Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games

E Algaba, JM Bilbao, JRF Garcıa, JJ López - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2003 - Elsevier
The Shapley–Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings
in which each player is pivotal. The Banzhaf power index depends on the number of ways in
which each voter can effect a swing. If the input size of the problem is n, then the function
which measures the worst case running time for computing these indices is in O n2 n. We
present a method based on generating functions to compute these power indices efficiently
for weighted multiple majority games and we study the temporal complexity of the …

[CITATION][C] Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games

L Urbina - 2008
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