the Council also adjusted the Mission's role in promoting cooperation with relevant partners, with a view to making maximum use of development financing in Somalia, to include response to climate change, drought and the safe, effective and equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, in addition to the response to flooding, locusts and the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>210</sup> The Council further mandated UNSOM to work closely with the United Nations country team, international financial institutions, and all relevant stakeholders to ensure that international support to the Federal Government and federal member states was conflict-sensitive and maximized policy and operational coherence based on a shared understanding of risks and opportunities for peace and development.<sup>211</sup>

Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General, following consultations with the Federal Government, to undertake a strategic review of UNSOM after the election process had concluded and after the anticipated reconfiguration of security support to Somalia, to include recommendations for clearly defined, measurable and realistic benchmarks to track the Mission's timely execution and achievement of its mandate and to initiate the development of an Integrated Strategic Framework, and to report to the Council by the end of March 2022.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (f).

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (m).

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., para. 6 (n).

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., para. 18.

## **United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel**

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters dated 14 and 28 January 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel with the United Nations Office for West Africa. UNOWAS was initially mandated to, inter alia, monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, and human rights and gender mainstreaming into conflict prevention and management initiatives. The mandate of UNOWAS was subsequently modified with new and additional tasks and most recently extended for a period of three years from 1 February 2020 to 31 January 2023.<sup>213</sup>

In 2021, the Council issued two presidential statements, on 3 February and 17 August 2021, concerning UNOWAS.<sup>214</sup>

In the presidential statement issued on 3 February 2021, the Council welcomed the assumption by UNOWAS of the good offices functions of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), following the conclusion of its mandate on 31 December 2020, and requested specific reporting on this function.<sup>215</sup> Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, as well as their impacts on food security on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and stressing the need for long-term strategies, the Council encouraged UNOWAS to continue to integrate this information in its activities.<sup>216</sup> The Council also encouraged cross-pillar efforts to foster greater coherence and coordination with the United Nations system as well as with partners in the region to implement the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the United Nations Support Plan for the

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<sup>213</sup> For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see previous supplements covering the period 2016-2020. For more information on peace consolidation in West Africa, see part I, sect. 8.

<sup>214</sup> [S/PRST/2021/3](#) and [S/PRST/2021/16](#).

<sup>215</sup> [S/PRST/2021/3](#), fifteenth paragraph.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, thirteenth paragraph.

Sahel, and to help to enhance the regional implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the African Union Agenda 2063. In this connection, the Council called on UNOWAS to work with all elements of the system in headquarters and in West Africa and the Sahel, in particular the Regional Collaborative Platform, to strengthen integrated responses to the challenges facing the region.<sup>217</sup>

Subsequently, in the presidential statement issued on 17 August 2021, the Council commended the recent democratic transition in Niger and the reconciliation efforts in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, encouraged the continued pursuit of these dialogues and further commended the good offices provided by UNOWAS in supporting democratic practices and the leadership of ECOWAS in mediation in the region.<sup>218</sup> The Council also commended the efforts of the countries of the region to advance the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in political processes, welcomed the Secretary-General's reporting on this issue and encouraged UNOWAS to continue its gender-sensitive reporting.<sup>219</sup> Welcoming the ongoing efforts by ECOWAS to evaluate its Conflict Prevention Framework Plans of Action, the Council called for enhanced political support and engagement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel in accompanying this process to ensure its effective and meaningful operationalization in the countries of the region.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid., seventeenth paragraph.

<sup>218</sup> [S/PRST/2021/16](#), tenth paragraph.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., eleventh paragraph.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., ninth paragraph.

## United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan

By resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#) of 3 June 2020, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) for an initial period of 12 months, in the context of the drawdown and exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).<sup>221</sup> The Council decided that UNITAMS, as part of an integrated and unified United Nations structure in Sudan, would have four strategic objectives, namely to assist the political transition in Sudan, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace; support peace processes and the implementation of future peace agreements; assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, in particular in Darfur and Blue Nile and South Kordofan (Two Areas); and support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

In 2021, by resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#) of 3 June 2021, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNITAMS for one year, until 3 June 2022, and introduced several adjustments.<sup>222</sup> Specifically, the Council amended the Mission's second strategic objective to support peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements to include the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of the Sudan and several Sudanese armed groups on 3 October 2020.<sup>223</sup> The Council also decided that UNITAMS would provide scalable support to the implementation of the Agreement and any future peace agreements, including ceasefire arrangements and monitoring mechanisms, to the provisions concerning power-sharing, landownership and usage, accountability and transitional justice, to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, safe and effective management and storage and security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles.<sup>224</sup> In addition, UNITAMS was tasked with providing good offices and support to ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government and Sudanese armed groups.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the history of the establishment of UNITAMS, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>222</sup> Resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (ii).

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (ii)(b).

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (ii)(a).

Resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#) further added new elements to the existing strategic objectives of UNITAMS to assist the political transition in the Sudan, assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, and support the mobilization of economic and development assistance, and coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance.<sup>226</sup> Concerning the Mission's assistance to the political transition, the Council requested UNITAMS to use its good offices to assist the Sudanese transition to realise the timelines set for the process and to provide technical assistance for the establishment and functioning of the Transitional Legislative Council.<sup>227</sup> Regarding the Mission's role in assisting peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, UNITAMS was tasked with providing expanded advisory and capacity-building support to the Sudanese Police Force and the Joint Security-Keeping Force envisaged in the Juba Peace Agreement, including through United Nations advisers and working in close cooperation with the United Nations country team.<sup>228</sup> The Council added that support for the development of measurable benchmarks for the implementation of the National Plan for Civilian Protection should emphasize transparency and inclusive procedures and that UNITAMS would support the strengthening of the promotion of human rights, in particular in conflict affected areas.<sup>229</sup>

Under the Mission's strategic objective to support the mobilization and coordination of assistance, the Council tasked UNITAMS to support the coordination with international financial institutions and donors to optimize resources in support of the Government's national priorities.<sup>230</sup> Furthermore, the Mission's support for the coordination of humanitarian assistance was expanded to include support to the Government's facilitation efforts and the mobilization of humanitarian financing.<sup>231</sup> The Council also requested UNITAMS and its integrated United Nations country team partners to finalise the Sudan Peacemaking, Peacebuilding and Stabilisation Programme and ensure that its implementation was sequenced and prioritized in line with the strategic objectives, and was reflective of available resources and personnel;<sup>232</sup> and to establish an Integrated Strategic Framework within 60 days of the adoption of the

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<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, 3 (iii) and (iv).

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (i)(a)-(b).

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (iii)(b).

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (iii)(c)-(d). See letter dated 21 May 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the national plan for civilian protection ([S/2020/429](#)) and letter dated 30 November 2021, transmitting the periodic progress report on the implementation of the national plan ([S/2021/984](#)).

<sup>230</sup> Resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (iv)(a).

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3 (iv)(c).

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 10.

resolution.<sup>233</sup> In terms of regional support to the Sudan, the Council encouraged UNITAMS, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity in their efforts, including through a United Nations-African Union senior level coordination mechanism.<sup>234</sup>

Importantly, in line with its strategic objectives and support to the Government's national priorities, UNITAMS was requested to prioritise six areas during the next mandate period: (i) ceasefire monitoring in Darfur; (ii) implementation of the Government's National Plan for Civilian Protection; (iii) ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government and armed groups; (iv) inclusive implementation of the power sharing provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement; (v) the constitution drafting process; and (vi) advisory and capacity-building support to the Sudanese Police Forces and justice sector.<sup>235</sup> Additionally, the Council took note of the benchmarks and indicators submitted by the Secretary-General to track the Mission's progress, requested UNITAMS, in consultation with the United Nations country team and the Government, to identify qualitative indicators to complement the existing indicators that were quantitative in nature.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> Ibid., para. 6.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid., para. 18.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., paras. 4 (i)-(vi).

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., para. 7. See the report of the Secretary-General dated 17 May 2021 on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of UNITAMS ([S/2021/470](#), annex 1), outlining the benchmarks and associated indicators designed to measure progress in the delivery of the nine strategic priorities across the four pillars of the Mission's mandate, as per resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#).



## Americas

### United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace of 24 November 2016 between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP.<sup>237</sup>

In 2021, by resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#) of 11 May 2021 and [2603 \(2021\)](#) of 29 October 2021, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of the Verification Mission for periods of, respectively, five months and one year, the second time until 31 October 2022.<sup>238</sup> In both instances, the Council acknowledged the request of the Government of Colombia for the Mission's extension.<sup>239</sup>

By resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), following the request of the Government of Colombia,<sup>240</sup> and to support the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement, the Council expanded the Mission's mandate to include the verification of compliance with, and implementation of the sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to individuals determined to have acknowledged detailed and complete truth and responsibility before the Judicial Panel for Acknowledgement of Truth, Responsibility and Determination of Facts and Conduct as per the sentencing framework established under agreement.<sup>241</sup> The Council decided further that the tasks of the Verification Mission in this regard would be those described in the letter of the Secretary-General dated 24 February 2021,<sup>242</sup> including verifying the fulfilment by sentenced persons of

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<sup>237</sup> For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see previous supplements covering the period 2016-2020. For more information on the item entitled "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)", see part I, sect. 13.

<sup>238</sup> Resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 4 and [2603 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>239</sup> Resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph and [2603 \(2021\)](#), eighth preambular paragraph.

<sup>240</sup> See [S/2021/147](#).

<sup>241</sup> Resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>242</sup> See [S/2021/186](#). The letter of the Secretary-General outlining recommendations for the expanded mandate of the Verification Mission was submitted further to the letter from the President of the Council dated 30 January 2021 ([S/2021/100](#)).

the terms of their sentences as well as the establishment by Colombian state authorities of the conditions necessary for this.<sup>243</sup> The Council further stated that the Mission would adopt a strategic and inclusive approach to such verification, as described in the letter of the Secretary-General, and noted the proposal contained therein to focus monitoring on overall trends in compliance and select individual cases.<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>243</sup> Resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*

## United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

By resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) of 25 June 2019, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). BINUH was mandated to advise the Government of Haiti in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; preserving and advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and promoting and protecting human rights. BINUH was further tasked with assisting the Government in planning and executing free, fair and transparent elections; reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National Police; developing an inclusive approach to reduce community violence; addressing human rights abuses and violations and complying with international human rights obligations; improving penitentiary administration management and oversight of prison facilities; and strengthening the justice sector.<sup>245</sup>

In 2021, the Council issued a presidential statement on 24 March 2021,<sup>246</sup> and adopted resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#) of 15 October 2021 concerning BINUH. By resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of BINUH in accordance with resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for a period of eight months, until 15 July 2022 without any modifications.<sup>247</sup> The duration of the mandate departed from the previous practice of one year since the Mission's establishment in 2019.

By resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of the BINUH mandate, including whether and how the mandate could be adjusted to address the ongoing challenges faced by Haiti; increase the effectiveness of the Mission and its efforts to support engagement between Haitian national authorities, civil society and other stakeholders; strengthen the rule of law; and promote respect for human rights, and to convey the findings within six months following the adoption of the resolution.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see previous supplements covering the period 2019-2020. For more information on the situation concerning Haiti, see part I, sect. 12.

<sup>246</sup> [S/PRST/2021/7](#).

<sup>247</sup> Resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 3.

By the presidential statement issued on 24 March 2021 and resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its encouragement for continued close collaboration and coordination between BINUH, the United Nations country team, regional organizations and international financial institutions with a view to helping the Government to take responsibility to realize the long-term stability, sustainable development and economic self-sufficiency of the country.<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> [S/PRST/2021/7](#), twelfth paragraph and resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), para. 4.

## Asia

### United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Council by resolution [1401 \(2002\)](#) of 28 March 2002 with the core mandate to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations in the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001, as well as to promote national reconciliation and rapprochement through its good offices and manage all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities.<sup>250</sup>

In 2021, by resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#) of 17 September 2021, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMA as defined in resolution [2543 \(2020\)](#) for a period of six months, until 17 March 2022, shortening the duration of the previous mandate of one year.<sup>251</sup>

By resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), following the takeover of the country by the Taliban in August 2021, the Council stressed the critical importance of a continued presence of UNAMA and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes across Afghanistan, and called upon all Afghan and international parties to coordinate with the Mission in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country.<sup>252</sup> The Council also requested the Secretary-General to submit a written report by 31 January 2022 on strategic and operational recommendations for the Mission's mandate, in light of the recent political, security and social developments.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2000-2020.

<sup>251</sup> Resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4. For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 14.

<sup>253</sup> Resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

### **United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia**

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was authorized by the Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,<sup>254</sup> at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#).

<sup>255</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, see previous supplements covering the period 2007-2020.

## Middle East

### United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#) in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.<sup>256</sup> Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.<sup>257</sup>

In 2021, by resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#) of 27 May 2021, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMI for one year, until 27 May 2022.<sup>258</sup>

Commending the efforts by the Government of Iraq to plan and execute free and fair Iraqi-led and owned elections that were inclusive, credible and participatory, the Council welcomed the request by the Government for further United Nations electoral advice, support and technical assistance in that regard.<sup>259</sup> Taking into account the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq dated 11 February 2021,<sup>260</sup> the Council requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and the Mission to provide a strengthened, robust and visible United Nations team with additional staff in advance of Iraq's forthcoming election on 10 October 2021, monitor Iraq's election day and continue to assist with the election in a manner that respected Iraqi sovereignty.<sup>261</sup> The Council further requested the Special Representative and UNAMI to engage, encourage and coordinate with, and provide logistical and security support to international and regional third-party observers invited by the Government, and to launch a United Nations strategic messaging campaign to educate, inform and update Iraqi voters on election preparations as well as on United Nations activities in support

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<sup>256</sup> See [S/2003/715](#).

<sup>257</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMI, see previous supplements covering the period 2003-2020. For more information on the situation concerning Iraq, see part I, sect. 21.

<sup>258</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, fourth preambular paragraph.

<sup>260</sup> See [S/2021/135](#).

<sup>261</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 2 (a).

of elections in advance of and on election day.<sup>262</sup> The Council further requested that the Secretary-General provide a detailed summary report on the electoral process in Iraq and on the Mission's assistance to that process within 30 days of the conclusion of the 10 October elections.<sup>263</sup>

The Council largely reiterated the remaining tasks of UNAMI with several additions. Specifically, the Special Representative and UNAMI were requested to take into consideration civil society input, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, when providing advice, support and assistance to the Government and the people of Iraq on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.<sup>264</sup> Similarly, the Council requested that the Special Representative and UNAMI advise and assist the Government in ensuring the full, equal, and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision making, including in the context of elections, and the promotion of women's economic empowerment by supporting the implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.<sup>265</sup>

The Council also requested that the Special Representative and UNAMI further assist the Government with facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation on a variety of issues, including the adverse impacts of climate change,<sup>266</sup> and the coordination and delivery of medical assistance to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>267</sup> The Council asked the Special Representative and UNAMI to note the importance of treating children affected by armed conflict primarily as victims and support the implementation of the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.<sup>268</sup> Additionally, the Council requested the Special Representative and UNAMI to encourage both the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Government to implement fully their 2021 budget agreement and to negotiate agreements on other outstanding issues.<sup>269</sup> Finally, the Council expressed its intention to review the mandate

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<sup>262</sup> Ibid., paras. 2(b) and (c).

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., para. 3. See also report of the Secretary-General dated 3 August 2021 on the implementation of resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), (S/2021/700).

<sup>264</sup> Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 4 (a).

<sup>265</sup> Ibid., para. 4 (e).

<sup>266</sup> Ibid., para. 4 (b)(iv).

<sup>267</sup> Ibid., para. 4 (c)(i).

<sup>268</sup> Ibid., para. 4 (f).

<sup>269</sup> Ibid., para. 4 (g).



and reporting cycle of UNAMI by 27 May 2022, or sooner, if requested by the Government of Iraq.<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> Ibid., para. 6.

### **Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon**

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was authorized by the Council by means of an exchange of letters dated 8 and 13 February 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.<sup>271</sup> The office was established with an open-ended mandate. The position of Special Coordinator was created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in 2000.<sup>272</sup> The Special Coordinator was tasked with coordinating the work of the United Nations in the country and representing the Secretary-General on all political aspects of the Organization's work. The Special Coordinator was also responsible to ensure that the activities of the United Nations country team in Lebanon were well coordinated with the Government of Lebanon, donors and international financial institutions. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to the mandate of the office.<sup>273</sup>

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<sup>271</sup> [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#).

<sup>272</sup> [S/2000/718](#).

<sup>273</sup> For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see previous supplements covering the period 2004-2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 20. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, see part I., sect. 21.

## **United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement**

The Security Council established the United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) by resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#) of 16 January 2019 to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hodeidah and ports of Hodeida, Salif and Ras Issa as set out in the Stockholm Agreement. UNMHA succeeded the work of an advance team which was established by resolution [2451 \(2018\)](#) of 21 December 2018 and deployed to begin monitoring and to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement.<sup>274</sup> UNMHA was mandated to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces and mine action operations; to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces; to work with the parties so that security was assured by local security forces; and to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement.<sup>275</sup>

In 2021, by resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#) of 14 July 2021, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNMHA for a period of one year, until 15 July 2022.<sup>276</sup>

By the resolution, the Council reiterated the existing mandate of the Mission without any modifications. The Council requested the Secretary-General to fully deploy UNMHA expeditiously, taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and called on the parties to the Hodeidah Agreement to support the United Nations.<sup>277</sup> In this connection, the Council demanded an end to the hindrances to the movement of UNMHA personnel in the Hodeidah governorate, particularly in conflict-affected districts, and expressed support for the efforts by UNMHA to reactivate the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its joint mechanisms to implement the Hodeidah Agreement and to meet the access needs of all parties and be equally responsive to their requests.<sup>278</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council a further review of UNMHA at least one month before UNMHA's mandate expiry.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> See resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>275</sup> For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see previous supplements covering the period 2019-2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 20.

<sup>276</sup> Resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 8. See also letter dated 3 June 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting a review of UNMHA requested by the Council in resolution [2534 \(2020\)](#) and prior the extension of the Mission's mandate by resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), (S/2021/528).