In contrast to perturbation-based attacks, patch-based attacks are physically realizable, and are therefore increasingly studied. However, prior work neglects the possibility of adaptive attacks optimized for 3D pose. For the first time, to our knowledge, we consider the challenge of designing and evaluating attacks on image sequences using 3D optimization along entire 3D kinematic trajectories. In this context, we study a type of dynamic attack, referred to as" adaptive active attacks"(AAA), that takes into consideration the pose of the observer being targeted. To better address the threat and risk posed by AAA attacks, we develop several novel risk-based and trajectory-based metrics. These are designed to capture the risk of attack success for attacking earlier in the trajectory to derail autonomous driving systems as well as tradeoffs that may arise given the possibility of additional detection. We evaluate performance of white-box targeted attacks using a subset of ImageNet classes, and demonstrate, in aggregate, that AAA attacks can pose threats beyond static attacks in kinematic settings in situations of predominantly looming motion (i., e., a prevalent use case in automated vehicular navigation). Results demonstrate that AAA attacks can exhibit targeted attack success exceeding 10% in aggregate, and for some specific classes, up to 15% over their static counterparts. However, taking into consideration the probability of detection by the defender shows a more nuanced risk pattern. These new insights are important for guiding future adversarial machine learning studies and suggest researchers should consider defense against novel threats posed by dynamic attacks for full trajectories and videos.