Papers by Dennis Plaisted
T here is something undeniably puzzling, difficult, about relations, Socrates is a fine individua... more T here is something undeniably puzzling, difficult, about relations, Socrates is a fine individual substance, and his paleness a fine accident; but what of his being taller than Simmias? If to our eyes Aristotle is working no harder in chapter seven of the Categories than in chapter eight, 1 to medieval eyes things were messier there-or at any rate sufficiently unsettled to yield an extended and hotly disputed controversy than which only the question of universals is knottier. Leibniz evidently managed no better than Aristotle, which scarcely counts against him: there were of course more medieval thinkers offering their glosses on Aristotle on relations than there are Leibniz scholars, but those of the latter who've thought they had something helpful to say about Leibniz on relations would agree that things are unsettled, and maybe even hotly disputed. Readers can gain some sense of this from Dennis Plaisted's excellent but sadly under-reviewed contribution to the debate in Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations (Rochester, 2002), which represents the most extended and detailed attack on broadly "reductionist" readings of Leibniz on relations to date. For reasons owing more to divine intervention than creaturely freedom, the present review is delinquent in a way that discussion of Plaisted's work should not be.
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2003
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2013
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, May 26, 2016
It has been alleged against divine command theory (DCT) that we cannot justify our acceptance of ... more It has been alleged against divine command theory (DCT) that we cannot justify our acceptance of it without giving it up. For if we provide moral reasons for our acceptance of God's commands, then those reasons, and not God's commands, must be our ultimate moral standard. Kai Nielsen has offered the most forceful version of this objection in his book, Ethics Without God. My principal aim is to show that Nielsen's charge does not succeed. His argument crucially relies upon the assumption that the moral judgments one employs to justify acceptance of a normative theory are more fundamental to one's moral outlook than the theory itself. I argue that this assumption presupposes a questionable foundationalist view of theory justification, and if we instead adopt a coherentist reflective equilibrium stance, we can thoughtfully evaluate DCT without abandoning it.
Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations
Two views of purely extrinsic denominations truth and purely extrinsic denominations extrinsic de... more Two views of purely extrinsic denominations truth and purely extrinsic denominations extrinsic denominations and where accidents are allowed to put their feet extrinsic denominations and the interconnection of all things extrinsic denominations and the foundations of relation extrinsic denominations and the claim that every monad expresses the universe a critique of Massimo Mugnai's version of NPE.
On justifying one’s acceptance of divine command theory
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2016
Reply to Cover
Leibniz Society Review, 2004
The Ethics of Appropriating Evil
Teaching Ethics, 2007
Professional Ethics and the Verdict
Teaching Ethics, 2008
... Although Kaitlin Costello's testimony is compelling and utterly believable, the judg... more ... Although Kaitlin Costello's testimony is compelling and utterly believable, the judge orders the jury, as a result of a legal technicality plied by ... But because the members of the jury have retained Dr. Thompson's capacity to hear the truth, they rule in favor of Deborah Anne Kaye ...
An Undignified Side of Death with Dignity Legislation
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2013
The primary justification for Death with Dignity legislation has been the principle of respect fo... more The primary justification for Death with Dignity legislation has been the principle of respect for autonomy. However, some have objected that if respect for autonomy is the reason for allowing physician-assisted suicide, then why not allow it for people with longer than six months to live? Defenders of the laws have responded that respect for autonomy must be balanced against the state's interest in the lives of its citizens. Persons with less than six months remaining have virtually no life left to protect; persons with more time have a meaningfully long segment of life remaining. The state can therefore overrule their autonomy interests to preserve their lives. This paper will argue that this response constitutes an ironic affront to the dignity of people with less than six months to live, for it implies that their lives are not worth enough for the state to prevent them from committing physician-assisted suicide.
Leibniz's Argument for Primitive Concepts
Journal of The History of Philosophy, 2003
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Papers by Dennis Plaisted