We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations
are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity
requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference, which excludes the
possibility of a “money pump.” The properties of collective choice rules used in our
characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there
are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative …

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations
are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity
requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference, which excludes the
possibility of a “money pump.” The properties of collective choice rules used in our
characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there
are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative …