[HTML][HTML] Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

N Feltovich, A Iwasaki, SH Oda - Stefan Seifert/Christof …, 2006 - books.google.com
Game-theoretic solution concepts imply that modifying a game by adding the same positive
or negative constant to all payoffs—a “change in payoff levels”—should not affect behavior.
Such a change does not affect any player's rank-ordering of outcomes, so pure-strategy best
responses, and hence pure-strategy Nash equilibria, are unaffected. Furthermore, it does
not affect expected-payoff differences under any given set of beliefs about opponents'
strategies, so best-response correspondences, and therefore mixed-strategy Nash …

[CITATION][C] Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

岩崎敦 - Dagstuhl Seminar 06461 (Negotiation and Market …, 2007 - cir.nii.ac.jp
Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt : an experimental
study | CiNii ResearchPayoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the
Stag Hunt : an experimental study … タイトル Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium
selection in the Stag Hunt : an experimental study
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