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## **Portuguese Military Procurement During the Colonial War (1961-1974)**

João Pedro Gomes Timóteo

Mestrado em História Moderna e Contemporânea

Orientadora:

Dr. Ana Monica Fonseca, Professora Auxiliar Convidada / Investigadora

Integrada

ISCTE-IUL

Setembro 2020



SOCIOLOGIA  
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Departamento de História

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## **List of Abbreviations or Acronyms**

BWB – Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung  
CMLA – Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã  
CETME – Centro de Estudios Técnicos de Materiales Especiales  
CPMB – Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena  
DGMG - Depósito Geral de Material de Guerra  
DM – Deutsche Mark  
FMBP – Fábrica Militar do Braço de Prata  
FNMAL – Fábrica Nacional de Munições de Armas Ligeiras,  
FRG – Federal Republic of Germany  
H&K – Heckler und Koch  
MANPADS - Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems  
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
OAU – Organization of African Unity  
OGMA - Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronáutico  
PIDE - Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado  
POW – Prisoner of War  
TIAS - Treaties and Other International Acts Series  
UN – United Nations  
UNSC or SC – United Nations Security Council  
US – United States of America  
USSR - Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

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## **Abstract**

Portugal's colonial war was a low-intensity, long-lasting conflict fought in three separate, noncontiguous theaters of operation. This led Portugal during the Colonial War to mobilize the largest number of men per capita of any western country, except for Israel. They rotated over 820,000 men through combat deployments in the colonies, having had over 120,000 troops deployed concurrently. For that, they required a large number of arms and equipment to carry on the fight, which lasted throughout the 1960s and only came to an end after a coup d'état deposed the Portuguese regime in 1974. The acquisition of these weapons, however, was complicated by the diplomatic siege that had been erected against Portugal. The Portuguese actions in the colonies were cause for much outrage, leading to open condemnation and, more importantly, as this dissertation is concerned, to a significant arms embargo, which was adhered to by many of Portugal's own allies, such as the United States. This study seeks to investigate some of the sources Portugal used to supply its military, paying special attention to the pivotal role played by the FRG.

**Keywords:** Cold War; Colonial War; Military Procurement; Portugal; Military History

A Guerra Colonial Portuguesa foi um conflito de longa duração, porém de baixa intensidade. Portugal engajou em combate em três teatros operacionais distintos. A grande escala da guerra levou a mobilização do maior exército, em termos de pessoal per capita, do mundo ocidental durante este período, com a exceção de Israel. Foram rotacionados mais de 820000 homens para o combate nas colônias, havendo mais de 120000 soldados em combate ao mesmo tempo. Para manter tal força de combate Portugal precisou de uma grande quantidade de equipamento e esta força teve de ser mantida desde o início da década de 1960 até 1974. A aquisição de armamento e equipamento foi excepcionalmente complicada, dado o cerco diplomático que isolou Portugal da comunidade internacional durante este período. Este isolamento, causado pelas políticas colônias do Estado Novo, resultou em embargos contra Portugal no que se diz respeito a armamentos e material de guerra. Esta dissertação tem o intuito de estudar os meios disponíveis à Portugal durante este período para a aquisição de armamento para suas forças armadas, com atenção a Alemanha Ocidental, visto a sua função fulcral nesta questão.

**Keywords:** Guerra Fria; Guerra Colonial; Aquisições Militares; Portugal; História Militar

## **Introduction**

With the end of World War II, the world saw itself organized in two large opposing blocs. On the one hand, there was the western bloc, led by the United States, which defended capitalism and economic liberty. On the other hand, there was the eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union, which defended communism and planned economies. Seemingly, amid their Cold War, the only thing that both leaders agreed upon was that European colonialism in Africa and Asia was no longer acceptable. This was a great departure from the pre-war world, where these colonies had played a substantial role in defining political, diplomatic, and economic policies. Great colonial powers such as Great Britain saw a quick end for most of their empire. France and Belgium held out a little longer but faced with foreign and domestic pressure they too caved. This leaves us with Portugal, the last of the European colonial powers to give up their colonies in Africa.

Portugal was faced with an enormous number of detractors in the international sphere, even risking becoming a pariah within NATO, with several members of the alliance going as far as considering the expulsion or suspension of Portugal from the organization, though these never came to pass. The precarious nature of Portugal's diplomacy was also furthered by the UN, where it was subject to much condemnation, at first by the newly independent Asian and African states, which sympathized with the liberation movements in Africa. These condemnations were naturally seized upon by the eastern bloc, which saw an opportunity to bring more nations to their cause. The United States would also condemn Portugal, even going as far as actively plotting against it in the UN, using as much soft power as they could in an effort to have Portugal disengage from its colonies without angering the Portuguese enough to lose access to the Lajes Airbase. This diplomatic conundrum would see many unilateral arms embargoes on Portugal, including one by the United States, and eventually, the UN would urge its member states to stop supplying Portugal with any equipment that would serve to continue the war in the colonies.

The overarching question I intend to answer with this dissertation is "How did Portugal, facing a substantial diplomatic encirclement that included arms embargoes, manage to arm and equip its armed forces?". This question initially came to my mind while watching a web-documentary about the Portuguese AR-10 rifle. The host, Ian McCollum, presented the mechanics of the rifle and stated that Portugal had intended to arm the whole of its military forces with it. However, the Portuguese could only acquire a limited number of these rifles, making it impossible



for their military to standardize the use of AR-10 rifles. Such shortfall was caused by the arms embargoes that prevented the acquisition of the rifles from the Netherlands<sup>1</sup>. As one question leads to others, if they could not acquire rifles what else were they denied? And considering that Portugal is not thought of as a great arms producer, how could they possibly maintain an extraordinarily large army in battle<sup>2</sup> for as long as they did?

What I found out was surprising to me. Portugal had a much larger, though greatly dependent on foreign materials, arms industry than I first believed to be the case. Portugal had a long-established military industry; however, it needed expansion and modernization. This was largely accomplished with the support of West Germany. Bonn could afford to ignore many of the restrictions present in Portugal's dealings with other countries, due to the fact that West Germany was not a UN member state until 1973. Another fact brought to light by my research was that the "proudly alone" rhetoric<sup>3</sup> of the *Estado Novo* regime was, at least, misleading, once Portugal had substantial diplomatic support from France<sup>4</sup> and was shielded from the harshest consequences of its colonial policy by the United States.<sup>5</sup>

In this dissertation, I will begin with an overview of Portugal's long colonial history followed by a short overview of the Colonial War itself. Then, I will explore the focus of this work, which is the acquisition of war materials for the Portuguese war effort in the colonies. I will also cover the diplomatic situation that led to the UN's arms embargo, as well as unilateral embargoes that had been issued against Portugal and the avenues that Portugal had available to procure weapons and other war materials in light of these restrictions. Furthermore, I will specifically

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<sup>1</sup> McCollum, Ian, Semiauto Portuguese AR-10 on a Sendra Receiver, Forgotten Weapons.

<sup>2</sup> CARDINA, Miguel, "*Guerra à guerra. Violência e anticolonialismo nas oposições ao Estado novo*", Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais (2010)

<sup>3</sup> FONSECA, Ana Mónica, "*A força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (158-1968)*", Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007

<sup>4</sup> MARCOS, Daniel, "*Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968)*", Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Portugal, 2007.

<sup>5</sup> REIS, Bruno, "*As Primeiras Décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas. Um Estado Pária Contra a Norma da Descolonização*" in "*Portugal e o Fim do Colonialismo. Dimensões Internacionais*", Edições 70, Lisboa, 2014

address the role that FRG played in this matter for two reasons. The first is the fact that FRG would prove to be Portugal's most reliable ally. FRG provided most of the designs, machinery, and technical expertise that made the Portuguese military industry viable, and they also provided a substantial portion of what Portugal could not get in their domestic market. The second reason is that the subject of military procurement and its political and diplomatic background is immensely complex and wide-reaching. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the scope of the content of this study.

## **Methodology**

The methodological basis for this dissertation was the analysis of primary source documentation about how Portugal's military equipment was procured. I have chosen, for the reasons stated before, to focus my studies on the German-Portuguese relationship. This relationship was the source of much of Portugal's foreign purchases and the foundation for its military industry. Therefore I have made extensive searches on the archives of the *Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã* (CMLA, or the Mixed Luso-German Commission); its vast trove of telegrams, contracts, requests, offers, and other documents was essential to understanding the dealings between Lisbon and Bonn in this matter. I have also sought extensive secondary sources to obtain the necessary background to understand these orders and how such cooperation came to be. Some sources from the Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional are also used in this dissertation, though these sources play a lesser role. Unfortunately, several documents from the *3ª Repartição*, which deals with weapons and equipment that were of interest to this study, were not available for research at the time.

I have also sought primary sources when dealing with diplomatic matters involving the United States of America. Their role in establishing the UN arms embargo against Portugal and the diplomatic roadblocks they had erected were also of interest to this study, as they explain much of Portugal's diplomatic isolation during that period and further illuminate the importance of the Portuguese connections with Germany. For this matter, I have made extensive use of the US State Department resources published online, as well as a 1973 congressional hearing regarding the implementation of US arms embargoes against Portugal and South Africa. The hearing was also

accompanied by extensive attachments that further explained the predicament beset on Portugal, containing documents such as the text of several UN resolutions regarding Portuguese Africa.

The UN played an important role in the situation that Portugal faced throughout the colonial war. I sought to explain the UN's role through the analysis of many of the same sources I used for the United States' role, and I mostly explored the relation of the Western Bloc in the UN with Portugal and not so much the role of the Eastern Bloc. This is because Portugal would not likely be able to acquire Soviet-built or Soviet-developed equipment in any sort of relevant quantities even if they had wanted to. This was further exacerbated by the anti-communist nature of Portugal's regime, which would prefer not to work with the Eastern bloc. Lisbon was at one time even offered Czech weapons and chose to not make much of this offer.<sup>6</sup> I also explored some secondary sources on the matter, which served to explore the position of several UN member states that could be relevant in this matter.

France also played a role in this matter, which will be covered in a section of this dissertation. Though I explored France's position mostly through secondary sources, I also found several requisitions for French materials on the CMLA archives. These orders comprised primarily of ammunition and were intermediated by Germany, which brought out some interesting aspects of Portugal's military procurement. I have explored these requisitions with some prominence in this work since they display Portugal's relationship with Germany, as well as its relationship with France. These cases are also interesting in the fact that they are often more complex than the usual purchase request and, therefore, reveal more about these proceedings than an ordinary request.

### **Source Citations**

Sources are cited in the footnotes in two different forms in this dissertation, depending on the type of source. The first is the alpha-numerical designation they receive within Portuguese archives, which offers a clear direction of where to find the material analyzed for this study. A more detailed citation of these sources is found in the Sources section hereof. The second form is the title and

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<sup>6</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, April 19, 1969, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President.

date of communications and memorandums found in the online archives of the US State Department; the links that directly access these sources are found in the Sources section as well.

### **Note on Nomenclature**

There are several naming conventions that could be adhered to, as such I have to consider the best possible way to phrase things for the sake of brevity. For instance, any mention of “Germany” or “Germans”, unless otherwise specified, refers to West Germany and its citizens. I will make it clear when talking about East Germany, by always referring to it as such. A similar situation happens with the different nomenclature of weaponry as they were adopted by different nations. Weapons oftentimes have different designations when adopted or trialed by different countries. One such example is the FN FAL, which is referred to as the G-1 in German service or FN m/962 in Portuguese service. I have chosen to forgo using the specific Portuguese nomenclature for the weapons because, firstly, they are rarely referred to by their Portuguese model number in the Portuguese sources I have researched; and secondly, Portuguese nomenclature is a niche, almost arcane, subject and would only generate confusion. I could have inserted multiple designations every time a weapon is mentioned, but that seemed to be unduly burdensome on the reader. I have mostly attempted to use the nomenclature that appears on the documents, though I sometimes reference other names to ensure clarity. For instance, the MG-1s and MG-3s were often referred to as the MG-42 in Portuguese documents; as the largest difference between the World War II machine gun and its post-war counterparts is the use of a different cartridge and some minor product improvements, I believe that maintaining the name used in the documentation is more appropriate. Nevertheless, this also leads to some issues: I have used the FAL and G-1 designations to refer to the same model of a weapon in different sections hereof because sometimes the relevant documents consulted referred to them as “espingarda FN”, FAL or G-1 interchangeably.

## **I - Portugal's Colonial History**

Portugal's long colonial past is well known, from their discoveries during the 1500s, to the forging of a wide-reaching commercial empire with trading posts spanning Africa, India, the Indies and even reaching Japan, to the colonization of Brazil and the eventual colonization of large swaths of Africa. These African conquests, however, would prove to be troublesome for numerous reasons, not the least of which was the Colonial War that is at the center of this dissertation. In this chapter, I will give a brief overview of Portugal's occupation of its African colonies. This overview will lay the foundation for the scenario that led to the Colonial War and the reasons why Portugal chose to keep its hold on its colonies for as long as it did.

### **Portugal's Colonial Background**

The Portuguese conquests in Africa came later than one would expect. Portugal had extensive colonial claims, but most of those were, in fact, only paper claims. One example that could attest to this fact is that in 1903 only 10% of the claimed area of Guinea had been occupied by the Portuguese. Similar situations occurred in Angola and Mozambique. This lack of occupation led to the loss of their claim on the "pink map" that would have stitched together Angola and Mozambique. The claim, instead, went to the British due to their larger presence in the claimed area and their desire to stitch together their empire from Cairo to South Africa. The rather lackluster occupation was not for a lack of trying, as the Portuguese had undertaken considerable efforts to occupy their claimed territories. From 1841 to 1936 Portugal carried out 81 armed interventions in Guinea and was actively engaged in combat approximately 7% of that time. Mozambique suffered 160 interventions from 1854 to 1916; however, much more time was spent at war, about 22%. Angola was even more troublesome; over 180 military interventions took place from 1848 to 1926. In the first three decades of these interventions (from 1848 to 1878), 22% of the time was spent in combat operations; however, that increased to 44% from 1879-1926, including the period from 1902 to 1920 where 83% of the time was spent at war.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> PÉLISSIER, René, "Guerras Coloniais" in "Dicionário de História de Portugal, Vol. VIII", Porto, Livraria Figueirenses, 1999

These wars were fought differently depending on the specific circumstances present during those undertakings. Timor, for instance, with its extreme distance and minuscule economic relevance, saw the extensive use of local or auxiliary forces, due to the difficulty and cost of sending regular troops to such a distant place. Portugal, on the other hand, deployed at least 8500 soldiers of the regular army to Guinea, as well as several thousand auxiliary soldiers. Mozambique required 17000 regular troops, though most of the forces involved in the campaigns were local. Subduing Angola, on the other hand, required the service of over 40000 regular Portuguese soldiers, involving few irregular or local forces. The resistance in Angola was so great that nearly all native ethnic groups had to be defeated in battle before the Portuguese could assert their authority. According to René Pélissier, these initial wars of conquest were determined by several major factors: 1) Use of irregular forces that practiced a “war of extermination”; 2) Poor quality training of the colonial forces; 3) Refusal of the metropolis to invest resources when enemy opposition was deemed too great; 4) The late use of foreign mercenary bands, which saw service as late as 1915; 5) Poor quality of weapons afforded, even to regular troops, who had to rely on the tactical superiority of their officers, and not exclusively on superior firepower; 6) Absence of foreign aid to local resistance groups, as well as constant infighting within those groups. Portugal’s occupation of Africa faced several problems besides armed resistance movements. Portugal faced opposition from nature itself, with tropical diseases killing more than the fighting, and the weather and the rugged terrain making transportation of troops and supplies difficult. The fact that Portuguese colonies were recent and had had as little as two generations to develop also hindered the Portuguese ability to consolidate their hold on the region, something that would exacerbate later conflicts.<sup>8</sup>

### **The Scramble for Africa and World War I**

After the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which saw European powers partitioning Africa, the Portuguese Government understood that its colonial empire had become an “object of great desire” by the major European powers. The British, the Germans, and the French would demonstrate an

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<sup>8</sup> PÉLISSIER, René, “*Guerras Coloniais*” in “*Dicionário de História de Portugal, Vol. VIII*”, Porto, Livraria Figueirenses, 1999

interest in the regions claimed by Portugal. However, aside from Portugal losing its claim on the territory between Angola and Mozambique, little came of those ambitions. The main reason for that was the fact that these great powers could not come to an agreement as to the partition of Portugal's holdings. None of the sides wanted the other to gain important strategic points and resources in the African continent that could later be used against them.<sup>9</sup>

With the outbreak of World War I, Portugal saw an increasing necessity to fortify the defenses in its overseas territories, sending military expeditions to Angola and Mozambique as early as September 1914. The main goals of these expeditions were to defend against any German incursion into Portuguese territory. The danger that Germany posed to the colonies, as well as the well-known designs on Portugal and its colonies by the European Great Powers and Spain, led Portugal into joining the war on the side of the Western Allies. This decision ensured that the Portuguese would continue to control its colonial holdings after the First World War and that Portugal's colonies would not be a bargaining chip at a foreign peace conference.<sup>10</sup>

### **Portuguese Colonial Policies**

It is important to understand the political and economic systems that administered the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Salazar's colonial policies, which were developed in the early days of his regime and lasted with minimal change until its downfall, are especially relevant to the understanding of the Portuguese Colonial Wars that would begin in the early 1960s.

With the end of World War I and the onset of the Great Depression, Portugal sought to consolidate its presence in its colonies, passing a series of legislative acts throughout the mid-1920s that culminated in a new Colonial Act in 1930, which would be incorporated into the Portuguese constitution of 1933. This Colonial Act was centered on protectionist policies and codified Portugal's "white man's burden", that is, the "burden to civilize and colonize overseas

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<sup>9</sup> CASTAÑO, David, "Notas e Enquadramento Histórico" in "João Ninguém, Soldado da Grande Guerra", Lisboa, Bertrand Editora, 2014.

<sup>10</sup> CASTAÑO, David, "Notas e Enquadramento Histórico" in "João Ninguém, Soldado da Grande Guerra", Lisboa, Bertrand Editora, 2014.

domains”. This “burden” was one of the primary justifications for the colonial system. The other justification, more pragmatic, was the fact that Portugal had been under threat of annexation by Spain for centuries. The predicament of being a tiny nation on the far-western edge of the continent, with few resources, led the Portuguese to believe that, without their colonial holdings, they would not be able to remain independent from their larger and more powerful neighbor to the east.<sup>11</sup>

The colonial system thus resulting had the following principles at its core: 1) The exclusion of foreign influences and interests on the colonies; 2) Subordination of colonial concessions to the interests of the Portuguese state, with these interests forming the basis for all colonial relations and the metropolis serving the “supreme arbiter” of all disputes in the colonies; 3) Centralization of colonial affairs in the Ministry of Colonies; 4) End of fiscal autonomy of the colonies, with all financial affairs being subordinate to the Ministry of Colonies.<sup>12</sup>

After World War II, the Portuguese economy became increasingly interwoven with its colonial holdings, and therefore its colonial policies were of major economic relevance. The principles that defined the Colonial Act were maintained. Even after the Act was repealed, the status of the colonies remained unchanged for all practical purposes. The only changes made to the Colonial Act were in the designation, with colonies becoming “overseas territories”. The change in nomenclature gave Portugal a plausible legal argument that they did not possess colonies, but that these territories were, in fact, a core part of Portugal’s territory. This was done largely with the intent to appease a global community that had quickly turned against colonialism. The *Estado Novo* regime, despite global trends, fully intended to maintain its colonial empire.

To further clarify the previous points: the main principle that guided Portugal’s policies towards the colonies was that the colonies’ economy and their politics should be subordinate to the interests of the metropolis. This meant that Lisbon would take raw materials from the colonies and use them to produce manufactured goods in Portugal, increasing its own industrial capacity.

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<sup>11</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, “*História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo*”, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994.

<sup>12</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, “*História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo*”, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994.



This increased industrial production would be sold to the colonies. The colonies for their part would be obliged to purchase goods from and export raw materials to the metropolis. Efforts to bring industry to the colonies were significantly hindered by the central government in Lisbon, even in cases where such industries were important for the continued economic growth in the colonies.<sup>13</sup>

Under these policies, Portugal's economy became dependent on the colonies, both for raw materials and for markets for its industrial output. As for the colonies, while being an integral part of Portugal's economy, were significantly hindered in their ability to grow their economies. In essence, such policies made it so that Portugal could not live without the colonies and that the colonies could not live under Portuguese control, effectively priming the area for future conflicts.

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<sup>13</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, *"História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo"*, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994.

## **II – “A Guerra do Ultramar”**

In this chapter, I intend to briefly cover the conflict that is key to this dissertation. The Colonial War was a long-running, low-intensity conflict, with numerous reasons for its existence. As such, this subject is exceedingly complex; therefore, for the sake of the limitations inherent to a dissertation, I necessarily have to simplify certain elements, such as the internal troubles that arose for the Portuguese regime. This simplification, however, does not detract from the points that I am attempting to make.

### **A Brief Overview**

The Portuguese colonial war, or as it was called by the *Estado Novo* regime “*Guerra do Ultramar*”, was, from Portugal’s perspective, one war in three separate operational theaters. The war was the result of unchanging policies in a changing world and the regime’s unwillingness to negotiate. For this war, however, unlike when Portugal first took hold of these regions, considerable external assistance by way of supplies, training, and expertise were made available to the independence movements. This support came out of the greater theater that was the Cold War, when the Soviet Union invested heavily into expanding their sphere of influence to Africa, as did its main rival: The United States.<sup>14</sup>

The first overt act of the colonial war in Angola was an attack by nationalists, who attempted to free political prisoners in Luanda in early 1961. The failed raid led to severe reprisals by Portuguese forces on the Luanda’s slums; nevertheless, these reprisals did not pacify the situation, and, if anything, further exacerbated the local desire for independence.<sup>15</sup> Portugal’s reaction to the raid inspired further action from factions that favored independence, and as violent revolts sprung up in Angola’s countryside in March 1961, it became obvious that a significant conflict had begun. The rebels began to massacre white farmers and anyone who collaborated with

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<sup>14</sup> OLIVEIRA, César, “Guerra Colonial” in “Dicionário de História do Estado Novo Vol. I”, Venda Nova, Bertrand, 1996

<sup>15</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, “*História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo*”, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994.

them, and reprisals against the rebels and their supporters were equally as brutal. The terror campaign waged by the independence movements met with initial successes, as the civilian population and many military posts were evacuated in the northeastern regions of Angola. However, with the arrival of Portuguese reinforcements in October, most of the abandoned posts were re-occupied. The numerous liberation movements however would be unable to unify or even decide on a united strategy, which made it nearly impossible to gain ground against the Portuguese. From 1962 until the end of the colonial wars there was considerable infighting amongst rebel groups. With an uneven front, it meant that most rebel groups could not hinder the Portuguese economy nor their military operations enough to win the war, as evidenced by the fact that no key economic sector was ever in any real danger of falling into rebel hands; however, they could hinder Portugal's forces enough to make it so that there could not be a military victory by the Portuguese which would end the war. Despite the rebels themselves having no perspectives of a real military victory, they would keep on fighting a guerrilla war intending on eventually exhausting Portugal out of the War.<sup>16</sup> Portugal's colonial position would continue to worsen, and the loss of the Portuguese State of India in late 1961 would embolden the growing liberation movements. Adding to that was the fact the Congolese were supporting and training Angolan rebels, as well as harboring bases for their operations within Congo's territory.<sup>17</sup>

The situation in Guinea came to a head in 1963, after a massacre of workers incited people into taking up arms. This theater of war was considerably more troublesome than Angola's. Not only was the terrain and climate worse, but the guerrillas that fought against the Portuguese were united and well-led. Furthermore, they also had considerable popular support among the local population. While in Angola average combat losses came to 105 men a year, the Portuguese forces fighting in Guinea averaged 122 yearly losses in a country that was 35 times smaller in size and had only a tenth of Angola's population.<sup>18</sup> These guerrillas were also extremely well-armed and,

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<sup>16</sup> PÉLISSIER, René, "Guerras Coloniais" in "Dicionário de História de Portugal, Vol. VIII", Porto, Livraria Figueirenses, 1999

<sup>17</sup> Memorandum from Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan), January 9, 1962, Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa

<sup>18</sup> PÉLISSIER, René, "Guerras Coloniais" in "Dicionário de História de Portugal, Vol. VIII", Porto, Livraria Figueirenses, 1999

in the early 1970s, they managed to stop all Portuguese aviation over the region because they possessed highly advanced Soviet-made ‘Strela’ MANPADS, a capability that, at the time, Portugal itself did not have.<sup>19</sup>

As for Mozambique, the war started in 1964. Mozambique, like Guinea, had a cohesive guerrilla group leading the armed fight against the Portuguese, although they were not nearly as effective as Guinea’s rebels had been. Portuguese losses came to 157, on average, per year. Interestingly enough, it was in Mozambique that the use of native African troops by the Portuguese Armed Forces became most widespread. Near the end of the war, more than 50% of regular Portuguese troops were native Africans.<sup>20</sup>

In 1967, the situation in Angola was relatively stable, with some cross-border raids from the Congo in the northern regions, namely Dembos, and in the southeast near the Zambian Border. Mozambique was less stable; they lacked the more substantial infrastructure that existed in Angola; however, the Portuguese also considered the situation there to be stable. The Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, had found themselves in a perilous position. The terrain of mostly swampy ground lent itself to hit-and-run tactics, and the substantial availability of weapons, which were largely delivered through the Republic of Guinea and Senegal by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, as well as China, resulted in an unstable position for the Portuguese. The main fear of losing Guinea-Bissau, which had little economic significance, was the loss of Cape Verde, because the loss of control of those Islands would, in all likelihood, see the Soviet Union establish military bases in the archipelago. A military base in Cape Verde would dramatically expand the Soviet capabilities to project power in the Atlantic, which could be a significant problem for NATO in case of a war.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> OLIVEIRA, César, “Guerra Colonial” in “Dicionário de História do Estado Novo Vol. I”, Venda Nova, Bertrand, 1996

<sup>20</sup> PÉLISSIER, René, “Guerras Coloniais” in “Dicionário de História de Portugal, Vol. VIII”, Porto, Livraria Figueirenses, 1999

<sup>21</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, January 3, 1969, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PORT–US.

Around that time the Portuguese often proudly boasted of the multiracial society that had been created in Brazil. These boasts were meant to establish that they could create a similar situation in their African territories if given a chance. In 1969 American sources cite that the Portuguese had around 120,000 troops in the field in Africa, of which nearly 30% were native Africans. They commented on this situation stating that the Portuguese felt comfortable in manning key installations with African soldiers and non-commissioned officers.<sup>22</sup> However, the Portuguese rhetoric of creation of a united multiracial nation was of little consequence. The racial polarization in Portuguese Africa had been made essentially irredeemable for a long time.<sup>23</sup>

This stability in the colonies, however, did not mean stability elsewhere. In 1969, during a private conversation between Marcelo Caetano and the American Ambassador Ridgway B. Knight, the Portuguese Prime Minister stated that the Portuguese military could fulfill its role at sea and in the air adequately, however, its land forces in the continent had been depleted. This served as a step-off point to request military aid from the United States, and Caetano requested equipment to outfit a brigade (though the exact figures were not specified in the conversation). This brigade would serve to train personnel in new modern equipment in case more equipment could be procured if the diplomatic situation were to change at a later date (such as hostilities erupting in Europe).<sup>24</sup>

Caetano held a less stringent view on the matter of independence, or at least autonomy, for the colonies. In this same conversation with the US ambassador, he would suggest that the colonies could have their independence if they could exist as states similar to Brazil, with a multiethnic population. However, undoing his previous statement, he said that the neighboring countries would not allow this to happen, so such a possibility was far from happening. His Government also had

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<sup>22</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, January 3, 1969, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US.

<sup>23</sup> Paper Prepared in the Department of State, June 28, 1962, Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries, Series, Africa.

<sup>24</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State, August 15, 1969, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US.

to cater to a more hardline stance held by the military establishment,<sup>25</sup> who were important in maintaining Caetano in power. Thus, changing the head after Salazar's illness had little impact on Portugal's colonial policies.

### **The National Situation**

Just as the international situation quickly became unsustainable during the early 1960s, Portugal's internal troubles worsened. The specifics of Portugal's diplomatic siege will be addressed in later chapters of this study, while this section will focus on the internal troubles that assailed Portugal during this period. The deterioration of Portugal's position with its NATO allies and the UN in 1961 had already spurred reformists to act. These reformists were comprised of military personnel that saw ample motive to go on the offensive in what became known as the *Abrilada* of 1961, led by Botelho Moniz. They believed that the Kennedy administration, which had recently ceased their support for Portugal in the UN, would support them against Salazar, making the once untouchable leader much more vulnerable. The reformists presented a letter to Salazar, in which they made several demands in the hopes of correcting the course the country was on and making it readier to deal with the global troubles that they deemed eminent. Salazar promised to consider the letter, which temporarily averted an attempt at a *coup d'état*, as sections of the reformists held out hope that Salazar would listen.<sup>26</sup> On Salazar's camp, regardless of promises, a counterattack was already being orchestrated. The promise to consider the reformists' position had led to complacency on their side; they only retook their initiatives after prodding from the American ambassador. However, Salazar's loyalists kept stalling the reformists, which allowed Salazar ample time to plan and organize a counter coup. Before the conspirators had time to lay out an effective plan to remove Salazar from office, Salazar's forces launched a preemptive strike against the opposition. They removed a significant portion of the military's top officers and replaced them with loyalists. In

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<sup>25</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, January 3, 1969, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US.

<sup>26</sup> RODRIGUES, Luís, "Militares e política: a Abrilada de 1961 e a resistência do salazarismo" in *Ler História* Vol. 65, *O Corpo de Estado-Maior do Exército Português: Apogeu e Queda*, *Ler História – Associação de Atividades Científicas*, Lisboa, 2013

effect Salazar had decapitated his own armed forces, installing in their place “yes-men” who, unlike their predecessors, could be trusted to toe the line and go to war.<sup>27</sup>

In 1961, the same year that Salazar brought his “yes-men” into power, Portugal’s Indian holdings were attacked and seized by India; Salazar had ordered the defenders of these territories to fight to the death, an order that was quickly defied by their commanding officers. The Portuguese State in India, which had existed in some form or another since the 1500s, surrendered within a day. After this defeat, another military revolt was planned. This revolt would focus on cutting off southern portions of Portugal, by launching an assault on Beja. However, in this initial assault, in early 1962, one officer managed to sound the alarm. The revolting forces were quickly surrounded, and the ensuing firefight forced them to scatter. A series of manhunts ensued, with the brutal treatment of suspects and renewed repression on dissenters being the norm, which would further inflame social tensions in Portugal. Salazar’s rapid defeat of these revolts temporarily solidified his hold on Portugal for the time being; the resulting purges allowed for the reinstatement of military discipline and afforded the ability to commit to the war, but they did not pacify society at large. Then began a period of constant political agitation in Portugal. Following the June 1962 elections, a wave of protests and strikes erupted throughout the country. These protests were largely influenced by the Portuguese Communist Party and other leftist groups and took a marked anti-colonial slant.<sup>28</sup>

The years of 1963 to 1965 would fare no better for the Salazar regime. In 1963 various catholic groups would condemn the regime, which was remarkable due to their previous position as one of Salazar’s powerbases.<sup>29</sup> 1964 sees a rising number of groups that opposed the continuation of the Colonial Wars and even some who support the independence of the colonies.

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<sup>27</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, “*História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo*”, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994.

<sup>28</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, “*História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo*”, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994; ROSA, Frederico, “*Humberto Delgado. Biografia do General Sem Medo*”, Lisboa: Esfera dos Livros, 2008

<sup>29</sup> CARDINA, Miguel, “*Guerra à guerra. Violência e anticolonialismo nas oposições ao Estado novo*”, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais (2010)

1965 marks the indisputable rise of a politicized student movement in Portugal.<sup>30</sup> These movements continued to intensify as time went on, causing an ever-rising force against the regime.

The situation that Portugal faced internally would worsen over time. To carry out the war, the army would need a substantial number of conscripts. Portugal had the highest number of mobilized men of any western nation, except for Israel. The mobilization was so extensive that in per capita terms Portugal had a mobilization five times higher than the force mobilized by the United States for the Vietnam War. The widespread conscription would give rise to substantial unrest, as well as incite an alarming rate of desertions, surpassing 20% in the later stages of the war. Deserters would often flee to France and any other country they could reach, exacerbating Portugal's already high emigration. However, some deserters would join resistance groups within Portugal. Some even took their equipment when they deserted, in an effort to prepare an armed resistance to the regime.<sup>31</sup>

In 1968, Salazar himself would fall ill and would be removed from power. His successor, Marcelo Caetano, initially had shown promise for reform; however, he would fare little better than Salazar. His policies demonstrated little or no change, the war continued, the repression at home remained. The regime would continue to slowly doom itself with ever-growing internal and external pressures.<sup>32</sup> Caetano, however, lacked some of the charisma and international standing that had been a hallmark of Salazar's regime; an example of this can be seen by the distancing that occurred between Paris and Lisbon that was hastened after the removal of Salazar.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, "História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo", Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994.

<sup>31</sup> CARDINA, Miguel, "*Guerra à guerra. Violência e anticolonialismo nas oposições ao Estado novo*", Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais (2010); PIMENTEL, Irene, História da Oposição à Ditadura 1926-1974. Porto, Figueirinhas, 2014

<sup>32</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, "*História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo*", Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994.

<sup>33</sup> REIS, Bruno, "As Primeiras Décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas. Um Estado Pária Contra a Norma da Descolonização" in "*Portugal e o Fim do Colonialismo. Dimensões Internacionais*", Edições 70, Lisboa, 2014.



In essence, the beginning of the colonial war saw an end to much of the foreign support that Portugal's Government had enjoyed in the 1950s, incentivizing reformists to act against the central government. These efforts only led to an even more centralized government and all attempts at internal reform or external revolution were thwarted. The international situation and the constant unrest at home were just a part of what Portugal had to handle in the early stages of the Colonial War.

### **The Regime ends and so does the War**

The years from 1971 to 1973 were, again, not too kind to Portugal. In this period the economic situation worsens considerably, wages fall, and inflation rises due to the failure of the economic model and diminishing exports. The economic downturn and the already decade-long colonial war hindered the Government's ability to invest in infrastructure. This situation further fueled the social unrest that had plagued the regime, which had been facing small-scale armed guerrillas and saboteurs since 1968, as well as protests and strikes long before that. However, the economy was not the final nail in the regime's coffin.<sup>34</sup>

Salazar had been replaced in 1968, yet most of his policies had not. Marcelo Caetano maintained most of the war-related policies in order to please the military establishment. This resulted in the continuation of the already unpopular colonial war. By 1974, a conspiracy of junior officers had been organized; they marched on Lisbon and deposed the Government on the 25<sup>th</sup> of April. The movement had been brewing for a long time, with US officials already recognizing the existence of pushback and discontent coming from junior officers as early as 1969.<sup>35</sup> Their actions in 1974 were aroused by anti-war sentiment within the military and the politicization of the armed forces. The movement, initially organized after a change in the military's promotion scheme, eventually concluded that the war was untenable and that an end to the regime was the only way to stop the endless conflict. The coup brought with it a government that sought to end the war and

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<sup>34</sup> FERREIRA, José, *"História de Portugal Vol. XIII: Portugal em Transe"*, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994

<sup>35</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, January 3, 1969, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US.

begin the decolonization process, which became two of the main concerns of Portugal's new provisional Government. A Portuguese exodus from the colonies ensued with the recognition of the colonies as independent nations, which marked the end of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa.

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### **The Final Tally**

Portugal had mobilized a total of more than 820,000 men throughout the war. And when the war ended Portugal had lost 8,831 troops of all races and had had an estimated 32,195 wounded. The rebels had fought the war primarily by harassing the movement of Portuguese forces, while the Portuguese sought primarily to minimize their losses. Thus, the primary aim of combat operations, on both sides, was not a total victory, but the undermining of the enemies' ability to wage war by weakening their morale and economies, as well as winning local populations over to their respective causes.<sup>37</sup> The war's impact on Portugal was noticeable since its long duration was proving to be exhausting to the country's population and economy. There was significant economic emigration, but the emigration problem had been exacerbated by the war. Desertions in the army had also become commonplace reaching 22% in 1973, with many of these deserters emigrating. The Portuguese Government found itself isolated and besieged in the international sphere, isolated even from its NATO allies. The last nail in the coffin of the *Estado Novo* was the fact that the long-lasting war had thoroughly politicized its armed forces.<sup>38</sup> Near its end, the war had become so unpopular in Portugal, both to the people and the military, that a military *coup*

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<sup>36</sup> FERREIRA, José, "*História de Portugal Vol. XIII: Portugal em Transe*", Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994

<sup>37</sup> PÉLISSIER, René, "*Guerras Coloniais*" in "*Dicionário de História de Portugal, Vol. VIII*", Porto, Livraria Figueirenses, 1999

<sup>38</sup> OLIVEIRA, César, "*Guerra Colonial*" in "*Dicionário de História do Estado Novo Vol. I*", Venda Nova, Bertrand, 1996

*d'état* deposed the militaristic regime. It is in this context that the *Estado Novo* regime lost its colonial war; they lost the war simply because they could not hope to truly win it.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> PÉLISSIER, René, “*Guerras Coloniais*” in “*Dicionário de História de Portugal, Vol. VIII*”, Porto, Livraria Figueirenses, 1999

### **III - The International Situation**

In the previous chapters, I ran through Portugal's long colonial history and a brief overview of the war, whose sourcing of arms and equipment is the main subject of this dissertation. This setup will allow me to fully explain the international situation, which led to the diplomatic siege of Portugal and created the many difficulties that the Portuguese faced in supplying their armed forces while being *persona non grata* in the international community.

The struggle between East and West, between Communism and Capitalism, that emerged in the post-war world created the environment that surrounded the many decolonization movements, the formation of NATO and East and West Germany, as well as the maintenance of Portugal's *Estado Novo* regime. I mention these three specific aspects of that tide due to their relevance to my research. I cannot explain Portugal's ability to acquire weapons and later the intense restrictions placed upon that without explaining some of the above. I have explored *Estado Novo*'s situation in previous sections of this work and now I will explore the other two subjects.

#### **The Cold War**

The Cold War served as the backdrop for much of the diplomacy of the post-war period, permeating too many of the strategic, diplomatic, and political decisions of that era. The Cold War was fought primarily through proxy wars, the most notable cases being the Vietnam War and the Soviet-Afghan War. However, it was also fought diplomatically, which is where the partition of Germany, its delayed entry into the UN, and the decolonization movement came into play.

After the end of World War II, the United Nations assumed a position similar to that of the League of Nations, albeit notably more effective and influential than its predecessor. The UN was formed out of the allied nations that won the war and later was enlarged to encompass most states that exist today, with notable exceptions of contested territories such as Transnistria and Kosovo. For much of the period object of this study (1961-1974), both East and West Germany were not members of the UN, attaining their entrance into the organization in 1973. Their entrance had been initially blocked, much like Portugal's had been until 1955, by the bickering of the communist eastern-bloc countries and capitalist western nations. However, unlike Portugal's, their legal status

as states was hotly debated, creating additional issues to their admission into the UN. The escalating Cold War led to the creation of two large alliances intended to dissuade each other from starting a third world war with the threat of total annihilation for both sides in the event that the Cold War turned hot.<sup>40</sup>

### **The Role of the UN**

Portugal was not the first colonial power to join the UN, and Portugal was not the first colonial power to resist the UN's anti-colonial agenda. There are several parallels between the Portuguese situation and that of other UN member states, namely Belgium, who abandoned their colonial empire in 1960 after a series of wars and uprisings. Belgium held a considerable colonial empire at the end of World War II, which the Belgians surely intended to keep. However, Belgium had to face external pressures from the UN long before Portugal, having joined the UN in 1945 as part of the victorious coalition at the end of the war, while Portugal was only admitted into the UN in 1955.<sup>41</sup>

Belgium's position is also relevant to an analysis of Portugal's situation for other reasons, namely that Belgium was a relatively well developed western democracy, which contradicts some of the usual thinking that Portugal only held to their colonies as long as they did due to the *Estado Novo*. Though the Portuguese dictatorship saw the colonies as its only hope of remaining in power and taking into account the usual repressive apparatus that comes with dictatorships, it stands to reason that Portugal would be somewhat more stubborn. Both Lisbon and Brussels also had a significant number of cultural ties to their position as a colonial power. They saw themselves, in terms of national identity, as nations of model colonizers, who carried the "white man's burden" to civilize lesser nations.<sup>42</sup> Add to that the substantial economic importance of the colonies to their

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<sup>40</sup> GADDIS, John, "The Cold War: A New History", Penguin Books Ltd, London, 2005

<sup>41</sup> REIS, Bruno, "As Primeiras Décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas. Um Estado Pária Contra a Norma da Descolonização" in "*Portugal e o Fim do Colonialismo. Dimensões Internacionais*", Edições 70, Lisboa, 2014.

<sup>42</sup> ROSAS, Fernando, "*História de Portugal Vol. XII: O Estado Novo*", Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, Lda. e Autores, 1994.

respective metropolis and we can understand the reasoning behind fighting these costly wars. Portugal's position in the UN was not a simple one, it had few allies and fewer still of those were truly reliable. The Portuguese were faced with significant pressure from the newly independent African and Asian states, who greatly sympathized with Portugal's colonial subjects; additional pressure came from eastern-bloc countries, whose anti-colonial and anti-capitalistic agendas were in direct opposition to Portugal's interests; and last, but not least, they were besieged by a great many western nations, including their own NATO allies. That being said, Portugal, contrary to their "proudly alone" rhetoric, was never truly alone. France often defended Lisbon's interests, and the United States, though opposed to Portugal's continued presence in the colonies, shielded the Portuguese from harsher proposals in the UN, such as mandatory sanctions under article VII of the UN charter.<sup>43</sup>

With everything that has been examined, it seems almost contradictory that Portugal would join the United Nations. Their most reliable source of material support, West Germany, was that reliable due to the absence of UN pressure. The diplomatic setbacks, suffered largely within the UN, were not helpful when it came to internal policy and stability. We must also consider that it was a time when becoming a UN member state was not an absolute inevitability, especially knowing that Switzerland only became a full member in 2002. So why did Portugal choose to join the UN? Oliveira Salazar had been an early supporter of the UN's creation; in the immediate post-war world, Portugal's dictator lauded the efforts to restore order to the international community. Furthermore, the idea the UN was founded upon, that being of an assembly of sovereign nation-states as equals, was seen as merely a recognition of "the reality of international life". Salazar also believed that the existence of the security council, composed of a few nations, along with a handful of permanent great nations with veto-powers, was a recognition of aristocratic values that were echoed in the *Estado Novo*. The UN was therefore a pragmatic codification of international

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<sup>43</sup> REIS, Bruno, "As Primeiras Décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas. Um Estado Pária Contra a Norma da Descolonização" in *"Portugal e o Fim do Colonialismo. Dimensões Internacionais"*, Edições 70, Lisboa, 2014.

relations, as well as the codification of the different capabilities of nation-states, clearly establishing a hierarchy of greater and lesser powers.<sup>44</sup>

Salazar's initial support for the United Nations would not result in Portugal's immediate entrance into its ranks. The veto power that he had praised, which would later be a centerpiece of his Government's diplomatic maneuvering, was used liberally by the USSR against Portugal's entrance into the UN, blocking it for a decade. Portugal was admitted into the UN in 1955 in a package deal along with many other nations. Admission into the UN was seen as a diplomatic victory at home, Portugal had finally been fully recognized in the new world order that had emerged after World War II. The Portuguese also gained access to new legal recourses, such as the International Court of Justice, which they used to file suit against India for the annexation of Goa.<sup>45</sup>

This initial support for the UN, however, quickly waned, especially as it distanced itself from the Eurocentric organization Salazar first believed it to be. As more and more African and Asian nations joined, and as the ideological opposition to colonialism from both of the leading great powers became more and more apparent, the already precarious Portuguese position worsened. Portugal's position within the UN rapidly deteriorated after 1960. Lisbon constantly had to seek out and build up a minimum support structure, while also distancing Portugal from the emerging non-western nations. In order to do that, the Portuguese relied as they could on allies, such as France, a permanent member of the UNSC with veto powers, to defend them from the backlash of their continued colonial ambitions in Africa. They managed, through careful diplomatic maneuvering, to evade any worst-case scenario, such as mandatory sanctions or expulsion. From the 1960s onward, Portugal's primary goal would be to stem the bleeding from their diplomatic wounds, ensuring, through careful diplomacy, that the great powers would minimize the damage that the "lesser powers" could realistically cause to the Portuguese nation.

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<sup>44</sup> REIS, Bruno, "As Primeiras Décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas. Um Estado Pária Contra a Norma da Descolonização" in *"Portugal e o Fim do Colonialismo. Dimensões Internacionais"*, Edições 70, Lisboa, 2014.

<sup>45</sup> REIS, Bruno, "As Primeiras Décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas. Um Estado Pária Contra a Norma da Descolonização" in *"Portugal e o Fim do Colonialismo. Dimensões Internacionais"*, Edições 70, Lisboa, 2014.

Another question also arises: Why did Portugal stay in the UN? After all, post-1960 it seemed like they were constantly fighting a losing war. A couple of reasons arise to answer that: the first is that national prestige would take a significant hit if the Portuguese were to leave; it would be, essentially, an admission of defeat, meaning that their arguments could not win the day. The second reason is that it allowed them some new options to maneuver, options that before 1960 had been effectively used by Portuguese diplomats. Leaving, therefore, was not a realistic option. This position was further confirmed after Indonesia's brief withdrawal from the UN in 1965, which had yielded poor results for Indonesia, leading to its quick re-entry into the UN.<sup>46</sup>

As the colonial war progressed, Portugal's position would worsen. The country was burdened with partial arms embargoes from a significant number of nations, including their own allies. Several UN resolutions targeting the nation would be passed, leading to an ever-mounting diplomatic encirclement to Lisbon. The amendment of the Portuguese constitution in 1951 to eliminate the term "colony" from the state's vocabulary was a symptom of those pressures influencing Portuguese diplomacy and internal policy even before its entrance into the UN; then, as a full member, these pressures only increased. Portugal's constant avoidance of recognizing that they held non-autonomous territories and the significant diplomatic efforts to achieve a legal victory on the colonial matter were other symptoms of that pressure. The UN served as a forum that conglomerated the forces opposing the continued oppression of the colonies by Portugal, and, therefore, was a significant obstacle to be overcome in any diplomatic dealings that Portugal endeavored to embark on.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> REIS, Bruno, "As Primeiras Décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas. Um Estado Pária Contra a Norma da Descolonização" in *"Portugal e o Fim do Colonialismo. Dimensões Internacionais"*, Edições 70, Lisboa, 2014.

<sup>47</sup> REIS, Bruno, "As Primeiras Décadas de Portugal nas Nações Unidas. Um Estado Pária Contra a Norma da Descolonização" in *"Portugal e o Fim do Colonialismo. Dimensões Internacionais"*, Edições 70, Lisboa, 2014.



## **The Role of France**

France was one of Portugal's closest allies, especially when dealing with the colonial question and the UN. Portugal had supported France during the French colonial conflict in Algeria, thus France supported Portugal in its colonial war troubles. From the mid-1950s to the early 1960s France had faced a position very similar to Portugal's post-1960 paradigm. The French were fighting a bitter war in Algeria, which would last for over 7 years, to remain in control of their colonies. Beginning in 1958, France would face significant internal pressures to decolonize; this pressure came initially from the emerging post-colonial nations who condemned the French imperialistic hold on their colonies. The pressure to decolonize was applied through the UN and would soon be joined by their NATO allies, with condemnations coming from Britain and America. France's refusal to relinquish their colonies would come, much like Portugal's, with rationalizations such as the claim that the colonies were an integral part of their national territory. <sup>48</sup>

The intervention of international politics in what the French viewed as national affairs would lead to a worsening of relations between France and NATO as well as the UN. This scenario left an important diplomatic opening for Portugal, who could position itself as one of France's fiercest supporters, and naturally expect these favors to be repaid later. These relations would not easily mend, leading France to seek a foreign policy that was more independent of America, NATO, and the UN. This led France to take advantage of Portugal's rift with the United States to advance the French own agenda in regaining their complete diplomatic autonomy, in an attempt to recover their international prestige. The colonial question was one that both Portugal and France were united on and would mutually support each other as far as it was possible. This mutual support would continue, in one way or another, from the late 1950s through the 1960s and would only begin to wane in the 1970s.<sup>49</sup>

France's downfall in the matter would be its own internal instability, which would see the French relinquish their hold on their colonies long before Portugal. Though this decision on

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<sup>48</sup> MARCOS, Daniel, "Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968), Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Portugal, 2007.

<sup>49</sup> MARCOS, Daniel, "Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968), Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Portugal, 2007.

France's part worried Lisbon, it would have, in the long run, little impact on its relationship with Portugal. France continued to support Portugal in the UN, going as far as to support its failed candidacy for a seat at the UN Security Council in 1960.<sup>50</sup>

The 1960s would see France rise to be one of Portugal's primary sources of military equipment. The French support, however, was, by no means, unwavering, as involvement in or support for colonialist regimes would become a burdensome ordeal as the decade progressed. Between 1962 and 1963 new regulations regarding arms sales to Portugal were implemented, France was not opposed to selling ammunition and "indispensable" parts to weapons that had already been sold to Portugal as can be exemplified in an ammunition deal in 1966, in which West Germany served as an intermediary for the purchase of over 2 million rounds of surplus .50 BMG (12.7x99mm NATO) ammunition from France; this deal also included nearly a million rounds out of German stocks.<sup>51</sup> France would also honor all previous deals with Portugal, though new ones would have to be authorized by an inter-ministerial commission in France. The rule of thumb was that, on the one hand, sales of larger equipment, such as anti-tank weapons, artillery, and combat vehicles were to be approved, though significant delays were not unusual. On the other hand, light armament, such as grenades, flame-throwers, and machine guns were usually denied due to their role in anti-guerrilla activities. These new regulations came due to international pressure felt by France, whose defense of Portugal's colonial policies had been a sore spot since the beginning of the colonial war. Franco-Portuguese relations would reach their height in 1964 with a large contract for French-built warships for the Portuguese navy.<sup>52</sup>

The supply of weapons was not the only form of support that France provided for Portugal. As it has been stated before, their support in the UN was indispensable for the pursuit of Portugal's diplomatic interests. France's position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council provided it with the power to veto resolutions, which posed a great opportunity for Portugal. The

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<sup>50</sup> MARCOS, Daniel, "Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968), Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Portugal, 2007.

<sup>51</sup> Encomendas de armas ligeiras, 1966, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0049/013, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>52</sup> MARCOS, Daniel, "Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968)", Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Portugal, 2007.

Portuguese diplomatic efforts would be focused on avoiding a worst-case scenario (e.g. mandatory sanctions or expulsion from the UN) in the UN; therefore, securing French assistance was an important aspect of its diplomatic strategy. Lisbon's diplomats were often successful in securing French assistance in the UN, shielding Portugal from the worst-case scenarios. Relations between the two countries would remain close but would begin to wane with the end of the Charles de Gaulle era and the removal of Salazar as head of State in Portugal. Both shake-ups in government happened between 1968-1969. De Gaulle had been an avid advocate for Portugal within France, and without his support the French Government was much more easily swayed away from Portugal. Adding to that was the fall of Salazar, who was a charismatic leader and well regarded in some French circles, but his ill health had forced the Portuguese State to replace him, further easing the distancing between these governments. France, like Germany, would also react poorly after the attack on Guinea-Conakry in late 1970. After the attacks Paris took a less liberal approach regarding Portugal, greatly limiting French shipments of weapons and other war materials to Lisbon, and effectively cutting off one of Lisbon's last reliable suppliers.<sup>53</sup> This essentially left Portugal with only the FRG as a reliable source of equipment.

### **Eastern Bloc Involvement**

Though not central to this paper, the armament supplied to rebel groups shines some light to the Portuguese diplomatic situation. I will cover very briefly some of the soviet interests that guided their policy towards Portugal and its colonies. Firstly, as I have mentioned before, since the Cold War was fought indirectly through proxy wars and diplomacy, expanding into the new African countries was a logical decision. Second, the Soviet Union had an interest in expanding their bases of operations, whether that meant naval bases in Vietnam (after the end of the Vietnamese Civil War and its prominent American intervention) or bases in Guinea Bissau, as they desired to attain the ability to operate in the South Atlantic.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>. MARCOS, Daniel, "Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968), Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Portugal, 2007.

<sup>54</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, January 3, 1969, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US.

Portugal maintained vigilance over war materials that were disembarked in ports near its colonies. The Portuguese kept a close eye on where the ships were from, where they had stopped along their voyage, and to whom they were delivering weapons. One example of this was the Yugoslav cargo ship Bled, which in 1969 offloaded weapons of Soviet origin to the Congolese ports in Pointe-Noire and Matadi. The ship was loaded with weapons in Sfax, Tunisia, Portuguese intelligence also noted that the ship had made stops in Trieste and Conakry. Another way that the Portuguese tracked shipments of weapons was through informants, who relayed information to them that might have otherwise not been recorded. One example is a 1965 conversation with a Belgian crewman on board the Danish cargo ship Slesvig, which was intended to transport ore and was docked in Moçamedes. He relayed his sympathy with the Portuguese cause and his distaste of communists, especially noting that his Russian wife was currently imprisoned in the Soviet Union. He claimed that the captain of the ship was a communist who supported the rebels in Portuguese Africa and that their ship had stopped 60 miles from the port where several crates, similar to those used to transport whiskey, were offloaded into row-boats crewed exclusively by Africans. He could not say what was in the crates, as he was not present at their offloading. The Portuguese attempted to contact the crewman after this initial deposition, but he evaded them. We can see clearly that the ship was carrying some kind of contraband because of the interaction that was described; however, whether they were transporting war materials is unclear, but this demonstrates that the Portuguese were highly suspicious of foreign ships that came near their colonies.<sup>55</sup>

In 1968, Portugal received intelligence informing that the Soviet Union did not see an early collapse or withdrawal of the Portuguese from Africa as a desirable outcome, as they would not be able to easily exploit that outcome. The exception to that was Guinea Bissau, because the Soviets desired a naval base in that region, and having a client state, or at least a loyal ally, would enable them to further project power into the Atlantic and possibly gain access to Cape Verde. To make this possible, an endless supply of Soviet-built weapons (or weapons built in their client states, such as Czechoslovakia) was made available to the local rebels. These weapons, along with Chinese landmines, were delivered to Guinea Bissau through the neighboring Republic of Guinea.

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<sup>55</sup> “Material capturado ao inimigo em Angola”, 1965-1966, PT/ADN/SGDN/2REP/146/0550/009, Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional (SGDN) - 2ª Repartição (Informações), Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>56</sup> This Soviet support would grow extensively, even going as far as supplying the rebels with *Strela* MANPADS, which grounded all Portuguese aviation in the embattled territory. Indeed there was a relevant seepage of Eastern bloc weapons into the Portuguese colonies, a hodge-podge of weaponry had been captured in Angola which included: Chinese and Soviet SKS carbines; Soviet RPD light machine guns and AK-type assault rifles; Czech and Chinese ZB26 light machine guns; Bulgarian, Chinese, Soviet and Yugoslav landmines; Chinese and Soviet rocket launchers; as well as a smattering of World War II equipment. In 1967, the large amount of equipment captured by Portugal, as well as their diverse selection, led requests from France and West Germany that some of this equipment be ceded to them for testing and evaluation. These requests were initially welcomed by the Portuguese, though there were significant delays, which were left unresolved until at least 1969.<sup>57</sup>

Surprisingly enough, Portugal could buy some weapons in the eastern bloc, namely from Czechoslovakia. This was in contrast, or more likely in response, to the American arms embargo against Portugal. This seemingly contradictory situation was brought up by Portugal when it came to campaigning against the export restrictions that had been imposed on them.<sup>58</sup> This cooperation with eastern bloc countries was not a one-off deal, as the Portuguese often exported tantalite from Mozambique to the Soviet Union. The shipping of this mineral was done over the explicit objections of the United States.<sup>59</sup>

Though a few points of cooperation existed between Portugal and the Eastern Bloc, namely the export of raw materials to the USSR and sometimes availability of weapons from other Warsaw Pact nations, they were nevertheless at odds, which meant that the Eastern Bloc countries could

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<sup>56</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, November 19, 1968, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3.

<sup>57</sup> “Material capturado ao inimigo em Angola”, 1965-1969, PT/ADN/SGDN/2REP/146/0550/001, Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional (SGDN) - 2ª Repartição (Informações), Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>58</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, April 19, 1969, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memos for the President.

<sup>59</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State, July 7, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66.

not be counted as a reliable source of weapons or diplomatic support. Portugal had been an intensely anti-communist state for a very long time. The *Estado Novo* dictatorship had flirted with fascism during World War II and was closer to the defeated Axis Powers in ideology and government form than it was to its new NATO allies. During the immediate post-war period, Portugal's PIDE had ensured that there was little to no communist activity in Portugal, and they maintained their repression of communist agitators during the Colonial War.<sup>60</sup> Meanwhile, the USSR and their allies often supplied the independence movements in Portuguese Africa with weapons, munitions, and other war materials. Coupled with that, the Soviets had clear interests in creating bases in West Africa, in order to improve their naval capabilities in the Atlantic. That meant the relations between Portugal and the Eastern Bloc nations were highly antagonistic.

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<sup>60</sup> NAVES, Luís, "*Portugal Visto Pela CIA*", Bertrand Editora, Lisboa, 2017

#### **IV - The Role of the United States of America**

Relations between Portugal and the US were often strained, even though Portugal was a NATO member. This was primarily due to America's opposition to Portugal's colonial ambitions. The United States' position against colonialism had been present in their foreign policy since the Monroe Doctrine, following through to the peace deals that ended World War I and the establishment of the League of Nations. It is, therefore, understandable that they would continue to pursue this goal after the end of World War II. With their newfound status as the most powerful nation in the world stage, rivaled only by the Soviet Union, it stands to reason that their anti-colonial stance would widen. As such, they pushed for an end of European control in Africa and Asia. The American position towards Portugal, however, would remain largely rhetorical, with the greatest actions taken being a restriction on what kinds of military materials could be exported to Portugal and a brief diplomatic "offensive" in the UN during the Kennedy Administration.

American policy toward Portugal was influenced by America's anti-colonialism, its goals being in direct opposition to Portugal's interests, which led to a worsening of the relations between the two countries. The Kennedy administration dramatically aggravated the situation. They voted against Portugal in the United Nations Security Council for the first time in 1961, and in 1962 the Kennedy administration was faced with two options: 1) To continue in their present course; 2) To adopt a harsher anti-colonial stance. Secretary of State Rusk believed that maintaining their current course would be seen in the UN as tacit support for Portugal's continued actions in Angola<sup>61</sup>. The moderate approach was also not going anywhere, and while there was a risk of deteriorating relations with Portugal, Secretary Rusk believed it would be in America's interest to adopt a harsher stance, as it would please the Civil Rights movement in the United States and offer a better platform to oppose the spread of communism in Africa. The topic of the Azores was also an important concern throughout Portuguese-American dealings. America had to pay great attention

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<sup>61</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, July 10, 1963, Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN.

to avoid losing access to the base when dealing with Portugal, otherwise, they would risk a significant strategic loss in the Atlantic.<sup>62</sup>

The US would be a proponent of UN resolutions that endeavored to limit Portugal's ability to acquire weapons in the international sphere. They did that in the hopes of forcing Portugal to the negotiating table in order to reach a peaceful solution for the colonial issue. However, for fear of angering their allies in Lisbon, American diplomats would prefer to leverage soft power to avoid being seen as the leading force of these efforts. They held out hope that through indirect diplomatic efforts they would be able to persuade other nations, such as France, to cease their support for Portugal's cause in the UN. Washington, however, sought to "minimize the danger of a sharp break with Portugal" during their diplomatic maneuvers.<sup>63</sup> This was due, in no small part, to the strategic importance of Portugal in NATO. The continued use of Lajes Airbase was always an important matter when dealing with Lisbon due to its essential position for NATO's strategy in the Atlantic Ocean. America perceived its own negotiating position as weak and, therefore, was often forced into adopting a much milder stance when dealing with the regime.<sup>64</sup>

As outlined above, and will be further explored below, the United States, while being, in principle, against much of Portugal's foreign policy, would dance around most of the key issues and seek to advance their position indirectly.<sup>65</sup> Therefore, they sought to appease the interest in moderate African factions while refraining from causing a break in relations with Portugal.

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<sup>62</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, July 10, 1963, Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN.; RODRIGES, Luís, "As negociações que nunca acabaram: a renovação do acordo das Lajes em 1962", in "Penélope. Revista de História e Ciências Sociais, No. 22", Cooperativa Penélope, Fazer e Desfazer a História, 2000

<sup>63</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, July 19, 1963, Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN.

<sup>64</sup> LOPES, Rui, "*Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974*" London, 2011

<sup>65</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, July 19, 1963, Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN.



The diplomatic objectives of the United States relating to Portuguese Africa were clearly stated by Dean Rusk on a telegram to Ambassador Stevenson in 1963 as follows:

“Our overall objective in the Security Council is to protect both our African and European interests. With this in mind, we should seek to satisfy the objectives of the moderate Africans in the Security Council while refraining from initiating or supporting a resolution of the character likely to cause Portugal to deny us the use of the Azores.... US will clearly oppose expulsion Portugal from UN or mandatory sanction against Portugal... [America’s] Objective is to get started a process of peaceful change, stimulated by an independent political negotiator...”<sup>66</sup>

The same telegram also outlined the desired aspects of a resolution, which called back to and expanded on an earlier memorandum by Secretary Rusk, which included: 1) The reaffirmation of the right of self-determination for the Portuguese territories; 2) A call for negotiations towards both sides; 3) A request for a single representative (rapporteur) to be designated to the Portuguese territories (explicitly calls for a single rapporteur and not a three-man commission); 4) A call to all concerned (i.e. UN member states) to cooperate with such representative and to refrain from providing Portugal with arms or to take any action that would further complicate the situation.<sup>67</sup>

These matters echo several previous UN resolutions regarding non-self-governing territories, as well as previous resolutions against Portugal such as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1819 (1962). The telegram also informed on the tactics that should be used to achieve the American goal, stating that:

“While US should assist as necessary to bring about consensus along above lines, it is important that we not seem to be in a leadership position especially in those elements of package (notably arms embargo) that will be particularly offensive to Portuguese. Every effort should be made to get French, British, and some members of “middle group” (Norway, Brazil, Venezuela, Philippines) to take lead in developing consensus around moderate resolution that can be viable alternative to African starting position. [...] emphasizing our opposition to Chapter VII sanctions and expulsion which reflects our

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<sup>66</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, July 19, 1963, Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN.

<sup>67</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, July 19, 1963, Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN.

desire to be helpful to Portuguese, but also bring out frankly above difficulties which confront both Portugal and ourselves in SC.”<sup>68</sup>

This telegram outlined the guidelines of what American diplomats should do in the UN. They were given wide latitude as far as how much to divulge of their position and to whom they should disclose. This telegram reveals a couple of important things about the US’s diplomatic efforts: 1) they wished to avoid aggravating Lisbon; 2) they preferred an indirect approach for achieving their goals in this matter.

Pressure from the United States towards Portugal would lessen after Kennedy was assassinated. His successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, was less interested in continuing Kennedy’s foreign policy regarding Africa. His focus was on internal matters at first and the war in Vietnam later. Such change in priorities would open room for Portugal to maneuver. Though Portugal was technically dealing with an easier, or at least less attentive, opponent, they were by no means clear of American condemnations. Washington would remain committed to defending the right to self-determination of Portuguese Africa. American diplomatic efforts would continue to attempt to bring Portugal to the table to negotiate with African leaders, although these efforts would yield few results other than bashing into Salazar’s adamant opposition to any declaration that would imply that self-determination was a possibility. However, America’s stated goals, which were a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Portuguese Africa and the self-determination of the peoples of those regions, had to be put in the backburner. The Americans had to significantly turn down their rhetoric in later years, due to the risk of losing access to the Azores, which would considerably diminish their abilities in the Atlantic.

The American position on Portugal was often antagonistic, and while the US did indeed antagonize the Portuguese regime, they were not alone in creating friction. Portugal, for its part, would antagonize the United States with a constant presence of anti-American attitude in radio and TV broadcasts, and would also impose roadblocks for protestant missionaries in Africa.<sup>69</sup> Portugal also maintained the claim that the lack of investment for infrastructure in the colonies

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<sup>68</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, July 19, 1963, Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN.

<sup>69</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State, January 24, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT.

was due to the military situation that continuously siphoned funds that would, allegedly, be used for improvements in Africa. Salazar contended that America's diplomatic efforts were misdirected, that they should be focusing on eliminating support for terrorist groups working against the Portuguese presence in Africa. Salazar would, as a way of justifying this position, compare unfavorably the chaotic and unstable regimes that had been arising in Africa to Portugal's administration which was allegedly more stable and prosperous than other regimes in Africa.<sup>70</sup> American officials made notes of how Portugal painted a "very rosy picture" of the situation in Angola and portrayed it as an island of "peace and contentment in a sea of African turmoil".<sup>71</sup> Lisbon greatly resented the implication that race relations were poor in their African territories, and the Portuguese also repeated *ad nauseam* that if the guerrillas and their supporters ceased their activities the Portuguese believed that the situation would improve dramatically for all involved. Such a picture, however, did not satiate the local population's desire for self-government, nor did it sway American opinion away from supporting the self-determination of those people.

Portugal's issues with America would not cease at purely the diplomatic level. In 1964, Lisbon accused the United States of providing weapons to rebel factions in Angola, claiming to have documentation that tracked a shipment of weapons to an American source. America denied that this was the case, maintaining that anyone could purchase American-made weapons on the world market, which was beyond their control. The Department of State would claim in internal documents, and in statements made by the Johnson administration to Lisbon, that no American weapons that had been sent through official channels to Africa had ever been diverted to the Angolan rebels.<sup>72</sup> These accusations were the result of constant suspicion by Portugal's government that weapons offloaded in neighboring countries would be redirected to the rebels within its colonies. Eastern-bloc shipments that contained war materials were often tracked by Portugal, especially when they came near Africa. However, Portugal's suspicion would not be

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<sup>70</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State, April 18, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT.

<sup>71</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, June 30, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

<sup>72</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, June 26, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT.

reserved solely for communist weaponry. An example can be seen with the case of the delivery of 51 tons of American-made ammunition by the U.S.-flagged cargo ship African Lightning to the port of Matai; the Portuguese relayed the fact that this shipment had arrived to several major commanders in Angola, signifying that they firmly believed that American ammunition was being diverted by the Congolese to Angolan rebels.<sup>73</sup>

The Johnson administration would continue to attempt to bring both the Portuguese and the more moderate African leaders to the table to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict.<sup>74</sup> These attempts yielded little result; the proposed lengthy transitional periods and a restrictive view of what self-determination entailed were unacceptable to the Africans, and the end-result of independence was an impossible prospect for the Portuguese.<sup>75</sup> These factors were coupled with the fact that the United States would not impose substantial sanctions on Portugal, primarily due to fears of losing access to the Azores, especially given that there was no formal deal in place that secured America's access to the base during peacetime. The fragile nature of the American presence in the Azores would be a continued point of leverage for the Portuguese in their negotiations with America. The issue would remain unresolved throughout the Colonial war, which would inevitably benefit the Portuguese by tempering America's stance towards them.<sup>76</sup>

During the Nixon administration, the question of a strategic defeat in either South America or Africa, that had not been as relevant when NATO was founded, became an important subject. Portugal would use this fact to attempt to ease some of the pressures it had felt due to its African policies. America at this time would cease its direct support for the liberation movements in Africa,

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<sup>73</sup> "Material capturado ao inimigo em Angola", 1964-1968, PT/ADN/SGDN/2REP/146/0550/005, Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional (SGDN) - 2ª Repartição (Informações), Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>74</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State, September 3, 1965, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US.

<sup>75</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, June 9, 1965, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT.

<sup>76</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, April 16, 1971, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

somewhat easing the strain on Portugal.<sup>77</sup> However, arms control measures would remain in place. The diverging views on Africa would not change in any meaningful way during the Nixon administration. There were significant proportions of the American public that felt strongly about an end to colonial regimes in Africa, meaning that, even if there was some desire from the administration to change course on the matter, public opinion would make it impossible to adopt a different policy toward Africa.<sup>78</sup> By the late 1960s, the diplomatic encirclement that characterized the final years of the *Estado Novo* regime would be in full swing. This meant that, even though American pressure was lower than it had been, Portugal's diplomatic situation was still as precarious as ever.

### **Export of Military Equipment**

Returning to the matter of military procurement, the export of weapons and war materials by the United States to Portugal had been placed under significant restrictions in response to the situation in the colonies. The export of vehicles, aircraft, and items such as landing mats for aircraft or bullet-resistant tires, radio, and radar equipment were under constant supervision. The intention of the United States was not to starve out Portugal; these materials could still be exported, as long as their end-use was in civilian applications. Direct military assistance was essentially off the table.<sup>79</sup>

American export restrictions were applied to any equipment that had been produced in or sold from the United States; also, contracting a manufacturing plant in the United States to supplement Portugal's production capacities was out of the question, as they would be faced with exactly the same issues. These same restrictions arose when purchasing equipment that included American parts from other sources; for instance, Portugal could not purchase aircraft parts that had

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<sup>77</sup> LOPES, Rui, "Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974" London, 2011

<sup>78</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State, August 15, 1969, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US.

<sup>79</sup> Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), July 3, 1972, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. II.

been built in the United States or anywhere by an American company without authorization by the US Government.<sup>80</sup>

American equipment exported to Portugal's military would have to go through the following procedure: first, a valid export license would need to be presented, which then would be reviewed by both the Department of Defense and the Department of State. These reviews would establish whether these exports were consonant with established US arms embargoes. Under this review, the United States often denied the export of both civil and military aircraft, trucks, and spare parts, as well as electronic equipment, given that such materials were likely to be used by Portugal in the war against its colonial subjects. The United States, however, still allowed equipment worth millions of dollars to be sold to Portugal, even remarkably late in the war. In 1972 and 1973 the United States authorized the following:<sup>81</sup>

Country and issuance date	Commodity	Value	End use
<b>Angola:</b>			
Jan. 24, 1972	Aircraft	85,300	Agricultural spraying.
Dec. 20, 1972	do.	90,520	Do.
Feb. 27, 1973	do.	26,000	Private use.
Mar. 1, 1973	Helicopter with parts	140,000	Transportation of personnel and supplies.
<b>Mozambique:</b>			
Jan. 7, 1972	Aircraft	171,600	Private use.
Aug. 1, 1972	do.	70,000	Fish spotting.
Aug. 9, 1972	Helicopters with parts	280,108	Geological survey.
Nov. 3, 1972	Aircraft	150,440	Air taxi.
Do.	do.	150,440	Do.
Do.	do.	579,390	Do.
Nov. 9, 1972	Helicopter parts with accessories and parts	1,726,085	Telephone line inspection, harbor supervision, etc.
Nov. 21, 1972	Aircraft	143,950	Air taxi.
Jan. 15, 1973	do.	143,985	Do.
Feb. 2, 1973	do.	25,000	Flying school.
Do.	do.	30,000	Crop spraying.

Note: Guinea; Madeira Islands; Western Portuguese Africa, NEC, Nil.

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These aircraft and parts were clearly destined for the colonies. However, since their use was civilian, they did not breach any of the standing embargoes on Portugal, and therefore their

<sup>80</sup> Implementation of the U.S. arms embargo (against Portugal and South Africa, and related issues). Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, first session, 1973

<sup>81</sup> Implementation of the U.S. arms embargo (against Portugal and South Africa, and related issues). Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, first session, 1973

<sup>82</sup> Implementation of the U.S. arms embargo (against Portugal and South Africa, and related issues). Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, first session, 1973, pp.29

sale was authorized. America's rules generally permitted the sale of civilian aircraft, but only if its end-user could be satisfactorily established as civilian (i.e. agricultural aircraft, airlines, etc.); as for military aircraft, or aircraft that could be operated by both civil and military operators, these sales were generally denied.<sup>83</sup>

I have focused on aircraft for this section for two reasons: the first is that I have been able to find primary sources regarding these procedures; the second is that Washington had, as a matter of course, denied Lisbon access to equipment that could be used on the ground during the colonial war. It also leads into the next section, Workarounds, where it is shown how Portugal succeeded in acquiring aircraft that would have otherwise been banned for export by the US.

### **Workarounds**

Naturally, when restrictive regulations arise, new methods to work around them are devised; after all, there are profits to be made where there is a demand not being met. In many cases, such as with Germany, Portugal used clever wording and a few mental gymnastics to be able to acquire and field the equipment it needed. However, with America, a much less cooperative partner, the workarounds had to be generally more inventive. One such case was the 1965 purchase of several B-26 airplanes. The acquisition of this aircraft was done through a Swiss intermediary, who contracted a Canadian company to refurbish the planes. The purchase was authorized by the US to a company they believed was acting in good faith. The Portuguese, for their part, claimed that they were unaware of the law-breaking nature of the deal. They received seven of the B-26s they had attempted to purchase using the intermediaries as a way to bypass American law and have a degree of separation between them and the illegality of their actions.<sup>84</sup>

The result of this situation was increased friction between Lisbon and Washington. Portugal believed it was in the right, as they paid a man in good standing for the items they

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<sup>83</sup> Implementation of the U.S. arms embargo (against Portugal and South Africa, and related issues). Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, first session, 1973

<sup>84</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, October 9, 1965, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548.

received. While America investigated the issue as a criminal matter, for someone was in clear breach of US law, it was not immediately clear to the Americans if the B-26s were US Government property or had been properly surplus. There were efforts to pursue a declaration from Portugal as to where these aircraft were to be used, however, the Portuguese were unwilling to make any such declarations as they would be meaningless. Lisbon, furthermore, refused to return the planes, citing they were paid in cash, and purchased in good faith.<sup>85</sup>

Lisbon further used this situation to raise issues with the American arms embargo. The Portuguese stated that the diplomatic friction that had arisen from the purchase of the planes far outweighed their importance, meaning that Portugal should be allowed to keep the aircraft without further interference. A statement mirrored by the Americans, who judged that the damage done to their relations far outweighed the tactical relevance of these aircraft and, therefore, the aircraft should be returned to the US. The Portuguese contended that America had authorized the sales of weapons to a wide array of African countries, citing Congo as an example, and that those countries, unlike Portugal, were not allies of the United States of America.<sup>86</sup> Portugal in this instance seemed to not see any issues in its actions, or, more likely, saw them as necessary and refused to acknowledge the issue to legitimize its position.

The workarounds were not only meant to skirt American regulations relating to the acquisition of weapons. The Portuguese also allowed other regulations to be broken, as exemplified by the sale of Rhodesian chromium through Mozambique to American companies. The shipping of Rhodesian material from Portuguese ports in Mozambique was nothing new, but during the 1960s the United States imposed sanctions on Rhodesia which prohibited American companies to purchase this mineral. Portuguese officials, however, issued fraudulent documentation stating that that material had arrived in and been shipped from Mozambique before

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<sup>85</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, October 9, 1965, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548.

<sup>86</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State, August 18, 1967, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PORT.



sanctions came into effect.<sup>87</sup> Portuguese trade with Rhodesia was another point of contention between America and Portugal. Lisbon maintained trading relations with the Rhodesians and often decried what the Portuguese seemingly viewed as a hypocritical condemnation of their position since they saw that much of the world still maintained some trading relations with Rhodesia.<sup>88</sup> Portugal was often accused of aiding in the contraband of Rhodesian chromium, as has been stated with their shipping of said mineral. Other goods such as petroleum were also shipped through Portuguese ports in Africa. Lisbon, however, was not solely to blame for running the blockade on Rhodesia; they contended that shipments of Rhodesian goods made through their ports were often carried by foreign vessels, especially ships flagged or operated by Britain or France.<sup>89</sup> Portugal's trade with Rhodesia was not only a workaround for Rhodesian exports, they also facilitated Rhodesian imports. These imports would be shipped to Mozambique, where they would be resold to South African dealers that then, instead of taking the items to South Africa, would take them to Rhodesia, throwing a lifeline to the embattled unrecognized state.<sup>90</sup>

In both the cases I explored in this section, that is, the purchase of B-26 planes and the chromium export, charges were brought against the American companies and intermediaries that had been complicit in breaking sanctions and export restrictions. These cases further strained relations between the United States and Portugal.

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<sup>87</sup> Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), October 31, 1969, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

<sup>88</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, November 18, 1967, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 PORT.

<sup>89</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, June 16, 1967, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, NATO 3 LUX.

<sup>90</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, November 18, 1967, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 PORT.

## The Azores

The Lajes air base in the Azores was a key strategic point for the defense of NATO's interests in the Atlantic. This air base is located, effectively, in a midway point between North America and Europe, meaning that in the event of armed conflict in the North Atlantic it would play a very strategic role in defending that area. In 1970 United States Secretary of Defense, Marvin Laird, considered that "for the foreseeable future the Azores will continue to be of major strategic importance as a base for anti-submarine warfare activities, as a site for communications and high-frequency direction-finding operations, and mid-Atlantic search and rescue operations"<sup>91</sup>, highlighting the fact that the base was still an extremely relevant point in NATO's defense strategy. The significance of the base continued to grow as Soviet activity in the Atlantic had increased in the early 70s, though this did not urge Lisbon to ease its negotiating position about the renewal of the lease for the base.<sup>92</sup>

The first use of the airbase by the United States was during World War II, but they transferred control of the base back to Portugal in 1946. However, with the onset of the Cold War and the formation of NATO, the strategic significance of the base came back into mind. The use of the base was extended once again to America in 1951 for five years and later extended until 1962. This agreement also stated that the temporary leasing of facilities concerned peacetime activities, as the base would be open to America in wartime for as long as NATO existed. At the end of this agreement, however, the Americans were not made to leave the base, nor did they immediately enter into another agreement.<sup>93</sup> This limbo, where America was afforded the use of the base without any formal agreement, was one of the reasons why America adopted a milder

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<sup>91</sup> Memorandum from Arthur Downey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 2, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

<sup>92</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, April 16, 1971, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

<sup>93</sup> Memorandum from Arthur Downey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 2, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

stance towards Portugal in fear of losing access to such a strategically important point in the Atlantic.

The subject of the Azores had been brought up as a talking point in several discussions between the two countries before, America's opposition to Portugal's continued hold on their colonies was often substantially lowered due to fears of losing access to the base. In fact, the fear of losing the Lajes Airbase was so substantial that the US resigned their position to a mostly rhetorical one, leaving little more than an arms embargo as a tangible consequence to Portugal's policies.<sup>94</sup> In 1967, Portugal began, in earnest, formal talks with the US regarding the use of the base. The Portuguese informed the Americans that they were willing to continue this partnership and that compensation for the use of the base could be through military assistance or economic assistance. Portugal also brought up the possibility of the United States issuing no-interest or low-interest loans as a form of payment for the base. Lisbon waited for the conclusion of the negotiations related to the establishment of an American base in Spain before pushing further the negotiations for the Lajes Field. This was done for two reasons: first, to not strain the American efforts with multiple negotiations that might impact one another; second, to see how the deal would work out for Spain and, perhaps, give Portugal more information as to what the Americans were willing to give for basing rights.<sup>95</sup> It is also reasonable to conclude that Lisbon was in no hurry to enact a deal regarding the base, as the limbo between having access to the base but no formal deal that guaranteed it gave Portugal an incredibly important asset that it could leverage in many negotiations.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> RODRIGUES, Luís, "As negociações que nunca acabaram: a renovação do acordo das Lajes em 1962", in "Penélope. Revista de História e Ciências Sociais, No. 22", Cooperativa Penélope, Fazer e Desfazer a História, 2000

<sup>95</sup> Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 9, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

<sup>96</sup> RODRIGUES, Luís, "As negociações que nunca acabaram: a renovação do acordo das Lajes em 1962", in "Penélope. Revista de História e Ciências Sociais, No. 22", Cooperativa Penélope, Fazer e Desfazer a História, 2000

In 1969, the United States invested one million dollars in developmental aid for Portugal, and in response to Portugal's renewed interest in negotiating a deal regarding the use of the base the State Department debated increasing that aid to close to 10 million dollars.<sup>97</sup> In 1970, they continued to debate the situation, suggesting the increase of developmental aid to 5 million dollars as a way to start negotiations and to keep Lisbon happy enough to at least maintain the *status quo*. This aid would come from the Department of Agriculture, as these funds would be targeted for the development of agriculture in Portugal, thus posing a lesser chance of upsetting American public sentiment.<sup>98</sup> This offer, however, did not go over well with the Portuguese, with Marcelo Caetano reportedly calling the offer "not only laughable but also offensive". Lisbon demanded the package be increased to 25 million dollars per year.<sup>99</sup> The Portuguese were, in fact, so immensely displeased with the offers they had received that, in 1971, the Americans believed they would rather have the airbase mothballed for wartime NATO usage than continue with the current state of affairs. The Department of Agriculture was against a large offer towards Portugal due to the difficulty of explaining it to congress<sup>100</sup>, who at the time considered that America had been taking on too much of Europe's burden in NATO.<sup>101</sup> Portugal's less-than-stellar standing within American politics was also not helping its situation, as any assistance would face greater pushback from congress. Nevertheless, a different compensation package had to be suggested. The duration and extent of the package changed during the negotiations, with suggestions including a request for Portugal to

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<sup>97</sup> Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), May 25, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I

<sup>98</sup> Memorandum from Arthur Downey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 2, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

<sup>99</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, April 16, 1971, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

<sup>100</sup> Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), April 6, 1971, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

<sup>101</sup> Telegram from Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, June 4, 1971, National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 579.

recognize soybean oil as edible in exchange for more agricultural aid, and the transfer of an oceanographic survey vessel to Portugal, among others.<sup>102</sup>

Important as these talks were during the twilight years of the *Estado Novo*, the exact deal reached, and its negotiations fall beyond the scope of this dissertation. The deal itself is also not as important as the negotiations that were eternally dragged on by Portugal to maintain its main point of leverage, which the Portuguese could use to skew their diplomatic interactions with America in their favor. This meant that the United States were forced to abdicate from their strong anti-colonial stance, so as to not hazard their access to the base.

## **Conclusions**

America saw in Portugal an important strategic ally; whose Atlantic holdings were invaluable to the appropriate defense of NATO interests in the Atlantic Ocean. However, the United States Government, as did its people, held the belief that colonialism was unacceptable. After World War II, America's pre-existing anti-colonial ideology was expanded from the American continent to encompass Africa and Asia, and its recognition of the right to self-determination played a significant role in the post-war world. Furthermore, America's consent to sales of equipment to neighboring countries, where they would often be diverted to the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa, continued throughout the war, which was seen with great suspicion in Portugal especially since this same equipment was denied to them. Lisbon seemed especially offended at the arms embargo imposed by the United States. To Portugal, the availability of American weapons to what they considered as unfriendly regimes in Africa while denying them the same arms was an absurd position that made little sense. The Portuguese further brought up the fact that they had been offered weapons from Czechoslovakia in an attempt to sway the Americans to lift the embargo.

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<sup>102</sup> Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), April 6, 1971, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

Along with America's position also came Salazar's traditional anti-American stance, which went from generally harmless, even a bit ridiculous, such as a ban on Coca-Cola, to the more serious that was the commonplace airing of anti-American programming on radio and television. Portugal also facilitated the sale of Rhodesian commodities, such as oil and minerals, by allowing them to be shipped from ports in Mozambique. These sales were further aggravating as Portugal allowed American companies to go around American sanctions, as well as allowed the shipping of strategic relevant resources, such as tantalite, to the Soviet Union.

These friction points flared up during the Kennedy administration, who forwarded America's anti-colonial agenda to a point further than it had ever been before. They adopted an antagonistic posture towards Portugal, restricting the export of weapons and of most equipment that would be useful in the colonies. However, due to their Atlantic holdings, namely the Azores, the Portuguese could maneuver diplomatically and make America's stance a lot milder than it would otherwise have been. Washington proposed and propelled forward resolutions in the UN that targeted the Portuguese ability to maintain their colonial empire while defending Portugal from mandatory sanctions and other more harmful propositions that could have been passed in the UN. This complex and seemingly contradictory position of both attacking and defending Portugal in the UN is, in my opinion, one of the most interesting aspects of the Luso-American relations of that era.

Portugal, for its part, did its best to gain access to American equipment it needed, which included the acquisition of several aircraft in a less-than-legal manner. Portugal also attempted to obtain American expertise, such as training for the Portuguese officers, and loans and other financial assistance. The Portuguese leveraged the immensely important air base in the Azores to their advantage, as well as any other form of leverage they could find in the negotiations with the US. Their clever diplomatic maneuvering, however, could not get America to relieve much pressure off them, much less undo the arms embargo that shut the doors on most equipment sales.

## **V - The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany**

Germany, as a result of the end of World War II, was in effect partitioned in two separate states, which maintained a claim to each other's territory. The North-Eastern portion of Germany was occupied by the Soviet Union, being turned into a communist satellite state. The remaining area, called West Germany, was occupied in three zones by the British, Americans, and French. West Germany, or officially the Federal Republic of Germany, maintained its independence. However, neither state was entirely recognized by the international community, which essentially meant that the west did not recognize the east and vice-versa, and both Germanies joined their respective alliances. This situation resulted in a long, significant period when neither Germany was a member state of the United Nations.

Due to its recent past history, occupied Germany was initially denied the ability to produce arms and other war materials, besides not being allowed to possess its own military after the Wehrmacht was disbanded. However, this stance would not be held by the Western Allies for very long, given the new threat from the East and the escalation of the Cold War. The reestablishment of the German military with the Bundeswehr in 1955 and, by extension, the reestablishment of its arms industry was crucial to NATO's strategic defense in Europe.

One of Germany's first backers was Portugal. Portugal defended the integration of West Germany into the international community soon after the end of the war. Portugal also had a strategic position that was complementary to Germany's since Portugal is the west-most country in Europe and Germany was then the east-most country in NATO. These positions essentially meant that Portugal was a relatively safe zone in the event of a war, while Germany would likely be the first casualty of World War III.<sup>103</sup> As such, West Germany sought fall-back positions and strong allies in its rearguard. At first, they secured deals for the storage of weapons and supplies and the use of bases in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. These, however, were not sufficient to fulfill the FRG's goals, so Portugal was the next logical decision.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> FONSECA, Ana Mónica, "*A força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (158-1968)*", Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007

<sup>104</sup> LOPES, Rui, "*Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974*" London, 2011

Portugal and West Germany elevated their respective delegations in each other's countries to embassies in 1956. This change came after a long period of friendship among these nations and took place not long after the remilitarization of West Germany just a year before. Portugal's geographic position and its close ties to Bonn led to the establishment of German military bases and warehouses in Portugal. These warehouses would serve to stash a considerable amount of military equipment, such as rifles and uniforms. Such equipment would be available to the FRG in case the West Germans needed to reconstitute their forces in the event of a war. This equipment would also be made available to Portugal in times of need, as long as they were replaced by Portugal by either returning the borrowed equipment in good condition or replacing them with brand-new items. The stationing of equipment in Portugal also required the creation of large port facilities and storehouses, which were built with German investment; however, these were not the only facilities to be built with the help of German expertise and money. Portugal developed a significant and robust arms industry of its own, producing rifles, explosives, and other war materials. Initially, the production of weapons like the G-3 rifles and their ammunition was meant to level Portugal's balance of trade with Germany; then it became an important asset in arming Portugal during its long-running conflict with its colonies, while also maintaining its initial objective of exporting to West Germany.<sup>105</sup>

German assistance in setting up the Portuguese arms industry was indispensable. Designs for weapons such as the G3 (originally developed as the CETME in Spain by German engineers after World War II), specifications for ammunition such as the 7.6x51 NATO cartridge, and the tooling and expertise required to set up the factories that would produce them, all of these came from West Germany. Assistance would also come in the form of German exports of steel, chemicals, and other raw materials, which would not otherwise have been available to Portugal. Nevertheless, imports for both the private and public sectors would often run into significant delays, as exemplified by the expansion proposed in 1962 of the facilities of the Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, that spent years waiting for Portuguese import permits for the building materials required for the expansion.

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<sup>105</sup> FONSECA, Ana Mónica, *"A força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (158-1968)"*, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007



As the FRG reasserted itself on the global stage, it required more allies to defend its strategic aims and its various economic interests. West Germany found these allies in Africa. As the many nations of that continent gained their independence, Bonn endeavored to expand the German trade and diplomatic efforts with them. These efforts were guided by the ‘Hallstein Doctrine’ that sought to exclude East Germany from the global stage. As new countries became independent, Bonn would offer political, diplomatic, and economic support as long as the countries also supported West Germany’s goals.

This expansion into Africa would eventually lead to increased strain on West Germany’s ability to supply Portugal’s military, since, understandably, these newly independent nations generally supported the various independence and liberation movements that were still active in Africa. Besides that, Germany would enter the UN in 1973 and would then be under the pressure of the various embargoes and resolutions that had been passed against Portugal, further straining their relationship with Lisbon.

### **Establishing the Luso-German Commission**

In 1960, talks that paved the way for deeper military cooperation between Lisbon and Bonn included the establishment of an air base in Beja and the formation of a commission to handle the affairs related to military cooperation between the two nations. The *Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã* (CMLA) began its functions in 1963 and reported directly to the Portuguese ministry of defense. The Portuguese delegation was led by Admiral Sousa Uva and the German delegation by Colonel Becker.<sup>106</sup>

The establishment of this commission was decided at those same initial talks regarding German use of air and naval bases in Portugal, as well as the storage of “logistical stocks” in Portuguese territory that could supply troops for 20 days of fighting. These agreements mirrored similar agreements undertaken by Germany in other NATO countries, such as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. These bases would be used in peacetime to train sailors and airmen, and in

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<sup>106</sup> FONSECA, Ana Mónica, “*A força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (158-1968)*”, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007

wartime they would serve as important rearguard positions in case German forces needed to regroup.<sup>107</sup> In addition to helping manage the use of bases in Portugal, the CMLA dealt with a significant number of other military matters, as well as economic matters, especially those related to the production of war materials. The dealings that took place with the commission were not limited to the purchase and selling of completed weapons. Purchase of spare parts and warranty services, among other things, were handled by the CMLA. They also held an important role in establishing and modernizing the Portuguese military industry by facilitating German help, as can be exemplified by the manufacturing of G3 rifles in Portugal, or the significant assistance toward Portugal's aircraft industry.<sup>108</sup>

### **Volume of Orders**

The Mixed Luso-German Commission handled a high volume of orders both to and from Portugal. Here I will go over the quantities of some of the items moved through the commission. The specifics of these orders, however, will be covered in Chapter VI.

Portugal kept “maps” of the equipment purchased through the commission. These documents related the orders from 1964<sup>109</sup> to 1974<sup>110</sup> with maps of equipment that arrived in Portugal. Throughout this period Portugal placed extensive orders for war materials from Germany. Chart 1, on page 47, is an example of that; it contains the order summary for August 1965. The data comes from a monthly report by Admiral Sousa Uva; although it is not clear exactly when these orders were made, the delivery date available for some of these items indicates that

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<sup>107</sup> FONSECA, Ana Mónica, *“A força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (158-1968)”*, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007

<sup>108</sup> Telecomunicações e electrónica: eventual colaboração com a indústria de armamento da RFA, 1968, PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0103/018, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>109</sup> Encomendas de Portugal à RFA, 1965-1968, PT/ADN/CMLA/029/0068/004, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>110</sup> Mapas de Encomendas e Certificados de Destino de Material, 1965-1975, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

they had already been delivered, while many more were to be delivered in August and September 1965. <sup>111</sup>

<b><u>Chart 1 – Order Report August 1965</u></b> <sup>112</sup>	
<b><u>Item</u></b>	<b><u>Quantity</u></b>
Ammunition for Bofors L/60-40mm	10000
7.65x17mm (.32 ACP) Ammunition	100000
89mm ‘EX’ Bazooka Rockets	500
Walther PPK 7.65mm (.32 ACP) Pistol	100
Walther PP 7.65mm (.32 ACP) Pistol	90
Walther P-38 9mm Pistol	450
3,5” Bazooka	1000
81MM Mortars	150
MG-42 Tripods	50
Scopes for the G-3 Rifle	66
AN/GRC-26 C – P55 Radio Sets	3
Replacement Parts for AN/PRC-1G	3
Amplifiers LV-80 FO AN/GRC-9 Radios	6

Similar reports were filed in other months and other years, with these reports often including hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for small arms, several hundred pistols, assorted replacement parts, assorted electronic equipment, ammunition for things such as mortars,

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<sup>111</sup> Mapas mensais de encomendas na RFA, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>112</sup> Mapas mensais de encomendas na RFA, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

autocannons, and rocket launchers. Even the purchases of police dogs<sup>113</sup> and barbed wire<sup>114</sup> that were processed through the CMLA were related in these reports. The records regarding these orders changed a little in their organization in 1971; the report was no longer the central part of the record, being replaced by receipts of items.<sup>115</sup>

These orders were not only large in value, but they were also large in a more literal sense. In October 1965, for example, nearly 20 tons of material were received, consisting mostly of 81mm Mortars and a few pistols. In November of that same year, a telegram was sent from the German warehouse in Alverca to the CMLA, requesting that the Portuguese find a different location to store goods shipped to them via *Luftwaffe* aircraft. This was due to a large stock of replacement parts intended for the *Luftwaffe* F104 fighter jet, which left them with no room to spare for Portugal's orders, otherwise they would be at risk of having to stop all shipping from the base due to a lack of space.<sup>116</sup>

### **The Issues in Africa and Elsewhere**

West Germany's "*Africapolitik*" was, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, defined by the 'Hallstein doctrine' that dictated its opposition to communism and a desire to isolate its eastern counterpart. Hence, the West-German Government would refuse to establish diplomatic ties with any state that recognized East Germany, apart from the Soviet Union. Bonn would rely on its positive image to expand its economic and diplomatic goals in Africa. This image benefited from the fact that Germany did not share the same extensive colonial past that most European nations did, and also

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<sup>113</sup> Mapas mensais das encomendas e consultas à RFA, 1968, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071/004, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>114</sup> Mapas mensais das encomendas e consultas à RFA, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071/005, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>115</sup> Certificados de destino de encomendas de material, 1971, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071/010, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>116</sup> Mapas mensais de encomendas na RFA, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

from West Germany's substantial foreign aid programs that used the 'Hallstein Doctrine' as a tool to further isolate East Germany.<sup>117</sup>

The FRG's standing in Africa would be hindered by Portugal's use of weapons provided by Bonn in the colonial war, which quickly became a sore spot for a significant portion of Africa's emerging states. Portugal used German fighter planes, rifles, and machine guns, besides having its own military industry supplied, or at least assisted, by Germany's industry and Government. The newly independent nations of Africa were understandably upset by these actions, which became a recurring topic for many of them during their negotiations with West Germany. Germany's assurances that these weapons were provided under the condition of them being used in Portugal's NATO duties or for the defense of its territory did not appease the African nations for long, since time and again Portugal would utilize all weapons they had available to continue the war against the colonies. This would lead to continued pushback on the FRG to cease its aid to Portugal.<sup>118</sup>

The position that Bonn had put itself in was difficult. On the one hand, they did not wish to denounce a NATO ally and risk NATO access to the all-important bases in the Azores, as well as slighting an important business partner. On the other hand, they did not wish to anger the emerging African nations that not only had opposed Portugal's colonial aspirations since before the beginning of the war but were becoming more adversarial as the conflict dragged on. Bonn's military assistance to Portugal would, therefore, be a source of constant friction with the emerging African nations.<sup>119</sup>

In November 1970, the troubles for the FRG caused by Portugal's war on its colonies would worsen with a Portuguese incursion into Guinea-Conakry to release Portuguese POWs. This action was condemned by the UN, though Portugal denied having any part in the raid. The incursion was not an isolated incident, and after the first raid, Portugal continued to make

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<sup>117</sup> LOPES, Rui, *"Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974"*, London, 2011

<sup>118</sup> LOPES, Rui, *"Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974"* London, 2011

<sup>119</sup> LOPES, Rui, *"Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974"* London, 2011

incursions into the territories of countries neighboring Guinea Bissau in search of Guinean rebels and their supporters. African, and indeed global, opposition to Portugal would be aggravated considerably after the attack. These actions also came during the brief *détente* of the cold war, which further exacerbated the issue of the cross-border raid. In the aftermath of Portugal's actions, Bonn's relations with Guinea-Conakry rapidly deteriorated, ending with the complete break-off of diplomatic relations between the two, and the recognition of East Germany by Guinea-Conakry. As for Portugal, the aftermath was a considerably deteriorated diplomatic position. Their actions outraged even their NATO allies, leading to a considerable increase in tensions within the alliance.<sup>120</sup>

In 1971, West Germany significantly decreased its military assistance towards Portugal. This came after the condemnation of FRG's foreign policy for many years by African leaders and the OAU, although such a move did not appease them. These people and organizations constantly decried German and NATO military assistance towards Portugal, and their complaints only gained more weight as time went on, given that more and more countries in Africa became independent and the continent gained importance in the Cold War. Adding to that, many solidarity movements in Europe joined the condemnation of apartheid and colonial states.<sup>121</sup>

In 1973, when both East and West Germany would finally gain entrance into the UN, few nations opposed the move enough to manifest it. The entrance of West Germany into the UN would bind it to several of the UN's resolutions, including those that encouraged or outright called for arms embargoes against Portugal. After 1973, the Portuguese regime would face considerable difficulties in acquiring materials, and opposition to the Government's policies would continue to mount within Portugal itself, leading to the Government's downfall in 1974, as covered in Chapter II.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> LOPES, Rui, "Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974" London, 2011

<sup>121</sup> LOPES, Rui, "Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974", London, 2011

<sup>122</sup> LOPES, Rui, "Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974", London, 2011

Also, in 1973 there were talks in Germany about imposing a complete arms embargo on Portugal and ceasing all exports to Portugal, including those that would be legitimately used in fulfillment of their NATO duties. These discussions arose out of Bonn's inability to ensure that the weapons provided would be used for the defense of Portugal and not in the continued repression of its colonial subjects. The fact that Portugal continuously used this equipment in the colonies is nearly indisputable. When the end-user agreement stated that the equipment would be used only in Portugal, the Portuguese contended that their overseas provinces were an inalienable part of Portugal. When the agreement was altered to state that their use would be restricted to Portugal's NATO duties, the Portuguese contended that they were fighting communist-backed insurgents in the colonies, and that, therefore, the use of those weapons against the independence movements were more than justified. This back-and-forth of half-hearted agreements was largely made to appease the Africans in hopes that they would back off on their pressure against the FRG, but the success from these agreements was always minimal and temporary.<sup>123</sup>

However, Bonn had, up to that point, made little fuss over the use of their equipment on what was, in all but name, an overt breach of end-user agreements. It was only natural that the proposed embargo was quickly shot down. Bonn stated that no evidence supported the accusation that the Portuguese had overstepped the boundaries of the end-user agreements, and that any such embargo would breach treaties with NATO, even though other NATO countries had by then imposed embargoes on Portugal. It can never be truly said that the Government in Bonn broke with the Portuguese regime, although they had never openly supported Portugal's actions. The FRG sought to distance itself from Portugal's acts in the colonies.<sup>124</sup> West Germany had taken on duties and commitments imposed upon them by its UN membership and was now under pressure to abide by the UN's many resolutions, several of which condemned Portugal and other colonial/apartheid states, such as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1819 (1962) or the United Nations Security Council Resolution 322 (1972).

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<sup>123</sup> LOPES, Rui, *“Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974”*, London, 2011

<sup>124</sup> LOPES, Rui, *“Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974”*, London, 2011

The distancing between Lisbon and Bonn was also propelled by increasing western opposition to the colonial war. A significant proportion of western opposition came from non-government actors. Youth organizations, anti-colonialism activists, communists, and other groups mounted opposition to Portugal and to governments that supplied Portugal. One instance of that is a 1969 letter by 30 Dutch youth groups that denounced the construction of warships in Hamburg which were meant for the Portuguese navy. The distancing of Bonn's and Lisbon's positions was furthered, at least concerning war material and their respective African policies, by the short rapprochement of the Eastern and Western Blocs in the early 1970s. These political hurdles were in addition to changes made to NATO's strategy in 1961, which moved to a stance of all-out attack, meaning a full nuclear response against any aggression from the east. This meant that Portugal's position as a strategic rearguard position was no longer as vital as it had been in the past. However, the Lajes Air Base still maintained its importance, so much so that West Germany's negotiators and politicians attempted to refrain from any position that would jeopardize the continued use of the base by NATO forces.<sup>125</sup>

### **The Beja Air Base**

Not soon after the remilitarization of Germany, in 1961, Germany entered into an agreement with Portugal for an airbase that would serve as a fallback position during wartime, as well as for flight training during peacetime, though initially no live fire or supersonic flights were allowed. This deal would cement the foundation of Portugal's and Germany's military cooperation. Portugal would cede the use of an area near the city of Beja in the Alentejo, and Germany, for its part, would build the infrastructure required for its operation, which included base facilities, roads, and railways. Housing for base personnel and a large military hospital would also be built under the agreement. Additionally, the agreement was predicated on the authorities in Bonn agreeing to place significant orders with Portugal's military industry, which included major contracts for rifles,

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<sup>125</sup> LOPES, Rui, *Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974*, London, 2011



grenades, bombs for aircraft, among other war materials.<sup>126</sup> These contracts were so important that they were still honored even throughout the colonial war, though they often needed to be renegotiated or delayed, as can be observed with the deliveries of the G-3 Rifle<sup>127</sup> or 105mm ammunition<sup>128</sup> that had been contracted by Bonn in the 1960s. Additionally, Bonn would also be expected to supply Portugal with weapons and other war materials as needed, which included the lending of hundreds of aircraft and other surplus equipment, the sale of ammunition, guns, and other equipment, as well as the construction of warships.<sup>129</sup>

Construction of the air base began in 1963, after the signing of agreements in 1962 that regulated the German presence in Portugal, though it would still not be completed by 1968<sup>130</sup>, when Germany had all but abandoned the base, leading to its use by civilian airlines in 1969. But, in late 1969, there was a renewed interest in the base, which led to a revival of its military use the following year. The renewed agreement also made an allowance for live-fire training. However, by 1972 little progress had been made and, eventually, the German Air Force saw fewer and fewer reasons to remain attached to the project, leading to a significant withdrawal of personnel and investment in infrastructure and military projects in Portugal. Bonn's spending on military infrastructure in Portugal had been extensive: by 1971 over 214 million DM had been spent, including over 144 million DM for the Beja air base. These expenditures demonstrated the enormous efforts that had been made in Portugal; however, such efforts had not yielded the results required to maintain them and had as well presented a significant issue with many African nations

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<sup>126</sup> FONSECA, Ana Mónica, *"A força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (158-1968)"*, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007

<sup>127</sup> Espingardas automáticas (CETME e G3) para o governo alemão, 1959-1961,

PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>128</sup> Telecomunicações e electrónica: eventual colaboração com a indústria de armamento da RFA, 1968,

PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0103/018, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>129</sup> LOPES, Rui, *"Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974"*, London, 2011

<sup>130</sup> FONSECA, Ana Mónica, *"A força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (158-1968)"*, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007

due to Portugal's colonial policies. Therefore, the German Government decided to cut their annual investments in Portugal by a third.<sup>131</sup>

The Beja Air Base was one of many bilateral deals that were struck between Bonn and Lisbon. These deals cemented much of Lisbon's relationship with Bonn; additional deals of the production of arms and munitions would be signed throughout this period, making for a mutually beneficial relationship between these countries. However, the deal for the air base was not the most advantageous for the Germans, given that the use of the Beja Air Base required frequent flyovers over Spain, which demanded authorization beforehand, hindering their use of the base. Another problem was that Spain was not a member of NATO, therefore if Spain remained neutral in case of a war flying military planes over its territory would be infeasible. Yet another reason for the diminishing interest in the base was the mounting costs of the ever-expanding plans and budget cuts during the *détente*.<sup>132</sup> In essence, as construction continued in Beja, the strategic relevance of this base diminished. This caused Bonn to gradually lose interest in the project, leading the Germans to abandon the project not once, but twice.

### **Industrial Assistance**

The modern Portuguese military industry was effectively kick-started with West-German assistance. An obvious example of this assistance is the setup of G-3 rifle production in Portugal. The specifics of this deal are covered in Chapter VI but, in short, Germany ceded the rifle design specifications to Portugal and assisted in setting up the licensed production of these rifles in the country, while Portugal committed to exporting a significant portion of its production to Germany. In an interesting aside, Portugal had to pay 2.5% royalties to Germany that would then be paid to CETME in Spain, as the Spanish still held the patents that served as the basis for the G-3's roller-delayed blowback operating mechanism. Germany also assisted Portugal in modernizing its munitions production by transferring design specifications for cartridges, such as the 7.62 NATO

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<sup>131</sup> LOPES, Rui, *Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974*, London, 2011

<sup>132</sup> LOPES, Rui, *Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974*, London, 2011

cartridge, as well as assisting in the setup of production facilities for ammunition and explosives. The establishment of production facilities for these items was initially meant to balance out the import-export ratio between Portugal and the FRG, meaning that much of the production was meant to be exported to Germany. As such, the quality of the production had to be as good as the quality of German production since the rifles and ammunition would be used by the *Bundeswehr*.

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Other projects also had significant German assistance during this period, such as the expansion of the Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, as well as the expansion of the Fábrica Nacional de Munições de Armas Ligeiras, Fábrica Militar do Braço de Prata, and Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronáutico. All of these were state-owned enterprises that manufactured or serviced arms and other military equipment for Portugal.

To elaborate on the previous paragraph, the main example I will explore in this section is the CPMB's expansion, as it relates to the significance of German assistance, the needs of the military, and several major inconveniences of working both with Lisbon and Bonn. The CPMB was a large munitions manufacturer for the Portuguese state, it existed in one way or another since the first half 18<sup>th</sup> century, eventually being dissolved in 2008. The expansion contracted in 1962 was supposed to increase the production capabilities of the factory to include the production of RDX explosives and the equipment to fill these explosives into shells and warheads, as well as to increase production output of the factory and modernize its existing capabilities.<sup>134</sup> The assembly of new production facilities would be made with assistance from WASAG-Chemie AG from Essen, West Germany. The company would supply by 1965 the machinery and expertise needed to conclude the required upgrades. Other inquiries were made to other companies before the decision to go with WASAG. The British PENCOL was considered for a time and, though both the British Government and PENCOL were eager to work with Portugal, the German offering was chosen, due to the large number of orders that had already been placed by Germany. The Portuguese were also concerned as to what the license agreement would entail, because they

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<sup>133</sup> Espingardas automáticas CETME e G3, 1959-1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>134</sup> Expansão da Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0103/012, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

wanted to produce TNT, RDX, and other explosives in Portugal using resources that were available in Portugal, for both military and civilian purposes. Lisbon also wished to export these explosives, if possible. Though the documentation does not explicitly state it, it appears, given the concerns voiced in the documentation, that the production license from London would be more restrictive than Bonn's.<sup>135</sup>

Further evidence of the urgent need for these improvements were some unsafe practices and outdated equipment still being used by the CPMB. These unsafe practices resulted in an explosion in 1963 in one of the two powder drying facilities, which damaged them. This required the reworking of production to make way for safer working practices. In 1964, a report stated that the facilities for the production of fuses were “primitive”, not being able to produce fuses with plastic components, and also highlighted the elevated price of the ones produced. This report concluded that there was an urgent need to upgrade these facilities in order to be competitive with foreign products. Laboratory facilities were also upgraded during this time.<sup>136</sup>

These newfound resources would be pursued with German assistance and, in return, Portugal would take on the duty to supply Bonn with 900,000 warheads for the *Panzerfaust* rocket launchers. These rockets were loaded with Composition B, which is a mix of RDX and TNT. Portuguese-produced ammunition for mortars and howitzers were generally filled only with TNT, as that was the only suitable high explosive that could be handled at their facilities. An important note is that these explosives and related equipment were often themselves imported, as shown by numerous orders to Dynamite Nobel in Germany. This can be exemplified by a 1971 order for detonators and primers for grenades to be used by the FMBP.<sup>137</sup> The facilities at CPMB were not capable of working with Composition B at the time, because they lacked the ability to produce and handle RDX. Along with the need to expand CPMB's capabilities, it was also necessary to increase output due to the ever-expanding situation in the colonies. Even though the expansion of

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<sup>135</sup> Expansão da Fábrica da Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, 1962,

PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0102/006, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>136</sup> Expansão da Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0103/012, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>137</sup> Granadas de mão, 1971, PT/ADN/CMLA/037/0101/051, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

the factory benefited both the Portuguese and German Governments, it was fraught with issues. A fact that aggravated the perceived losses was the fact that the machinery required to work with RDX and composition B had, as of February 1964, already been delivered by WASAG-Chemie, and were essentially just gathering dust in Lisbon's customs warehouse as they awaited for the facilities that would house them to be built.<sup>138</sup>

The expansion would further consist of new production lines for the following: 1) lead azide and lead nitrite; 2) lead styphnate; 3) detonators; 4) penthrite; 5) tetryl. These facilities would allow Portugal to manufacture the "small parts" of explosives, such as modern detonators, primers, and fuses. These new products would complement the capabilities the Portuguese already had to produce the larger portion of explosives, such as the grenade portion of a 105mm artillery shell (meaning the steel shell that served as fragmentation and the explosive portion, but not the more complicated fuse that detonated the shell).<sup>139</sup>

The acquisition of steel rebar for the construction of the facilities was severely delayed. In May 1964, an official letter was sent by the CPMB to the minister of defense complaining about the situation. The proposed expansion had been stopped for the lack of that material, leading to increased costs due to the delays and an increased risk of delays on already contracted materials that relied on these improved facilities. At first, the CPMB had attempted to procure this material from foreign sources, and the delay was caused by Portuguese protectionist measures, which had the Government demanding that the CPMB bought the materials from national sources, although the price was around 25% greater than the international offerings. The CPMB later accepted this demand but had to request funds from the Government to pay for the difference. The Government proved to be less than helpful in the matter by refusing the increased budget and suggesting that CPMB and Siderurgica Nacional (SN), manufacturer of the rebar, resolve the situation on their own. The companies could not even agree to a meeting, let alone pricing. Their dealings were restricted to phone calls and telegrams, which proved to be so ludicrously unhelpful that SN raised their prices from 3217\$00 to 3.590\$00 (the quantity is not related on the offering, I assume this is

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<sup>138</sup> Expansão da Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0103/012, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>139</sup> Expansão da Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0103/012, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

per piece of rebar, though the length and gauge are not mentioned). This letter concluded with a continued plea to be allowed to import the material. A similar letter reminding the minister of defense of the lack of materials was sent in August of that same year and again pleaded for the import permits for the rebar.<sup>140</sup>

Bonn often preferred to offer machinery and expertise instead of ready-made items. The expansion and modernization of Portugal's arms industry needed significant help from outside sources, and Germany could more easily deflect criticism by supplying the tools for producing war material rather than materials directly. The expansion of FNMAL, for instance, was quickly approved by Germany's Foreign Ministry in hopes that they would no longer need to export primers to Portugal for the production of ammunition. The criticism they received regarding these deals was easily swatted away by stating that the machinery remained in the Portuguese mainland, not in the colonies. Bonn was essentially stating that what came out of these factories was of no concern to Germany.<sup>141</sup>

## **Conclusions**

The role that West Germany played in arming Portugal cannot be understated, so much so that this area alone requires its own conclusions, though more examples as to the nature of this assistance will be given later. Lisbon's relationship with Bonn had been an important stepping-stone for reasserting Germany's independence. Portugal had backed Bonn's entrance into the world stage since the end of World War II, and also backed its entrance into NATO. This support was welcomed by the Germans, who sought new allies and relations, and, perhaps above all, required economic partners for their growing industry. The Portuguese for their part benefited greatly from their relationship with FRG. This relation gained further importance when a sizeable, ever-growing portion of the UN positioned itself against Portugal, thus beginning the diplomatic encirclement that characterized the twilight years of the *Estado Novo*. Bonn's position outside of the UN allowed

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<sup>140</sup> Expansão da Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0103/012, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>141</sup> LOPES, Rui, "Between Cold War and Colonial Wars: The making of West German Policy towards the Portuguese dictatorship, 1968-1974", London, 2011

the Germans to ignore the pressures that were put on member-states to restrict arms sales to Portugal, though they were still pressured by individual states and the OAU. Though Germany never broke with Portugal, they also partially caved to foreign demands requiring, at least on paper, more stringent export licenses as time went on. The Germans also attempted to distance themselves from Lisbon's policy towards Africa, oftentimes denying their involvement in arming the Portuguese military. Bonn, seeking to maintain plausible deniability on the matter, as well as to appease Lisbon's desire for a balanced import-export ratio, often favored aiding Portugal's industrial production. Producing weapons and ammunition in Portugal was beneficial on both accounts as the Germans could create a degree of separation between them and the goods they helped produce, as well as allow for the import of these goods from Portugal, thus appeasing Salazarism's ideological desire to balance exports.

West-German assistance allowed Portugal to modernize and expand its military industry, swaging gaps in its previous capabilities and enabling the Portuguese to produce their small arms, ammunition, explosives, and other supplies. These capabilities without a doubt helped Portugal to maintain its Colonial War for a lot longer than it could have otherwise. This does not mean that their direct supplies were any less important, they supplied an enormous number of machine guns, ammunition, mortar rounds, electronic equipment, jets, and warships, among several other items vital to the war effort. As we can glean from the amount of equipment imported into Portugal from West Germany and by the number of items produced in Portugal that were either of German design or built with assistance from German industry, it is impossible to deny the importance of this relationship, especially given the precarious diplomatic and military situation that Portugal had found itself in throughout the war. West Germany was, with little doubt, the most reliable ally Portugal had in the long-running fight to retain control over its overseas colonies.

## **VI - Military Procurement**

As with all militaries, especially those faced with an active armed conflict, the Portuguese Armed Forces required weapons, munitions, uniforms, and other materials for their operations. Portugal, however, had few reliable allies willing to supply it with these items. There were, as has been thoroughly explored in other sections, several reasons for this: Portugal was a dictatorship; it maintained colonial administration in all but name in its “overseas provinces”; and was actively waging war on the native populations of these provinces.

In such a context, the Portuguese had to rely on what little they could get and on whatever political maneuvering they could do to acquire these materials, although they were never in a situation as dire as Rhodesia’s, which had to quickly produce improvised weapons when cut-off from most forms of outside assistance. Portugal, for its part, could largely count on the FRG to furnish what they required; other than that, France and the United States of America could be counted on to lesser extents.

West Germany was in a unique position to assist Portugal. They had, as examined before, a long and mutually beneficial relationship before the onset of the colonial war, in addition to the fact that Bonn was at the head of a sophisticated and highly productive industrial economy, with significant capacity for the production of a wide array of items, including weapons and other war materials. Their complementary positions, especially pertaining to NATO’s defense strategy, was also an important aspect of these relations, allowing Bonn a valid reason to maintain its relationship with Lisbon long after Portugal had become *persona non grata* in the international sphere.

Germany was also unconstrained by the UN’s partial arms embargoes against Portugal. These embargoes caused a considerable conundrum for Portugal, due to their new-found inability to obtain much of the equipment desperately needed for its wartime military. However, both East and West Germany were not member states of the UN, because of the bickering of the Eastern and Western Blocs. Given the situation, West Germany took the pragmatic approach of not abiding by embargoes that, ostensibly, did not concern it. This situation allowed the Germans much more latitude when dealing with Portugal, whereas countries such as Belgium, with an extensive arms



industry of their own and a member of NATO and the UN, was under much more pressure to limit arms sales to Portugal.<sup>142</sup>

Naturally, other holdouts undermined the effectiveness of these embargoes. One of those was France. Building on another long-running partnership with Lisbon, and wanting to reemerge as diplomatically independent, Paris saw Portugal as an important tool for the French foreign policy. However, for reasons that have been covered before, this partnership was not nearly as reliable as the one with West Germany.<sup>143</sup>

### **Permissions**

The export of weapons, in most cases, requires the purchaser to declare their intended purpose before an export license is granted. These export licenses serve as a guarantee of the intended end-user and the most likely form in which those items would be used. This is done to ensure that weapons provided to a state are not used in a manner that would be detrimental to the sellers or to pose an impediment should the buyer decide to sell the weapons to an unauthorized third party. As such, these licenses may include restrictions to the arms' use and re-exportation. One such restriction can be seen in West-German exports to Portugal, where a declaration that weapons were to be used solely by the Portuguese military was introduced into the lending contract for G-1 rifles in 1962.<sup>144</sup>

The United States, for their part, would require that Portugal stated in its requests that “Material purchased under this clause will be used only within the NATO Defense Area as described in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty”. This was in addition to language that referred directly to the 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Portugal

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<sup>142</sup> FONSECA, Ana Mónica, “*A força das Armas: o Apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (158-1968)*”, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007

<sup>143</sup> MARCOS, Daniel, “*Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968)*”, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Portugal, 2007.

<sup>144</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

(TIAS 2187). This defense agreement stipulated that “Neither government, without the prior consent of the other, will devote assistance furnished to it by the other government to purposes other than those for which it was furnished”.<sup>145</sup> Such language was meant to deter any use of American equipment for goals to which America was opposed, a sterling example of which was Portugal’s colonial conflict. This reflects the United States’ long-running doctrine of maintaining a larger control of weapons sold to foreign powers. A more recent example is the refusal to license production of the Patriot Air-Defense System to Turkey, which caused the deal for several Patriot batteries to fall short, which led to Turkey’s adoption of the Russian S-400 system in 2019. In a case more relevant to this study, America made attempts to limit the use of their weapons by the Portuguese in their campaign in Africa. This can be exemplified by a letter from Under Secretary of State Ball to the American Ambassador to Portugal in 1964 that discussed a proposed visit of the Ambassador to Portuguese Africa that ended on the following note: “Now, if you’ll just get him [Franco Nogueira] to pull those F-86s out of Guinea, as he promised to do, we shall be impressed indeed!”.<sup>146</sup> The United States’ less-than-liberal approach to authorizing sales, and their constant vigilance of how their weapons were used after sales, made them a less reliable partner in the acquisition of new military equipment. That went along with the fact that Washington pressured Lisbon to significantly limit the freedom of operation for the American-made equipment once they had been acquired.

France had a good working relationship with Portugal, and its initial readiness to supply arms and munitions was important for Portugal’s war effort. However, as covered before, this readiness quickly declined. The French began to require assurances about what would be done with any new weapon system that was sold to Portugal, and demanded any request for war material to be approved by a commission before the sale could be authorized. This effectively meant that only larger equipment unsuited for a colonial conflict, and spare parts and ammunition for systems that had already been purchased, would be authorized, while sales of new small arms and lighter

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<sup>145</sup> Implementation of the U.S. arms embargo (against Portugal and South Africa, and related issues). Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, first session, 1973

<sup>146</sup> Letter from the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson), February 6, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT.

weapon systems, such as mortars, that were truly useful during the Colonial War were generally denied. Making the French aid much less effective and much less reliable than Germany's.

As for the FRG, Bonn required that the Portuguese Government issued a declaration regarding the end-purpose of the equipment in question. As examined before, in 1962 they required only that Portugal agreed to field the weapons exclusively by their military. As time went on and pressures increased on the FRG to stem the flow of weapons to the Portuguese colonies, Portugal was required to declare that the purchased equipment would be used for the defense of its territory. One such case that required this type of declaration was the purchase of 7.65 ACP ammunition for Portugal's security forces. Apparently, this was the first time any such declaration was required for a routine purchase of ammunition<sup>147</sup>; however, the new declaration was requested for military purposes in a handful of orders before that. This led Portugal to issue a single declaration regarding the acquisition of war material from Germany in 1964, stating that any equipment purchased would be used only in Portugal and in defense of NATO interests.<sup>148</sup> At the same time that the end-user certifications were tightened, Bonn also imposed the need for ministerial authorization for any arms sales made to Portugal, which meant delays in their acquisitions.<sup>149</sup> Portugal, as examined before, considered its colonies, at least in the legal sense, to be its territory and, therefore, the use of any equipment acquired was more than allowed under such agreements. The Portuguese also considered that, since they were fighting against communist guerrillas in their territory, their use of this equipment in the colonies was in the best interests of NATO. This made the end-use declarations essentially meaningless and no more than a face-saving exercise for the German Government.

The change in Germany's position over time came in response to external pressures coming from the emerging African nations, who opposed Portugal's presence in Africa, and by extension opposed Bonn's substantial material support of Lisbon. Initially, the only requirement for the end-

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<sup>147</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>148</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>149</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras e material diverso na RFA, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/007, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

user licenses was an agreement that Portugal would use the weapons solely for their own military. The wording of this declaration would suffer further superficial changes to include that the items would not be taken out of NATO's area of operations, as defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Which, again, made little difference in how the Portuguese used their equipment. Some issues were later raised by Germany regarding the use of their weapons outside of Portugal, and the Germans made an attempt to ensure that what they meant by Portugal referred only to Continental Portugal and did not include the colonies. However, the Portuguese categorically and stubbornly disregarded this notion, they viewed their position as being logically true to the wording of their agreements.<sup>150</sup>

These requirements caused little change to Portugal's policies when it came to using the weapons it had acquired. The refusal to sign agreements after the fact for the B-26s they bought from the United States reflected the Portuguese need to use whatever they could get, even if their use would mean damaging relations with foreign governments. While the embargoes played a significant role in what they could acquire, the Portuguese paid little mind to the end-user agreements for the weapons they could acquire.

### **Acquisition Procedures**

The process of acquiring war materials is not an uncomplicated one. It relies on meeting the real needs of troops on the ground, the needs of political, economic, and diplomatic interests on national and international levels, as well as the ability of the state to acquire the relevant goods. The processes I intend to cover were mostly run through the Mixed Luso-German Commission, which dealt with the relations between the Portuguese Government and the German industry regarding military matters. The commission sometimes was also used as an intermediary between the Portuguese Government and other parties that had subsidiaries in Germany or in dealings that were facilitated by the German Government. These matters could range from an expansion of a

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<sup>150</sup> Certificados de destino de encomendas de material, 1971, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071/010, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

munitions factory, as was the case with the Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena in 1962<sup>151</sup>, to the acquisition of shoes, as was with a failed offer by Jakob Schreiner – Köln in 1967.<sup>152</sup>

The commission dealt primarily with requests for German equipment by the Portuguese Government, requests by the German Government for Portuguese equipment, and offers from the German industry to the Portuguese Government. The commission also served as an intermediary between other foreign parties when convenient, such as a 1966 purchase of .50 BMG ammunition from France<sup>153</sup> that will be covered later on, or the offer of the Armalite AR-15s by the American manufacturer Colt through its German subsidiary.<sup>154</sup>

Orders made through the CMLA could vary greatly in size and content. One unusual order was for a single Walther Pistol, to be delivered through a diplomatic pouch.<sup>155</sup> There were a large number of orders for a relatively low number of guns, and often pistols would be purchased in orders of around 100 guns.<sup>156</sup> Nonetheless, orders could contain several hundred guns such as a 1971 order for 465 pistols.<sup>157</sup> These orders also usually came with several spare magazines, and would sometimes include cleaning kits and holsters. However, spare parts were usually ordered in

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<sup>151</sup> Expansão da Fábrica da Companhia de Pólvoras e Munições de Barcarena, 1962,

PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0102/006, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>152</sup> Ofertas e demonstração de material alemão, 1967, PT/ADN/CMLA/029/0068/008, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>153</sup> Encomendas de armas ligeiras, 1966, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0049/013, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>154</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>155</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>156</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>157</sup> Consultas de material, 1º vol., 1971, PT/ADN/CMLA/023/0051/003, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

separate orders, such as the case with a 1964 order for replacement parts for 20,000 Walther pistols.<sup>158</sup>

Machine guns were another item often ordered, usually in batches of more than 100, and there were even orders for over a thousand MG-42s. These orders were notable because they often also requested a significant number of replacement parts, such as extra bolts. Other materials related to these machine guns were also ordered alongside them, although items like tripods would usually be ordered separately. The reasons for the tripods being ordered separate from the machine guns were two: 1) the machine gun in use was a variant of the MG-42, a general-purpose machine gun, which could often be used with just the attached bipod or mounted on a vehicle; 2) the cost was another major reason for ordering them separately and in relatively low numbers. The cost of the tripod in 1967 was 1471,98 DM per tripod<sup>159</sup>, as compared with the 460 DM price tag for a refurbished gun.<sup>160</sup> The pricing on these machine guns, however, could vary significantly. Another request for brand new MG-42's from *Rheinmetall* was made in 1965, and the cost for the new MG-42s was 885 DM for the machine gun alone; the total price, with all the accessories that Portugal wanted along with the gun, was 1352,90 DM per gun.<sup>161</sup>

Orders for rifles often consisted of several thousand guns. The number of weapons that were ordered reflected the needs of an army exceptionally well, as nearly every soldier needs a rifle and only a small number of them would be issued machine guns and fewer still would be issued pistols. The pistols, for their part, would more often be used by law enforcement agencies, such as PIDE, or issued to officers who usually did not need to use them in combat. The pistols'

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<sup>158</sup> Encomendas de armas ligeiras excepto pistolas 1º vol., 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/003, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>159</sup> Encomendas de armas ligeiras excepto pistolas 1º vol., 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/003, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>160</sup> Aquisição de material ligeiro excepto pistolas, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>161</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

limited effectiveness in a battlefield meant they were less often deployed, which is why they were not purchased in greater quantity.

Orders of ammunition for small arms were often very large, ranging from tens of thousands of rounds<sup>162</sup> to hundreds of millions<sup>163</sup>. They may also include concurrent deals from multiple manufacturers and from more than one country. Portugal had a substantial capacity to produce ammunition for its rifles and general-purpose machine guns (7.62 NATO). However, ammunition for heavy machine guns (.50 BMG), pistols (.32 ACP), mortars and anti-aircraft armament was severely limited and often had to be imported.

The CLMA also dealt with sales from Portugal to West Germany, though these orders were generally larger orders spanning multiple years and with a set schedule for delivery and production. This was the case with the production of G-3 rifles. Portugal had a long-running contract to supply Germany with these weapons. This contract had been in place since the beginning of production of the rifles in Portugal and was a major reason for the establishment of licensed production in Portugal.

The commission also dealt with issues with the equipment, delivery, or any other issues that might arise. For instance, the locking blocks on several Walther P-38 pistols (known as Pistola 9 mm Walther m/960) bought by Portugal were easily broken within the normal lifetime of the guns. The CMLA served as an intermediary for what amounted to a warranty repair request between the Lisbon and the Walther factory in Ulm, Germany. The factory sent replacement parts and requested that the defective ones be sent in for testing, along with several rounds of regularly issued ammunition. This testing revealed, according to Walther, that due to the large variance in 9mm Parabellum loads, that the Portuguese ammunition was “too hot”, meaning that chamber pressures exceeded those that the pistol was designed for, which then caused the breakages.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Aquisição de pistolas a cartuchos Walter, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/008, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>163</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0050/019, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>164</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1966, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0049/012, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

## Requests

What I refer to as a Request is a proposal that is initiated by Portugal to a foreign source. These requests came for a variety of items, such as ammunition, guns, explosives, or even building materials that would have to be imported to meet the demands of the Portuguese Military. This requisition procedure was a relatively direct one. Any of the three branches of the armed forces or the ministry of defense itself would issue a request for equipment, which would then be forwarded to the appropriate agency that would pursue this request. For this study, I will be focusing largely on the CMLA, as it was Portugal's main avenue for the acquisition of war materials. To examine Portuguese military procurement, I will be analyzing a couple of instances where the Portuguese government made requests for equipment from Germany, which went through the CMLA.

The first example is a 1965 request for the acquisition of several MG-42s chambered in 7.62 NATO, meaning a variant of the Rheinmetall MG-1, although Portugal maintained the World War II designation. This request was made by the Ministry of Defense and was destined for the Army High Command. The request clearly states 100 machine guns along with several accessories required for their use, such as ammunition belts, sling, extra barrels, flash hider, and bipod. In this same document, there is a request for replacement parts, extractors, firing pins, bolt components, among other parts that are often replaced. The timeframe for fulfillment is also given as the then-current year (1965). The request is sent to the Portuguese delegation in the CMLA who inquires as to price, delivery dates, and any further questions that could prove to be relevant.<sup>165</sup>

In this specific case, the initial offer made by Germany would total 102,066.66 DM for the 100 guns, which would come directly from German inventory at cost. That elicited questions regarding whether those are new, refurbished, or used items. The request is also doubled to 200 guns. German authorities later revised the order price to the significantly lower sum of 92,000 DM for all 200 guns (460 DM per weapon) because these guns were refurbished, not new. The order is again increased by 50 guns, to a total of 250 MG-42s, bringing the costs to a total of 115,000

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<sup>165</sup> Aquisição de material ligeiro excepto pistolas, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa



DM. A *Luftwaffe* aircraft delivered the items directly to Portugal, at the cost of 2,501.85 DM for packaging and 428.40 DM for transportation, bringing the total cost of the order to 117,930.25 DM. The items were delivered to OGMA in Alverca in August 1965.<sup>166</sup> This method of delivery is very often used and seems to be the standard for a majority of cases, though there are exceptions such as a 1966 purchase of more than 3 million round of .50 BMG ammunition, 2 million of which came from French inventory and were delivered to Bordeaux by train and from there to Lisbon by ship.<sup>167</sup>

Payment, in this case, was to be handled by the Portuguese Air and Naval attaché in Bad Godesberg and should be done no later than 30 days after the items were received by Lisbon. There was, however, a minor delay due to a few missing items that had to be shipped after the fact. Though common, this form of payment was not the only one used to finalize orders, especially when it came to placing orders directly to private industry. For those, payment could be handled in some different ways, one of which was to have the FMBP serve as a middleman for payments to Germany. Another method used was the issuance of an irrevocable letter of credit, often issued before the items were shipped. Additionally, the payment could be a barter with surplus equipment or brand-new equipment produced in Portugal. One such case of an exchange of surplus equipment for new was the exchange of Savage pistols (presumably Savage Model of 1907 that had been issued by Portugal during World War I) and related accoutrements, such as holsters and magazines, for newly-produced Walther P-38 pistols. The Savage pistols would be received by the Walther company and later shipped to the United States, where they would be sold on the civilian market.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Aquisição de material ligeiro excepto pistolas, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>167</sup> Encomendas de armas ligeiras, 1966, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0049/013, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>168</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa; Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1967, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/002, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa; Aquisição de armas ligeiras na RFA, 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/006, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

The exchange of older, obsolete equipment was not a one-off deal, as can be seen in a 1969 proposal by MEREX, who proposed to sell G-1 rifles and a significant number of spare parts for them. This proposal included an offer to purchase Portuguese AR-10 rifles as partial payment for the goods sold. This appears to be more of an interest in acquiring the AR-10s by MEREX than anything else, as MEREX also offers to sell any equipment that the Portuguese might require in case they are not interested in the G-1 rifles. In this specific case, the Portuguese Navy was the only branch to reply, saying that the proposition was of no interest to them since they had neither the AR-10s in stock nor any interest in the G-1 rifles. Nonetheless, the reply also requested 88.9mm rockets, as well as both 60mm and 80mm mortar rounds.<sup>169</sup> Payment by way of new equipment was also not uncommon, as will be covered later. Portugal decided to purchase some equipment they had borrowed and offered 7,500 new G-3 rifles as payment to Germany. Similarly, they offered 20,000 G-3 rifles as payment for several Saber VI airplanes that were purchased from Germany.<sup>170</sup> The contracts for rifles, however, would later pose some challenges to Portugal, which will be examined in the Exports section of this chapter.

A different outcome of a request could also be the impossibility of it being fulfilled, as was the case with a 1964 request for 800 double star signal flares for aircraft, in several different color configurations (200 of each, AN M56A1, AN M-38, AN M-57A1, and AN M-58A1) and 40 illuminating aircraft launched flares (Mk6 Mod.6). The request proceeds as usual, a telegram is sent from Lisbon to the Portuguese delegation at the CMLA, who inquires into the possibility of acquiring the items from Germany and the conditions for such a deal. The response, however, says that the required items are not produced in Germany, nor do they have any surplus stocks for sale. The CMLA reports that it is possible to acquire the flares from the American Government with an expected delivery time of 3 months.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Ofertas e Demonstrações de Material, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/029/0069, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>170</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0050/019, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>171</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

This outcome is similar to that of a 1968 attempted purchase of 60mm and 81mm mortar rounds, as well as additional ammunition for several cannons and .50 BMG rounds. The initial requests asked for 60mm white phosphorus (WP) smoke rounds; 81mm WP smoke rounds; 81mm illuminating flares; 57mm HE M306A1 rounds; 106mm HEAT rounds; and .50 BMG M48 tracer rounds, intended as training ammunition for the 106mm cannon. The quantities asked for each kind of ammunition were the same, that being a batch of either 2000, 5000, or 10,000 rounds, except for the M48 .50BMG, of which they sought batches of either 50,000, 100,000, or 500,000 rounds. An interesting aspect of this request is that the Portuguese government pushed the CMLA to hasten their reply to the request, due to the urgent need for this ammunition. However, the CMLA noted that any consultation regarding the pricing and availability of such items was difficult and could not be resolved within 4 weeks. The result of this request was not forthcoming, the required model of shells was either not used by the *Bundeswehr*, as was the case with the 60mm WP smoke rounds and the HE 57mm rounds; or there was no surplus material that the Germans were willing to part with, as was the case with the remaining ammunition, the .50BMG ammo was no longer for sale, the 81mm mortars shells were to be dismantled for parts, and there was no surplus of 106mm rounds. Therefore, they had to resort to other possibilities. The BWB initially looked for suppliers within Europe that could serve Portugal's needs, but only found a supply of 60mm and 81mm mortars with the company Hotchkiss Brandt in France. This deal, even though it was with a French company, was initially handled through the CMLA due to the presence of the FRG as an intermediary. However, the presence of an intermediary resulted in the deal falling through due to the presumption by the Portuguese Government that the intermediation would result in added costs.<sup>172</sup> This, however, would not stop other deals such as a 1966 deal for three and a half million rounds of .50 BMG. The FRG was not able to supply this immense demand in a timely fashion, which forced the Portuguese to rely on the French for about two-thirds of the required amount.<sup>173</sup> The presence of the FRG as an intermediary was not an issue in this case, though the

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<sup>172</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0050/019, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>173</sup> Encomendas de armas ligeiras, 1966, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0049/013, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

size of the shipment raised problems concerning the delivery method since it could not be delivered by air, as was often done with shipments from Germany.

## Offers

For the purposes of this study, an offer is a proposal coming from outside the Portuguese state for the purchase or sale of military equipment. Portugal had, for a long time, access to wide markets for the purchase of weapons. Suppliers would approach the Portuguese delegation at the CMLA or directly approach the military attaché in Bonn to make proposals. However, approaching the attaché directly was not considered to be the appropriate course of action, as his reaction would be to redirect the other party to the CMLA. This can be exemplified by a 1967 attempt by Jakob Schreiner – Köln to sell shoes to Portugal, who initially approached the military attaché in Bonn, who in turn referred them to the CMLA as the appropriate authority for dealing with the offer. The offer stated that the company had in stock 55,000 pairs of brand-new leather shoes, that had been surplused by the French army. The company emphasized that it was very eager to work with the Portuguese Government, going as far as to suggest that payment for the shoes be made in the form of “raw-produce”. They attempted to contact the CMLA twice before receiving a response. The Portuguese considered the shoes to be unfit for their purposes, since, according to the pictures provided, these would not be in line with Portuguese regulations regarding footwear; furthermore, shoes fitting these regulations could be easily procured within Portugal, giving yet another reason to decline the offer.<sup>174</sup>

Further proposals included a 1964 offer from Colt’s German subsidiary for the adoption of the Armalite AR-15 system (adapted into the M-16 by Colt for the American military). This offer is given special attention by the navy, communicating the pros and cons of the weapon system to the other branches of the military. However, there being no production facilities for neither the AR-15 nor its ammunition in Portugal, the offer was quickly rejected by the army, air force, and

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<sup>174</sup> Ofertas e demonstração de material alemão, 1967, PT/ADN/CMLA/029/0068/008, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

navy.<sup>175</sup> A similar offer was made by Interarmco from Monaco, who contacted the Portuguese government through the CMLA in 1965 offering the same rifle. This second offer was apparently requested by a Portuguese company called Quimatón, which left several questions unanswered as to the nature of the deal. There was seemingly no follow-up on this offer.<sup>176</sup>

Offers could also come from governmental sources, as was the case of a 1964 offer from the West-German Government. The offer stated that there were large stocks of .50 BMG ammunition for sale at 0.50 DM per round from *Bundeswehr* stocks. The proposal was sent to the CMLA, which forwarded the proposal to the Portuguese Ministry of Defense. Then the three branches of the armed forces could make their orders. In this case, 250,000 rounds of API (armor-piercing incendiary) ammunition were ordered for the Portuguese air force and were transported by *Luftwaffe* aircraft.<sup>177</sup>

Another type of offer was obsolete equipment that had been surplus. For instance, a 1966 offer of a large amount of decommissioned equipment from German stocks, most of which was comprised of World War II leftovers, 7.92x57 (8mm Mauser) ammunition, rifle grenades, 20mm autocannons, and ammunition of varying types for them. This offer had a time limit attached to it. There were four lists of equipment attached to the offer, each with its deadline, at which point Portugal would no longer be able to purchase the items. In this case, no documentation suggests that Lisbon purchased, or attempted to purchase, any of the items, presumably because no such equipment was being fielded or the Portuguese possessed superior capabilities at that point.<sup>178</sup> The limited availability for this sort of equipment would often be a problem. Germany made regular offers of surplus equipment to friendly nations, often at favorable prices for the buyer, and the sale would be realized upon a first-come-first-served basis. That meant that the usual 4 weeks of

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<sup>175</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>176</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras e material diverso na RFA, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/007, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>177</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>178</sup> Ofertas de material, 1966, PT/ADN/CMLA/029/0068/007, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

deliberation allowed in the German offer were not the true limit of the order, in the sense that if any eligible entity decided to purchase the equipment before that time had elapsed, it could do so, which was often done by Greece and Turkey. The Portuguese noted that both of these nations had a designated team within their embassies to quickly analyze these offers. This, in turn, meant that several of Portugal's attempts at purchasing surplus equipment from Germany would fail due to their tardiness in responding to such offers.<sup>179</sup>

Offers were often an important avenue for companies to gain a foothold into the Portuguese market. However, the majority of what the CMLA dealt with was standard orders for equipment that had already been adopted by the Portuguese military. They usually dealt with the near-monthly order for spare parts and ammunition, as well as items such as machine guns that were not produced in Portugal. The possibility of becoming one of these regular suppliers was extremely enticing to many companies, as regular military contracts are highly profitable and usually very reliable. Therefore, landing any successful offer would often mean good profits for the company that made it.

### **Demonstrations**

Demonstrations were also arranged by several German companies to display what they could offer Portugal. Although these demonstrations could be seen as a subset of offers, they do deserve a separate mention. Military contracts pose the chance for steady and reliable profits, especially when it comes to a wartime military that must make up for lost and expended equipment. Therefore, companies that want to have their offerings adopted by a military often arrange for demonstrations to be made to foreign officials. As an example, in 1964, the company Berlin-Karlsruhe Industrierwerke arranged a demonstration in Alcochete of Sch-Mi DM-31 anti-personnel mines (derived from the World War II S-mine that had been used to great effect by the *Wehrmacht*). This model of land mine is a bounding fragmentation mine, meaning that there is an initial lifting charge that propels the mine into the air, allowing for the midair detonation of the

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<sup>179</sup> Ofertas e demonstração de material alemão, 1967, PT/ADN/CMLA/029/0068/008, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

main charge, which causes a high lethality over an extended area. The mine's lethal capabilities come from propelling a large amount of shrapnel at high velocities employing an explosive. An extensive report made on the land mines observed that they were similar to the American M2 and M16 landmines, or the German World War II S-Mines. Among the noted differences was an explosive charge lower than other mines on the market, but they still maintained a high lethality due to the aforementioned shrapnel. The lethal range of the mine was estimated to be 2 to 5 meters, though shrapnel was still found to affect targets 21 meters away. The mine also boasted a simplified firing mechanism (considered to be reliable, but less safe than other alternatives), and a different shape to the projectiles (added material for shrapnel) in the mine. Initial safety testing and discussions on the overall safety of the mine were also added in the report, and the Portuguese concluded that the mine was generally safe for transport and use. Tactical use of the mines was also discussed in the report, as well as a comparison with other mines already in the Portuguese inventory.<sup>180</sup>

There was an initial interest by the Portuguese military to acquire the mines, and a telegram was sent to the Portuguese aeronautical attaché in Bonn and the CMLA. The telegram requested the price of the mines and raised the possibility of acquiring them as well as training mines. Though the mines were highly praised for their efficiency, the request for their purchase was withdrawn, given that they were not sufficiently more effective than any other landmine already being produced in Portugal.<sup>181</sup>

Heckler & Koch also made demonstrations to Portugal in an attempt to gain sales for their new equipment. In 1965 H&K organized a demonstration of the MG21 machine gun, the HK 54 submachine gun, the HK33 and HK33K rifles (a 5.56x45 NATO variant of the G3), and a scoped G3 Rifle. The demonstration was scheduled to last for two to three hours and would include instruction on how to operate the weapons since Portuguese authorities wanted to operate the weapons themselves during the demonstration. The H&K team brought the guns in their baggage and had Portuguese authorities facilitate their passage through customs. Portugal provided 2,000

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<sup>180</sup> Aquisição de material ligeiro excepto pistolas, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>181</sup> Aquisição de material ligeiro excepto pistolas, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

rounds of ammunition for each caliber (7.62 NATO, 5.56 NATO, and 9mm Parabellum) for this demonstration.<sup>182</sup>

As stated in the previous section, having its equipment adopted by the military is highly beneficial to a company. As such, demonstrations make a good case for the adoption of the equipment offered. We can see that in the case of the MG-21 that was eventually adopted by Portugal and a demonstration of the weapon surely did not hurt its chances of being adopted.

### **Loaned Equipment**

The lending of equipment was a core part of the establishing of Luso-German relations. The same talks that brought German bases to Portugal also dealt with storing stocks and sharing them when necessary. The FRG would lend a substantial amount of equipment, from large ticket items such as aircraft to small pieces of gear, such as cleaning kits for rifles. The Portuguese would often be able to borrow this equipment at little or no cost, under the condition that the equipment should be returned in good condition or be substituted by new equipment.

An example of an extensive lending agreement was a 1962 deal in which Bonn lent to Portugal 15,000 G-1 rifles along with 150 sets of spare parts, 500 MG-42s, and 5,000 cleaning kits. The equipment itself was at no cost to Portugal, though they did have to pay for the shipping and packaging of the items, as well as any other costs associated with their delivery to Portugal and their return to Germany. At that time Germany had much more lax requirements for their end-user licenses, requiring only that Portugal agree to use these weapons exclusively for its military. The agreement also naturally stipulated that Portugal would have to return the items to Germany in good condition or replace them for an equivalent item (i.e. an exchange of damaged or destroyed G-1s for new G-3s).<sup>183</sup>

The FALs are an interesting weapon in Portuguese usage. They were primarily sent to the colonies while metropolitan Portugal initially received the majority of the production of G-3 rifles.

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<sup>182</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras e material diverso na RFA, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0048/007, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>183</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa



The situation in 1961 had escalated to a point where the number of FALs in Portuguese service did not meet the demand in the field. In 1962, the small arms situation continued to be troublesome for the Portuguese; the DGMG's stocks had fallen to 7,576 rifles, with those being 1,601 G-3 rifles and the remainder FAL variants. The already low stocks had to be distributed to troops in combat overseas and training in the metropolis. The DGMG, therefore, requested that the Portuguese government acquired 5,000 G-3s from FMBP and 5,000 FALs, which were not produced in Portugal and thus had to be imported. <sup>184</sup>This trouble in acquiring rifles would continue to be a problem for Portugal in the years to come and would eventually impact other contracts, though this will be examined in the Production and Exports section of this study.

Portugal also bought some of the equipment they borrowed during the war. This happened in 1964 with the equipment mentioned in the previous paragraphs. The 15,000 FAL rifles and 500 MG-42 machine guns were both in well-used condition; the 150 parts kits for the FAL rifles and 5,000 cleaning kits were all in like-new condition, and an additional 2,700 Uzi submachine guns that had been borrowed were also purchased by Portugal in this deal. The equipment in good condition was evaluated at the normal sale price, meaning 170.41 DM for the Uzis, with an additional 23.70 DM for 6 magazines and 12.10 DM for two magazine pouches per gun, to a total of 556,767 DM, plus 362,721 DM for the parts kits and 18,000 DM for the cleaning kits. The rifles were evaluated at 1,354,500 DM, or 20% of the price of a new rifle due to their well-used condition, and the same thing was done for the MG-42s which amounted to 130,000 DM. The total value of this purchase came to 2,421,988.85 DM. Upon signing the contract Portugal would automatically become the owner of the weapons, which were already in its possession. The payment method was initially supposed to be 7,655 new G-3 rifles, evaluated at 316.40 DM each. The number of guns to be used as payment was later revised to 7,500 rifles, due to price negotiations favoring Lisbon <sup>185</sup>

Payment for the purchase was supposed to be completed within one year from the signing of the contract. However, this form of payment quickly became unfeasible due to the ever-growing

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<sup>184</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>185</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0050/019, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

needs of Portuguese forces for the G-3 rifles they produced. A renegotiation of the contract was proposed in 1967 since the deliveries still had not been concluded; it was also noted that the earliest date to complete the deliveries would be mid-1969, and even such a date was only provisory. Therefore, and as will be covered in the following section, the Portuguese sought to alter the form of payment to other war materials or, as a last resort, to pay in cash. Initially, there was a deal to make payments in 105mm shells, though this also fell through. After the failure to deliver on the shells, no other resort was found for payment and, in December 1967, it was decided to liquidate in cash the debts incurred for the purchase of the loaned equipment, as well as ammunition for the Oerlikon auto-cannons, which were supposed to be paid in G-3 rifles.<sup>186</sup> In late 1968, the amount of 17,433,152\$30 escudos was transferred to FMBP, which would then use that cash to pay Germany in 1969 for the purchased equipment.<sup>187</sup>

The Portuguese could occasionally request equipment from German stocks at no cost to themselves. This was possible when Germany had a surplus of stocks that they did not mind sharing, such as the G-1s I have covered in this section. However, Bonn denied Portugal's requests on other occasions. One such example is the attempt in 1962 to borrow 2,000 scopes for the G-3 rifles to outfit the "*caçadores*" ("*jager*" light infantry) deployed overseas. These scopes were very expensive, costing nearly as much as a G-3 rifle. The trend of scopes being as expensive as, if not more than, the rifles still continues today. This request was denied because the *Bundeswehr* did not possess enough scopes for its own forces. Nevertheless, in this same request, Portugal asked for a transfer of the technical data package for the production of "Seitz" filters, which was taken under advisement by Bonn. Regrettably, I did not find a final answer for this portion of the request.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0050/019, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>187</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0050/019, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>188</sup> Aquisição de armamento diverso à RFA, 1962, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0047/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

## **Production and Exports**

In this section, I intend to explore both the production of war materials in Portugal and their exports. Most of what Portugal produced had initially been intended for exportation. This set up only changed with the escalation of the Colonial War since Portugal truly needed most of its production for itself. There were also significant issues with production that impacted several export contracts. Therefore, production and exports cannot be divorced and need to be addressed together in this section.

Though it might be surprising, given Portugal's precarious situation, Lisbon maintained several extensive arms export contracts with Bonn. These contracts had their basis lay down in the establishment of military cooperation between the two countries, which I have covered in other sections of this dissertation. The exports included aircraft munitions; G-3 rifles, assembled in Portugal and often with German parts kits; and ammunition. Portuguese sales to Germany were meant to close the gap between what was imported from Germany and what was exported to it. These contracts also often served as a form of payment for other equipment that had been bought from or loaned by Germany.

One case that illustrates the nature of these contracts was a 1963 order for a total of 210 million rounds of 7.62x51 NATO by West Germany to the Portuguese industry. This order included a previous contract for 100 million "normal rounds" (DM 41, an equivalent of the American M80 ball) to be produced by December 1963 and 20 million tracer rounds, which would only be completed in October 1964, due to delays in the construction of new production facilities. The new contract was an order for 190 million "normal rounds" to be produced from January 1964 to June 1967 and 20 million tracer cartridges to be produced from November 1964 to June 1966. These contracts included another 9,250,000 cartridges to be supplied to Germany by Portugal as payment for 1,102 MG-42 general-purpose machine guns, as well as several spare parts and several accoutrements for them, which had been supplied to Portugal by Germany. The price for the MG-42s was stipulated as 1,572,705.90 DM, and the number of cartridges was later adjusted to 7,399,129, which totaled the same amount as the machine guns. After some delays, due to the aforementioned production issues, the contract was fulfilled by FNMAL in Moscavide. FNMAL

shipped 7,400,000 cartridges, rounding up the number for ease of shipping owing to how the ammunition was packaged.<sup>189</sup>

The export of G-3 rifles that was mentioned earlier is also an interesting aspect of Portugal's and Germany's relationship. In 1961, Lisbon was contracted to deliver 50,000 rifles to the FRG. They would be delivered in batches of 500 rifles a month beginning in 1962, ramping-up deliveries to 1,500 rifles a month in 1965. For each rifle, there was an included accessory package of 6 magazines, a sling, and a flash hider which also served to launch rifle grenades. These were all to be built according to specifications provided by Heckler & Koch (designers of the G-3), as stipulated in the licensing agreement struck between Portugal and Germany.<sup>190</sup> As it has been mentioned in other sections, Portugal would also use its production of G-3 rifles to pay for certain materials acquired from Germany. The transfer of these rifles would be in addition to the items already contracted and their deliveries would start after the primary contract had been fulfilled.<sup>191</sup>

In 1964, Portugal was supposed to deliver 19,989 rifles for the FRG; however, there were significant delays, to the point that, by mid-1965, only 14,250 of the rifles that were supposed to be delivered had arrived in Germany. Deliveries were supposed to ramp up into 30,000 rifles per year for the years of 1966, 1967, and 1968. In 1965, however, Lisbon stated that they could not afford to allow the delivery of over 2,500 "indispensable" rifles per month, as the weapons were needed for the situation in Africa.<sup>192</sup> Furthermore, the expected production for the FMBP was 3,900 rifles per month, but, in 1965, they were only able to produce 2,500 rifles. Lisbon expected deliveries from the FMBP to rise to 3,000 rifles per month in 1967, meaning that if the Portuguese had kept to their original delivery schedule to Germany, they would be handing over the entirety

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<sup>189</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0050/019, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>190</sup> Espingardas automáticas (CETME e G3) para o governo alemão, 1959-1961, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>191</sup> Aquisição de armas ligeiras, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/022/0050/019, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>192</sup> Espingardas automáticas (CETME) para a RFA, 1963, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072/003, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

of their production to Bonn.<sup>193</sup> Portugal and Germany agreed to significantly reduce the expected deliveries for 1965 and forward to 6,000 rifles per year, essentially going back to the 1962 schedule of 500 rifles per month.<sup>194</sup> This situation led to a request to increase the output of the *Fabrica Militar do Braço de Prata*, to allow for the fulfillment of Portugal's own needs, as well as Bonn's. Portuguese production had several limiting factors, and the factory was not equipped to supply a wartime military on its own; they initially relied heavily on German-built parts kits that had to be purchased from H&K, imported into Portugal, and only then assembled.<sup>195</sup> Though it should be noted that Portugal did in fact manage to produce parts within Portugal, with things such as barrels already being produced in 1965, they never did seem to become fully independent of German parts.<sup>196</sup>

The primary reason given for these production issues were personnel-related, as the factory could not hire enough people for two full shifts. This lack of laborers was due to uncompetitive salaries, which meant that the job was not that attractive to new people, and the ones that were already there often left for better-paid jobs, leading to a high turnover rate at the factory. The proposals to fix these issues relied on an increase of salaries and the acquisition of new equipment to supplement existing production lines (the words used were “reinforcement of equipment”, which leads me to believe this is a way to not entirely cease production when doing maintenance on certain machines). Portuguese officials stipulated that production could be doubled if they could fully man two shifts; they also proposed an increase in the production capacity of the factory.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Encomendas de Espingardas G3, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0073/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>194</sup> Espingardas automáticas (CETME e G3) para o governo alemão, 1959-1961, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072/001, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>195</sup> Espingardas automáticas (CETME) para a RFA, 1963, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072/003, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>196</sup> Espingardas G3 para a RFA, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0073/008, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>197</sup> Encomendas de Espingardas G3, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0073/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

In Chart 2, we can clearly see that these measures to increase production were initially successful. In 1968, production more than doubled from around 22,000 rifles in the years before to 52,112 rifles, but production then fell again to 38,125 in 1969. Nevertheless, production output remained nearly the same in 1970 as it was in 1969. But production dropped considerably in 1971 to levels near to what they were in 1966. The reasons are not immediately obvious to why they increased so much in 1968, or why production decreased again. I can only assume that manpower issues were fixed in 1968, only to return alongside the economic downturn in 1971. The economic downturn also came at a time when the immediate need of the Portuguese military was not as intense as before, given that the situation overseas had somewhat stabilized in 1967.

<b>Chart 2 – G3 production numbers 1966-1971</b>		
<b>Year</b>	<b>Rifles Produced</b>	<b>Total Production (since 1963)</b>
<b>1966</b> <sup>198</sup>	22643	57247
<b>1967</b> <sup>199</sup>	21752	78999
<b>1968</b> <sup>200</sup>	52112	134111
<b>1969</b> <sup>201</sup>	38125	172236
<b>1970</b> <sup>202</sup>	37000	213236
<b>1971</b> <sup>203</sup>	23160	236396

<sup>198</sup> Material tipo alemão para as FAP: espingardas G3, 1966, PT/ADN/CMLA/044/0111/002, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>199</sup> Coordenação da produção para as FAP e FAA: espingardas G3, 1967, PT/ADN/CMLA/044/0111/005, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>200</sup> Coordenação de produção para as FAP e FAA: espingardas G3, 1968, PT/ADN/CMLA/044/0111/008, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>201</sup> Coordenação de produção para as FAP: espingardas G3, 1969, PT/ADN/CMLA/044/0111/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>202</sup> Coordenação de produção para as FAP e FAA: espingardas G3, 1970, PT/ADN/CMLA/044/0111/011, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>203</sup> Coordenação de produção para as FAP e FAA: espingardas G3, 1971, PT/ADN/CMLA/044/0111/012, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

Another interesting point to be made about the Portuguese production of the G-3 is that the FMBP sold these rifles to Germany for 2,274\$45 (316.40 DM), while they supplied their military at a cost of 3,238\$00 per rifle, including a bayonet not present in the German contract, which was sold separately in 1965 for 265\$00<sup>204</sup>. This discrepancy in pricing was explained to the Portuguese Government by the FNBP to be due to Portuguese testing requirements and the need to exchange Escudos for Deutschmarks to pay H&K for the parts kits they provided at a cost of 2110\$94, along with a 2.5% royalty payment for the patents, which was made to Germany, who would pass it on to CETME in Spain. These added costs were not present in the German contract. Heckler & Koch, however, could provide the weapons to Portugal for an even lower price of 2407\$00 for the German model and 2654\$00 for the Portuguese model; though their price was lower, the acquisition of rifles from the German manufacturer was only done in emergencies.<sup>205</sup>

The reliance on the German parts kits was extensive, and they included the following parts: barrel; operating handle components, meaning the charging handle a cap for the tube it rested on and related parts; magazine catch, spring and retaining pins; receiver retaining pins; recoil spring and buffer; ejector; bolt, including locking rollers, extractor and firing pin; trunnion; flash hider/grenade launching muzzle device; front and rear sights; the fire control group, I.E. hammer, trigger, selector lever and other parts related to their function; sling and its mounting gear; stock and handguard; rivets and other pins needed for the assembly of the rifle.<sup>206</sup> This dependence on German parts essentially meant that Portugal's job in the production of the G-3 was the assembly of the receiver, which joined all the parts into a functioning weapon. Later Portugal would

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<sup>204</sup> Encomendas de Espingardas G3, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0073/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>205</sup> Aquisição de espingardas G3, 1º semestre, 1964, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072/005, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>206</sup> Espingardas automáticas (CETME) para a RFA, 1963, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072/003, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

commence production of most parts on its own,<sup>207</sup> though orders for things such as follower springs and other parts would remain common.<sup>208</sup>

Portugal also was not authorized to supply these weapons to any country other than itself and West Germany.<sup>209</sup> This I can safely assume is one of the reasons why these weapons were never provided to the embattled Rhodesians, whom Lisbon held some sympathy towards; after all, their positions as international pariahs, and the reasons they became so, were not too dissimilar.

As stated above, Portugal generally assembled G-3 rifles from parts kits, which were bought directly from H&K and were the overwhelming costs for the production. There was an attempt to distance the Portuguese production from relying on these parts kits, with the plans to swage the production gap (as referenced above) also talking of intentions to have completely Portuguese-built guns.<sup>210</sup> Portuguese industry was generally dependent on parts from Germany; Portugal's ammunition production was set up with German assistance and it was also often dependent on the import of primers from Germany.<sup>211</sup> This dependence on foreign sources was a sore spot for Portugal's ability to autonomously arm its forces. The regime's attempt at acquiring armament from the "national" industry was often more of a show than a realistic prospect, given that they were dependent on foreign materials and parts. Lisbon's attempts at modernizing Portugal's industry was in an effort to secure the independence of their armed forces, seeing as they were handicapped by foreign embargoes, which threatened to cut them off their foreign suppliers.

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<sup>207</sup> Espingardas G3 para a RFA, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0073/008, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>208</sup> Encomendas de Espingardas G3, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0073/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>209</sup> Espingardas automáticas CETME e G3, 1959-1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0072, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>210</sup> Encomendas de Espingardas G3, 1965, PT/ADN/CMLA/031/0073/009, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>211</sup> Certificados de destino de encomendas de material, 1971, PT/ADN/CMLA/030/0071/010, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa



Bonn diminished its imports from Portugal, especially those related to military contracts, in 1967, due to a change in the political and strategic interests of the West German Government. Adding to that was the fact that Portugal had had significant troubles in concluding their contracts, such as the case with the G-3s covered above, or a contract for 105mm artillery shells, where deliveries essentially fizzled in the 3<sup>rd</sup> phase of the contract. These failed contracts were also difficult to replace with different materials. In 1968, there had already been three attempts at finding a replacement product for a contract for artillery shells, all of which were to no avail. This situation led to the suggestion of increased cooperation in the industrial sector, especially in the aeronautical sector. Production of Sidewinder Air-to-Air missiles, components thereof, or related materials, such as launchers (presumably the “launcher” referred to in the documentation is the mounting hardpoint that attaches and launches the missiles from aircraft), was suggested in late 1967 to 1968, though the American origin of these missiles was an obstacle to their production in Portugal. Assistance in the production and maintenance of F-104 Starfighters was also suggested by the Portuguese since Bonn was in the process of producing 150 of those fighters.<sup>212</sup> These attempts at achieving a trade deal for different items to replace those that Portugal could not deliver were not usually fruitful. Portugal’s industry was not capable of offering Bonn with good enough alternatives, which resulted in the payment in cash for several debts that Portugal would have preferred to pay in some different fashion.

The failure of these contracts was, in short, due to significant production issues that caused enormous delays in the delivery of equipment. Adding to these issues was the ever-growing need of Portugal’s own military, which forced Lisbon to deviate a sizable portion of the production originally slated for export to its own military, aggravating the existing delays. Efforts to increase production were also plagued with significant issues, and shortages in manpower and materials worsened these issues. Disputes between different industrial sectors and the constant meddling of the government, who insisted to their detriment on reliance on nationally produced materials, also further aggravated the production issues.

As already established, Germany preferred to supply the Portuguese industry with the ability to supply themselves, and the large number of exports from Portugal to Germany was an

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<sup>212</sup> Telecomunicações e electrónica: eventual colaboração com a indústria de armamento da RFA, 1968, PT/ADN/CMLA/038/0103/018, Comissão Mista Luso-Alemã, Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

extension of these dealings. Portugal sought to maintain a balanced export-import ratio with foreign governments, something that was not always doable, given that the Portuguese economy suffered from significant handicaps when compared to other countries; a lack of innovation and the constant hindrance of government intervention made for a poor competition in the open market. The modernization and expansion of Portugal's arms industry to produce German equipment were, thusly, one of the few avenues to balance exports. These industries also had played a significant role in Portugal's ability to wage war, allowing Portugal a modicum of independence from foreign suppliers, and the ability to somewhat deflect the criticisms levied against their suppliers.

## Conclusions

Portugal's position during the years from 1961 to 1974 was extremely difficult. Lisbon had been actively fighting in Angola since 1961, and their colonial war troubles kept expanding until, in 1964, the Portuguese were effectively fighting three separate wars, in three different non-contiguous territories, which required a substantial military force to maintain the status quo.<sup>213</sup> The expansion of Portugal's military, to mobilize over 120,000 men overseas at the same time<sup>214</sup> and a total of more than 820,000 over the course of the war,<sup>215</sup> required the acquisition of a considerable amount of equipment, which had to be maintained and replaced over time. Portugal's situation was further aggravated by its position as a pariah in the international community, a position the Portuguese earned through their stubborn hold on their colonies. The Portuguese Government saw itself internationally isolated, at first by the emerging African and Asian states that arose in the post-war world, then officially by the UN and their allies in NATO. The United States, for instance, headed from afar the UN arms embargo on Portugal.<sup>216</sup> The Americans often complained when the equipment they produced was being used by Portugal in the colonies<sup>217</sup> and denied the sale of arms and of most equipment of military value that could be destined to the colonies. Similar embargoes and restrictions were imposed on Portugal by most of the world, including several NATO members, such as the Netherlands.

Due to their troubled diplomatic position, the acquisition of military equipment was effectively restricted to a few reliable allies, namely France and West Germany, with precious little coming from other sources. Arms were occasionally offered by other parties, but these grew to be

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<sup>213</sup> OLIVEIRA, César, "*Guerra Colonial*" in "Dicionário de História do Estado Novo Vol. I", Venda Nova, Bertrand, 1996

<sup>214</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, January 3, 1969, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US.

<sup>215</sup> PÉLISSIER, René, "*Guerras Coloniais*" in "Dicionário de História de Portugal, Vol. VIII", Porto, Livraria Figueirenses, 1999

<sup>216</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, July 19, 1963, Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN.

<sup>217</sup> Letter from the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson), February 6, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT.

more and more restricted as the war dragged on. The French defended Portugal in the UN and even though they enacted several restrictions, they initially demonstrated little issue in arming Portugal. Their help, however, grew more and more limited and, as time went on, Paris sought to limit the sale of new weapon systems that could be used in the colonies, but they would still allow the sale of larger items, such as ships, as well as parts and munitions for weapons that they had already been sold. This willingness to work with the Portuguese was present especially during General de Gaulle's time as President of France but waned considerably after his tenure.<sup>218</sup>

The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, was more consistent and dependable when it came to the acquisition of war materials. Their initial absence in the UN made the Germans unencumbered by the resolutions which targeted Portugal. This allowed them greater freedom to operate as they saw fit, especially regarding their support for Portugal's *Estado Novo*. They sought Portugal as an ally for its geographic position, for its continued diplomatic support after World War II, and to gain access to Portugal's markets. They aided Portugal in modernizing and expanding its military industry with loans, machinery, parts, expertise, and large orders for Portuguese-built, but German-designed, equipment. Bonn's assistance proved to be invaluable. Portugal would, in all likelihood, have been forced out of the war earlier or be forced to rely on cruder less effective weaponry, much like Rhodesia was forced to do during the Bush War. Though relations declined somewhat, especially after the Guinea-Conakry raid in 1970, Bonn never abandoned Lisbon.

West Germany often sought to replace its direct supplies of ready-made weapons by machinery and expertise, though continuing with frequent sales of machine guns and other equipment. Thus, the Germans could deflect a lot of criticism by denying their involvement in arming Portugal, while at the same time keeping the supply of large quantities of arms and ammunition to Portugal. Germany's indirect arming of Portugal by providing the Portuguese with the necessary tools to "arm themselves", was as important as, if not more than, the ready-made equipment the Germans could offer. This indirect assistance allowed Portugal's arms industry to function effectively while giving Bonn reasons for plausible deniability of its role in Lisbon's

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<sup>218</sup> MARCOS, Daniel, "*Salazar e de Gaulle: a França e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1958-1968)*", 2007

colonial conflict. Though Portugal's arms industry would still be largely dependent on German parts, as evidenced by the large number of German-made parts in Portuguese-built G-3s, it allowed Portugal some self-reliance when it came to their military needs. This self-reliance gained through the relationship with Bonn also provided Portugal with the ability to maintain its own equipment, as can be evidenced by their significant role in the Portuguese aeronautical industry.

As we could see, Portugal's "proudly alone" rhetoric was not exactly true. Though they did indeed find themselves in a substantial diplomatic siege, Portugal still had allies and sympathizers whom they could rely on. The protection in the UN that was afforded by France and, to a lesser extent, the United States, proved to be a saving grace for Lisbon, who would otherwise have faced more severe repercussions. Likewise, equipment coming from Bonn and, though to a lesser degree, from Paris, allowed Portugal to otherwise continue fighting for longer than they would have been able to do. Additionally, the stupendously important industrial connections with West Germany, which were extensively covered in this study, enabled Portugal to establish a large and modern arms industry that supplied both the Portuguese and the German militaries, though the production issues that plagued Portuguese industry must be reemphasized as they caused issues in both cases.

As to the procedures for the acquisition of weapons, much can be gleaned from the documentation I have studied. The sale of weapons internationally is a complex subject, since there is significant involvement of politics and diplomacy, and as such what is the "best" weapon in tactical applications could be the worst in political or diplomatic terms. The American-designed, Dutch-produced AR-10 rifle, for instance, was considerably more reliable, more durable, and more accurate<sup>219</sup> than the German-designed, Portuguese-produced G-3 rifle.<sup>220</sup> The G-3's main advantage in military terms was being more controllable than the AR-10; however, the reason

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<sup>219</sup> Relatório das experiências de tiro com espingarda de assalto holandesa Armalite da Comissão Técnica para a Substituição da Espingarda, 1961, PT/ADN/SGDN/3REP/238/0735/022, Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional (SGDN) - 3ª Repartição (Armamento e Equipamento), Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa

<sup>220</sup> Relatório das experiências de tiro com espingarda de assalto alemã CETME da Comissão Técnica para a Substituição da Espingarda, 1961, PT/ADN/SGDN/3REP/238/0735/023, Secretariado Geral da Defesa Nacional (SGDN) - 3ª Repartição (Armamento e Equipamento), Arquivo da Defesa Nacional, Lisboa.

why it became the main weapon of the Portuguese military can only be concluded as a political and diplomatic decision. This is due to the already mentioned embargoes that impeded Dutch arms exports to Portugal, as well as American restrictions to what could be done with weapon systems designed in America, coupled with the *Estado Novo's* desire for self-reliance. All these reasons made the G-3 a much more palatable system to equip the Portuguese military with, especially since it allowed Lisbon to work around the export restrictions imposed against them.

The agreements for sales of equipment and the licensing of production for weapons required permits that had to be obtained from one's own government and permissions to be gotten from the government of wherever the item was going to or coming from. This is further complicated by international agreements and restrictions, such as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1819 (1962), which added pressure to increase restrictions on the sale of arms to Portugal and other colonial or apartheid states. The process itself, once the legal matters are taken care of, is more direct. A request is made for certain materials and, if they are available, quantity, price, and delivery are negotiated. Many requests became standard procedure, as was the case with Portugal's import of ammunition for Walther pistols, where thousands of rounds were ordered several times a year. Others could be more sporadic, as with tripods for the MG-42, which were also commonly ordered, although not as frequently, and often required more than one process to be acquired due to their high cost and rather restricted tactical application. Offers and demonstrations proceeded much the same way; nevertheless, the availability and price were generally evident upfront and the onus for refusal lay mostly on the Portuguese side.

The acquisition of tools and expertise, however, might be an even more important aspect of German-Portuguese relations in this period. The availability of tooling and expertise allowed Portugal to be relatively independent if they were to indeed become "proudly alone". The Portuguese arms industry, as has been extensively covered here, had been modernized with German assistance. They became capable of producing modern rifles and modern munitions and developed maintenance facilities that allowed them to keep their modern equipment in working order. This industry was large enough that the Portuguese could afford to export thousands of rifles and tens of thousands of aircraft launched bombs, artillery shells, and mortar rounds, even during the height of the Colonial War, though some of these orders had to be scaled back due to reasons I have already examined here.

The cooperation with Germany allowed Portugal to forgo better relations with the United States and most of Europe since the Portuguese needs could be met by Bonn while not sabotaging their own objectives by caving to external pressures. West Germany, for its part, benefited from having a loyal ally and important economic partner; even if the Germans did attempt to distance themselves from Lisbon's policy in Africa, they did precious little when it came to action against their ally. Even after 1970, when Portugal had become much more internationally ostracized and Germany's strategy relied less and less on Lisbon, both countries were still able to maintain their relationship in a nearly unhindered fashion, except for some face-saving alterations to the wording of certain agreements.

Portugal's military action in the colonies was extremely important to the *Estado Novo*, as the regime saw its continued hold on its colonial empire as the only real way to stay alive. Accordingly, its national military industry also grew in importance, as it allowed the Portuguese to supply many of their own needs and ignore, or bypass, many of the embargoes that had been placed upon them. The ideology of that regime also favored the purchase of goods and services from sources within Portugal. This ideological drive for the creation of the national industry was even more prevalent in their military procurement process. Portugal refused to import landmines, shoes, and other materials with the reasoning that they could be acquired from domestic sources. This is not in itself an unreasonable demand; Brazil, for instance, when purchasing military equipment, often requires some agreement for enabling the local production of much of the equipment it adopts. This was one of the main reasons for its adoption of the Saab JAS-39 Gripen fighter jet in 2014 in a competition where the F/A-18 lost out on the contract due to America's opposition to the transfer of technology that Brazil demanded. America itself requires the foreign equipment they adopt to be produced in the United States, with a full transfer of technology, which is one of the reasons they scrapped the purchase of two Israeli Iron Dome batteries. Portugal, however, sometimes took this logic to the detriment of its own interests, such as with the acquisition of rebar for the expansion of the CPMB, which was significantly delayed due to disputes with the local producer and the refusal of the government to grant import permits. They also only purchased G-3 rifles from Germany on an emergency basis, preferring to rely on their local industry, even if the product they could purchase was the exact same model as the one produced at home, but more expensive and still often relying on imported parts.

Portugal's military procurement and production of military equipment during the Colonial War is indeed an extensive and complex subject. The Portuguese's inability to fully rely on fickle foreign sources forced them to be resourceful. This led to the developments that have already been examined in this study, namely their reliance on West Germany and the expansion of their industries. However, government intervention seems to have hindered the Portuguese industries more than helped. This adds to the fact that the war plagued Portugal's every diplomatic move and dictated much of its own internal policy, which eventually led to the downfall of the regime and the Portuguese empire in Africa. While I do not believe that the *Estado Novo* could have won, or even survived, the colonial war, perhaps it would have had a more effective industry had it not ideologically imposed the restrictions it did.

Even if Portugal had been substantially more effective in its production efforts, it would still be subject to foreign restrictions. Portugal had internationally fallen victim to its out-of-time policies, and there was little to nothing it could do to truly change its diplomatic position. That is, of course, short of surrendering its colonies to the liberation movements, which indeed became the fact after 1974 when the *Estado Novo* was deposed. The fall of the regime brought about a new government, which held decolonization as one of its primary goals. At last, the Colonial War and the diplomatic strain that it had caused came to an end.



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