

# Pursuit-Evasion Games with Incomplete Information in Discrete Time

Ori Gurel-Gurevich \*

October 25, 2018

## Abstract

Pursuit-Evasion Games (in discrete time) are stochastic games with nonnegative daily payoffs, with the final payoff being the cumulative sum of payoffs during the game. We show that such games admit a value even in the presence of incomplete information and that this value is uniform, i.e. there are  $\epsilon$ -optimal strategies for both players that are  $\epsilon$ -optimal in any long enough prefix of the game. We give an example to demonstrate that nonnegativity is essential and expand the results to Leavable Games.

**Key words:** pursuit-evasion games, incomplete information, zero-sum stochastic games, recursive games, nonnegative payoffs.

## 1 Introduction

Games of Pursuit and Evasion are two-player zero-sum games involving a Pursuer (P) and an Evader (E). P's goal is to capture E, and the game consist of the space of possible locations and the allowed motions for P and E. These games are usually encountered within the domain of differential

---

\*Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, 76100, Israel. e-mail: ori.gurel-gurevich@weizmann.ac.il

games, i.e., the location space and the allowed motions have the cardinality of the continuum and they tend to be of differentiable or at least continuous nature.

The subject of Differential Games in general, and Pursuit-Evasion Games in particular, was pioneered in the 50s by Isaacs (1965). These games evolved from the need to solve military problems such as airfights, as opposed to classical game theory which was oriented toward solving economical problems. The basic approach was akin to differential equations techniques and optimal control, rather than standard game theoretic tools. The underlying assumption was that of complete information, and optimal *pure* strategies were searched for. Conditions were given, under which a pure strategies saddle point exists (see, for example, Varaiya and Lin (1969)). Usually the solution was given together with a value function, which assigned each state of the game its value. Complete information was an essential requirement in this case. For a thorough introduction to Pursuit-Evasion and Differential Games see Basar and Olsder (1999).

A complete-information continuous-time game “intuitively” shares some relevant features with *perfect-information* discrete-time games. The latter are games with complete knowledge of past actions and without simultaneous actions. Indeed, if one player decides to randomly choose between two pure strategies which differ from time  $t_0$  and on, his opponent will discover this “immediately” after  $t_0$ , thus enabling himself to respond optimally almost instantly. Assuming the payoff is continuous, the small amount of time needed to discover the strategy chosen by the opponent should affect the payoff negligibly. A well-known result of Martin (1975, 1985) implies that every perfect-information discrete-time game has  $\epsilon$ -optimal pure strategies (assuming a Borel payoff function) and so should, in a sense, continuous time games.

Another reason to restrict oneself to pure strategies is that unlike discrete-time games, there is no good formal framework for continuous-time games. By framework we mean a way to properly define the space of pure strategies and the measurable  $\sigma$ -algebra on them. There are some approaches but none is as general or complete as for discrete-time games. This kind of framework is essential when dealing with a general incomplete information setting.

This paper will therefore deal with discrete-time Pursuit-Evasion Games. We hope that our result will be applied in the future to discrete approximations of continuous-time games. Pursuit-Evasion Games in discrete time are formalized and discussed in Kumar and Shiau (1981).

Pursuit-Evasion Games are generally divided into two categories: *Games of Kind* and *Games of Degree*. Games of Kind deal with the question of *capturability*: whether a capture can be achieved by the Pursuer or not. In a complete-information setting this is a yes-or-no question, completely decided by the rules of the game and the starting positions. With incomplete information incorporated, we simply assign a payoff of 1 for the event of capture and payoff 0 otherwise. Games of Degree have the Pursuer try to minimize a certain payoff function such as the time needed for capture. The question of capturability is encountered here only indirectly: if the Evader have a chance of escaping capture indefinitely, the expected time of capture is infinity. The payoff, in general, can be any function, such as the minimal distance between the Evader and some target set.

What unites the two categories is that the payoff function in both is positive and cumulative. The maximizing player, be it the Pursuer or the Evader, gains his payoff and never loses anything. This is in contrast with other classes of infinitely repeated games, such as undiscounted stochastic games, where the payoff is the limit of the averages of daily payoffs.

Discrete-time stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953) who proved the existence of the discounted value in two-player zero-sum games with finite state and action sets. Recursive games were introduced by Everett (1957). These are stochastic games, in which the payoff is 0 except for absorbing states, when the game terminates. Thus, absorbing states are as happens in Pursuit-Evasion Games, where the payoff is obtained only when the game terminates. The game is said to have a uniform value if  $\epsilon$ -optimal strategies exist that are also  $\epsilon$ -optimal in any long enough prefix of the game. Everett proved the existence of the uniform value for two-player, zero-sum recursive games.

We shall now formally define Pursuit-Evasion Games to be two-player zero-sum games with cumulative and positive payoffs. To avoid confusion, the players will be called the Maximizer and the Minimizer, and their respective

goals should be obvious.

Our main result is the existence of uniform value for Pursuit-Evasion Games with incomplete-information and finite action and signal sets, followed by a generalization for arbitrary signal sets. In section 4 we present a different class of games to which our proof also applies. In section 5 we show that the positiveness requirement is indispensable by giving an appropriate counterexample.

## 2 Definitions and the main Theorem

A *cumulative game with complete information* is given by:

- Two finite sets  $A^1$  and  $A^2$  of actions.

Define  $H_n = (A^1 \times A^2)^n$  to be the set of all histories of length  $n$ , and  $H = \cup_{n=0}^{\infty} H_n$  to be the set of all finite histories.

- A daily payoff function  $f : H \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ .

Let  $\tilde{H} = (A^1 \times A^2)^{\mathbb{N}_0}$  be the set of all infinite histories. The daily payoff function induces a payoff function  $\rho : \tilde{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  by  $\rho(h) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} f(h_n)$ , where  $h_n$  is the length  $n$  prefix of  $h$ . In the sequel we will only study the case in which  $f$  is nonnegative, so that  $\rho$  is well defined (though it may be infinite).

The game is played in stages as follows. The initial history is  $h_0 = \emptyset$ . At each stage  $n \geq 0$  both players choose simultaneously and independently actions  $a \in A$  and  $b \in B$ , and each player is informed of the other's choice. The new game history is  $h_{n+1} = h_n \frown \langle a, b \rangle$ , i.e., the concatenation of  $\langle a, b \rangle$  to the current history. The infinite history of the game,  $h$ , is the concatenation of all pairs of actions chosen throughout the game. The payoff is  $\rho(h)$ , the goal of the Maximizer is to maximize the expectation of  $\rho(h)$ , and that of the Minimizer is to minimize it.

If all the values of  $f$  are nonnegative, we call the game *nonnegative*. A *complete information Pursuit-Evasion Game* is a nonnegative cumulative game.

As cumulative games are a proper superset of recursive games (see Everett (1957)), Pursuit-Evasion Games are a proper superset of nonnegative recursive games.

As is standard in game theory, the term “complete information” is used to denote a game with complete knowledge of the history of the game, and not the lack of simultaneous actions (which is termed “perfect information”).

A *cumulative game with incomplete information* is given by:

- Two finite sets  $A^1$  and  $A^2$  of actions.

Define  $H_n$  and  $H$  as before.

- A daily payoff function  $f : H \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ .
- Two measure spaces  $S^1$  and  $S^2$  of signals.
- $\forall h \in H$  two probability distributions  $p_h^1 \in \Delta(S^1)$  and  $p_h^2 \in \Delta(S^2)$ .

Define  $\tilde{H}$  and  $\rho$  as before. In particular, the signals are not a parameter of the payoff function.

An incomplete-information cumulative game is played like a complete information cumulative game, except that the players are not informed of each other’s actions. Instead, a signal pair  $\langle s^1, s^2 \rangle \in S^1 \times S^2$  is randomly chosen with distribution  $p_h^1 \times p_h^2$ ,  $h$  being the current history of the game, with player  $i$  observing  $s^i$ . An *incomplete-information Pursuit-Evasion Game* is an incomplete-information nonnegative cumulative game.

Define  $H_n^i$  to be  $(A^i \times S^i)^n$ . This is the set of private histories of length  $n$  of player  $i$ . Similarly, define  $H^i = \cup_{n=0}^{\infty} H_n^i$ , the set of all private finite histories, and  $\tilde{H}^i = (A^i \times S^i)^{\mathbb{N}_0}$  the set of all private infinite histories.

In a complete-information cumulative game a behavioral *strategy* for player  $i$  is a function  $\sigma^i : H \rightarrow \Delta(A^i)$ . In an incomplete-information cumulative game a (behavioral) *strategy* for player  $i$  is a function  $\sigma^i : H^i \rightarrow \Delta(A^i)$ . Recall that by Kuhn’s Theorem (Kuhn (1953)) the set of all behavioral strategies coincides with the set of all mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over pure strategies.

Denote the space of all behavioral strategies for player  $i$  by  $\Omega^i$ . A *profile* is a pair of strategies, one for each player. A profile  $\langle \sigma^1, \sigma^2 \rangle$ , together with  $\{p_h^i\}$ , induces, in the obvious manner, a probability measure  $\mu_{\sigma^1, \sigma^2}$  over  $\tilde{H}$  equipped with the product  $\sigma$ -algebra.

The *value* of a strategy  $\sigma^1$  for the Maximizer is  $val(\sigma^1) = \inf_{\sigma^2 \in \Omega^2} E_{\mu_{\sigma^1, \sigma^2}}(\rho(h))$ .

The *value* of a strategy  $\sigma^2$  for the Minimizer is  $val(\sigma^2) = \sup_{\sigma^1 \in \Omega^1} E_{\mu_{\sigma^1, \sigma^2}}(\rho(h))$ .

When several games are discussed we will explicitly denote the value in game  $G$  by  $val_G$ .

The *lower value* of the game is  $\underline{val}(G) = \sup_{\sigma^1 \in \Omega^1} val(\sigma^1)$ .

The *upper value* of the game is  $\overline{val}(G) = \inf_{\sigma^2 \in \Omega^2} val(\sigma^2)$ .

If  $\underline{val}(G) = \overline{val}(G)$ , the common value is the *value* of the game  $val(G) = \underline{val}(G) = \overline{val}(G)$ . Observe that  $\underline{val}(G)$  and  $\overline{val}(G)$  always exist, and that  $\underline{val}(G) \leq \overline{val}(G)$  always holds.

A strategy  $\sigma^i$  of player  $i$  is  $\epsilon$ -*optimal* if  $|val(\sigma^i) - val(G)| < \epsilon$ . A strategy is *optimal* if it is 0-optimal.

A cumulative game is *bounded* if its payoff function  $\rho$  is bounded, i.e.  $\exists B \in \mathbb{R} \forall h \in \tilde{H} \quad -B < \rho(h) < B$ .

Let  $G = \langle A^1, A^2, f \rangle$  be a cumulative game. Define  $f_n$  to be equal to  $f$  for all histories of length up to  $n$  and zero for all other histories. Define  $G_n = \langle A^1, A^2, f_n \rangle$ . Thus,  $G_n$  is the restriction of  $G$  to the first  $n$  stages. Let  $\rho_n$  be the payoff function induced by  $f_n$ .

A game  $G$  is said to have a *uniform value* if it has a value and for each  $\epsilon > 0$  there exist  $N$  and two strategies  $\sigma^1, \sigma^2$  for the two players that are  $\epsilon$ -optimal for every game  $G_n$  with  $n > N$ .

The first main result is:

**Theorem 1** *Every bounded Pursuit-Evasion Game with incomplete-information and finite signal sets has a uniform value. Furthermore, an optimal strategy exists for the Minimizer.*

**Proof.** Let  $G$  be a bounded Pursuit-Evasion Game with incomplete-information. Let  $G_n$  be defined as above. Since  $A^1, A^2, S^1, S^2$  are all finite, there are only a finite number of private histories of length up to  $n$ .  $G_n$  is equivalent to a finite-stage finite-action game, and therefore it has a value  $v_n$ . From the definition of  $G_n$  and since  $f$  is nonnegative

$$\forall h \in \tilde{H} \quad \rho_n(h) \leq \rho_{n+1}(h) \leq \rho(h)$$

which implies that for all  $\sigma^1 \in \Omega^1$

$$val_{G_n}(\sigma^1) \leq val_{G_{n+1}}(\sigma^1) \leq val_G(\sigma^1) \tag{1}$$

so that

$$\underline{val}(G_n) \leq \underline{val}(G_{n+1}) \leq \underline{val}(G).$$

Therefore,  $v_n$  is a nondecreasing bounded sequence and  $\underline{val}(G)$  is at least  $v = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} v_n$ .

On the other hand, define  $K_n = \{\sigma^2 \in \Omega^2 \mid \underline{val}_{G_n}(\sigma^2) \leq v\}$ . Since  $\underline{val}(G_n) = v_n \leq v$ ,  $K_n$  cannot be empty.

$K_n$  is a compact set, since the function  $\underline{val}_{G_n}(\sigma^2)$  is continuous over  $\Omega^2$ , which is compact, and  $K_n$  is the preimage of the closed set  $(-\infty, v]$ .

For all  $\sigma^2 \in \Omega^2$   $\underline{val}_{G_n}(\sigma^2) \leq \underline{val}_{G_{n+1}}(\sigma^2)$ , so that  $K_n \supseteq K_{n+1}$ . Since the sets  $K_n$  are compact, their intersection is nonempty.

Let  $\sigma^2$  be a strategy for the Minimizer in  $\bigcap_{n=0}^{\infty} K_n$ . Let  $\sigma^1$  be any strategy for the Maximizer. From  $\rho(h) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \rho_n(h)$  and since  $\rho$  is bounded, we get by the monotone convergence Theorem

$$E_{\mu_{\sigma^1, \sigma^2}}(\rho(h)) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} E_{\mu_{\sigma^1, \sigma^2}}(\rho_n(h)).$$

Since  $\sigma^2$  belongs to  $K_n$ ,  $E_{\mu_{\sigma^1, \sigma^2}}(\rho_n(h)) \leq v$  and therefore  $E_{\mu_{\sigma^1, \sigma^2}}(\rho(h)) \leq v$ . Since  $\sigma^1$  is arbitrary  $\underline{val}(\sigma^2) \leq v$ , so that  $\overline{val}(G) \leq v$ . Consequentially,  $v$  is the value of  $G$ .

Notice that any  $\sigma^2 \in \bigcap_{n=0}^{\infty} K_n$  has  $\underline{val}_G(\sigma^2) = v$  and is therefore an optimal strategy for the Minimizer.

Given  $\epsilon > 0$  choose  $N$  such that  $v_N > v - \epsilon$ . Let  $\sigma^1$  be an optimal strategy for the Maximizer in  $G_N$ , and let  $\sigma^2 \in \bigcap_{n=0}^{\infty} K_n$ . By (1)

$$\forall n > N \quad v_n - \epsilon \leq v - \epsilon < v_N = \underline{val}_{G_N}(\sigma^1) \leq \underline{val}_{G_n}(\sigma^1)$$

so that  $\sigma^1$  is  $\epsilon$ -optimal in  $G_n$ . As  $\sigma^2 \in K_n$  one has  $\underline{val}_{G_n}(\sigma^2) \leq v < v_n + \epsilon$  so that  $\sigma^2$  is  $\epsilon$ -optimal in  $G_n$ .

These strategies are  $\epsilon$ -optimal in all games  $G_n$  for  $n > N$ . Thus, the value is uniform. ■

Remark: Most of the assumption on the game  $G$  are irrelevant for the proof of the theorem and were given only for the simplicity of description.

1. The action sets  $A^i$  and the signal sets  $S^i$  may depend respectively on the private histories  $H_n^i$ .

2. The signals  $\langle s^1, s^2 \rangle$  may be correlated, i.e. chosen from a common distribution  $p_h \in \Delta(S^1 \times S^2)$ .
3. The game can be made stochastic simply by adding a third player, Nature, with a known behavioral strategy. The action set for Nature can be countable, since it could always be approximated by large enough finite sets. The action sets for the Maximizer can be infinite as long as the signals set  $S^2$  is still finite (so the number of pure strategies for the Minimizer in  $G_n$  is still finite).
4. Since the bound on payoffs was only used to bound the values of  $G_n$ , one can drop the boundedness assumption, as long as the sequence  $\{v_n\}$  is bounded. If they are unbounded then  $G$  has infinite uniform value in the sense that the Maximizer can achieve as high a payoff as he desires.

### 3 Arbitrary signal sets

Obviously, the result still hold if we replace the signal set  $S$  by a sequence of signal sets  $S_n$ , all of which are finite, such that the signals for histories of length  $n$  belong to  $S_n$ . The signal sets, like the action sets can change according to past actions, but since there are only finitely many possible histories of length  $n$ , this is purely semantical.

What about signals chosen from an infinite set? If the set  $S$  is countable than we can approximate it with finite sets  $S_n$ , chosen such that for any history  $h$  of length  $n$  the chance we get a signal outside  $S_n$  is negligible. We won't go into details because the next argument applies for both the countable and the uncountable cases.

A cumulative game  $G$  is  $\epsilon$ -approximated by a game  $G'$  if  $G'$  has the same strategy spaces as  $G$  and for any pair of strategies  $\sigma, \tau$

$$|\rho_G(\sigma, \tau) - \rho_{G'}(\sigma, \tau)| < \epsilon.$$

**Lemma 2** *If  $G$  is a bounded Pursuit-Evasion Game with incomplete information then  $G$  can be  $\epsilon$ -approximated by a Pursuit Evasion Game with in-*



complete information with the same action sets and payoffs which can be simulated using a sequence of finite signal sets.

**Proof.** Let  $G$  be such a game. Assume, w.l.o.g., that the payoff function  $\rho$  is bounded by 1. Fix a positive  $\epsilon$ . Let  $\epsilon_n = \epsilon/2^n$ . Define  $p_n^i = \sum_{h \in H_n} p_h^i / |H_n|$ , the mean distribution of the signals at stage  $n$ . Every distribution  $p_h^i$  of time  $n$  is absolutely continuous with respect to  $p_n^i$ . By Radon-Nykodim theorem, a density function  $f_h^i$  exists such that  $p_h^i(E) = \int_E f_h^i dp_n^i$ . Clearly,  $f_h^i$  is essentially bounded by  $|H_n|$ .

Let  $S_n^i$  be  $\{0, \epsilon_n, 2\epsilon_n, 3\epsilon_n, \dots, \lfloor |H_n|/\epsilon_n \rfloor \epsilon_n\}^{|H_n|}$ . For  $h \in H_n$  define  $f_h^i$  to be  $f_h^i$  rounded down to the nearest multiple of  $\epsilon_n$ . Define  $F_n^i : S^i \rightarrow S_n^i$  by  $F_n^i(s) = \{f_h^i(s)\}_{h \in H_n}$ . Let  $G'$  be the same game as  $G$  except that the players observe the signals  $F_n^i(s^i) \in S_n^i$  where  $s^i$  is the original signal with density  $f_h^i$ .

Given a signal  $s^i$  in  $S_n^i$  one can project it back onto  $S^i$  by choosing from a uniform distribution (with respect to the measure  $p_n^i$ ) over the set  $E(s^i) = F_n^i{}^{-1}(s^i)$ . Let  $G''$  be the game  $G$  except that the signals are chosen with the distribution just described. Denote their density function by  $f_h^i$ . This game can be simulated using only the signals in  $G'$  and vice versa so they are equivalent.

$G$  and  $G''$  have exactly the same strategy spaces. The only difference is a different distribution of the signals. But the way the signals in  $G''$  were constructed it is obvious that the density function  $f_h^i$  do not differ from  $f_h^i$  by more than  $\epsilon_n$  for any history  $h$  of length  $n$ . Given a profile  $\langle \sigma^1, \sigma^2 \rangle$  denote the generated distributions on  $\tilde{H}$  in  $G$  and  $G''$  by  $\mu$  and  $\mu''$ . The payoffs are  $\rho_G(\sigma^1, \sigma^2) = \int \rho d\mu$  and  $\rho_{G''}(\sigma^1, \sigma^2) = \int \rho d\mu''$ . But the distance, in total variation metric, between  $\mu$  and  $\mu''$  cannot be more than the sum of distances between the distributions of signals at each stage, which is no more than  $\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \epsilon_i = \epsilon$ . By definition of total variation metric, the difference between  $\int \rho d\mu$  and  $\int \rho d\mu''$  cannot be more than  $\epsilon$ . ■

**Theorem 3** *If  $G$  is as in lemma and have bounded nonnegative payoffs, it has a uniform value.*

**Proof.** Let  $G$  be such a game, and for any  $\epsilon$  let  $G_\epsilon$  be an  $\epsilon$ -approximation of  $G$  produced by the lemma.  $G_\epsilon$  is equivalent to a game with finite signal

sets and therefore has a value according to Theorem 1, denoted  $v_\epsilon$ . It is immediate from the definition of  $\epsilon$ -approximation that  $\underline{v}$ , the lower value of  $G$  cannot be less than  $v_\epsilon - \epsilon$ , and likewise  $\bar{v}$  is no more than  $v_\epsilon + \epsilon$ .  $\bar{v} - \underline{v}$  is therefore less than  $2\epsilon$ . But  $\epsilon$  was chosen arbitrarily, so that  $\bar{v} = \underline{v}$ .

Given  $\epsilon > 0$  let  $\sigma^1$  and  $\sigma^2$  be  $\epsilon/2$ -optimal strategies in  $G_{\epsilon/2}$  that are also  $\epsilon/2$ -optimal in any prefix of  $G_{\epsilon/2}$  longer than  $N$ . Clearly, these strategies are  $\epsilon$ -optimal in any  $G_n$  with  $n > N$ . Thus, the value is uniform. ■

## 4 Leavable games

Leavable games are cumulative games in which one of the players, say the Maximizer, but not his opponent is allowed to leave the game at any stage. The obvious way to model this class of games would be to add a “stopping” stage between any two original stages, where the Maximizer will choose to either “stop” or “continue” the game. However, we would also like to force the Maximizer to “stop” at some stage. Unfortunately, it is impossible to do so and still remain within the realm of cumulative games, so we will have to deal with it a bit differently.

Leavable games were introduced by Maitra and Sudderth (1992) as an extension to similar concepts in the theory of gambling. They proved that a leavable game with complete information and finite action sets has a value. We will prove that the same is true for leavable games with incomplete information.

Let  $G$  be a cumulative game with incomplete information. A *stop rule* for player  $i$  is a function  $s : \tilde{H}^i \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  such that if  $s(h) = n$  and  $h'$  coincides with  $h$  in the first  $n$  coordinates, then  $s(h') = n$ . A *leavable game with incomplete information*  $L(G)$  is given by a cumulative game with incomplete information  $G$  but is played differently, as follows. Instead of playing in stages, both players choose their behavioral strategies simultaneously with the Maximizer also choosing a stop rule  $s$ . The game is played according to these strategies and the payoff is  $\rho(h^1) = \sum_{i=0}^{s(h^1)} f(h_n)$  where  $h^1$  is the Maximizer’s private infinite history.

**Theorem 4** *A bounded leavable game with incomplete information and finite*

signal sets has a value and that value is uniform. Furthermore, an optimal strategy exists for the Minimizer.

**Proof.** The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 1.  $L_n$  is Defined to be the game where the Maximizer is forced to choose a stop rule  $\leq n$ .  $L_n$  is thus equivalent to  $G_n$  in the proof of Theorem 1.

The major point we should observe is that if  $A^1$  and  $S^1$  are finite, any stop rule  $s : \tilde{H}^1 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  is uniformly bounded:  $\exists B \forall h \in \tilde{H}^1 \quad s(h) < B$ . This implies that any pure strategy for the Maximizer in  $L$  actually belongs to some  $L_n$ . Therefore, a strategy  $\sigma^2$  for the Minimizer with  $val_{L_n}(\sigma^2) \leq v$  for all  $n$ , has  $val_L(\sigma^2) \leq v$ . ■

## 5 Counterexamples

The question arises whether positiveness is an essential or just a technical requirement. Both our proof and the alternative proof outlined need the positiveness in an essential way, but still is it possible that every cumulative game have a value?

The answer is Negative. We shall provide a simple counterexample of a cumulative game (actually a stopping game, see Dynkin (1969)) with incomplete information without a value.

The game is as follows: at the outset of the game a bit (0 or 1)  $b$  is chosen randomly with some probability  $p > 0$  to be 1 and probability  $1 - p$  to be 0. the Maximizer is informed of the value of  $b$  but not the Minimizer. Then the following game is played. At each odd stage the Maximizer may opt to “stop” the game and the payoff is -1 if  $b = 0$  and 1 if  $b = 1$ . At each even stage the Minimizer may opt to “stop” the game and the payoff is -1 if  $b = 0$  and some  $A > \frac{1}{p}$  if  $b = 1$ .

The payoff before and after someone decides to “stop” the game is zero.

This is a very simple stopping game with only one “unknown” parameter, yet, as we now argue, it has no value.

**Claim 5** *The upper value of this game is  $p$*

**Proof.** To see that  $\overline{val}(G) \leq p$  let the Minimizer's strategy be to continue at all stages. The Maximizer cannot gain more than  $p1 + (1-p)0 = p$  against this strategy, so the upper value cannot be higher than  $p$ .

On the other hand, let  $\sigma$  be a strategy for the Minimizer. It consists of  $\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$  the probabilities of stopping at stage  $i$  and  $\sigma_{\infty} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sigma_i$  the probability of never choosing "stop".

Fix  $\epsilon > 0$  and let  $N$  be an odd integer such that  $\sum_{i=N+1}^{\infty} \sigma_i < \epsilon$ . Let  $\tau$  be the following strategy for the Maximizer: if  $b = 0$  never stop, if  $b = 1$  stop at stage  $N$ . The payoff under  $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} & p \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i A + p \left( \sum_{i=N+1}^{\infty} \sigma_i + \sigma_{\infty} \right) 1 + (1-p) \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sigma_i (-1) + (1-p) \sigma_{\infty} 0 \\ &= p \left( \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sigma_i + \sigma_{\infty} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i (pA - 1) + \sum_{i=N+1}^{\infty} \sigma_i (p - 1) \geq p - \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality holds since  $pA - 1 > 0$  and  $\sum_{i=N+1}^{\infty} \sigma_i < \epsilon$ .

Therefore  $\overline{val}(G) \geq p$ . ■

**Claim 6** *The lower value of this game is  $p - \frac{1-p}{A}$ .*

**Proof.** Let the Maximizer play the following strategy: If  $b = 1$  stop at time 1 with probability  $1 - \frac{1-p}{Ap}$  and continue otherwise. If the Minimizer never decides to stop the payoff will be  $p(1 - \frac{1-p}{Ap})1 + (1-p)0 = p - \frac{1-p}{A}$ . If the Minimizer decides to stop at any stage, the payoff will be  $p(1 - \frac{1-p}{Ap})1 + p\frac{1-p}{Ap}A + (1-p)(-1) = p - \frac{1-p}{A}$ . Clearly any mix of these pure strategies will also result in payoff of exactly  $p - \frac{1-p}{A}$ .

To see that the Maximizer cannot guarantee more assume to the contrary that there exist a strategy  $\sigma$  for the Maximizer with  $val(\sigma) > p - \frac{1-p}{A}$ . This strategy consists of the probabilities  $\{\sigma_i^0\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$  of stopping at stage  $i$  if  $b = 0$ , and  $\{\sigma_i^1\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$  if  $b = 1$ .

By our assumption, the payoff against any strategy for the Minimizer should be more than  $p - \frac{1-p}{A}$ . Let the Minimizer always choose to continue. The expected payoff in that case is

$$p \left( \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sigma_i^1 \right) 1 + (1-p) \left( \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sigma_i^0 \right) (-1) > p - \frac{1-p}{A},$$

which implies

$$\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sigma_i^1 > 1 - \frac{1-p}{Ap}.$$

Let  $N$  be sufficiently large such that  $\sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i^1 > 1 - \frac{1-p}{Ap}$ . Consider the following strategy for the Minimizer: continue until stage  $N$  and then stop. The payoff will be

$$\begin{aligned} & p\left(\sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i^1\right)1 + p\left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i^1\right)A + (1-p)(-1) \\ &= p + p\left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i^1\right)(A-1) + (1-p)(-1) \\ &< p + p\frac{1-p}{Ap}(A-1) + p - 1 = p - \frac{1-p}{A}, \end{aligned}$$

a contradiction. ■

## References

- [1] Basar T. and Olsder G.J. (1995) *Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory*, Academic Press, New York
- [2] Dynkin E.B. (1969) Game Variant of a Problem on Optimal Stopping, *Soviet Math. Dokl.*, **10**, 270-274
- [3] Everett H. (1957) Recursive Games, *Contributions to the theory of Games*, **3**, 47-78, Princeton N.J., Annals of Mathematical Studies, **39**, Princeton University Press
- [4] Isaacs R. (1965) *Differential Games*, Wiley, New York
- [5] Kuhn H.W. (1953) Extensive Games and the Problem of Information, *Ann. Math. Studies*, **28**, 193-216
- [6] Kumar P.R. and Shiau T.H. (1981) Zero-Sum Dynamic Games, *Control and Dynamic Systems, Leondes (Ed.)*, **17**, 345-378

- [7] Maitra A. and Sudderth W. (1992) An operator solution of stochastic games, *Israel Journal of Mathematics*, **78**, 33-49
- [8] Martin D.A. (1975) Borel determinacy, *Annals of Mathematics*, **102**, 363-371
- [9] Martin D.A. (1985) A purely inductive proof of Borel determinacy, *Proc. Symposia in Pure Mathematics*, **42**, 303-308
- [10] Shapley L.S. (1953) Stochastic Games, *Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.*, **39**, 1095-1100
- [11] Varaiya P. and Lin J. (1969) Existence of Saddle Points in Differential games, *SIAM J. control*, **7**, 141-157