Asongu, Simplice A and Jellal, Mohamed (2013): On the channels of foreign aid to corruption. Published in: Economics Bulletin , Vol. 33, No. 3 (29 August 2013): pp. 2191-2201.
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Abstract
The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main findings are established to unite the two streams of the debate. (1) Foreign aid channeled through government’s consumption expenditure increases corruption. (2) Development assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is targeted towards reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through government expenditure. Our results integrate an indirect component and reconcile the debate by showing that, the effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | On the channels of foreign aid to corruption |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa |
| Subjects: | B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B20 - General F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F35 - Foreign Aid F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F50 - General O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O10 - General O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O55 - Africa |
| Item ID: | 49378 |
| Depositing User: | Simplice Asongu |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Aug 2013 17:48 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 04:03 |
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| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/49378 |
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