Round Addition DFA on SPN Block Ciphers

Hideki YOSHIKAWA; Masahiro KAMINAGA; Arimitsu SHIKODA; Toshinori SUZUKI

doi:10.1587/transfun.E97.A.2671

Regular Section

Round Addition DFA on SPN Block Ciphers

Hideki YOSHIKAWA, Masahiro KAMINAGA, Arimitsu SHIKODA, Toshinori SUZUKI

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Keywords: differential fault analysis (DFA), round addition, block cipher, SPN block cipher, AES, KLEIN, LED

JOURNAL RESTRICTED ACCESS

2014 Volume E97.A Issue 12 Pages 2671-2674

DOI https://doi.org/10.1587/transfun.E97.A.2671

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Abstract

A method of round addition attack on substitution-permutation network (SPN) block ciphers using differential fault analysis (DFA) is presented. For the 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES), we show that secret keys can be extracted using one correct ciphertext and two faulty ciphertexts. Furthermore, we evaluate the success rate of a round addition DFA attack, experimentally. The proposed method can also be applied to lightweight SPN block cipher such as KLEIN and LED.

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