Strong secrecy for erasure wiretap channels
2010 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, 2010•ieeexplore.ieee.org
We show that duals of certain low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, when used in a
standard coset coding scheme, provide strong secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap
channel (BEWC). This result hinges on a stopping set analysis of ensembles of LDPC codes
with block length n and girth≥ 2k for some k≥ 2. We show that if the minimum left degree of
the ensemble is l min, the expected probability of block error is O (1/n⌈ l min k/2⌉-k) when
the erasure probability ϵ<;; ϵ ef, where ϵ ef depends on the degree distribution of the …
standard coset coding scheme, provide strong secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap
channel (BEWC). This result hinges on a stopping set analysis of ensembles of LDPC codes
with block length n and girth≥ 2k for some k≥ 2. We show that if the minimum left degree of
the ensemble is l min, the expected probability of block error is O (1/n⌈ l min k/2⌉-k) when
the erasure probability ϵ<;; ϵ ef, where ϵ ef depends on the degree distribution of the …
We show that duals of certain low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, when used in a standard coset coding scheme, provide strong secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC). This result hinges on a stopping set analysis of ensembles of LDPC codes with block length n and girth ≥ 2k for some k ≥ 2. We show that if the minimum left degree of the ensemble is l min , the expected probability of block error is O(1/n⌈ l min k/2 ⌉ -k) when the erasure probability ϵ <;; ϵ ef , where ϵ ef depends on the degree distribution of the ensemble. As long as l min and k > 2, the dual of this LDPC code provides strong secrecy over a BEWC of erasure probability greater than 1-ϵ ef .
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