Miguel Sicart undertakes an ambitious, two-fold agenda in this volume. At a first level, he seeks to develop a theoretical framework that goes beyond previous work in game ethics, for example, whether taking a philosophical approach that begins with a predefined ethical theory such as deontology or utilitarianism or taking a more psychological approach as exemplified in so-called effects studies. To do so, Sicart draws upon an exceptional range of theoretical resources from the likes of Aristotle as well as more contemporary figures in phenomenology, hermeneutics and information ethics. At the same time, and as Aristotle would insist (ie theory must be grounded in and constantly tested against praxis), this philosophical task is fully informed both by Sicart’s solid mastery of the relevant research and literatures of game studies and his own extensive firsthand experience as a player of these games. So far as I can gather, he draws the balance between these three large domains (philosophy, game studies and player experience) more or less perfectly as he develops his theoretical framework. The upshot is nothing less than a novel, substantive and impressively fruitful framework for analyzing the ethical dimensions of computer games.

It is novel and substantive, first of all, as it pushes these fields forwards in taking up virtue ethics (alongside the more familiar theories of utilitarianism and deontology), thereby incorporating Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, a kind of practical wisdom that requires both extensive (and embodied) experience alongside rational reflection. This move is not only essential, in my view, for a robust ethical theory in general. It is further central to one of the key contributions of this volume, as I see it; namely, a robust and positive account of the game player as an ethical being in contrast with the sometimes prevailing stereotypes of gamers as ‘moral zombies’, in Sicart’s phrase (p. 18). Second, his framework further incorporates, and with unusual effectiveness, the considerable philosophical resources offered by both more contemporary philosophers such as Michel Foucault, Alain Badiou, Barbara Becker, Luciano Floridi and Philip Brey, as well as by such classic figures in phenomenology and hermeneutics as Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This conjunction allows Sicart to build a theoretical framework that not only does justice to the game player as an ethical being, but also to the experience of gameplay itself (ie as described phenomenologically and with attention to the role of hermeneutics or interpretation in such play). Moreover, Sicart is impressively aware of the cultural dimensions of ethics, design and play. In this direction, one of the chief virtues of his theory is that it functions effectively not only at a first or normative level (ie as offering direction for ethical judgments about what counts as a good game, good play, etc.), but, further, his framework is robust at a second, metaethical level, insofar as Sicart can defend his theory as pluralist (one that takes on board fundamental cultural