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Cover photo: Picture of the houses along the canal in Copenhagen, May 26th.
Photo by Willem Kloempken, Junior, studying History, Peace, War, and Defense, and Geographic Information Systems.

THE JOURNAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STAFF

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

So many students and organizations contributed their time and effort to the Journal of Foreign Affairs at Carolina (JFAC) this semester. The team would like to thank the Carolina International Relations Association (CIRA) and its leadership, particularly Mikhal Ben-Joseph, President, and Rohan Rajesh, Vice President, for advising and supporting the journal as a branch of CIRA. Thank you to our authors and photographers for contributing your creative work, and for working with our editorial team throughout the semester. Finally, JFAC is grateful to the many departments at UNC who share our requests for student submissions each semester. The publication of JFAC's Fall 2022 issue would not be possible without each of these people.

FROM THE EDITOR

It is hard to believe that we are at the end of another semester, and that 2023 is around the corner. Both this fall and this year were eventful in foreign affairs — 2022 will likely be another year remembered in history books far into the future. Economic turmoil, continued challenges in stopping the spread of diseases, and the ongoing war in Ukraine are all examples of this year's major global upheavals. However, there have also been many instances of international cooperation, such as in scientific innovation and diplomatic coordination.

This year's international events, both positive and tragic, are all reminders of the fact that no country or individual is isolated from the impacts of global affairs. So many of the future's challenges, whether averting economic crises, responding to climate change, or protecting democracies, will require voters, scientists, and leaders in all areas of society to think beyond national borders.

With this future in mind, our editorial team has worked hard this semester to publish undergraduate analyses of foreign affairs across many disciplines, both to increase the visibility of student work and to further the campus conversation about questions we think are significant and relevant: questions like what makes historical figures memorable, how political parties evolve, and why international relations change over time.

This Fall 2022 issue of the Journal of Foreign Affairs at Carolina features student pieces on broad and varied international topics. Several pieces examine historical phenomena: ancient, as in "If Alexander Didn't Exist;" 20th-century, as in "The Racial Ideology of the Ustaša;" and more recent, as in "Religious Sectarianism and Secular Nationalism in the Syrian Civil War." Others delve into today's domestic politics, both of the U.S. ("We're Gonna Need a Bigger Budget?") and of countries around the world ("Effective Strategies for Fighting Political Corruption in Peru"). Still others take a regional or comparative approach, as in "History and Hope" and "Comparing France's La Republique en Marche and Poland's Law and Justice Party."

It continues to be the journal's mission to expand students' awareness of and interest in international topics like these, so that after graduation, students will stay informed about global events in their careers, leadership roles, and everyday lives. This fall, the journal grew its editorial team, received more well-researched articles and creative photography submissions than we could publish, and returned almost completely to in-person meetings. The executive team is incredibly proud of JFAC's editors, authors, and photographers for their work this semester.

Of course, this publication would not be possible without them, as well as the leadership of the Carolina International Relations Association, the professors who kindly distributed our requests for student work, and the executive team at JFAC. Thank you Jay, Stuti, Robert, Michelle, Phoebe, Mariana, and Emma, for being phenomenal executive team members. Thank you to the seven student authors who contributed their pieces to this issue and collaborated throughout the semester with JFAC's editors to prepare their articles for publication. Last, but certainly not least, a huge thank you to the Fall 2022 editorial team, whose consistent hard work and enthusiasm made this semester at the journal an especially fun one.

To our readers, I hope the following articles spark a continuing interest in learning more about international events. To our editorial team, I greatly look forward to working with each of you again this spring semester.

Sincerely,



Hannah Rubenstein
Editor-in-Chief

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If Alexander Didn't Exist: Refining Lee L. Brice's Analysis of Philip II's Revolution in Military Affairs

Sophie Van Duin

Sophie van Duin is a second-year student at UNC studying Peace, War & Defense (PWAD) along with Hispanic Literatures & Cultures. She has a fascination with history, and particularly with how the culture of conflict has changed over time. This paper was written as a part of her PWAD studies in PWAD 422: Ancient Greek Warfare, taught by Professor Fred Naiden (whom she highly recommends).

In Lee L. Brice's article, "Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Question of a Macedonian 'Revolution in Military Affairs,'" he begins by defining the conditions necessary for a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to occur, and then investigates whether Philip II of Macedon fulfilled those conditions. He concludes that "Philip did initiate a major RMA that his son saw through to fruition" but that, although he "came so close," he did not fully achieve a major RMA within his own reign.[1] That Philip and his son revolutionized warfare together is inarguable to this author. However, the far more interesting question is: If Alexander was never born, can the argument be made against Brice that Philip achieved a major RMA regardless? The answer is yes.

Brice spends roughly half his article arguing for the five conditions he sets forth as necessary to classify something as an RMA. To remain within the scope of this paper, this author will accept these stipulations as they are. In order, an RMA must (according to Brice): 1) occur within a short time period, set by Brice as 60 years maximum; 2) "be new in either conception or employment"; 3) "include dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts"; 4) "force every opponent to… adapt… or be defeated; and 5) "have socio-political implications or repercussions."[2] This paper (for the most part agreeing with Brice) will argue that Philip's 23-year reign satisfies every one of these requirements.

Philip came to power in Macedonia in 359 BCE, after the death of his brother, Perdiccas. Macedonia at this point was nowhere close to as powerful as it would become and under sizable threat from multiple enemies—among them the Paeonians, Illyrians, Thracians, and Athenians.[3] Philip was placed in the position of having to immediately transform his army into a force that could stand strong against the threats the Macedonians expected to face.[4] This resulted in a wave of military innovation during Philip's first year as king. He developed the novel Macedonian phalanx, and the long spears (sarissas) used by the phalanx formation.

The two most generally noted differences between the sarissa and the spears used before in the rest of the Hellenistic world are the sarissa's length (projecting 15-16 feet out in front of the man carrying it) and that it was wielded with two hands instead of one. However, Philip's technical innovation here was not limited to simply making the previously-used spears bigger. Rather, the sarissas were practically an entirely new kind of weapon. Their longer length necessitated a different type of wood: ash, rather than cornel. Their spear tips were different, smaller and narrower compared to

their predecessors. And, they were being used for a new purpose: to penetrate armor and shields, rather than to wound exposed flesh.[5]

The use of the sarissa within the context of the Macedonian phalanx was designed by Philip as a result of being both inspired by and desiring to defend against a Theban offensive tactic introduced by the general Epaminondas, a man Philip came to know during his time as a hostage in Thebes prior to his reign.[6] The original Theban manifestation of this tactic involved amassing a unit of men an unusually large amount of ranks deep to attack a specific point on the enemy's line. Epaminondas used this tactic to great success, for instance at the battle of Leuctra. Philip adapted this tactic for use in Macedonia, using wood for mass rather than men (which would have been more expensive). This creative adaptation and the development of the sarissa alone, even disregarding other innovations Philip introduced to the battlefield, surely satisfies the second condition of Brice's RMA, new "conception or employment," as the sarissa was new in conception, and its use in the Macedonian phalanx was a new employment of Epaminondas's tactics.

The third condition for an RMA is dramatic change in military operation, organization and doctrine. In talking about operation, we may continue the conversation regarding the sarissa and what Philip learned from Epaminondas in Thebes. Within the Macedonian infantry, the development of the phalanx was the main dramatic change in operation. Within the cavalry, the biggest operational changes were their reorganization into structured units and the use of the wedge instead of square formation, though this new formation was not invented by Philip but adopted by him from the Thracians and Scythians.[7] Drawing again from Epaminondas and improving on that general's work, Philip also caused the different arms of his army to cooperate and communicate with one another in extremely effective ways.

In terms of organization and doctrine, it seems that Philip took many cues from Sparta, which, after all, was the epitome of military prowess in this area. He too had a familiarity with his men which allowed for two-way communication between himself and lower officers, where he both passed down orders and listened to those below him.[8]Additionally, like Sparta, discipline was a high priority for Philip; it had to be, as the phalanx depended on its men staying in near-perfect formation. Philip was also strict with his troops. For instance, he limited the number of servants they were allowed, and forced them to carry their own gear.[9]

Unique to Philip was his particular use of the term or status of "hetairoi" (companion). Philip desired a way to instill loyalty in his men, and in doing so he faced a slightly different challenge than his contemporaries to the south. For example, in Athens, the people were understood to represent the government, so the army saw itself as representing the Athenians. In Macedonia, on the other hand, the king represented the government.[10] Therefore, Philip faced a somewhat unique issue when it came to ensuring the loyalty of his troops. They needed to be convinced not to fight for their people, but for him. In order to accomplish this, Philip expanded the term "companion" (hetairos), a word with strong connotations in the Greek world dating back to the Iliad, to include more people than it ever had before.

Like the kings before him, Philip had his core entourage of King's Companions (cavalry companions), but in addition to this he also had his infantry called "foot companions" as well as many other important men he bestowed the status of companion upon (such as engineers, and possibly other intellectuals).[11] This title of "hetairos" was often more than symbolic. First, as in the Iliad, it represented a certain reciprocal relationship between Philip and his men–which is not to say a symmetrical relationship, where they shared equal social or economic status. Rather, it was a relationship in which not only were Philip's companions expected to risk themselves for him, but he too was expected to risk himself for them. Not only were they expected to obey his orders, he was expected to listen to their opinions. Additionally, Philip frequently gave out land grants along with the title of companion in return for military service, which served to make soldiers less dependent on local landholders and instead directly loyal to the King.[12]

It is clear from most of the preced-

ing information that Philip's innovations varied in the degree to which they can be considered novel versus improvements on the ideas of others. The man clearly drew inspiration from the Thebans and Spartans, and built on institutions like the King's Companions that existed in Macedonia prior to his reign. However, we should not allow this fact to take away from Philip's ingenuity for three reasons. First, no change happens in a vacuum; it is always informed by the theories and doctrines that preceded it. Also, Philip rarely transplanted the exact same theory or technique from another army to his. Rather, he adapted each to fit his people and his resources, and this is largely what allowed him to be successful: He knew his kingdom. Finally, Philip's ability first to learn of and then to synthesize all of these various strategic elements from the Hellenistic world within such a short time frame is a rare achievement.

By this point, the first three conditions of an RMA (time limit, new conception/employment, and new doctrine/operation/organization) have been addressed by this paper and met by Philip. Now, moving down our list of conditions, and for the moment skipping number four, we arrive at the need for an RMA to have repercussions outside the military. Brice considers the fact that Philip meets this criterion to be "beyond debate,"[13] and he is correct. Part of this is due to how Macedonia, like many other Greek states, was set up: Based on the available evidence, it is likely that Macedonia lacked any sort of civil administration and instead was managed by officers within the military hierarchy. When citizens are obligated to serve in the military, and the military is the government, revolutions within the military cannot help but affect society at large.[14] Overall, the greatest societal change we know Philip produced was the urbanization of Macedon, as can be seen through this speech that Arrian claims Alexander made:

"Philip took you over when you were helpless vagabonds, mostly clothed in skins, feeding a few animals on the mountains and engaged in their defence in unsuccessful fighting with Illyrians, Triballians and the neighbouring Thracians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of skins, he brought you down from the mountains to the plains; he made you a match in battle for the barbarians on your borders, so that you no longer trusted for your safety to the strength of your positions so much as to your natural courage. He made you city dwellers and established the order that comes from good laws and customs."[15]

This urbanization can most easily be seen in the expansion of the capital city of Pella, which "Philip enlarged… from a small city, because he was reared in it."[16] This place, which Demosthenes describes as "then [before Philip] a mean and insignificant city,"[17] was transformed during Philip's reign into somewhere worth visiting by many intellectuals, among them Speusippus, Theopompus (although he did not enjoy Philip's court much), and Theophrastus.[18] In short, the Macedonian capital was not only enlarged in terms of population but in terms of cultural significance in Greece. The same can be said for Macedon itself during Philip's reign.

Where Brice felt Philip's case was weakest was when it came to his fourth condition for an RMA: that "every opponent must either adapt to the RMA, or be defeated." I will address the exact wording of Brice's reasoning later, but for now let us take this condition as literally as possible. Philip's campaigns were dominated by victories, and these we can safely put aside as falling into the "or be defeated" category of battles. Therefore, the question quickly becomes: What about the few battles that Philip lost? First on this short list of defeats come the two battles in which General Onomarchus of the Phocians defeated Philip in Thessaly. Details on these battles vary by account, but it appears that in at least one battle the victory was due to the first ever use of field artillery, which we may safely consider an "adaptation" (as opposed to continued utilization of the old ways of war).[19] Then there are his failures at sea and Philip's failure at Byzantium. Given that no claim has been made that Philip achieved any kind of naval RMA, these can be put aside as irrelevant. The only other major loss Philip's army suffered on land was the defeat of the expeditionary force led by Parmenion in Anatolia at the hands of Memnon of Rhodes, and the main cause of this defeat appears to have been the demoralizing effect that news of Philip's death had

on the Macedonians.[20] Given what we have explored regarding how the Macedonian army was engineered to be directly loyal to the king, that the king's death led to their defeat abroad is not unexpected and, in this author's opinion, should not count against Philip in terms of meeting the fourth RMA condition.

In his conclusion, Brice makes use of an interesting phrase when he claims that Philip did not achieve a major RMA. His reader may then well ask, what defines a major RMA? What criterion is Philip missing that relegates his RMA—excluding the achievements of his son—to solely minor status? Is it simply because his achievements are perceived as standing in the shadow of Alexander's, or is there another variable at play? Brice mentions specifically—in reference to Philip and the fourth condition for an RMA—that,

"by 338 the Greek city-states that Philip "schooled" in battle continued to fight in the same ways they had fought earlier in his reign and earlier in the fourth century. They had not accepted (although some men certainly realized) that to beat Philip they needed to innovate a matching response to the Macedonian reforms. …Philip's opponents at Chaeronea did not accept that theirs was an obsolete way of war."[21]

Is this then the crucial variable that Philip was missing? Was Alexander's existence required for a major RMA solely in order to ensure that the revolution achieved a crucial, unstated but implied, sixth condition: contemporary recognition? However, it seems doubtful that the Greeks realized "theirs was an obsolete way of war," even in Alexander's time. In 331 BCE, around when Alexander was about to fight at Gaugamela, Antipater was caught up in a Lacaedamonian rebellion near Megalopolis. Given that no historian of that time period mentions any special adaptation that the Spartans and their allies used to fight the Macedonians, and given the far greater number of Lacaedamonians that died compared to their enemies, it seems safe to say that even at this point in history they still were using their "obsolete" ways of war in the hopes of defeating post-RMA Macedon.[22]

Another possibility is that Brice does not see Philip's RMA as major because Philip's work stands in the shadow of Alexander's accomplishments in Persia. After all, more people tend to know of "Alexander the Great" than his father. However, in the RMA context, this argument holds little weight, because Alexander, independently, can not be said to have achieved his own RMA. While he instituted some new reforms in tactics, he inherited his army and his top generals from his father, and thus cannot lay claim to an independent RMA as we have defined it. If Alexander did not exist, Philip would still have engineered a revolution in his own right. The reverse is not necessarily true.

If we still contend that the designation of major RMA depends on contrast with other leaders within the same era, better comparisons for Philip can be found in Macedonia's past. For example, King Archelaus ruled from 413 to 399 BCE and was responsible for modernizing Macedonia greatly. He hellenized Macedonia, was a patron of the arts, convinced Euripedes to come live at Pella during his last years, transferred the capital to Pella and turned the city into a site worth visiting.[23] In terms of military reform, Thucydides states:

"For those [roads] which now exist were built by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who, when he became king, made straight roads and in various ways improved the country. In his force of cavalry and infantry and in his military resources generally he surpassed all the eight kings who preceded him."[24]

So, what sets Philip apart from Archelaus, besides having a successor who furthered his legacy rather than reversing his progress? What distinguishes him from other previous Macedonian kings such as Alexander I? On one hand, Philip was similar to previous kings. He inherited the King's Companions from these predecessors. Many of the threats he faced upon the throne were similar to that which his forerunners had weathered as well. Like Philip, Alexander I and perhaps also Archelaus competed at the Olympics.[25]

However, unlike Archelaus or Alexander I, Philip was able to expand Macedonian power to an extent previously unheard of within his short reign. Part of this success may have merely been fortunate timing on Philip's part, but given that we have established that Philip had to face many similar threats as his prede-

cessors and that these forces used largely the same kinds of tactics and held similar resources as before, clearly Philip's expansion of power cannot exclusively be ascribed to luck. Philip also had impressive diplomatic shrewdness that contributed to his success, but we should not allow that fact to detract from our perception of the impact of his military cunning.

First of all, deciding which battles should be fought and which can be avoided is equally as important in a tactical sense as how to fight the battles, if not more. Secondly, given the country's lack of enormous wealth, especially in the beginning of Philip's reign, it is likely not that, but instead Macedonia's increasing military strength that turned it into a desirable ally. Given then, that luck played a limited role and diplomacy was dependent, in large part, on military capability, it appears that the factor which set Philip apart from his predecessors (and allowed him to outdo them in terms of Macedonian expansion) must have been military reforms that were superior to not only Archelaus' but that of all other previous kings. The most important of these, for Philip—in the context of breaking with previous Macedonian tradition—were most likely his land grants and expansion of the title of companion, which would have helped unify Macedonia through loyalty to the king in a way it had never been before. So, if the condition for a major RMA is favorable contrast with other kings, Philip passes this test as well.

Having come this far, we may well ask: Why does it matter whether or not Philip's RMA was his alone or one "his son saw through to fruition"? The answer is simply because the RMA question is useful not just as an interesting semantics debate, but also as a way to examine who in history was able to make impressive changes quickly and how such a feat might be replicated in the modern day—even outside of the military context. To suggest that a leader's best chance at making a significant difference in a short amount of time is to hope for a successor who can carry on their work is greatly unhelpful.

To be sure, we can give Philip some credit in helping Alexander grow into the man he became: Philip hired Aristotle as Alexander's tutor and gave him leadership experience in the Macedonian army prior to his son's ascension as king. For instance, Alexander gained significant experience on the battlefield at Chaeronea. However, we must acknowledge that at the end of the day, Philip's grand strategy was necessarily a personal one: one that was centered around what he wanted to achieve in his lifetime alone. As Philip knew from experience, Macedonian successions tended to be chaotic. Macedonian kings traditionally lacked the power to appoint their own heirs, [26]which meant that Philip could never be sure that Alexander would be the one to succeed him, given the numerous alternative relatives and generals. Additionally, given Philip's untimely death, we cannot say who he would've preferred to succeed him if he had lived. Even Olympia, one of Philip's wives, worried that Philip preferred his wife Cleopatra over her and would have preferred that a future child of hers become king instead of Alexander. We also know that there could have been tension between Alexander and his father, as the events surrounding the day of Philip's death demonstrate.[27] However, even putting all this aside, it is well known that no matter how carefully a parent might plan, how their child turns out remains largely a matter of chance. So, in the debate over Philip's RMA, with an eye towards what Philip alone accomplished, it is in our best interest to disregard Alexander's existence almost entirely and instead look to what Philip's personal grand strategy was and how he managed to execute it.

Philip's great strengths in terms of military reform were the following: 1) a willingness to learn from others, especially as he did in Thebes from Epaminondas; 2) the ability to adapt tactics/doctrine/strategy learned abroad into something uniquely suited to his circumstances, resources, and men; and 3) (although it has been covered to a lesser extent in this paper) impressive skill in obtaining allies through diplomacy, marriage, and a shrewd handling of the politics of victory. His success in history is due to these skills, not to the fortunate birth of the type of child that would both seek to continue and have the aptitude for continuing his father's legacy. Philip's major revolution did not hinge on the existence of his son.

References and Endnotes

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

A picture of Sarajevo at sunset, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Yellow Bastion. June 20th. Photo by Willem Kloempken, Junior, studying History, Peace, War, and Defense, and Geographic Information Systems.

(Above) May 2020, Kangding, Sichuan, PRC. Type 120 Black and White Negative Film. Sitting on the busiest traffic route from Southwestern China to Tibet, passing Kangding marks the appearance of the first few summits with perennial snow coverage.
Photo by Qiaoan Gu, Junior, Biology and Studio Art Double Major, Geography Minor

(Right) Taken near the Cabo Rojo salt flats in Puerto Rico, December 2021. Captured on Fujifilm Superia X-tra 400 ISO film.
Photos by Macayla Jackson, Sophomore, Geography Major and Data Science Minor.

The Racial Ideology of the Ustaša: Origins and Implications

Max McCarthy

Max McCarty is a Junior at UNC, majoring in Peace, War and Defense, and Public Policy, with a minor in Russian Culture. He initially wrote this article for POLI 469: Conflict and Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia. During this class Max became interested in the Balkans during the Second World War, which inspired him to write about the Ustaše.

The Second World War brought immense political change to Europe. Yugoslavia was no exception to this change, as the country was invaded and partitioned in 1941. A unique geopolitical situation followed, leading the Ustaša, a Croatian fascist organization, to found the Independent State of Croatia (NDH).[1] While there was an already sizable Croatian nationalist movement within Yugoslavia, the Ustaša were not popular in the pre-war period because they were considered radical in their ideas on identity and race. While in control of the NDH, the Ustaša capitalized on existing theories and conceptions of race to achieve its political and geopolitical goals.

The Ustaša was in control of Croatia from 1941 to 1945.[2] The organization was formed in 1929 by Ante Pavelic, an ethnic Croatian born in modern-day Bosnia. He embraced the cause of Croatian nationalism from a young age, and later, became an influential member of the Croatian Party of Rights before the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, where he quickly became more radical in his views and methods.[3] After the Yugoslavian King Alexander I established his dictatorship in 1929 and banned political parties, Pavelic fled Yugoslav authorities to fascist Italy, where he found his most influential ally, Benito Mussolini.[4] It was during this time in Italy that Pavelic created and established the Ustaša. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia fell on April 10, 1941, and The Independent State of Croatia was created after the joint German-Italian invasion of the region. The Independent State of Croatia was granted sovereignty over almost all of modern-day Croatia and Bosnia, although Germany and Italy continued to maintain occupation over some of these regions.[5] The Ustaša's appointment to power by the Axis powers gave them a lot of influence over the NDH and the state-building process in Croatia, which allowed the organization to pursue its political goals.

The Ustaša had clearly defined ethnolinguistic ideas of the Croatian nation, as most other Croatian nationalism movements of the time; however, what defined the Ustaša was their definitions of nationhood centered around race. The Ustaša developed very strict and segmented definitions of race, which were influenced by previous Balkan theory and, later, by Nazi ideas of "Aryanism."[6] This was not necessarily unique to the Ustaša however, as racial "science" and theories dominated the political circles of the interwar Balkans, and even the whole of Europe.

Our modern conception of race is very different from the definitions used by many theorists before and during the Second World War. Racial science regarded race as a biological attribute, defined by physical characteristics, blood lineage, and broader aspects such as anthropological findings and ideas such

as the 'spirit.' As Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state, both nationalist movements and Yugoslavists searched for reasons or 'justifications' that legitimized their nation's claim to a state and the unification of Southern Slavs.[7] As such, there was much discourse on racial identities in the Balkans prior to World War II and even before the formation of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavist intellectuals were often motivated to formulate their theories on race by their ideology, where they legitimized Yugoslavia on a racial basis. These theories were set against the reality of the Serb-dominated state, where Yugoslavist intellectuals focused on the Serbian people as the main component of the races of the Balkans.[8] The synthesis between Yugoslavist theories and Serbian nationalism could be seen best within the works of Jovan Cvijic, one of the leading Yugoslav intellectuals on the subject of race at the advent of Yugoslavia's creation. Cvijic embraced the idea of a 'Dinaric' racial identity of the Yugoslavs, where the South Slavic people of Yugoslavia shared a racial identity.[9] However, the common identity he preached placed the 'Serbian Type' above all others, stating that "the best example of the really pure patriarchal Dinaric type is certainly the Serbian Variety."[10] Cvijic identifies specific psychological characteristics that he connects to the true 'Dinaric man,' characteristic that he states are most prevalent amongst the Serbs and lacking in most Croatian regions, further emphasizing the racial hierarchy constructed by his theories.[11]

Croatian theories followed a similar train of thought and embraced many of the same ideas as those of the Yugoslavists. While Croatian nationalists and intellectuals accepted the notion that there exists a shared 'Dinaric' race between Yugoslav peoples, the Croatians sought to distinguish themselves from the other Southern Slavs, proving their 'exceptionality.'[12] They also hoped to legitimize the Croatian nationalist movement as there would now be a racial basis for their independence. The Anti-Yugoslav Croatian intellectuals of the pre-war period focused on several main features, such as: physical characteristics, western connections, and distinctions between themselves and neighboring peoples.[13] Ćiro Truhelka, a notable early 20th century Croatian archaeologist, wrote an article titled Croatian Bosnia: We and They over There, which intended to display Bosnia as a Croatian region through the study of racial characteristics.[14] This study, although well before the inter-war period, exemplifies many of the ideas that would be explored by later intellectuals, such as the acceptance of the Dinaric racial group and the attempts to distinguish Croatians from Serbs and other Southern Slavs. Truhelka's lasting contribution was his assertion that Bosnians were racially Croatian, which would become a main tenet of many successive racial theories utilized by the Ustaša. [15]

The inter-war period brought with it a wave of new theories, ideas, and nationalist fervor, fueling further racial studies in the Balkans. Historian and theorist Filip Lukas became the leading Croatian nationalist intellectual of the inter-war period and espoused some of the main ideas that inspired the elements of the Ustaša's ideology.[16] Lukas directly critiqued Cvijic's theories on the Serbian racial exceptionality and adopted an opposite stance. He accepted the idea of the Dinaric race and its extension of most South Slavic people, but argued that, as opposed to Serbs, Croatians were the "purest" form of the Dinaric race. To 'support' this claim, Lukas used findings from the Swiss anthropologist Eugene Pittard, who used physical characteristics to racially separate Serbs and Croatians while also defining Bosnian Muslims as racially Croatian.[17] In the 1930s, Lukas fully embraced Croatian nationalism and began his focus on Croatian connections to the West. While he uses the ideas of an East-West relationship to describe the 'superiority' of Croatian culture and civilization, he also uses it to explain the racial origins and admixture in both the Croatian and Serbian peoples. Lukas described Croatia as a gateway between the East and West, where the Dinaric peoples of Croatia had interbred with Germanics, Romans, and Illyrians, which resulted in a

racially distinct and 'civilized' Croatian people.[18] The Serbians, he argued, had interbred with different peoples such as Vlachs, Thracians, and Near Eastern immigrants.[19] The arguments of pre-war racial theories, the ideas of Lukas in particular, set the framework for Ustaša's racial ideology.

Upon its formation, the Ustaša quickly embraced and refined these preexisting theories of Croatian racial identity. Dr. Mladen Lorkovic, a leading Ustaša ideologist, published his study "The Nation and Land of the Croats" in 1939, which reflected the Ustaša racial ideology more clearly as it focused on the "Aryan" origin of Croatians.[20] While Lukas had argued that Croatians were the 'purest' of the Dinaric race, Lorkovic was concerned with the theories of Iranian origins and the warrior elite, which quickly became the main tenets of the Ustaša racial thinking.[21] The most important distinction between inter-war Croatian racial theory and that prevalent in the NDH was that Ustaša intellectuals embraced the idea of "Aryanism," relating Croatians to Gothic-Iranians and adopting Nazi racial theory. While there was certainly variation among intellectuals, the prevailing idea adopted was that some group of warriors (typically Indo-Iranian, but occasionally Nordic) became the ruling class of ancient Croatia, which ruled over a "Slavic majority."[22] The Croatian ethnographer Mirko Kus-Nikolajev stated in his publications to the Ustaša state paper that "Racial psychology gives the Dinaric race a high life and cultural value. The strengthening of the Nordic element in the Dinaric race would also mean the strengthening of the positive features in our nation."[23] While Kus-Nikolajev refers directly to the 'Nordic element' present in Croatia, the prevailing views on the Nordic and Indo-Iranian aspects of Croatian race were almost identical. The Ustaša believed that the ancient Indo-Iranian warrior ruling class of Croatia imbued the Croatian peoples with their 'superior' attributes, a trait that was not displayed by the Serbs in the south who had admixture that was primarily Vlach or Asiatic.[24] Another major element of Ustaša racial theory in the NDH was its stance on Jews in Croatia. While aforementioned theorists such as Ciro Tuhelka and Filip Lukas had defined the Jews as 'racially foreign,' the Ustaša took a harsher stance stemming from the anti-communist stance of the Ustaša.[25] This stance viewed communism as a largely Jewish enterprise, and the Ustaša organization desired to become closer allies with the Nazis in Germany. The Ustaša adopted a harsher stance against Jews to conform more closely to their fascist ideology and to earn the favor of Germany, despite not being entirely reflected in previous racial theory.

It is important to understand not only the Ustaša's racial ideology, but their political goals as well. These goals were based on two main ideas: that an ethnically distinct Croatian nation existed, and that it had a historic right to statehood. [26]Pavelic and the Ustaša made it clear that those not considered racially fit would be excluded from political life, and that many in the Ustaša desired a racially pure Croatia.[27] As such, when the Ustaša gained control over Croatia, they had already achieved their most pressing goal: an independent Croatia. They then decided to go after many different political pursuits, such as religious unity and economic reformation, but their long history of racial and biological justifications manifested itself in the institutionalization of these racial ideas and the beginning of mass killings. In addition to the 'purification' of Croatia, the Ustaša, as the rulers of the NDH, endeavored to redefine or 'recreate' the Croatian nation.[28] The efforts to redefine the Croatian nation caused the Ustaša to commit abundant resources into promoting what it saw as the rightful and legitimate Croatian culture, often focusing on the Croatian's "Warrior past." Both political goals were pursued through many means, but race was a primary and integral aspect to the methods of their realization.

Once the Ustaša had practically been given control over almost all of modern-day Croatia and Bosnia, they were able to pursue their political ambitions through the NDH. The Ustaša had already established

sophisticated racial theories and hierarchies, and they were quick to implement it within the NDH. The first implementation of these racial ideas was in the Aryan Race Laws which closely resembled the Nazi Nuremburg Laws. On April 30, 1941, many laws were passed concerning race, ethnicity, and citizenship, but the "Law decree on racial affiliation" and the "Law decree on the protection of the Aryan blood and honor of the Croatian nation" were the most racially charged.[29] In these laws, the legal concept of the "Aryan" was introduced, a term that was used by Nazi theorists and came to define ethnic and racial Croatians.[30] The term Aryan, while used primarily by the Nazi race theorists, was used as an encompassing term for the Croatian race that pre-war Croatian Intellectuals had defined. The Dinaric and Nordic races that were the main subjects of discussion by those theorists both became defined as Aryan, while Jews, Serbs, and Romani people all fell outside of this category. In practice, the distinction institutionalized many of the pre-war theories created by Croatian nationalists, such as the identification of the Croatian people with a Nordic or Indo-Iranian "core." This defined Bosnian Muslims as racially Croatian (and thus Aryan) and excluded Jews and Serbs as separate races.[31] Much of the distinction relied on the racial definitions, but it was slightly more forgiving than the policies of Nazi Germany, as a select few Jews were seen as "integrated" and granted status of a honorary Aryan.[32] Nonetheless, the racial distinctions that were defined by Croatian Ustaša intellectuals became law and helped initiate the oppression and eventual mass killing of Jews and Serbs.

The Ustaša then implemented different methods to achieve a "racially and ethnically pure" Croatia and utilized their racial rhetoric and theories to justify it. There were different methods used to persecute the Jews and the Serbs, the two main targets of the Ustaša's discrimination. The persecution of the Jews was implemented in Croatia much like it was in Nazi Germany, by identifying Jews and excluding them from social, economic, and other general activities. In the Aryan Race Laws of 1941, Jews were prohibited from marrying Croatians, and extensive law was published to determine who, by blood, was considered Jewish or Aryan.[33] Thus, Jews in the NDH were excluded from normal life in an attempt to keep Croatia 'racially pure' by preserving the Aryan blood of the Croatian people.

The treatment of Serbs in the NDH was different from that of the Jews, as this dynamic was uniquely Croatian and was not based on Nazi law or theory. In June 1941, the Racial-Political Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was created in the NDH with orders to "prepare proposals and drafts of laws, law decrees, and regulations that concern the areas of racial biology, racial politics, and racial hygiene and eugenics."[34] While most of their work entailed the identification and monitoring of Jews and Romani people, some of the work published by Boris Zarnik, a prominent inter-war racial theorist and the primary author of the NDH race laws, was centered around the pre-established ideas of Aryanism and the Indo-Iranian warrior class.[35] His work, drafted under the Racial-Political Committee, did not classify Serbs as non-Aryan directly but instead identified them as "Greek-Easterners," in reference to their Orthodox faith. Serbs were thus primarily identified by their adherence to the Orthodox faith, but Ustaša racial theorists classified them in racial terms.[36] The NDH continued the ideas from the inter-war period concerning the Serbian race, since they were a mixture of eastern peoples such as Vlachs and Greeks, which made them decidedly less Aryan in the eyes of the Ustaša.[37] Many Ustaša members publicly espoused the idea that the Serbs, as well as the Jews, were "enemies of the people" and drew connections between Serbs and past invasions or hardships.[38] The idea was bolstered by the geopolitical situation of the NDH, as it faced two major partisan adversaries: the Chetniks and the Communist Partisans. Both, at least initially, were composed primarily of Serbs, which bolstered anti-Serb propaganda and sentiment in the NDH.[39] When the

Ustaša began the mass killing and deportation of Serbs from Croatia, it used the Orthodox faith to identify Serbs and justify the killings, but racial definitions were used when determining whether conversion or assimilation was 'possible.' Many Serbs and Orthodox Croats were converted to Catholicism by state endeavors, thus being considered "Croatian". Some Serbs were deemed to possess sufficient Aryan features and thus were considered fit to assimilate.[40] It was with this justification that the Ustaša carried out its program of mass killing, conversion, and deportation, killing hundreds of thousands of Serbs and displacing many more, all to achieve its goal of a racially and ethnically 'pure' Croatia.

The racial ideology of the Ustaša was not only used to justify and incite mass killings, but also to promote certain types of behaviors and activities in the "New Croatian Man."[41] As was previously stated, the definition of race in the period before the Cold War was much more fluid and open to redefinition. Historical, anthropological, and cultural trends heavily influenced how race was defined. Many inter-war theorists pointed to the Croatian warrior spirit or the supremacy of the ruling Indo-Iranian warrior class, and the Ustaša translated these sentiments into policy. The Ustaša attempted to inspire a "cultural revolution" of sorts as many fascist leaders had, drawing on the ancestry and historical myth of the Croatian people. Pavelic himself said that Croats were "by blood" soldiers, and the official Ustaša newspaper attributed many of these "superior" characteristics to race.[42] The racialized idea of the "warrior spirit" was then utilized to organize and mobilize the Croatian people militarily. The Ustaša had long been anti-communist as almost all fascist organizations were, so when the German invasion of the Soviet Union began on June 22, 1941, the Ustaša seized the opportunity.[43] A Croatian infantry regiment was sent to the eastern front to fight the Soviet Union on behalf of Germany, called the Croatian Legion.[44] The Croatian legion was used to demonstrate the Croatian warrior spirit and the model of the ideal Croatian man while fighting the Soviet Union. Ustaša state media heralded the warrior characteristics seen through history in Croats and those seen in the Croatian legion to encourage the desired cultural changes. Theorists such as Filip Lukas stressed this racial element in their publications.[45] While the initiative to establish a "New Croatian Man" may have failed to drastically change cultural trends, the racial ideology of the Ustaša certainly facilitated its pursuit.

While the Ustaša used many different methods and ideas to achieve their political goals, they had a decidedly racial aspect to their ideology. This racial aspect was adopted from the existing ideas and theories on race existing in the Balkans and Europe as a whole. The Ustaša used this adopted racial ideology to 'justify' their actions, primarily the mass killing of Serbs and other groups inside the Independent State of Croatia. These actions by the Ustaša not only altered the distribution of ethnicities in Croatia and Bosnia, but also influenced future Croatian and Serbian culture and defined the antagonistic relationship that would later manifest itself in the Yugoslav wars and even in conflicts today.

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40. Ibid, 213-214.
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Farm living in Styria, Austria.
Photo taken July 2022 by Kayce Arkinson, First-Year, studying Global Studies and Data Science.

(Above) May 2020, Bakuo Street, Lhasa, Tibet, PRC. Type 120 Black and White Negative Film. Bakuo Street sits around Dazhao Temple, the core and sacred place of Tibetan Buddhism. Monks and pilgrims circle the streets to reveal their devotion.
Photo by Qiaoan Gu, Junior, Biology and Studio Art Double Major, Geography Minor.

(Left) The White Cliffs of Dover, taken by Jacob Concepcion during the Summer of 2022 while studying as an exchange student at King's College London. These chalky cliffs have welcomed sailors, soldiers, and travelers to Britain's shores for centuries. Photo by Jacob Concepcion, Junior, studying Peace, War, and Defense and Geographic Information Systems.

History and Hope: Exploration into Neocolonist Traumas in the Past and Visions for the Future in Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and their Effects on Positionality on the Global Power

Willow Taylor Chiang Yang

Willow Taylor Chiang Yang (she/her/hers) is a current sophomore at UNC studying an IDST (Interdisciplinary Studies) major in American Political Economy, with a minor in PPE (Philosophy, Politics, and Economics). She has long held a fascination with the international economy, particularly the economic and cultural impacts of China's dominance on the traditionally Western-oriented markets, but her Global Studies class last semester, "Great Decisions" (GLBL 381), provided her the opportunity to analyze the global webs of diplomacy surrounding this topic with more detail and precision. She is grateful for her high school economics and history teachers for sparking and cultivating the interest, and for her professors here at UNC for encouraging it and giving her the space to explore more deeply.

As Southeast Asia (SEA) is an increasingly economically and politically developing region of the world, it has not only become a valuable target for Chinese imperialism (most recognizably through the interest of the geopolitical Belt and Road Initiative) as an area to practice "peripheral" statecraft but also gained value to Western and traditionally Western-allied (WTWA) countries as potential allies and conduits for actions to reduce Chinese power.[1] However, Western imperialism and neocolonialism have violently plagued the area in both history and the present, and atrocities against civilians and governments are not easily forgotten. In order to identify trends in this tension between SEA and WTWA countries, I focus on the relationships between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, a group of 10 leading SEA countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or "Quad" (a group of four WTWA countries: U.S., Australia, India, and Japan).[2] By analyzing the relationships between coalitions through a temporal framework of historical precedent and future aspirations, we are able to better understand the current points of stress as well as avenues for cooperation in the relationship between not only the two international alliances but also, more generally, WTWA powers and SEA countries.

Over the past few centuries, the relationship between SEA and WTWA countries has been one of, in significant part, international dominance versus submission through exploitation and imperialism. As

the balance of power shifts to the East and as SEA countries become more prominent and powerful, the relationship between WTWA and SEA communities may be strained by resulting distrust, cultural rejection, and resentment. From the 1800s to the present, WTWA countries (particularly the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and Japan)[3] conquered, occupied, or otherwise violated the political sovereignty of countries across the SEA region, from Burma (now Myanmar) to the Philippines.[4] WTWA countries used regional countries as battlefields for proxy wars, manual agricultural labor, and other economic and political ends,[5] one of the most infamous and gruesome examples of which was the Vietnam War and its My Lai massacre. The exploitation was generally widespread and, in many cases, repressive,[6] as with the case of the Dutch Cultivation System in Java, Indonesia, which exploited local populations as forced labor.[7] While territorial conquest has diminished and largely been officially dispelled in the area, puppet governments, economic dependence, and even military occupations persist today—the Philippines still has U.S. military bases which the U.S. Army has access to[8] and, as of 2021, there were still six U.N.-recognized Non-Self-Governing Territories left in the Pacific out of 17 worldwide.[9] The economies of many of these countries also remain reliant on their former occupiers due to intertwined infrastructures and lasting exploitative trade relationships.[10] In the latter half of the 20th century, however, many SEA countries underwent anti-colonialist revolutions, which have been widely documented as being heavily influenced by rejection of the westernized imperialism that dominated the region.[11] In the "post-independence" era,[12] [13] SEA countries have expressed strong rejection of WTWA imperialism and occupation, with the advent of nationalist movements, like the Tatmadaw rule in Myanmar (which has since become widely unpopular, but which garnered support early on in its rejection of colonialism)[14] and that of Sukarno's movement in Indonesia.[15] Among recent examples, populist and nationalist president of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte notably "announc[ed] [his] separation from the U.S." In October 2016, he proclaimed that "America has lost it" and reiterated his earlier insults towards American leaders. More importantly, however, his comments overtly called out the tension between traditionally subjugated and dominant powers: "Your stay in my country was for your own benefit. So time to say goodbye, my friend."[16] Despite inflammatory rhetoric, the Philippines made no move to economically or militarily pull away from the U.S. thereafter;[17] indeed, this is emblematic of the larger feeling in SEA, where democracy is valued and viewed as an inherently western ideology. WTWA countries are generally viewed favorably, despite legacies of colonialism, with 81% of respondents living in ASEAN countries saying they value western education in a recent study.[18] Recent pro-democracy protests in Myanmar have also asked for and drawn heavily upon western support.[19] [20] Analyses of history, current rhetoric, and other contemporary and historical evidence make clear that while the modern opinion of WTWA powers is generally one of cooperation and friendliness, there are underlying cultural tensions that betray residual and continuous distrust, resentment, and rejection of Westernization.

Political sovereignty, self-determination, and advancement in the international system are amongst the most important aims of any given state. The SEA countries and ASEAN countries are no exception. The above-mentioned past of the countries' relationships with dominant powers mix with the standard desires of international respect and advancement to foster a distinct rejection of neocolonialism from both WTWA and China, as well as a pull to ally with whichever coalition would best serve their political and economic interest (as opposed to moral alignment). ASEAN's 2020 Vision, established in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, emphasizes economic improvement and "achieving global competitiveness."[21] It also has underlying tones of independence from other regions in the world,

with frequent references to intra-ASEAN development and shoring up the foundations of regional cooperation. At the end, however, they make the vision of autonomy explicit: "We envision our nations being governed with the consent and greater participation of the people with its focus on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the good of the community."[22]

This push for self-determination has been clear in ASEAN's dealings with China. In addition to the aforementioned anti-colonialist rhetoric of SEA countries towards WTWA countries, SEA and ASEAN countries have also displayed a distinct dislike for imperialist policies of China. Most countries in ASEAN have treated China's "community of common destiny" rhetoric with caution;[23] Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Maldives, in particular, have approached Beijing with some level of reluctance, given China's transparent motives in the region, particularly with their debt traps and exploitative contracts.[24] Turmoil in the South China Sea also poses potential issues as well; if economic hegemony is possible for China, then it may enable further military aggression with more impunity, as the retraction of economic aid could serve as a deterrent for rebellious actions against a powerful China. Even with these concerns, however, the economic dominance of China cannot be denied. It has been the largest trading partner of ASEAN for the last decade, and the annual trade between the two is valued at twice as much as that of between ASEAN and the U.S.[25] Laos and Cambodia have, in recent years, tightened ties with China, with the China-Laos Railway project and China-Cambodia Community of Shared Future, respectively.[26] While the other ASEAN members have largely held out, they also have not announced condemnations. The tension between the visions of autonomy and desires for economic power are clear. The legacies of colonialism mean that ASEAN inherently rejects Chinese and WTWA countries' attempts to assert dominance and neocolonialist tactics. The necessities of the modern world, the global shifts in power, and growing pressures exerted by a hegemonic China push them to choose between adhering to their independence or compromising for global prominence.

In the last several decades, the world has seen a marked shift in the global order. The SEA and the international community's recognition of the world order's drift toward China, China's own recognition of their economic and political stance, and the greater economic power of SEA countries have created complications in the calculus for SEA countries and ASEAN seeking to ally with stronger powers while balancing their own need for political sovereignty. As the Belt and Road Initiative seeks to expand, as democratic protests continue, and as the role of SEA and ASEAN becomes more imperative in the balance of power across the globe, past influences and future hopes will be significant in what comes next, and may well be determining factors in the future of international security and globalization.

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2. It should be noted here that ASEAN is primarily an economic trade bloc and the Quad an informal, communicative group of countries with shared interests. While they differ in scope and focus, the two groups have increasingly aligned on the question of the international presence of China as the economic and security realms collide.

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(Above) The Princess Diana Memorial Garden, located beside Kensington Palace in London. Taken during the Summer of 2022 while studying at King's College London.
Photo by Jacob Concepcion, Junior, studying Peace, War, and Defense and Geographic Information Systems.

(Right) Pokala took this photo in Copenhagen, Denmark while studying abroad. This is St. Alban's Church, an Anglican Church, that is near the Kastellet (the Citadel). It is constructed from flint stone and in the style of English churches.
Photo by Rhea Pokala, Sophomore, Public Policy major and Social and Economic Justice minor.

Religious Sectarianism and Secular Nationalism in the Syrian Civil War

Madison Parks

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Abstract

The political and social aspirations of a democratic Syria have been largely suppressed under Bashar al-Assad's regime. The regime's brutal crackdown of protests and opposition during the Arab Spring launched the nation into crisis. This paper examines the transformation of national and religious identities in Syria during more than a decade of civil war. I will draw on two key historical shifts to contextualize this transformation: first, the rise of Bashar al-Assad to the presidency following the death of his father Hafez al-Assad, and second, the events that followed the Arab Spring protests in 2011. This paper also analyzes the role of the Syrian Ba'ath Party in, on the one hand, perpetuating the legitimacy of the Assad family, and on the other, constructing national unity through a secular model of Arab nationalism. While the conflict in Syria is often framed as sectarian, this paper shows why and how a secularist project of nation-making ends up fueling religious divisions. Bashar al-Assad marked a decisive break with the cross-sectarian coalition that had formerly held the fledgling nation together. To concentrate power in his favor and oppress the opposition, Assad abandoned secular nationalism and turned to religious nationalism. This brutal crackdown launched a nation once unified under a single national identity into a violent sectarian conflict through the intentional weaponization of religious, ethnic, and class differences.

In his article for the Atlantic Council, "Five decades of Baathism survived because of nationalism," Rahaf Aldoughli argues that scholars and pundits have "failed to comprehend the role of 'emotional nationalism' in instigating violence, obstructing the transition to democracy, and ensuring the Baathist regime's survival in the Syrian context."[1] Emphasis on the primordial aspects of nationalism – bonds of love and loyalty, familial ties, and involuntary belonging to the Syrian nation – have resurfaced under the current Assad regime against divided opposition and the rise of Islamist groups during the civil war. This, Aldoughli claims, has resulted in a new cultural identity in Syria based on 'Assadism' – the new Syrian nationalism – that stresses loyalty to Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian state as one unit, and opposition to Salafist and extremist ideology.[2] The new Syrian national identity is thus a result of the Assad regime's goal to equate loyalty to his authoritarian regime with loyalty to Syria, largely through social and cultural programming of Ba'athist ideology. This paper examines the transformation of national and religious identities in Syria during more than a decade of civil war. I will draw on two key historical shifts to contextualize this transformation: first, the rise of Bashar al-Assad to the presidency following the death

of his father Hafez al-Assad, and second, the events that followed the Arab Spring protests in 2011. This paper also analyzes the role of the Syrian Ba'ath Party in, on the one hand, perpetuating the legitimacy of the Assad family, and on the other, constructing national unity through a secular model of Arab nationalism. First, I will provide a general background on the competing nationalisms within the region during the formation of the Ba'ath Party, as well as the original ideology of Ba'athism and the economic structures that have shaped Syria's socioeconomic structure. I then provide an analysis of the construction of Ba'athism's Syro-centric secular nationalism that shaped Syrian identity under Hafez al-Assad. The following section will cover Bashar al-Assad's rise to the presidency, and how his 'reforms' led to the abandonment of secular nationalism. Before moving into the transition from secular nationalism to religious nationalism during the civil war, I provide a brief note on identity during the Syrian Uprising, and an argument against the claim that sectarianism is a root cause of this conflict. Lastly, using Bruce Lincoln's (2007) nation-state-faction typologies, I show that his devolution model most accurately corresponds to the case of Syria. While the conflict in Syria is often framed as sectarian, this paper shows why and how a secularist project of nation-making ended up fueling religious divisions.

Background

Within the Middle East region, pan-Arab nationalism — the idea of a political alliance or union of all Arab states or peoples — was central to the post-colonialism period.[3] Pan-Arabism was frequently in conflict with pan-Islamism, which centered on the Islamic notion of the ummah, and advocated for an alliance of all Muslims or of all Islamic states.[4] The nationalism that arose in Syria can be best defined as a Syro-centric model of pan-Arabism, in which a secular, state-based nationalism determined the designation of people's sense of identity and belonging. This was accomplished through Ba'athism. The movement's Syrian founders, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, created a movement "dedicated to achieving freedom (hurriyah) from foreign control and the unity (wihdah) of all Arabs in a single state," and later incorporated socialism, which "they interpreted as social justice for the poor and underprivileged."[5] The official Ba'ath Party in Syria was established in 1947, but would not fully centralize power until Hafez al-Assad's bloodless coup in 1970.[6] Because Syria was ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, the official nature of Ba'athism was secular, but as it will be later discussed, the official secularity of the Ba'ath Party was only imposed from above and was mainly used to legitimize the rule of the minority.[7]

The economic structure of Syria changed dramatically between the initial Ba'athist takeover of the state and the presidency of Bashar al-Assad. Ba'athism, in its original form, was an anti-systemic mode of organization that wished to protect the proletariat class.[8] Under Wallerstein's (1989) definition of anti-systemic movements, Ba'athism would best be characterized as a social, rather than national, movement:

> "For the social movement, this meant that, despite the internationalism of their ideology…the organizations they created had to be national in structure. And the objective of these organizations had to be the coming to power of the movement in that state."[9]

When the party came to power, several economic reforms were enacted that highlight the party's anti-systemic organization. Nationalizations eroded the economic foundations of bourgeois land power, land reform transformed the landless proletariat into a small-holding peasantry dependent upon the state, the state-employed middle class was broadened through education and increasing state employment, and Hafez al-Assad "used a combination of kin and sectarian solidarity, Leninist party loyalty, and bureaucratic command to concentrate power."[10] A strong social market provided legitimacy for the regime in rural and middle-class communities. Throughout his presidency, Hafez slowly opened the economy to liberalization while

also ensuring that the Sunni elite remained weak. In his last decade, he abandoned much of the socialist and anti-systemic principles of the original Ba'athist ideology, opening the door for corruption and creating a pathway for his son to transform the economy into a neo-liberal, pro-globalization enterprise. Not long into his rule, Bashar al-Assad reversed nearly all of the remaining socialist policies enacted by his father and the Ba'ath Party: he privatized state farms in the north after more than four decades of collective ownership; privatization created new monopolies in the hands of his relatives and associates; the small and medium-sized enterprises that had previously encompassed 99 percent of Syrian businesses were negatively affected by marketization; healthcare and education spending did not increase alongside population growth; and social services, meant to ease rising inequalities, shifted from state spending to private charities "led by bourgeois and religiously conservative layers of Syrian society, especially religious associations," thus strengthening the socioeconomic role of religious associations at the expense of the state.[11] Socioeconomic inequalities under the Assad regime would eventually make Syria vulnerable to the rising swell of Arab Spring protests in 2011.

The Syrian Ba'ath Party

The initial state formation of Syria spawned a post-independence period of nationalist mobilization that brought the Ba'ath Party into power. The first issue party leaders faced was the problem of national identity. This period of post-colonialism in the greater Middle East and Levant region bore multiple competing nationalisms, but many Syrians attached themselves to Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islamism.[12] Syria had several sub-state identity communities, such as the Alawi of the Assad family, that made the creation of a single Syrian national identity a daunting task. It was because of "resistance to imperialism" and the growing worldwide support of Israeli statehood that Pan-Arabism became a "hegemonic identity."[13] The popularity of Pan-Arabism led politicians in Syria to abandon dependence on sectarian identities and frame their ideologies in inclusive nationalist terms. As a result, "sectarian minorities sought integration into Arab national identity in parallel with modernization and hence their social mobilization."[14] Syria needed to centralize its own state-centric national consciousness based on a secular national identity, and this was accomplished through Ba'athism.[15]

With Syria's oligarch institutions fracturing, anti-regime mobilizations successfully depicted the ruling oligarchy as linked to imperialism, producing a revolutionary version of nationalism. Given its anti-systemic mode of organization, Ba'athism had the means to align itself with an internationalist, working-class movement, in conjunction with the Pan-Arabist belief in resistance to western imperialism. Hinnebusch (2020) says on the rise of the Ba'ath party:

> "The Ba'ath party was the most successful of several radical middle class parties that challenged the post-independence ruling oligarchy. It integrated the sectarian minorities and also mobilized parts of the Sunni new middle class and peasantry on the basis of secular radical Arab nationalism and populism with a distinct element of class struggle. The military was politicized by middle class nationalist officers who made it an instrument to force open the oligarchic order and, as they were radicalized, to overthrow it."[16]

The integration of minority and majority factions into what would ultimately become Hafez al-Assad's cross-sectarian coalition institutionalized the Ba'ath regime's ideology as central to Syrian national identity. This cross-sectarian coalition is what Hinnebusch (2020) terms 'sectarian arithmetic' which "ensured representation of all sectarian groups in the party politburo and government council of ministers."[17] However, Lakitsch (2018) provides insight as to how Assad's sectarian staffing policy may have maintained a sense of ambiguity in the national consciousness: "Correspondingly, while the Assad Regime put considerable effort into successfully de-

veloping and promoting a common Syrian Arab identity, it retained the French Personal Status Law that classified legal subjects according to their religious affiliations. Thereby, the law preserved a crucial foundation for sectarianism."[18] The glue holding the secular nationalist identity together was the appearance of cross-sectarian leadership, but religious identity and sectarianism still had legal basis in the constitution of the Ba'ath party.

Aldoughli (2020) finds similar flaws in the Ba'athist model of secularism, noting that the emergence and embracing of secularism in Syria can be attributed to several factors:

> "These included the popular desire to break away from the past, manifested in deserting the Ottoman political system that relied on religion as the main source of legitimacy; and the direct encounter with and exposure to the French political system under the mandate, which in turn made secularism an accepted ideology in which to frame the Syrian political landscape in the post-colonial era as a reaction to the repressive policies of Ottoman rule and a way to break with the past." [19]

These factors help provide an understanding of the relationship between secularism and nationalism in post-colonial Syria, and how the two ideologies merged into a unifying national identity. According to Balibar (2011), the notion of nationalism is constantly dividing, meaning "there is always a 'good' and a 'bad' nationalism…there is the one which tends to construct a state or a community and the one which tends to subjugate, to destroy."[20] As mentioned previously, the Ba'ath party's revolutionary nationalism succeeded in the face of the unpopular ruling oligarchy by decrying it as a remnant of the old imperial order – they were liberators who would reconstruct Syria under an inclusive, unified Syrian identity. In this Syro-centric version of Pan-Arabism, constructed by the Ba'ath party, "sub-state identities, both sectarian and ethnic, were to be assimilated into a common Arab nationalist identity."[21] The biggest threat to Syrian national identity was sectarianism, thus requiring secularism as means of creating a homogenous sense of nationhood.[22]

President Bashar Al-Assad

Following the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, the Ba'ath party ratified Hafez's process of installing his son, Bashar al-Assad, as his successor to the presidency. If the goal in ratifying this process was to fortify the Ba'athist power structure under a new leader, then the party failed to understand the lack of sentimentality within Bashar. Ba'athist ideology was abandoned under the new Assad regime in favor of an economy open to the world market and a nation that would adapt to the age of globalization.[23] This abandonment of Ba'athist ideology, however, created an ideological vacuum in which Islamism and Assad's neo-liberalism would compete to fill.[24] Moreover, Assad's desire to enter the world economy and welcome globalization was a fundamental shift away from both Syro-centric nationalism and the social market that provided legitimacy for the regime in rural and middle-class communities. On the eve of the demonstrations that erupted in 2011, Bashar al-Assad had transformed the regime into a "post-populist version of authoritarianism based on an alliance with crony capitalists that was vulnerable to sectarian conflict."[25]

To fully understand the role of the Ba'ath party in maintaining legitimacy for the Assad family, it is important to note the notion of political order and consolidation. Citing Brooker (2013), Aldoughli (2020) notes that there are two approaches that fit the Syrian case before and after 2011: "one approach to consolidation in non-democratic regimes can be by propagating 'patriotic claims' stating that the new regime is a necessary response to worse possible outcomes such as separation, civil war, or revolution."[26] This approach was evident in the initial consolidation of the Syrian state by the Ba'athist party under Hafez al-Assad, and was employed, albeit in a different manner, during the 2011 protests by Bashar al Assad's regime. If the people perceive the legitimacy claims from the first approach to be weak, a possible sec-

ond approach by the regime would be to "strengthen its control over society and state machinery."[27] As the Ba'athist party ideology and organization continued to fracture under Bashar al Assad, the regime adopted the latter approach and abandoned the secular nationalism that maintained his father's legitimacy for thirty years. With the arrival of the Syrian Uprising in 2011 and civil war that followed, sectarian discourse would become the foundation for supporting the regime's legitimacy as the protector of Syrian minorities, secularism, and Syrian national identity.

It is understandably difficult to apply Balibar's distinction between 'good' and 'bad' nationalism in the case of Syria. In Syria's post-independence era, the Ba'ath party understood that constructing and maintaining national unity required homogenizing a heterogeneous society through secular nationalism. This was also needed to create a separation between the Syria that was ruled under the mandate and the Syria that arose alongside other Arab nations under Pan-Arabism. But the fact that Syria was born of good intentions, or the 'good' nationalism, does not mean that nationalism has been deployed with good intentions. Balibar further elaborates on his distinction, saying:

"Let us take this to its extreme conclusion and say that this formal symmetry is not unrelated to the painful experience we have repeatedly undergone of seeing nationalisms of liberation transformed into nationalisms of domination (just as we have seen socialist revolutions turn around to produce state dictatorships), which has compelled us at regular intervals to inquire into the oppressive potentialities contained within every nationalism."[28]

Under Hafez al-Assad, nationalism was used to dilute sectarianism, to unify Syria under a single national identity and to justify minority rule.[29] However, Hafez's Regime never shied away from using factionalism to legitimize his authority, especially in dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood. But at its core, Syria's national identity was rooted in secular nationalism as means to deter sectarianism. In contrast, Bashar al-Assad sought to legitimize his authority by breaking with secular nationalism. When faced with demonstrations against his regime, he not only benefited from preexisting sectarianism, but depicted religious faith as overlapping with expressed patriotism. The official discourse emphasized "the incompatibility of being a true believer and not being a patriot."[30] Under Bashar al-Assad, secularism became a weakness — religion had become synonymous with nationalism.

Identity in the Syrian Uprising

Beginning in January of 2011, revolutions calling for democratic reforms, the ousting of dictatorial regimes, and social change swept the Middle East and North Africa in what would become the Arab Spring. In March 2011, in the Syrian city of Dar'a, a group of young boys were detained for graffitiing 'the people want the downfall of the regime' on school walls. As a response, Dar'a became the launch point of the uprising. On the same day that the square outside of the Omari mosque in Dar'a was named 'dignity square,' Syrian forces opened fire against peaceful protestors, leading to the first casualties of the uprising.[31] The notion of karama (dignity) became central to Syrian identity during the protests, as noted by Harkin (2018):

> "The assertion of dignity…was a refusal to be dehumanized or to be discounted and the chants of the demonstrators that 'the Syrians will not be humiliated' was one manifestation of 'dignity'… this dignity-humiliation tension both underpins the socioeconomic problems that backgrounded the revolution…and it is a deeply political rejection of the actions of the state as represented in the streets during the protests by its government officials, army, and security apparatus."[32]

Initially, religion and ethnicity did not play a large role in the uprising. In the Hamidiyya market in Damascus, demonstrators chanted, "We are Alawites, Sunnis, people of every sect, and we want to topple the regime."[33] In its origin, the Syrian Uprising was a secular, non-sectarian uprising, led by dem-

onstrators who asserted that "their sectarian affiliations were not the driving force behind their political demands," and "displayed both crosses and crescents at the protests to demonstrate their non-aligned stance."[34] The notion of karama was, above all, the foundation on which the Syrian Uprising spread across the country.

Sectarianism: A Root Cause or Reaction?

As previously stated, the conflict in Syria was not born of sectarianism, but was sectarianized in order to maintain legitimacy for the regime. The conflict emerged in media and foreign policy discourses as another example of violent sectarianism in the Middle East and North Africa region. The Syrian civil war, erupting alongside similar conflicts in Iraq and Libya, was therefore presented as a product of sectarian tensions raging since time immemorial — a simple manifestation of the perceived perpetual hatred between Sunnis and Shi'is.[35] By adopting this discourse, specifically in the West, it has become commonly accepted that the Syrian conflict arose out of sectarianism in and of itself. In this conflict, and others in the region, it would be more accurate to understand sectarianism as a reaction to the unique political crises that emerged during the Arab Spring. Furthermore, sectarianism has been a common strategy of the political patronage that has characterized Ba'athism since its consolidation of Syria. According to Marashi (2014):

> "In states where sects are prevalent, regimes often create an in-group through which a particular sect predominates among the higher echelons of politics. Even so, the Ba'athist regimes in Iraq and Syria maintained cross-confessional alliances. This strategy allowed them to claim legitimacy as states in which members of any community could rise to the top, provided that they were loyal to the leadership."[36]

This system secured both loyalty to and legitimacy for the regime by communicating to these in-groups that their privileged socioeconomic status would fall were the regime to fall. This strategy also helps to explain why certain Sunni groups in Syria — mainly the business class — have not abandoned the regime, and why some Alawite communities have not remained loyal. The strategy of patrimonial sectarianism, to create bonds of loyalty to the state through cross-sectarian bureaucratic alliances, was central to legitimacy for the Ba'ath Party and Assad family.

Despite evidence that sectarianism in Syria arose out of Ba'athist political schemes, the media and western thinkers have scarcely placed blame on the regime for the conflict's sectarian evolution. Though the conflict itself had been sectarianized by the regime from the beginning, external perceptions did not grasp the role of sectarianism until jihadists — specifically the Islamic State — joined in on the hostilities. It was what Bashar al-Assad had already set in motion — state-sanctioned violence against civilians, bombing opposition neighborhoods, indiscriminate imprisonment and torture — that created a vulnerable environment for jihadism to flourish. Bamiyeh (2019) claims:

> "…modern jihadism should be seen less as a problem in its own right than as a symptom of other problems. In particular…that jihadism is a symptom of bad governance, and that persistent, large scale violence in a given territory tends to be produced by the same systems that claim to fight it."[37]

Jihadism did not precede the conflict, nor did it play a role in initiating the Syrian Uprising, but was instead created in the theater of conflict that resulted from Assad's bad governance.[38] Similarly, the local war in Syria had "destroyed local societies, along with their traditional capacities and mechanisms for conflict resolution and conflict avoidance."[39] This meant that certain demographics of Syrians, largely the male youth, were increasingly more open to joining jihadist organizations that gave them direction, purpose, and means to fight against the regime. Thus, it should be understood that jihadism was a reaction to the Assad Regime's bad governance and was not a root cause of the conflict as a whole.

From Secular Nationalism to Religious Sectarianism

Following the Arab Spring's entrance into Syria, Assad understood that the only way to maintain legitimacy was to suppress dissent and weaponize religious, ethnic, and class differences. He enforced a new Syrian national identity that required Syrians to choose between conservative, 'non-political' Islam that was synonymous with 'patriotism' and painted the opposition as being synonymous with 'fanaticism' and 'Salafist' extremism. During the protests, Assad began to situate religious beliefs as one of the underlying causes for the unrest, and that recent events portrayed a 'crisis of morality.'[40] By framing the unrest in religious terms, Assad was able to make an early attempt "to absolve state policies of any responsibility for fueling the urgent demands of protests against the Ba'athist state."[41] In the same way that radical nationalist movements had protested against the ruling oligarchs in the early days of Syrian statehood, Ba'athism as an ideology and as a power structure had weakened, becoming unpopular amongst many communities in Syria that were targeted by Assad's financial reforms. These communities became vulnerable to the rising threat of Islamism, which was given more credence under Assad's assertion that religion and nationalism could coexist. Nevertheless, despite attempts to frame the conflict in Syria as sectarian from the start, the Syrian uprising only became sectarian when the regime and opposition alike needed sectarian discourse to solidify support. Syrians who suffered as a result of Assad's neo-liberal state reconstruction were more likely to view their suffering as sectarian discrimination.[42]

These competing claims to legitimacy created a discourse that would eventually invite violence from internal and external players, deepening sectarian divides in regions where they previously did not exist. "Secular armed opposition groups were marginalized or Islamized, especially as secular urban middle class protestors exited Syria and were replaced by Islamized rural youth as the foot soldiers of the uprising."[43] However, despite Assad's attempts to brand demonstrators and opposition as Islamists, many of the protestors who framed their grievances in religious terms had no interest in the Islamic reconstruction of the state.[44] The Syrian national identity during the uprising did not subscribe to the ideology of the regime, nor did they to Islamism. Instead, they sought a democratic Syria in which religion and politics would together acknowledge their basic demands, as described by Lakitsch (2018):

> "Various protestors also called for the introduction of the civil state, dawla madaniyyah…Religion respects democratic prerogatives, whereas politics accepts the legitimate role of Islam as a public religion. Thus, the civil state provides a concept that fulfills the central demand of the secular state (autonomous sphere of politics) while not rejecting the primal and fundamental role of Islam."[45]

The notion of a civil state challenged the claim of the official secularity of the Syrian state. Casanova (2009), describing the necessary requirements of secularism as a statecraft doctrine, claims that "if the secularist principle of separation is not an end in itself, then it ought to be constructed in a way that it maximizes the equal participation of all citizens in democratic politics and the free exercise of religion in society."[46] Secularism in Syria was not crafted as a means to democratic participation, but rather as an ideology imposed from the top down, and mainly for the purposes of justifying minority rule.[47] This part of Casanova's argument, however, is rooted in western conceptions of secularization, and does not take into consideration that the "process of secularization in the Arab world does not entail the common notion of separating the state from religious institutions," but rather "employ[s] religious rhetoric in the public space for purposes related to legitimacy and authority."[48] Thus, it was no surprise that both the regime and Islamist factions, grappling for power in a divided Syria, rejected the civil state as a compromise, contributing to the evolution of the demonstrations into a brutal civil war.[49]

After the brutal crackdown on the civilian population by the regime had begun, Assad reconstructed Syrian identity and made religion and nationalism counterparts. This allowed state violence to be justified in terms of protecting vulnerable religious minority communities in Syria from the Sunni Islamist factions and Salafi extremists. This is not to say that violent Islamist groups did not present a legitimate threat to Syrian civilians, as was later witnessed under the temporary territorial holds of the Islamic State. Most, if not all, parties to this sectarian conflict paved the way for what Lincoln (2004) believes to be the most dangerous situation when religion and violence converge:

> "The ugliest, most dangerous situations of all are not those in which the disadvantaged turn violent, believing they enjoy divine favour. Worse still are episodes in which groups who already enjoy disproportionate power (and other resources) persuade themselves that religious injunctions, like the need to convert the heathen or the need to spread 'freedom', justify use of their superior force against disadvantaged other, construing such aggression as benevolent, meritorious, or holy."[50]

As the regime continued to inflict violence on unarmed citizens, the opposition increasingly embraced anti-Alawi and Sunni sectarian discourse; and, as the opposition became militarized, "sectarian Islamist ideologies became the most effective recruitment tools" for both the regime and oppositional forces.[51] Assad rallied the minority communities and reinforced the cohesiveness of its Alawi base, therefore painting anyone in the opposition as Islamist terrorists. By just the early stages of the decade-long civil war, the conflict was being waged with religious sectarianism at its core.

Devolution of the Syrian State

Lincoln (2007) argues that there are four types of conflict characterized by three separate moments: the initial moment, in which "prior to the outbreak of conflict proper, the tensions, contradictions, and lines of cleavage are still contained within the nation-state of the status quo ante;" the conflict moment, where "specific fractions of the preexisting nation commit themselves to a struggle against others and also, quite often, against the state;" and the emergent moment, "when the outcome of that struggle – actual or desired – becomes apparent."[52] Given the fracturing of Syria along regional, ethnic, and religious lines over the course of the civil war, now in its tenth year, Lincoln's devolution model most accurately depicts the current state of the nation:

> "…there is a situation in which a modern nation-state deconstructs in a decidedly postmodern fashion…groups that were encompassed in the decaying formation may take advantage of the state's (temporary?) weakness to reassert other sorts of identity. Should leadership fall to their most militant factions – as is likely to happen – they may also wage war against once and future rivals, the state included."[53]

If we apply this model to Syria, there are three fractions central to the conflict: the state, led by the Assad regime, Kurdish forces in much of northern Syria, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an alliance of militant groups, in the Idlib province.

Syrian Kurds, who have long felt the oppression of the regime, created an autonomous region in northeast Syria in 2012, and have been trying to defend the region from Assad's forces, the Islamic State, and Turkish-backed forces ever since.[54] The region has also become a safe haven for other Syrian minorities, including Assyrian Christians, Armenians, Circassians, and Yazidis.[55] The Kurdish-led fraction of this model is not so much characterized by religion as it is by ethnicity: "Sometimes the groups, causes, and communities to which commit themselves on such occasions have little connection to issues of religion…lines of kinship, ethnicity, patronage, and geography defines the lines of cleavage."[56] In the Idlib province of northwestern Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham — the most militant fraction of the rebel groups in the region — has defended the province from the regime and its foreign backers for years. The group's for-

mer ties to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State remain evident in their ideology — their "primary objective being the establishment of Islamic rule is Syria via 'toppling the criminal [Assad] regime and expelling the Iranian militias."[57] However, HTS, in effort to gain some form of outside assistance for the Idlib province, has launched campaigns against the "destabilizing" Islamic State, and has pursued unity amongst jihadist groups in Syria while maintaining a policy of 'no negotiations' or reconciliation with the Assad regime.[58] The dynamic between the three parties echoes what Lincoln describes as the "chaotic turbulence" in devolution conflicts where the Assad regime, Syrian Kurds, and HTS struggle awkwardly towards multiple goals:

> "These include putting an end to an old, constraining state; constructing a new one of a different sort and along different lines; constructing (or reconstructing) a coherent and more or less homogenous nation; extricating themselves from lingering connections to other emergent nations, from whom they feel bitterly estranged but who were recently fellow subjects of the same state; winning international recognition, financial, and diplomatic support; and gaining whatever territory and booty are possible at their enemies expense."[59]

In every stage of this conflict, the three fractions have sought at least one of these goals. Syrian Kurds have long sought to reclaim Kurdistan, which encompasses parts of Syria, Iraq, and Turkey; however, both Iraq and Turkey have fought against this goal, leaving the Syrian Kurds to fight to maintain their autonomous region only within Syrian borders. HTS openly desires the construction of a new Syrian state along different, more homogeneous and sectarian lines. Lastly, the Assad regime has used the threat emanating from the two other fractions to gain financial and diplomatic support in hopes of regaining northern Syria. Thus, Syria has been fractured into three nation-states within a nation-state. Given that the parties remain in conflict, it is difficult to assume that this is the emergent moment for Syria. Figure 1.2 below shows what a potential emergent moment would look like for the Syrian case using Lincoln's model.

Conclusion

A secularist project of nation-making ended up fueling religious divisions in Syria because secularism was entirely dependent on the regime in power. Hafez al-Assad used secularism as a source for legitimacy because secular, pan-Arab nationalism provided leaders with legitimacy when he rose to power. Secularism guaranteed the support of a heterogeneous country by unifying the people, not through sectarian identities, but through a common Syrian identity. Also important was the appearance of the cross-sectarian coalition in the state's power structure, which at a minimum gave off the appearance of a unified and secular government. The legitimacy, and thus the state, begins to falter when the image of cross-sectarianism fades. Bashar al-Assad infused sectarianism into the state's power structure while also continuing to present Syria as a secular nation. Before the onset of the Syrian Uprising, the government had already become secular in name only — Assad forced the majority Sunnis out of power and centralized the coalition into the hands of the minority Alawites and his family members. Despite Syrian demonstrators being secular and non-sectarian, Assad determined that secularism was no longer a source of legitimacy for his regime, and needed to frame the uprising in religious terms. The regime reconstructed Syrian identity and made religion and nationalism counterparts. This marked the pivotal transition from secular nationalism to religious sectarianism, a choice made by the Assad regime alone. In 2011, the core of the demonstrations was secular, and the appearance of jihadist organizations was still years away. The assertion by the Assad regime that the demonstrators were Sunni extremists was only used as a means to justify the brutal crackdown on demonstrators, and to present Assad as the hero of Syrian minorities. Religion was weaponized as a justification for violence and as a means to proclaim

one's loyalty to the regime. As a result, Syria has devolved into nations within a nation, fractured across religious, ethnic, and geographic lines.

At the center of this crisis is the Syrian citizen, who has been forced to adopt whichever identity ensures their survival. Because of the departure from the official secularity of the state, Syrians who have remained within the border of Assad's grip must center their national identity around loyalty to Assad. As the main targets of the regime's sectarian discourse, a large share of Syrian refugees are Sunni Muslims. Minority communities — including Druze, Yazidi, Christians, and Jews — have also either fled the country or sought shelter under the protection of the SDF in the Kurdish Autonomous Region, fearing persecution from the regime and Islamist factions who retain territorial strongholds. Those living in the Idlib Province have either accepted the rule of HTS or do not possess the means to leave. It remains to be seen whether it is possible for Syria to regain any semblance of national unity under the fist of Bashar al-Assad, especially considering half of its population has either fled or died as a result of his actions.

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Figures



Fig. 1.1. *Reconstruction of Bruce Lincoln's typology of the devolution of the nation state, showing the initial moment in Lincoln's original form while factoring in Syria's three main fractions for the conflict at the start of the civil war.*[60]



Fig. 1.2. *The potential emergent moment for Syria using Lincoln's devolution model if hostilities were to end today. Included underneath each nation-state is the most militant of all fractions, the region in which they operate, and other fractions of the religiously/ethnically homogenous nation.*[61]

Fighting Political Corruption in Peru

Scarlett Kennedy

Scarlett Kennedy is a senior at UNC-Chapel Hill majoring in Political Science and Peace, War, and Defense. Inspired by her interest in Peru and its ongoing corruption scandals, she wrote this paper for her class on "Politics of the Global South: Latin America."

Despite Peru's troubled history of authoritarian regimes and military juntas, today it is in many ways a great example of Latin American success. Between the years 2002 and 2012, it had an impressive GDP growth of 6.5 percent each year, and poverty was reduced by half.[1] Despite its economic success, its presidents have had remarkably low approval ratings. This can be explained by its persisting problem with political corruption, which has proven to be a formidable foe to democracy, deeply steeped in Peruvian government and politics. Efforts to fight corruption have yielded little success but have acted as learning opportunities for what works and what doesn't for a successful strategy to be created. This strategy could involve concentrating energy and resources on battling corruption at the local level, especially through partnering with Peruvian organizations.

For Peru's democracy to thrive, it will be essential to take meaningful action to address its problems with corruption. In his book, Political Corruption in Comparative Perspective: Sources, Status and Prospects, Charles Funderburk assures that "consequences of widespread political corruption for societies include lower rates of economic growth, slower development of economic and political institutions, widespread cynicism and alienation among the populace undermining the legitimacy of the state, and in some cases political and social instability."[2] Funderburk strengthens this point by emphasizing the harmful effect corruption has on a country's economy. Corruption can lead to low investment in the public sector as well as a lack of economic competition and productivity. Widespread political corruption deters foreign countries from investing in Peru because it displays mismanagement and instability. On Transparency International's Corruption Index, compiled by measuring perceived levels of corruption, Peru scores 36/100.[3] It is worth pointing out that this number has declined since 2014 when Peru scored 38. Compared to the United State's score of 69/100,[4] or the average score of 43/100,[5] Peru's score is notably low, indicating a high level of corruption throughout the country. These struggles with corruption are clearly reflected in Peruvian public opinion—65% of Peruvians have experienced heightened distrust in their government due to corruption in the past year.[6]

Political corruption in Peru can be traced back to the Fujimori administration. The Fujimori era is one of Peru's most infamous political time periods in which the president was blatantly corrupt. Although Fujimori took action against the Shining Path—Peru's armed guerillas who terrorized the country—his presidency was full of scandals. Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori's advisor and head of the secret police, used the opposition to give his party a political advantage.[7] He bribed government officials, misused governmental funds, censored the media, spied on political opposition, and even oversaw acts of torture and illegal arrests. Fujimori was accused of supporting Montesinos throughout these acts and even destroying evidence. Later, Fujimori used the army in order to suspend the constitution and dissolve Congress to allow himself to run for a third term. However, Peru's legislature declared him "morally unfit,"

and Fujimori fled the country.[8] His administration ended in 2000.

More recently, in March of 2018, current president Martin Vizcarra was sworn in to take the place of the previous president, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, due to a corruption scandal.[9] During Kuczynski's presidency, he was accused of accepting bribes from Brazilian construction company Odebrecht SA in exchange for work contracts.[10] Similarly, in 2019, Alan García, two-term President of Peru from 1985-1990 and 2006-2011, was served with an arrest warrant for receiving bribes from Odebrecht during his second term.[11] With Peruvian officials at his home to arrest him, García committed suicide. In the same position and facing a possible impeachment trial, Kuczynski resigned, allowing Vizcarra to assume the presidency.[12]

Vizcarra appeared highly motivated to fight corruption in Peru, but the fight proved unsuccessful. In October 2019, Vizcarra asked to change the system by which judges of the Constitutional Tribunal are appointed in Peru.[13] The Constitutional Tribunal is the political body responsible for mediating disagreements between Congress and the president, making them especially important in times of conflict between the President and Congress. Although Congress allowed this change, they appointed someone of their own choice instead of allowing Vizcarra to select a new appointee. In response, Vizcarra motioned to dissolve Congress. This was an act largely supported by the people of Peru, who were tired of the seemingly never-ending onslaught of political corruption in their country.

Although some Peruvians supported Vizcarra's attempt to dissolve Congress, seeing it as the only way to pass the anti-corruption policies that they continuously block, others view it as a repeat of the past. Some feared that this move would end the same as Fujimori's dissolution of Congress and that Vizcarra would use it not to rid the country of corruption but instead to increase his own power. Legally speaking, whether or not Vizcarra was allowed to dissolve Congress comes down to how the Peruvian Constitution is interpreted.[14] According to the Constitution, the President can legally dissolve Congress only if they refuse a vote of confidence twice. Vizcarra had tried three times to obtain this vote of confidence from Congress in order to pass reform proposals, and each time Congress granted the vote of confidence but rejected the reforms. According to Cynthia McClintock, a professor of political science at George Washington University, "In spirit, the Congress had very definitely denied confidence to two cabinets; by the exact letter of the law, probably it had not." Congress retaliated by voting Vizcarra out of office and replacing him with vice president Mercedes Aráoz.[15]

These complicated technicalities resulted in confusion of power in Peru between the powers of the President and the powers of Congress. If Vizcarra legally had the right to dissolve Congress, then they never had the power to suspend his presidency. However, if his move to dissolve Congress was in fact illegal, then their vote to remove him was legitimate, and he was no longer President.[16] The situation was further complicated when President Mercedes Aráoz resigned from office due to her belief that the constitutional integrity of Peru had been broken. Peru's head of Congress also refused to step into the position. Since Vizcarra maintained the support of many regional governors, the police, the head of the armed forces, and the 2,000 Peruvians who had taken to the streets of Lima, it seemed that he had effectively remained in power.

In order to come to a determinative resolution, it was expected to go to the courts. This was problematic as well since now even the legitimacy of the courts was in question. Doubt in the integrity of the Peruvian courts is rooted not just in speculation but in evidence. One recent example was reported by the Organized Crime and Corruption Project in July of 2018 when recordings were leaked of several Peruvian judges engaging in corrupt acts.[17] Most of these recordings consisted of conversations where judges were negotiating softer sentencing for payment. There have also been recordings of judges giving jobs in exchange for bribes. When the courts themselves are steeped in corruption, it is hard for the people of Peru to know who they can turn to. Who can they count on to uphold justice and equality if not the courts? The answer to this question remains unclear, but it does not bode well for the future of Peru's elections.

Despite the influential support Vizcarra had behind him, he was impeached on November 9th of 2020 by Congress for the second time, and he stepped down with the parting words, "I declare that without agreeing with the decision, today I will leave the presidential palace and go to my home...history and the Peruvian people will judge the decisions that each one of us makes."[18] Congress's impeachment of Vizcarra is unpopular among Peruvians, of whom only 20% support the act. He was impeached for accusations of accepting bribes for public works contracts while governor of Moquega.[19] Vizcarra's supporters took to the streets in protest of what they saw as an unjust coup, and Congress has been accused of using the impeachment to postpone elections.[20] With the vice presidential and second vice presidential seats vacant, Manuel Merino, a Peruvian lawmaker and businessman, took Vizcarra's place as interim president. However, NPR reported that many Peruvians, infuriated by the entire situation, refused to recognize Merino's authority as legitimate.[21] The chaos reached its climax with two Peruvians being killed by police during a protest, ultimately causing Merino to step down from his position and once again leave the seat of the presidency vacant. If the accusations against Vizcarra are correct, the current state of politics in Peru seems to have become a disheartening territorial battle between corrupt politicians and lawmakers. This is a bleak way of looking at things for a country full of people who deserve to be heard and genuinely fought for by their leaders.

Political corruption is clearly a problem that has haunted Peru and stood as a roadblock to legitimate democracy throughout history. One thing that makes political corruption such a difficult issue to tackle is that political leaders, especially in Latin America, often appropriate the topic to gain popularity for their own benefit.[22] With so many powerful people exploiting the fight against corruption disingenuously, it makes it more difficult to take strategic action. The pervasiveness of the issue could also be explained by a phenomenon called a "collective action problem."[23] From the perspective of the collective action problem, corruption in Peru is so prevalent that no individual is willing to step up and take action against it, since there is more to gain from engaging in the corruption than there is in investing the effort and resources required to fight it. Joseph Pozsgai-Alvarez summarizes this best when he poses the question, "[W]ho is to lead the change when the argument is based on the absence of willing actors?"[24] After all, effective change requires a strong and determined leader.

Foreign assistance, such as aid from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, is a popularly tried method of tackling corruption. Unfortunately, this has often proven to be ineffective or sometimes even damaging due to the lack of accountability and oversight.[25] This money often ends up only getting used to fuel corruption instead since there are few requirements to ensure that the funds are put to proper use. Strict accountability measures should be required on any international funding that is provided to combat corruption to prevent misuse. In defense of international organizations, a case study by the United Nations showed that they are at least more likely to be reformed under criticism than governmental organizations. It is possible that international organizations could have a future of success in fighting corruption if they learn from mistakes and make reforms that require a higher level of accountability for funding. In spite of this, it could be some time before anyone can safely count on international organizations to solve these problems effectively.

Since the ubiquity of corruption is one of the biggest obstacles to solving it, perhaps it makes sense to take the approach of chipping away at it little by little. As stated earlier, Peru has political corruption on both the national and local levels, which is one factor that makes corruption even more complicated to contend with. An example of corruption in local Peruvian politics comes from the underprivileged region of Áncash, where a tax revision entitled local governments to a higher portion of the tax revenues that came in from the mining industry.[26] The region began to see huge profits in the form of tax dollars.[27] This should have translated to better healthcare and education for local residents, but the governors and mayors of the region used the money for their own benefit instead. By the end of

this, every single governor that had served between the years 2006-2017 was in prison on corruption charges, and out of the 20 mayors that also served there, 17 were being investigated for corruption.[28] Laura M. Luehrmann, a scholar of Comparative and International Studies at Wright State University, found through her research in South Africa and China that "citizens focusing on local corruption may be more effective than civil society campaigns aimed at the national level."[29]

In this case, it could be more effective to break apart the conditions making corruption so omnipresent by first focusing on eradicating it locally through popular engagement. A reasonable plan of action would be to focus the most energy on chipping away at corruption on a local level with the efforts of grassroots organizations and individual civilian participation and allow international organizations to learn from these efforts and see what methods lead to success. After that, international organizations could step in with their newfound knowledge from the experience of local efforts to provide the financial power that only large international organizations can provide. This strategy allows local organizations to continue progressing in efforts against corruption without sacrificing the financial advantage that international organizations have the potential to lend later on.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recently released updated recommendations for combating corruption in Peru.[30] These recommendations include added protections for government employees who blow the whistle on corruption and raising awareness of the proper channels for reporting corruption. It will be difficult to implement such measures without engaging local communities. Transparencia, a Peruvian civil organization that works on improving democracy and political representation, would make a useful ally for involving local citizens and stakeholders.[31] Transparency International's Peruvian Branch, Proética, is already working on involving Peruvian citizens and organizations like Transparencia in fighting corruption through a network of citizen volunteers and interested stakeholders for improving information access and government oversight.[32] The OECD and other international organizations should employ a similar strategy to push for the implementation of its recommendations for fighting corruption.

It has been shown that Peru faces a profound struggle against corruption—this issue exists in all branches of government from the local level to the national level. This corruption has infiltrated Peruvian politics, undermining the legitimacy of the state and causing political instability. This is the main problem Peru faces today in its democracy, as demonstrated in the devastating effects on civilian trust in government and politics, elections, and the economy. The situation is bleak, but a plan of action can help pave the way to integrity in Peru's government. A logical approach would involve international organizations shifting their efforts and resources into partnering with regional entities that have proven ability to make a meaningful difference. If this plan of action is taken, corruption can be addressed more effectively for a more stable political environment.

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Farm living in Styria, Austria.
Photo taken by Kayce Arkinson, First-Year, studying Global Studies and Data Science.



(Above) May 2020, Tibet, PRC. Type 120 Black and White Negative Film. Highway leads into lakes.
Photo by Qiaoan Gu, Junior, Biology and Studio Art Double Major, Geography Minor.

(Left) Pokala took this photo in Copenhagen, Denmark. It is hundreds of bikes parked near a subway station entrance. Copenhagen has an excellent public transportation system and the city is designed in a way that most people walk, bike or use public transport to get to where they need to go. The Tour de France time trials happened in Copenhagen while she was there and residents were given the opportunity to bike the course. I saw many people, including families with small children, bike the course.
Photo by Rhea Pokala, Sophomore, Public Policy major and Social and Economic Justice minor.

Comparing France's La Republique en Marche and Poland's Law and Justice Party

Ryan Johnston

Ryan Johnston is a sophomore at UNC, double majoring in Political Science and Psychology, with a minor in History. Ryan wrote this article for POLI 438 (Democracy and International Institutions in an Undivided Europe) with Professor Milada Vachudova. He was inspired to write about this specific topic due to his continued interest in comparative party politics.

Political parties have continually shifted throughout history in response to current events and prevalent political attitudes. The main focal points of modern-day European political parties are issues like immigration, populism, and the controversial European Union.[1] Two parties, France's La Republique En Marche, and Poland's Law and Justice Party, have taken very different paths to prominence in their respective countries. Lucjusz Nadbernezny, the mayor of Stalow Walow and a member of Law and Justice, has funded the travel of far-right protesters carrying signs exclaiming "pure blood, clear mind" and "Europe will be white or uninhabited."[2] La Republique En Marche, founded by Emmanuel Macron, created one of the biggest voter mobilization efforts in modern history, with thousands of volunteers interviewing tens of thousands of French voters on a variety of issues in one of the most fervent efforts at voter connectivity that the world has ever seen.[3] The two parties take very different approaches at appealing to voters, cultural issues, and economic issues.

The questions that I explore relate to the comparison of France's La Republique en Marche (LREM) party and Poland's Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice/PiS) party. How do they appeal to voters? How do they compare on cultural issues and economic issues? I analyze the differences between the parties' strategic appeal to voters, the parties' policy plans, and their evolution over time. I will focus on a few policy areas such as the parties' attitudes towards the European Union, immigration, economics, and social progressivism.

In this paper, I argue that the two parties remained fundamentally different, despite La Republique En Marche's shift to the right-wing in recent months, especially regarding Muslim refugees. These ways include their history, the methods used to appeal to voters, attitudes on the LGBT community, and the EU. I use a system of quantitative analysis to support my argument that the two parties are in different quadrants of a standard political spectrum.

La Republique en Marche and Law and Justice: Their History and How They Appeal to Voters

The similarities and differences between La Republique en Marche and Law and Justice center around their rise to prominence and their voter appeal strategies. La Republique en Marche centers their voter appeal strategy around big-tent, centrist ideas that are intended to appeal to everyone regardless of political creed. Law and Justice (PiS) centers their voter appeal strategy around nationalist rhetoric that emphasizes the maintenance of a nar-

row definition of Polish culture and the demonization of minorities.

La Republique En Marche: History and Appeal to Voters

The rise of La Republique en Marche was meteoric, to say the least, as the party garnered 308 out of 577 seats in their first parliamentary election to secure an outright majority, while also winning the president's office during the 2017 French election of Emmanuel Macron.[4] LREM's breakthrough was unprecedented given their lack of a footing in the French political scene. The two biggest parties in France have traditionally included Les Republicains (LR), who dominate the conservative arena, and La Partie Socialiste (PS), the prominent left-wing party.[5]

The rise of LREM was led by a few key factors: mobilization and the presence of a strong leader, Emmanuel Macron. LREM launched a program called the Grande Marche, which involved thousands of volunteers partaking in interviews of around 45 minutes with 25,000 people across the country about their view of French politics and culture.[6] The Grande Marche focused on problems that French families and individuals would like to see solved, such as high unemployment, high government debt, and low economic growth.[7] This tactical strategy encouraged voters to feel personally connected to their party of choice, which LREM aimed to fulfill with their personalistic approach to French politics.[8] This formed the basis for how LREM appeals to individuals, on a personal basis, with the party taking steps to appeal to wide groups of people.[9] The people of France felt that LREM truly resonated with them and that they cared about the issues that were most prominent to the people, as well as feeling that LREM gave them a "genuine voice in the new political project,"[10] which was backed up by Macron's rhetoric during the elections, on a plan of moderate deregulation and strengthening ties with the EU.[11] Macron's economic platform included a gradual decrease in the corporate tax, the creation of universal unemployment insurance, and the exemption of 80 percent of residents from the residency tax.[12] Macron's foreign policy platform centered around the creation of multiple positions and bureaus that strengthen EU economic cooperation, such as an Economy and Finance Minister for the eurozone and a European Security Council.[13] Macron's wide-reaching plan to institute economic deregulation and his interest in strengthening ties with the EU made him an appealing choice to many French voters, which was the focal point of LREM's voter appeal strategy.

Law and Justice: History and Appeal to Voters

The Law and Justice Party came to prominence in the early 2000s, gaining a parliamentary victory in 2005 and a presidential win in 2006.[14] The party rose to power relatively quickly and has maintained a stable presence in Polish politics with victories in 2015 and 2019.[15] The original vision of the Law and Justice Party laid in creating an anti-establishment, anti-communist framework for Poland which sought to depart from the institutions of the post-communist state.[16] The party evolved its manifesto over time, adding stronger religious elements, stronger redefinition of the role of the state, the desire to maintain "Polish culture," and a social welfare system meant for "true" Poles.[17] The evolution of the PiS manifesto acts on the desire for order from segments of the Polish populace, which PiS fulfills in their fervent social conservatism as well as their affirmations of "Polish culture." During the 2015 election, the Law and Justice Party ran on a platform of reconstructing the state, hard conservative stances on moral issues, opposition to the European Union, and rewriting the past.[18] Specifically, the PiS policy of historical revision includes educational policy, which includes a de-Communization of Polish, streets, landmarks, and buildings.[19] Furthermore, the main element of the Law and Justice Party's appeal to its voters lies in its ethnopopulist ideology as a whole, which seeks to demonize out-groups in order to elicit a desire for greater order within society. Ethnopopulists argue that these out-groups, such as the European Union and Muslim refugees, "threaten national secu-

rity, the economy and the survival of the national culture."[20] Utilizing ethnopopulist rhetoric has proven effective for the Law and Justice Party, which now has the prospect of "emerging as the established party of government in Poland,"[21] while garnering higher levels of support from many voters.

The two parties that I compare utilize far different styles of rhetoric, but have achieved the same result: the capturing of a majority in parliament. LREM will likely maintain its personalistic approach that has resulted in large amounts of success, but the party will have to fulfill its promises to listen to the French people. Law and Justice's strategy will, in all likelihood, stay the same, with the recent electoral success for the party and the shift in attitudes of some Polish voters.

Attitudes of the Two Parties Towards Out-Groups

In this section, I will argue that the attitudes of the two parties towards out-groups, specifically Muslim immigrants, foreign culture, and the European Union, are shifting to be more similar. I will argue that LREM has shifted to a more conservative position regarding Muslim refugees and that recent events represent a more permanent shift in party dogma.

The Law and Justice Party: Minorities

The Law and Justice Party has always used anti-immigration and anti-EU rhetoric as a central point to the party ideology, with the view that "Poland must be a state for Poles."[22] Furthermore, PiS believes that the European Union is seeking to destroy the identity of the Polish nation and determine the trajectory of the Polish people. The Law and Justice Party has taken strong stances on the status of minorities, members of the LGBT community, and immigration. Regarding the status of minorities, PiS argues that minorities should not be celebrated or welcomed into Poland, and they should rather be simply "tolerated."[23] The party aims to place "enormous emphasis on the unity of the nation and national homogeneity on an ethnic basis,"[24] through employing ultra-nationalist rhetoric and a homogenous view of how the Polish nation should be made up.

Law and Justice: Immigration

Further, the ultra-nationalist rhetoric of the Law and Justice Party in terms of immigration mirrors the view towards minorities as a whole. PiS contributes to a demonization of immigrants, specifically Muslim refugees, in Poland when this population is largely non-existent in the country. Many citizens of Eastern Europe have had little experience with refugees, Muslims, or people of color, and are surrounded by ethnically homogenous communities, which makes it easier to construe the perceived Muslim "threat."[25] However, the strategy of demonizing refugees has proved electorally effective for PiS. Due to events concerning Afghan refugees being rejected at the border of Poland and Belarus, PiS has been able to turn their increased border security into an uptick of 2.2 percentage points in the polls.[26]

Law and Justice: LGBT Rights

The fervent attitudes of PiS on immigration and minorities extend to their rejection of the LGBT community in Poland. Under the influence of narrowly interpreted religious ideals, PiS argues that the growth of this community represents a degradation of morals within Polish culture. PiS has taken a strong stance on the issue, stating the growth of the LGBT community is a manifestation of social demoralization.[27] The Polish government has taken action against the LGBT minorities in the country, going so far as to have towns in the country declare themselves as "LGBT-free zones," which are said to cover approximately a third of Poland.[28] The culmination of these actions have signaled a hardcore stance from the Law and Justice Party towards the LGBT community, with the core of this belief originating from the party's close allegiance to the Catholic Church and the belief in a Catholic-Polish nation. PiS believes that Polish national identity is intertwined with Catholicism, and that the Catholic Church serves as a pillar of Polish identity.[29] In the view of the PiS, this belief is incompatible with the expansion of LGBTQ+ rights in Poland, and serves as one

explanation of the denial of these rights by PiS.

Law and Justice: The EU

The summarization of all these stances by the Law and Justice Party can be drawn back to a single conflict point, the European Union. The Law and Justice Party originally started out as a soft Eurosceptic party, with subtle opposition against the EU.[30] PiS engaged in soft Euroscepticism through admission of the EU's economic successes in creating a common European market, but rejected wider European integration beyond general cooperation.[31] Now, the party is more fervently anti-EU, marked by their rejection of the supremacy of EU law derived from a ruling given by Poland's top court.[32] However, the attitudes of PiS towards the EU are more complex than they seem. The party's main conflict with the EU doesn't necessarily revolve around whether Poland should be a member; rather, it seems that PiS wants all the benefits of being in the EU without making any concessions. Conflicts have arisen across a wide range of issues concerning the rule of law between the EU and Poland, including government interference in media reporting, engaging in deforestation, and the relocation of refugees.[33] Further, despite the pushing of anti-EU rhetoric across the country, voters in Poland still hold a popular view of the EU, with 67% saying that the EU is a good thing for the country, 71% saying that the EU has strengthened the national economy, and 84% saying that they have a favorable view of the EU.[34] The paradox remains, why are voters electing a party that holds a negative view of the EU, despite supporting the EU themselves? The answer might lie in some voters supporting the EU overall, but not wanting Poland to go too deep in integration with the Union, with the voters seeing "the EU both as a threat to culture and identity.[35] The attitudes of the Law and Justice Party can be categorized as ultra-nationalistic, and the rhetoric pushed by the party has driven voters to support their cause. Amid rising Islamaphobia, La Republique en Marche might not be far behind them, considering the reactionary stances that they have taken regarding Muslim refugees.

La Republique En Marche: Attitudes Towards Out-Groups

La Republique En Marche: Muslim Refugees

The traditional attitude of the Law and Justice Party towards out-groups is similar to the new shift from Emmanuel Macron and LREM, which seeks to take a reactionary stance on the presence and status of Muslim refugees in French society. Following the recent Islamist terrorist attacks in France, Macron and LREM have pushed bills concerning security and Islamist extremism. These bills include greater oversight of mosques and schools to 'protect' France and "promote respect for French values - one of President Emmanuel Macron's landmark projects."[36] Specifically, one bill by Parliament aimed to "ban home-schooling, flag in a database those deemed to 'excuse' terrorist acts, subject organizations that receive government subsidies to a test of allegiance to 'the values of the republic,' and increase strictures against polygamy."[37] The focus on protecting French values given by Macron and LREM could be nationalistic, reminiscent of Law and Justice's continued devotion to promoting Polish values and the importance of the nation. While this lean towards nationalism is concerning, it may represent a reflection of the French people's concern for security and fear of terrorist attacks. The tilt might not necessarily be a shift to nationalist conservatism, but rather a shift to reactionary attitudes concerning immigration and assimilation. Other than their actions and rhetoric about Muslim refugees, however, La Republique En Marche remains fundamentally different from Law and Justice.

La Republique En Marche: LGBT Rights

Despite Macron and LREM's stance on Muslims, there are several glaring differences between LREM and the Law and Justice Party. One major area where the two parties disagree is LGBT rights and protections, with LREM holding pro-LGBT views. Despite LREM's support of the LGBT community,

they have achieved little concerning LGBT rights during the term of Macron, which represents the entire lifespan of LREM to this point. During the Paris Pride March in June, marchers gathered under the slogan: "Less talk, more rights! Too many promises, we're going backwards!"[38] Further, a poll conducted by Statista showed that over half of the people surveyed viewed Macron's actions negatively in the improvement of LGBTQ+ rights and LGBTQ+ families, as well as fighting discrimination against LGBTQ+ people.[39] While not necessarily holding negative views towards the LGBT community, Macron and LREM have failed to deliver on promises to curb discrimination and expand protections. While the rhetoric coming from LREM is pro-LGBT, their actions have not reflected their words.

La Republique En Marche: The EU

Finally, when comparing the two parties, one must consider their attitudes towards the EU, with LREM remaining a largely pro-EU party. Macron ran on a platform that made strengthening ties with the EU a central part of his campaign. He hoped to "tighten the integration between Eurozone countries" and commit the French government to a central role in the EU.[40] While the French people remain largely melancholy about the EU, with only 51% having a favorable opinion of the EU as of 2019,[41] Macron has pushed the importance of the EU in his subsequent policy plan. While Macron has remained pro-EU from his campaign to his presidency, he has held different opinions on the role of France in NATO. Macron has claimed that NATO is experiencing "brain death" due to a lack of communication and coordination among member states, specifically between the United States and European nations, and that a re-assessment of the role of France in NATO is needed.[42] Macron's statements on NATO are reflective of a defense-oriented mindset, one in which Macron believes that only France itself can defend from foreign threats. While this is not necessarily a sign of Macron becoming a fervent nationalist, it is concerning rhetoric that could threaten cooperation with foreign powers and could put the French government on the track to holding anti-EU views. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that LREM shifts to an anti-EU position given that LREM's platform champions the commitment of the French to the long-term maintenance of the EU.

Quantitative Analysis

In this section, I use a method of quantitative analysis, specifically a graphical method, to cross-analyze the two parties across a variety of issues and positions to better understand the similarities and differences between LREM and PiS. I employ two sets of graphs from Milada Anna Vachudova's "Populism, Democracy, and Party System Change in Europe," which are derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). One graph analyzes a cross-section between the salience of immigration rhetoric and anti-establishment rhetoric, and the other graph analyzes a cross-section between left-right economic positions and Traditional-Authoritarian-National-Green-Alternative-Libertarian (TAN-GAL) positions. I present the meanings of these terms in the corresponding paragraphs. From the analysis of these graphs, I argue that LREM and PiS are different in their presentation of rhetoric, economic, and cultural positions, and the consideration of these differences must be taken into account when projecting how the two parties will evolve.

Salience of Rhetoric

In this subsection, I analyze the graphical comparison using the salience of immigration rhetoric and the salience of anti-establishment rhetoric. The salience, or prominence, of both immigration rhetoric and anti-establishment rhetoric contributes to the LREM and PiS classification as populist parties and their differentiation from each other on the use of this rhetoric to appeal to voters. The axes are used to demonstrate how important the two issues are in an attempt to appeal to voters, with political parties from a variety of countries plotted on a cross-section. I analyze LREM and PiS on these axes, and I show that while the two parties are similar in the importance of immigration

rhetoric to their platforms, they differ largely on the magnitude of this importance.

The cross-section used is important for categorizing populist parties, especially since "for an exclusionary ethnopopulist party, such as the League in Italy, antiestablishment rhetoric and rhetoric related to immigration are both strongly salient."[43] Using this method of comparison, PiS can be categorized as an exclusionary ethnopopulist party under the aforementioned criteria due to its position in the bottom-left quadrant of Figure 1 which includes parties with high salience of both immigration rhetoric and antiestablishment rhetoric.[44] This aligns with the party's appeal strategies and doctrine on both issues, with the anti-establishment rhetoric shown in party beliefs that communist archives should be opened, public officials should public declare asset holdings, and that qualifications should be set for those holding public office.[45] Further, the salience of these issues shows in their attitudes towards the EU, and the immigration rhetoric shown in aforementioned statements about minorities and Muslim refugees.

The position of LREM is more complex, as shown in Figure 4,[46] with the party standing in the center on anti-establishment rhetoric, denoting a moderate level of importance, and towards the bottom on immigration rhetoric, denoting an above-average level of importance. The positioning on anti-establishment rhetoric is likely explained by LREM's goal, which has been described by scholars as an attempt "to replace one set of establishment elites with another," which reflects a more technocratic shift in policy-making.[47] Concerning immigration rhetoric, the party's positioning is still largely in the center, which reflects LREM's centrist position in French politics. However, the positioning of LREM would likely be shifted in the present day, with immigration rhetoric being more salient to the party's doctrine and policy-making in the present day than in 2019. The two parties' positions on the graphs are not largely different, but the differences in the two parties largely result from their positioning on the cross-section between economic and cultural positions.

Economic and Cultural Positions

In this subsection, I analyze the graphical comparison using the left-right economic position and TAN-GAL position of the two parties. Before comparing the two parties, I will explain the meaning of TAN-GAL and its importance. The TAN-GAL measurement aims to classify European political parties on a cultural level, with TAN standing for "traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist," and GAL standing for "green, alternative, and libertarian". I show that the two parties are opposites in their economic and cultural positions, with LREM being situated in the top-right of the graph and PiS being situated in the bottom-left. Using this comparison, I argue that the difference in the parties' positions solidifies the argument that the two parties vary greatly in party doctrine.

The cross-section of PiS on the graph shows that the party holds strong traditionalist cultural positions and moderate left-wing economic positions, with the party being situated near the extreme TAN end of the TAN-GAL axis and slightly to the left of the left-right economic axis as shown in Figure 7.[48] The party has aimed to use the state in a more active role to build the 'perfect' Polish society and nation, and this can be reflected by positions that include "support for business[es], but a tendency to regulate the market strongly via the active role of the state; a nationalist motivation and extensive redistributive social programmes."[49] The party has aimed to limit the influence of elitism and foreign businesses in the Polish economy, and has aimed for "ensuring economic growth while favoring the nationalistically motivated projection of domestic entrepreneurs, maintaining state ownership in major enterprises and what is in Polish terms a grandiose public welfare policy."[50] The party's economic position is reflective of their belief in benefitting the Polish people and the Polish state while simultaneously building a strong,

nationalistic movement of ethnic Poles. The party's cultural position is reflective of their aforementioned positions on Muslim refugees, immigration, and the EU, which all mirror traditionalist and nationalist positions on the topic. The position of PiS on the cross-section is a stark contrast to LREM's position, with the two parties located in opposite quadrants of the graph, demonstrating the stark contrast in the two party's beliefs and attitudes.

The cross-section of LREM on the graph shows that the party holds moderate progressive cultural positions and moderate right-wing economic positions, with the party being situated on the moderate ends of both the GAL end of the TAN-GAL axis and the right of the left-right economic axis as shown in Figure 10.[51] The positioning of LREM in this graph is reflective of LREM's entire dogma of moderation, but disproves Macron's original vision of LREM as neither "left or right." In fact, while LREM certainly holds more progressive views on the cultural end, including their views towards the LGBTQ+ community and the EU, they hold more right-wing economic positions which were specifically laid out in Macron's presidential platform in 2017. These positions include cutting the corporation tax from 33% to 25%, cutting 120,000 public-sector jobs, and unifying France's complex pension system.[52]

Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that La Republique En Marche, a party advertised as centrist, big-tent, and (by some) populist, has largely maintained what it has advertised, but has also taken concerning actions in relation to Muslim refugees, including their increased oversight of mosques and government surveillance of Muslims, and their lack of action in protecting LGBTQ+ rights. I also argued that the Law and Justice Party remains an ethnopopulist party with a stranglehold on power in Poland, with concerning amounts of xenophobia coming from the party's rhetoric, especially concerning their treatment of refugees at the border.

I analyzed the differences in party rhetoric and strategies to appeal to voters, as well as the parties' histories and the evolution of their platforms. I analyzed the attitudes of the two parties towards out-groups, including Muslims, immigrants, the LGBTQ+ community, and the EU, with a startling amount of overlap between the two parties with some of their actions and rhetoric. My conclusion is that while La Republique En Marche certainly has the potential to fulfill its original goal as a centrist alternative to the traditional two-party dominance in France, it has shifted to the right and it might not be able to recover its former centrist position given the perception of outside threats among a portion of the French populace. My second conclusion is that the Law and Justice Party will continue to push its xenophobic rhetoric to secure Polish votes given the sustained negative perception of outgroups among PiS supporters. However, if the Law and Justice Party continues to unnecessarily restrict civil freedoms, as well as continually push anti-EU stances, the party has the potential to lose its grip on power. Overall, only time will tell how the political platforms of La Republique En Marche and the Law and Justice Party evolve, but they are clearly going in very different directions.

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Figures



Figure 1

Parliamentary party positions in 2019 in Hungary and Poland. For each party, the salience of antiestablishment rhetoric is plotted against the salience of immigration rhetoric. Data are from the 2019 round of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2020). Abbreviations in Hungary: DK, Democratic Coalition; Fidesz-KDNP, Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union Christian Democratic People's Party; JOBBIK, Jobbik-Movement for a Better Hungary; LMP, Politics Can Be Different; MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party. Abbreviations/translations in Poland: Konfederacja, Confederation Liberty and Independence; Lewica, Left Together; Nowo, Modern; PiS, Law and Justice Party; PO, Civic Platform; PSL, Polish People's Party; SLD, Democratic Left Alliance; Wiosna, Spring.

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

Figure 4

Parliamentary positions France and party positions in the United Kingdom in 2019. For each party, the salience of antiestablishment rhetoric is plotted against the salience of immigration rhetoric. For the United Kingdom, anti-EU parties not in parliament are included. Data are from the 2019 round of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2020). Abbreviations in France: DLF, France Arise; FI, France Unbowed; LREM, La République en Marche!; PCF, Communist Party; PS, Socialist Party; RN, National Rally (formerly FN, National Front); MODEM, Democratic Movement (formerly UDF); VERTS, Greens. Abbreviations in the United Kingdom: CONS, British Conservative Party; BREXIT, Brexit Party; GREEN, Green Party; LAB, Labour Party; LIBDEM, Liberal Democratic Party; PLAID, Party of Wales; SNP, Scottish National Party; UKIP, United Kingdom Independence Party.

Vachudova, "Populism, Democracy, and Party System" , 481



Figure 7

Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in Poland. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position is plotted against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: Konfederacja, Confederation Liberty and Independence; Lewica, Left Together; Nowo, Modern; PiS, Law and Justice Party; PO, Civic Platform; PSL, Polish People's Party; SDPL, Social Democracy of Poland; SLD, Democratic Left Alliance; Wiosna, Spring; TAN–GAL, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative, libertarian.

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

Figure 10

Parliamentary party positions in 2010 and 2019 in France. For each party, the TAN–GAL cultural position is plotted against the left–right economic position. Data are from the 2010 and 2019 rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). Abbreviations: DLF, France Arise; FI, France Unbowed; LREM, La République en Marche!; MODEM, Democratic Movement; MPF, Movement for France; NC, New Center; PCF, Communist Party; PRG, Left Radical Party; PS, Socialist Party; RN, National Rally (formerly FN, National Front); VERTS, Greens; UMP, Union for a Popular Movement; TAN–GAL, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist–green, alternative, libertarian.

Vachudova, "Populism, Democracy, and Party System" , 486

We're Gonna Need A Bigger Budget?

Will Kloempken

Now a junior at UNC-Chapel Hill, Will Kloempken is majoring in History and Peace, War & Defense (PWAD) with a minor in Geographic Information Systems. He wrote this article for the dialectic assignment in PWAD 212: History of Sea Power. He chose the topic of military spending specifically because it is always among the first targets for critics of skyrocketing national debt and the military-industrial complex. He then examined the Department of the Navy, a more manageable and appropriate topic, from a measured and objective perspective.

Living in the United States, it certainly feels like the military and military-adjacent issues receive much attention by both the media and everyday people. There are a variety of opinions on the military, ranging from condemnation of the state of veteran services to what role the military should play in foreign affairs. Especially with rising inflation and skyrocketing debt, the military budget is often at the center of the conversation. President Eisenhower foretold the future when he warned about the burgeoning military-industrial complex.[1] The fiscal year 2021 saw more than $700 billion allocated to the Department of Defense; the proposed FY 2023 budget would allocate a whopping $773 billion (in part due to inflation).[2] Abiding by the traditional budget division, $230 billion of that sum would be dedicated to the Navy and Marine Corps.[3] In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a metric often used to put spending in perspective, military spending has remained at around 3.5% since 2014–almost a whole percentage point of that spent just on the Department of the Navy. The world average in 2020, in contrast, was 2.0% of GDP spent on militaries.[4] This has understandably led to questions of form and function regarding budgetary parameters of the U.S. military, especially in comparison to other discretionary spending programs.[5] This paper will dig deeper into the arguments surrounding naval spending. Specifically, what can be done and what ought to be done as equipment begins to age and population growth slows? The hundred-billion-dollar question is: how much should be spent on the Navy?

It should be noted that budgetary concerns such as these exist on a spectrum. There are many possible equations regarding military investments and many ways to categorize or alter spending. Differences of opinions and administrations vary priorities. Additionally, the military–like any other constituency–has a powerful lobby looking out for their interests. As a result, this paper will specifically examine two relativist arguments regarding spending for the Department of the Navy (includes funding for the Marines and the Coast Guard): that the budget should be lower overall, with more targeted approaches and a general streamlining of investments, and the opposing viewpoint that the budget should be increased to modernize and retain its dominant position atop the world hierarchy.

There are cogent arguments surrounding requests for proportional raises in funding, including inflation spikes and the COVID-19 pandemic. Much of the discussion, however, revolves around modernization and diversification of the components of the Navy to be better able to handle an ever-widening list of roles and objectives. The Department of the Navy must be able to operate in domestic waters and against perceived terrorist threats and rogue states, all while deterring regional rivals like Russia and China. In order to follow the examples of both the Air Force and Army, there are calls from lawmakers and military personnel for widespread incorporation of unmanned and automated units.[6] This is an astute assessment: large-scale modernization is recognized to be a

preeminent need for the U.S. Navy.[7] Already, alarm bells are beginning to sound at publications like the Wall Street Journal and the Naval War College Review as China expands its maritime capabilities.[8] There are fears that relative parity is in danger in subtle ways, even now.

Naval expansion first necessitates a stronger industrial base. After the first World War, the United States engaged programs of austerity and initiated immense naval drawbacks; in part to comply with Naval Treaties like the London and Washington treaties in the interwar period that established tonnage and numerical limits on shipbuilding.[9] One article by Captain Jamie McGrath, USN, compares that period in time to the United States Navy after the Cold War. The main focus of his article describes planning, procurement, infrastructure and the skilled labor force. Today, the United States relies almost exclusively on contracting private shipyards to build new vessels, often in ones and twos. This has a number of ripple effects that ought to be rectified if the Navy wishes to maintain surge capability in case of war as it did in the late '30s and '40s. Firstly, modern facilities and labor are not sufficient to supply the Navy with new vessels and rapid repair to replace losses. In the interwar period, some of the justification of President Franklin D. Roosevelt regarding naval expenditure were the side effects of increasing employment and growth of domestic industry; interests that still exist in domestic politics. Captain McGrath argues that the Trump reforms were a step in the right direction, but did not go far enough. Continuing to order ships piecemeal prohibits development of a dedicated labor force and is not stable enough to encourage private industry to invest in the future. If ships were ordered in batches or classes, standardization of parts and economy of production on the back end would potentially limit costs by 10% while stimulating the economy and employment. The expansive reforms and funding of FDR and Representative Vinson in the 1930s were crucial for the Navy's success in 1938-1945. Captain McGrath notes that such expansion and reform require close work between Congress and the President, but with proper planning and growth on the back end, the economy and manufacturing can support gradual growth and surge capability in the case of war.[10]

Proponents of the aptly named "355 Ship Plan" or plans like then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper's Battle Force 2045 (targeting 500 ships) anticipate another problem involving greater production and the rate of replacement. Expansion under current conditions, like Esper and many others argue, is just too slow; planning and targeting for decades down the line is irresponsible. There are simply insufficient levels of production and upgrades to counteract aging units. Worse, the Navy has a habit of retiring ships ahead of schedule to save money. As the United States reenters a period of great-power politics, Esper's view is that the Navy must switch from a doctrine of pure power projection to include the capacity to defeat a peer competitor. This involves large expansions of smaller and more flexible craft, including unmanned systems. To compensate, Esper calls for a reduction in supercarrier capability over time, instead placing emphasis on smaller 'light' carriers that resemble modern amphibious helicopter carriers. This plan is more in line with measures of the United States Navy during the Cold War. In order to achieve larger numbers, the Navy has already made some hard decisions with regards to service lives and reserves (also impacting surge capability). To provide funding for such an expansion, he advocates that the Navy procure savings internally by ending legacy programs. In return, he would be willing to spend more and increase the percentage of the Navy budget dedicated to shipbuilding. However, calculations for fiscal planning to support Esper's plan necessitate at least a 50% hike in the shipbuilding fund. Esper also believes that these measures ought to be completed before 2050, but buildup of the Navy attracts consternation from members and representatives from other services.[11]

Whatever the prospects for the future, evidence does show a decline in active vessels. While the FY2022 Department of the Navy (DoN) budget and shipbuilding plan provide for the acquisition of 13 vessels, eight of them newly constructed, it should be noted that the same plan lists 15 deactivations of vessels in concert with the disposal/sinking of 30 inactive vessels.[12] The

data backs McGrath, Esper, and others' arguments regarding the rate of production. The Navy's website currently lists 298 hulls as part of their battle fleets, a number many believe quite insufficient to handle potential future responsibilities. A common theme among the sources; retiring some vessels early to save money while replacing them with newer models and service life extensions on older models creates a muddled strategy full of contradiction, one of many things proponents of expansion aim to rectify.[13]

The same concerns apply to the state of naval and marine aviation. There is already evidence of declining naval aviation; flight hours and availability rates among naval attack aircraft are down over the last few years, reaching a 40% availability rate according to a CBO report. The report notes that this could be a result of many variables, but older "legacy" fighters are responsible for a large part of the decline. The report goes on to say that as many as half of the majority of series of attack aircraft are in long-term storage: a fate which is "a status from which only a few aircraft have ever returned to operational use."[14] Statistics for the newest all-purpose aircraft, the F-35B and F-35C variants for the Marine Corps and the Navy respectively, show availability at significantly higher rates. In fact, F-35Cs have recorded, on average, at least 70 more flight hours per aircraft than either of their counterparts in other service branches and enjoy higher availability rates than other older aircraft.[15] Despite this, the F-35 program has received intense scrutiny due to reports of immense unaffordability.[16] In fact, the House Armed Services Committee, no doubt with the support of powerful defense industry lobbyists and regional interests, has asked why the Navy does not do more for naval aviation. To that end, a dozen new F-18 Super Hornets (E/F models) have been ordered, despite rumblings that the money could be better spent elsewhere.[17] The fact remains that the Navy is dividing and prioritizing resources for a number of different air programs, including research and development for future aircraft. After all, it should be noted that actual manufacturing of airplanes accounts for less than half of the total price tag over the lifetime of the aircraft.[18]

Despite this data, there are those that argue reduction and cost-cutting in the Department of the Navy are to be desired. The United States Navy has not been in a peer conflict in at least three decades and arguably since the Second World War. Even in the case of a peer conflict, there is no guarantee that direct confrontations between large naval operators will be decisive or prevalent. Strategic considerations aside, there are sensible fiscal arguments behind operating a smaller Navy as well. Roughly 70% of the lifetime cost of a vessel stems from maintenance, supply, and operation.[19] Furthermore, manpower is expensive and there are already hints at a shortage.[20] With naval personnel levels projected to level off, one report labeled this measure a "placeholder designed to save money until a long-term fleet plan is put in place."[21] That same report notes that a modern Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has about the same tonnage as a WWII-era cruiser. As ship numbers decrease, ship size increases–making ships more expensive. Crucially, this report highlights that decreasing ship counts have not affected deployments, meaning fewer ships are asked to maintain the same workloads as the Navy did in the late '90s. This could also be a factor in sailor turnover and maintenance costs. The bottom line appears to be that the United States expects its Navy to do more and become more with an insufficient budget.

Everyone from opinion columnists like Farhad Manjoo to lawmakers like Bernie Sanders have called for the drastic reduction in military spending. There are certainly arguments for such reforms; the United States Department of the Navy receives about as much funding as the entire Chinese armed forces—the second-highest military spender in the world. On top of that, most of the rest of the largest navies in the world are allied to the U.S. The U.S. accounts for 40% of the world's total military expenditures—with simple math, that means the Navy receives about 13% of the world's total.[22] Domestic actors argue that utilizing so much of the discretionary spending budget on the military is irrational when homelessness and other such issues persist at home, including insufficient programs for veterans. Former Ambassador Barbara Stephenson, in a lecture given to

a PWAD 250 class at UNC Chapel Hill, argued that such investment in the military covers up woeful shortages in areas like soft diplomacy and foreign investment, which are of equal or greater importance. Many voters say that they are worried about the government's inability to protect them from cyber, environmental, or health crises.[23] Then there are worries about the ballooning national debt. All sides incriminate the military budget as one of the largest offenders.

One other facet of the argument for a slashed budget is centered around the exorbitant amounts devoted to research, development, and cost overruns. The DoN R&D category, in the FY2021-2022, is allotted more money than the Navy's Aircraft/UAV procurement budget, and almost as much as the shipbuilding budget.[24] While R&D is crucial to maintaining a competitive edge, many argue that its current form is grossly negligent. In a 2011 article, Subrata Ghoshroy, a researcher at MIT, outlines some of the issues with defense R&D.[25] Wasteful, classified, speculative spending that has little to no oversight should be on the chopping block first, Ghoshroy argues. Secondly, there is not enough devotion to "basic" and "applied" science or "production" in favor of the more general "development," "testing," and "research". Part of this is an oversight problem, part of it is a problem of political earmarking, and part of it is a capitalism problem, he argues. The lawmakers and defense industries continue to pat each other on the back to the tune of vast sums of money while the military sees few significant improvements.

Yet another target of budget slashing is the sheer physical size of the Navy and Marine Corps, particularly the number of people on the payroll in combination with infrastructure and real-estate. As unpopular as closing bases may be to constituents and contractors, the bases are arguably quite expensive. Well over $55 billion go into personnel costs for the Marines and Navy. When training, recruitment, and base support budgets are factored in, that raises the bill by another $17 billion. Active strength of the DoN increased in the Trump Administration after a major decline beginning in 2003.[26] Behind the scenes, the number of civilians employed rises and reservists continue a long period of decline. End strength is scheduled for a slight drawback over the next few years, but pay bumps figure to keep inflating the personnel budget. A reduction to 2012 levels could lower manpower numbers by as much as 20 or 30 thousand, and if civilian contractors continue to rise, it is arguable that end strength could be even lower.

The flip side of the capital equation for the DoN includes bases and infrastructure. A 2016 calculation projected the DoN to have a 7% budget surplus in 2019.[27] A 2005 report following the last BRAC reduction called for another round in a decade—a process that has not happened and is not likely to, due to stiff Congressional resistance.[28] The calculus is complex to be sure; there are up-front costs to reorganize and close physical locations, but future savings could reach tens of billions.[29] There are plenty of examples of rebounding communities that prosper after the closure of facilities, too.[30] The issue is even more urgent, some columnists think, as climate volatility ramps up.[31] Sea level rise, hurricanes, flooding, and similar problems threaten as much as $100 billion worth of naval infrastructure. Many of the largest bases and drydocks, such as those at Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, Yokosuka, and Diego Garcia, are marginally protected. Millions have already gone into reinforcing and protecting infrastructure, but projections for the future might very well make those millions moot. If the Navy is responsible for developing the future of combat 30 years down the line, perhaps they ought to account for the future environment as well.

Whatever one thinks about either argument, proponents of both can present shrewd claims that are supported by interpretations of existing evidence. The rising Chinese capability and recent conflicts, as well as measures of aging naval forces, tactical and strategic shortfalls, and the necessity to be the best Navy require large sums of money. The argument to expand the Department of the Navy does make a certain sense; funding is needed to be flexible, rapid and effective. Captain McGrath, the House Armed Forces Committee, and Mark Esper advocate for a larger Navy because it offers greater security and ability—two concepts that are hard to argue against for

most Americans.

On the other hand, it is clear that some military spending is wasteful, and some signs show that it may not be what America really needs. American voters worry about issues like cybersecurity, terrorism, public health, and climate change, which this military is not designed to fight. Surrounded by military allies, it is easy to argue that such size and scope is superfluous and that hundreds of thousands of personnel may be too many. Expensive military bases, speculative research, and other costly programs do seem to be getting in the way of real results and worthy of debate. While veterans' affairs and healthcare would be a paper unto itself, there are concerns on that front as well, not to mention retraining and other such initiatives.

It is possible—probable, even—that there is no one right answer when it comes to the military budget. Both sides have calculated platforms utilizing differing interpretations, often with the same data points and measures. That said, one thing both sides of this dialectic seem to support is change, so I will start there when drawing my own conclusions.

Regarding R&D, Ghoshroy supports putting this research in the hands of governmental and university agents, rather than private-sector agents.[32] I think that this is a logical proposal. That the R&D budget ought to be significantly reformed and restructured to better achieve objectives is an outcome both sides of the dialectic would approve. It is rumored that the Pentagon has never passed an audit, which is telling when it comes to probable fiscal waste and overspending.[33] According to both sides, it is a categorical must to have real leadership, with dedicated problem-solving and close relationships between Congress and military leaders. Holding to a schedule, meeting progress standards, and working on fewer theoretical cash sinks is a potential first step. Secondly, I think that with some convincing, another BRAC round of downsizing could be implemented. Paying a couple billion now—especially while this administration is in a spending mood—for savings down the road and closing superfluous installations will limit operational and overhead costs, especially once climate projections are figured in. Crucially, such measures will principally boost the efficiency of the money already being spent. If implemented, measures such as these will save in the long run, but increase output as well, mollifying both sides.

The overlap seems to end there. One side argues for greater manpower and numerical presence of ships with the newest aircraft technology. The other side believes that manpower and aircraft are too expensive, and that it is possible to still accomplish reasonable objectives and maintain efficacy with fewer platforms. The evidence would seem to prove the first side correct; the advantage that the United States Navy previously enjoyed is shrinking due to a variety of reasons. If one of the stated objectives of both sides is a secure and flexible Navy, then greater spending seems to be the best way to ensure human capital and hardware are meeting measures of capability. However, as I stated before, budgetary matters do not exist in a vacuum and there are always tradeoffs. Thus, the overall question, to me, concerns a cost-benefit analysis.

For instance, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), writing about the rising cost projections for the F-35 program (an estimated $1.7 trillion lifetime), argued that it is irresponsible to continue throwing money into the project while results lag and future cost analysis looks to be positively unaffordable. The cost per tail per year (CPTPY) appears to be so outside of the allotted sustainment costs that, by a date as early as 2036, the program will be over budget by more than $1.5 billion for F-35Bs and F-35Cs. According to their calculations, the estimated CPTPY is at least 30% too high. As these aircraft are expected to provide the backbone of Marine and Navy air complements for at least two decades, the GAO believes this to be a problem that needs immediate attention. It suggested limiting unit procurement until such measures of affordability can be met as well as planning for a sustainable future.[34] This seems like an eminently logical and necessary step. Spending beyond means is not a recipe for success, especially if equipment designed for utility far in the future is struggling to meet timelines and availability mandates now. It would be hard to argue, even in Congress, that the solution is to buy more planes. On the other

hand, if costs are truly vastly higher to produce smaller batches of ships, then it makes fiscal sense to order more and expand the industrial base while keeping surge ability intact. Thus, it appears to me that the answer between these two ardently-opposed camps is intelligent and planned compromise.

When looking at a dialectic between two opposing positions, such as whether or not military matters in the Department of the Navy require more funding or ought to be less supported, there is often truth in both sides. This is the case here as well. However, I find the arguments of surplus and excess, combined with relativist evidence detailing comparisons of U.S. spending to other nations, many of which are allies, to be the most compelling point. Decreasing spending will open up other budgetary possibilities and allow the government to counteract debt while still maintaining relative combat effectiveness. If the budget is reformed, better planned, used more efficiently, and streamlined, then there can be room for further improvement; areas of critical need will be able to attract necessary support. I think perhaps even the current measures for capability and objectives ought to be reexamined. A radical redefinition of strategic assumptions and objectives are of paramount importance in the fluid and dynamic world we now find ourselves in. With a few judicious cuts and proper targeting of funds, I think discretionary spending can be curtailed while areas of need like modernization can be boosted. Overall, I believe the evidence regarding the size of the budget of the Department of the Navy is most conclusive towards reduction in current budgets, but satisfying a combination of demands with compromise and foresight could be attractive to supporters of both arguments.[35]

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(Previous page) I took this photo in Stockholm, Sweden. The city consists of 14 islands, so water is always nearby. There is a tradition called morgondopp, which means morning dip in English, where Swedes take a swim in the sea or another water source during the summer.
Photo by Rhea Pokala, Sophomore, Public Policy major and Social and Economic Justice minor.

(Above) This picture was taken in Garibaldi Provincial Park in British Columbia, Canada. It is the ancestral homeland of both the Lil'wat and Squamish First Nations.
Photo by Siddharth Reddy, Junior, Peace, War, and Defense and Slavic and East European Languages and Cultures double major and Religious Studies minor.

(Upper right) Anti-Putin Protestor Outside the Russian Embassy to Germany. Berlin, Germany March 24th, 2022. Taken with permission of the protestor. Due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, protestors put up a 'freedom square' outside the Russian Embassy full of flowers and protest signs against Putin/Russia. This man was there holding up these two signs for hours, his face showing the anger he feels.
Photo by Max Pollack, Junior, Political Science and Peace, War, and Defense majors, History minor.

(Lower right) A picture in the oldest wild-growth white birch forest in Denmark. On the island of Amager south of Copenhagen. June 4th.
Photo by Willem Kloempken, Junior, studying History, Peace, War, and Defense, and Geographic Information Systems.


AWAY WITH PUTIN
PUTIN A WAR CRIMINAL