Detecting malicious modifications of data in third-party intellectual property cores
Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference, 2015•dl.acm.org
Globalization of the system-on-chip (SoC) design flow has created opportunities for rogue
elements in the intellectual property (IP) vendor companies to insert malicious circuits (aka
hardware Trojans) into their IPs. We propose to formally verify third party IPs (3PIPs) for
unauthorized corruption of critical data such as secret key. Our approach develops
properties to identify corruption of critical registers. Furthermore, we describe two attacks
where computations can be performed on corrupted data without corrupting the critical …
elements in the intellectual property (IP) vendor companies to insert malicious circuits (aka
hardware Trojans) into their IPs. We propose to formally verify third party IPs (3PIPs) for
unauthorized corruption of critical data such as secret key. Our approach develops
properties to identify corruption of critical registers. Furthermore, we describe two attacks
where computations can be performed on corrupted data without corrupting the critical …
Globalization of the system-on-chip (SoC) design flow has created opportunities for rogue elements in the intellectual property (IP) vendor companies to insert malicious circuits (a.k.a. hardware Trojans) into their IPs. We propose to formally verify third party IPs (3PIPs) for unauthorized corruption of critical data such as secret key. Our approach develops properties to identify corruption of critical registers. Furthermore, we describe two attacks where computations can be performed on corrupted data without corrupting the critical register. We develop additional properties to detect such attacks. We validate our technique using Trojans in 8051 and RISC processors and AES designs from Trust-Hub.
ACM Digital LibraryShowing the best result for this search. See all results