We study logit dynamics (Blume in Games Econ. Behav. 5: 387–424, 1993) for strategic
games. This dynamics works as follows: at every stage of the game a player is selected
uniformly at random and she plays according to a noisy best-response where the noise level
is tuned by a parameter β. Such a dynamics defines a family of ergodic Markov chains,
indexed by β, over the set of strategy profiles. We believe that the stationary distribution of
these Markov chains gives a meaningful description of the long-term behavior for systems …

We study logit dynamics [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] for strategic games.
At every stage of the game a player is selected uniformly at random and she plays according
to a noisy best-response dynamics where the noise level is tuned by a parameter β. Such a
dynamics defines a family of ergodic Markov chains, indexed by β, over the set of strategy
profiles. Our aim is twofold: On the one hand, we are interested in the expected social
welfare when the strategy profiles are random according to the stationary distribution of the …