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U filozofiji uma, тežak problem svesti is to explain why and how humans and other organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experiences.[1][2] It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give a (healthy) human being the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioral functions such as watching, listening, speaking (including generating an utterance that appears to refer to personal behaviour or belief), and so forth.[1] The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation—that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioral—since each physical system can be explained (at least in principle) purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon.[3][4][1]

Proponents of the hard problem argue that it is categorically different from the easy problems since no mechanistic or behavioral explanation could explain the character of an experience, not even in principle. Even after all the relevant functional facts are explicated, they argue, there will still remain a further question: "why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?"[1] To bolster their case, proponents of the hard problem frequently turn to various philosophical thought experiments, involving philosophical zombies (which, they claim, are conceivable) or inverted qualia, or the claimed ineffability of colour experiences, or the claimed unknowability of foreign states of consciousness, such as the experience of being a bat.

Chalmers on stage for an Alan Turing Year event at De La Salle University, Manila, 27 March 2012

The terms "hard problem" and "easy problems" were coined by the philosopher David Chalmers in a 1994 talk given at The Science of Consciousness conference held in Tucson, Arizona.[5] The following year, the main talking points of Chalmers' talk were then published in The Journal of Consciousness Studies.[3] The publication gained significant attention from consciousness researchers and became the subject of a special volume of the journal,[6][7] which was later published into a book.[8] In 1996, Chalmers published The Conscious Mind, a book-length treatment of the hard problem, in which he elaborated on his core arguments and responded to counterarguments. His use of the word easy is "tongue-in-cheek".[9] As the cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker puts it, they are about as easy as going to Mars or curing cancer. "That is, scientists more or less know what to look for, and with enough brainpower and funding, they would probably crack it in this century."[10]

The existence of the hard problem is disputed. It has been accepted by some philosophers of mind such as Joseph Levine,[11] Colin McGinn,[12] and Ned Block[13] and cognitive neuroscientists such as Francisco Varela,[14] Giulio Tononi,[15][16] and Christof Koch.[15][16] On the other hand, its existence is denied by other philosophers of mind, such as Daniel Dennett,[17] Massimo Pigliucci,[18] Thomas Metzinger, Patricia Churchland,[19] and Keith Frankish,[20] and by cognitive neuroscientists such as Stanislas Dehaene,[21] Bernard Baars,[22] Anil Seth,[23] and Antonio Damasio.[24] Clinical neurologist and skeptic Steven Novella has dismissed it as "the hard non-problem".[25] According to a 2020 PhilPapers survey, a majority (62.42%) of the philosophers surveyed said they believed that the hard problem is a genuine problem, while 29.72% said that it does not exist.[26]

Reference

  1. ^ а б в г Chalmers, David (1995). „Facing up to the problem of consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2 (3): 200—219. 
  2. ^ Harnad, Stevan (1995). „Why and how we are not zombies”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1: 164—167.  See also Harnad, Stevan (април 2000). „How/why the mind–body problem is hard”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 7 (4): 54—61. 
  3. ^ а б Chalmers, David (1995). „Facing up to the problem of consciousness” (PDF). Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2 (3): 200—219. 
  4. ^ See Cooney's foreword to the reprint of Chalmers' paper: Brian Cooney, ур. (1999). „Chapter 27: Facing up to the problem of consciousness”. The place of mind. Cengage Learning. стр. 382 ff. ISBN 978-0534528256. 
  5. ^ Problem of Consciousness (Tuscan 1994)
  6. ^ JCS vol. 4, pp. 3-46, 1997
  7. ^ Chalmers, David (1997). „Moving forward on the problem of consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 4 (1): 3—46. 
  8. ^ Shear, Jonathan (1997). Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0262692212. 
  9. ^ „Episode 83, The David Chalmers Interview (Part I - Consciousness)”. The Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast (на језику: енглески). 19. 7. 2020. Приступљено 2020-09-05. 
  10. ^ Pinker, Steven (29. 1. 2007). „The Brain: The Mystery of Consciousness”. Time. Приступљено 19. 12. 2018. 
  11. ^ Levine, Joseph (2009-01-15). „The Explanatory Gap”. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind: 281—291. ISBN 978-0199262618. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0017. 
  12. ^ McGinn, Colin (20. 2. 2012). „All machine and no ghost?”. New Statesman. Приступљено 27. 3. 2012. 
  13. ^ Block, Ned (2002). „The Harder Problem of Consciousness”. The Journal of Philosophy. 99 (8): 391—425. JSTOR 3655621. S2CID 111383062. doi:10.2307/3655621. 
  14. ^ Varela, F.J. (1. 4. 1996). „Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 3 (4): 330—349. 
  15. ^ а б Tononi, Giulio; Boly, Melanie; Massimini, Marcello; Koch, Christof (јул 2016). „Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate”. Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 17 (7): 450—461. PMID 27225071. S2CID 21347087. doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44. 
  16. ^ а б Tononi, Giulio; Koch, Christof (март 2015). „Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 370 (1668): 20140167. PMC 4387509 Слободан приступ. PMID 25823865. doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0167. 
  17. ^ Dennett, Daniel C. (2013). „The tuned deck”. Intuition pumps and other tools for thinking. W. W. Norton & Company. стр. 310 ff. ISBN 978-0393240689.  and also "Commentary on Chalmers": Dennett, Daniel C. (1996). „Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 3 (1): 4—6. 
  18. ^ Massimo Pigliucci (2013). „What hard problem?” (PDF). Philosophy Now (99). 
  19. ^ Churchland, Patricia (1996). „The Hornswoggle Problem” (PDF). Journal of Consciousness Studies. 3 (5–6): 402—408. Приступљено 10. 1. 2021. 
  20. ^ Frankish, Keith (2016). „Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness” (PDF). Journal of Consciousness Studies. 23 (11–12): 11—39. Приступљено 20. 12. 2018. 
  21. ^ Dehaene, Stanislas (2014). Consciousness and the brain: deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. Viking Adult. стр. 259–266. ISBN 978-0670025435. 
  22. ^ Edelman, Gerald; Gally, Joseph; Baars, Bernard (2011). „Biology of Consciousness”. Frontiers in Psychology. 2 (4): 4. PMC 3111444 Слободан приступ. PMID 21713129. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00004 Слободан приступ. 
  23. ^ Seth, Anil (новембар 2016). „The real problem”. Aeon. Приступљено 22. 4. 2018. 
  24. ^ Sean Carroll (29. 4. 2019). „Sean Carroll's Mindscape”. Preposterousuniverse.com (Подкест). Sean Carroll. Корисна информација се налази на: 1:04.46. „I’m just saying that the idea of a hard problem that you cannot transpose, I think is wrong.” 
  25. ^ „Psychological Scales. The Hard Problem of Consciousness.”. arabpsychology.com. Приступљено 2023-10-29. 
  26. ^ „PhilPapers Survey 2020”. survey2020.philpeople.org. Приступљено 2022-05-26. 

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