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Coordinates: 55°00′53″N 3°03′54″W / 55.0146°N 3.0649°W / 55.0146; -3.0649
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The accident occurred due to poor working practices on the part of the two [[Signalman (rail)|signalmen]] involved; George Meakin, who had worked the night [[shift work|shift]], and James Tinsley, who was to work the early day shift. If they had been working correctly then Tinsley would taken over from Meakin at 6.00 am. However the two men had an developed an informal arrangement allowing whichever was working the early shift to arrive later. If the local passenger train from Carlisle to Beattock was due to be [[Shunt (railway operations)|shunted]] at Quintinshill{{#tag:ref|Normally the local train would not shunt at Quintinshill but a rule allowed for the train to be shunted at one of the intermediate stations or signalboxes if one or other of the night expresses from London to Glasgow were running late.{{sfn|Rolt|1982|p=207}}|group=nb}} then the signalmen at Gretna would advise whichever was working the early shift of this and the day signalman would hitch a ride on the local train to Quintinshill, thus saving himself the {{convert|1.5|mi|1}} walk from Gretna. To avoid their malpractice being detected by company management, whoever was working the night shift would record all train movements after 6.00 am on a piece of paper rather than record them in the [[British absolute block signalling#Train register|train register]]. When the day man arrived, he would copy the entries from the paper into the train register making it look as if the shift change had occurred at the correct time.{{sfn|Nock|1980|p=109}}
The accident occurred due to poor working practices on the part of the two [[Signalman (rail)|signalmen]] involved; George Meakin, who had worked the night [[shift work|shift]], and James Tinsley, who was to work the early day shift. If they had been working correctly then Tinsley would taken over from Meakin at 6.00 am. However the two men had an developed an informal arrangement allowing whichever was working the early shift to arrive later. If the local passenger train from Carlisle to Beattock was due to be [[Shunt (railway operations)|shunted]] at Quintinshill{{#tag:ref|Normally the local train would not shunt at Quintinshill but a rule allowed for the train to be shunted at one of the intermediate stations or signalboxes if one or other of the night expresses from London to Glasgow were running late.{{sfn|Rolt|1982|p=207}}|group=nb}} then the signalmen at Gretna would advise whichever was working the early shift of this and the day signalman would hitch a ride on the local train to Quintinshill, thus saving himself the {{convert|1.5|mi|1}} walk from Gretna. To avoid their malpractice being detected by company management, whoever was working the night shift would record all train movements after 6.00 am on a piece of paper rather than record them in the [[British absolute block signalling#Train register|train register]]. When the day man arrived, he would copy the entries from the paper into the train register making it look as if the shift change had occurred at the correct time.{{sfn|Nock|1980|p=109}}


On the morning of 22 May the night [[express train|expresses]] were both running late so the local train would have to be shunted at Quintinshill and therefore Tinsley took advantage of the free ride on the local train to arrive at Quintinshill at about 6.30 am.{{sfn|Rolt|1982|p=208}} As the [[passing loop|goods loop]] was occupied with the 4.50 am [[freight train|goods train]] from Carlisle, Meakin decided to shunt the local passenger train onto the [[Railroad directions#United Kingdom|Up main line]]<ref group=nb>On the line between Carlisle and Glasgow, Up is towards Carlisle and Down is towards Glasgow.</ref> Although not a preferred method of operation, this was a not a dangerous thing to do if the proper precautions were taken. Out of the previous 21 occasions that the local train had been shunted at Quintinshill, on four occasions it had been shunted onto the Up line.{{sfn|Thomas|1969|p=32}} On this occasion neither of the important safety precautions were taken. Firstly, Kirkpatrick signal box (the preceding box in the Up direction) was not sent the "blocking back" signal which would have informed the Kirkpatrick signalman that the line was occupied and warned him not to send any more trains towards Quintinshill.{{sfn|Thomas|1969|pp=34–35}} Secondly the signalman at Quintinshill should have placed a signal lever collar over the relevant signal lever to stop himself from clearing the signal and allowing another train to proceed from Kirkpatrick.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=23}} The laxity of the [[Fireman (steam engine)|fireman]] of the local train, George Hutchinson, in carrying out his duties under [[Rule 55]] meant that Tinsley's and Meakin's failures went unobserved. Had Hutchinson carried out his duty correctly, he would have reminded the signalman that his train was standing on the Up main line and would have checked that a lever collar was in place before returning to his train. He did neither, and merely signed the train register, using a pen which Tinsley, who was intent on filling in the train register, handed over his shoulder without looking up, and left the signal box at 6.46 am.{{sfn|Thomas|1969|pp=35–36}} Also in the signal box, against the rules, were two other railwaymen (brakesmen from the two goods trains) whose presence distracted Tinsley and Meakin who was discussing the [[First World War|war]] with the two brakesmen.{{sfn|Nock|1980|p=112}}
On the morning of 22 May the night [[express train|expresses]] were both running late so the local train would have to be shunted at Quintinshill and therefore Tinsley took advantage of the free ride on the local train to arrive at Quintinshill at about 6.30 am.{{sfn|Rolt|1982|p=208}} As the [[passing loop|goods loop]] was occupied with the 4.50 am [[freight train|goods train]] from Carlisle, Meakin decided to shunt the local passenger train onto the [[Railroad directions#United Kingdom|Up main line]]<ref group=nb>On the line between Carlisle and Glasgow, Up is towards Carlisle and Down is towards Glasgow.</ref> Although not a preferred method of operation, this was a not a dangerous thing to do if the proper precautions were taken. Out of the previous 21 occasions that the local train had been shunted at Quintinshill, on four occasions it had been shunted onto the Up line.{{sfn|Thomas|1969|p=32}} On this occasion neither of the important safety precautions were taken. Firstly, Kirkpatrick signal box (the preceding box in the Up direction) was not sent the "blocking back" signal which would have informed the Kirkpatrick signalman that the line was occupied and warned him not to send any more trains towards Quintinshill.{{sfn|Thomas|1969|pp=34–35}} Secondly the signalman at Quintinshill should have placed a signal lever collar over the relevant signal lever to stop himself from clearing the signal and allowing another train to proceed from Kirkpatrick.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=23}} The laxity of the [[Fireman (steam engine)|fireman]] of the local train, George Hutchinson, in carrying out his duties under [[Rule 55]] meant that Tinsley's and Meakin's failures went unobserved. Had Hutchinson carried out his duty correctly, he would have reminded the signalman that his train was standing on the Up main line and would have checked that a lever collar was in place before returning to his train. He did neither, and merely signed the train register, using a pen which Tinsley, who was intent on filling in the train register, handed over his shoulder without looking up, and left the signal box at 6.46 am.{{sfn|Thomas|1969|pp=35–36}} Also in the signal box, against the rules, were two other railwaymen (brakesmen from the two goods trains) whose presence may have distracted Tinsley and Meakin who was discussing the [[First World War|war]] with the two brakesmen.{{sfn|Nock|1980|p=112}}
[[File:Quintinshill animation 1.gif|frame|center|Animation of the series of events causing the crash.]]
[[File:Quintinshill animation 1.gif|frame|center|Animation of the series of events causing the crash.]]
At 6.34 am one of the signalmen, which it was never established, gave the "[[British absolute block signalling#Signalling a train|train out of section]]" bell to Kirkpatrick for the coal train which now stood in the up goods loop.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=25}} After giving train out of section, this was the point at which the "blocking back" signal should have been given to Kirkpatrick but neither man did this.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=25}} At 6.38 am the first of the expresses from Carlisle passed Quintinshill heading north. At 6.42 am Kirkpatrick "[[British absolute block signalling#Signalling a train|offered]]" the troop train to Tinsley. Tinsley immediately accepted this and four minutes later was offered the second northbound express from Gretna Junction.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=23}}. At 6.47 am Tinsley received the "train entering section" signal from Kirkpatrick for the troop train and offered it forward to Gretna Junction, having forgotten all about the local passenger train which was occupying the Up line. It was immediately accepted by Gretna Junction so Tinsley pulled "off" his Up home signal to allow the troop train forward.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=23}} Had he placed a lever collar on this signal as he should have done (and as Hutchinson should have checked) then Tinsley would not have been able to pull the signal lever.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=25}}
At 6.34 am one of the signalmen, which it was never established, gave the "[[British absolute block signalling#Signalling a train|train out of section]]" bell to Kirkpatrick for the coal train which now stood in the up goods loop.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=25}} After giving train out of section, this was the point at which the "blocking back" signal should have been given to Kirkpatrick but neither man did this.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=25}} At 6.38 am the first of the expresses from Carlisle passed Quintinshill heading north. At 6.42 am Kirkpatrick "[[British absolute block signalling#Signalling a train|offered]]" the troop train to Tinsley. Tinsley immediately accepted this and four minutes later was offered the second northbound express from Gretna Junction.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=23}}. At 6.47 am Tinsley received the "train entering section" signal from Kirkpatrick for the troop train and offered it forward to Gretna Junction, having forgotten all about the local passenger train which was occupying the Up line. It was immediately accepted by Gretna Junction so Tinsley pulled "off" his Up home signal to allow the troop train forward.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=23}} Had he placed a lever collar on this signal as he should have done (and as Hutchinson should have checked) then Tinsley would not have been able to pull the signal lever.{{sfn|Druitt|1915|p=25}}

Revision as of 14:56, 11 July 2012

Scene from a Leith tenement mural depicting the funeral procession for victims of the disaster.
Quintinshill rail disaster
Map
Details
Date22 May 1915
06:50
LocationQuintinshill, Dumfriesshire
Coordinates55°00′53″N 3°03′54″W / 55.0146°N 3.0649°W / 55.0146; -3.0649
CountryScotland
LineCaledonian Railway Main Line (WCML)
Incident typeCollision, fire
CauseSignalling error
Statistics
Trains5
Deaths230[nb 1]
Injured246
List of UK rail accidents by year

The Quintinshill rail disaster occurred on 22 May 1915 in Scotland near Gretna Green at Quintinshill, an intermediate signal box with sidings on each side on the Caledonian Railway Main Line linking Glasgow and Carlisle (the line now forms part of the West Coast Main Line).

The crash, which involved five trains, killed a probable 230[nb 1] and injured 246 and remains the worst rail crash in the United Kingdom in terms of loss of life.[2] Those killed were mainly Territorial soldiers from the 1/7th (Leith) Battalion, the Royal Scots heading for Gallipoli. The precise number of dead was never established with confidence as the roll list of the regiment was destroyed by the fire.[1]

The crash occurred when a troop train travelling from Larbert to Liverpool[3] collided with a local passenger train that had been shunted on to the main line, to then be hit by an express train to Glasgow which crashed into the wreckage a minute later. Gas from the lighting system of the old wooden carriages of the troop train ignited, starting a fire which soon engulfed the three passenger trains and also the two goods trains standing on nearby passing loops. A number of bodies were never recovered having been wholly consumed by the fire and the bodies that were recovered were buried together in a mass grave in Edinburgh's Rosebank Cemetery. Four bodies, believed to be of children were never identified or claimed and are buried in the Western Necropolis, Glasgow.

The cause of the accident was poor working practices on the part of the two signalmen involved which resulted in their imprisonment for culpable homicide after legal proceedings in both Scotland and England.

A memorial to the dead soldiers was erected soon after the accident and there are a number of more recent memorials at various locations. An annual remembrance service is held at Rosebank Cemetery.

Sequence of events

The accident occurred due to poor working practices on the part of the two signalmen involved; George Meakin, who had worked the night shift, and James Tinsley, who was to work the early day shift. If they had been working correctly then Tinsley would taken over from Meakin at 6.00 am. However the two men had an developed an informal arrangement allowing whichever was working the early shift to arrive later. If the local passenger train from Carlisle to Beattock was due to be shunted at Quintinshill[nb 2] then the signalmen at Gretna would advise whichever was working the early shift of this and the day signalman would hitch a ride on the local train to Quintinshill, thus saving himself the 1.5 miles (2.4 km) walk from Gretna. To avoid their malpractice being detected by company management, whoever was working the night shift would record all train movements after 6.00 am on a piece of paper rather than record them in the train register. When the day man arrived, he would copy the entries from the paper into the train register making it look as if the shift change had occurred at the correct time.[5]

On the morning of 22 May the night expresses were both running late so the local train would have to be shunted at Quintinshill and therefore Tinsley took advantage of the free ride on the local train to arrive at Quintinshill at about 6.30 am.[3] As the goods loop was occupied with the 4.50 am goods train from Carlisle, Meakin decided to shunt the local passenger train onto the Up main line[nb 3] Although not a preferred method of operation, this was a not a dangerous thing to do if the proper precautions were taken. Out of the previous 21 occasions that the local train had been shunted at Quintinshill, on four occasions it had been shunted onto the Up line.[6] On this occasion neither of the important safety precautions were taken. Firstly, Kirkpatrick signal box (the preceding box in the Up direction) was not sent the "blocking back" signal which would have informed the Kirkpatrick signalman that the line was occupied and warned him not to send any more trains towards Quintinshill.[7] Secondly the signalman at Quintinshill should have placed a signal lever collar over the relevant signal lever to stop himself from clearing the signal and allowing another train to proceed from Kirkpatrick.[8] The laxity of the fireman of the local train, George Hutchinson, in carrying out his duties under Rule 55 meant that Tinsley's and Meakin's failures went unobserved. Had Hutchinson carried out his duty correctly, he would have reminded the signalman that his train was standing on the Up main line and would have checked that a lever collar was in place before returning to his train. He did neither, and merely signed the train register, using a pen which Tinsley, who was intent on filling in the train register, handed over his shoulder without looking up, and left the signal box at 6.46 am.[9] Also in the signal box, against the rules, were two other railwaymen (brakesmen from the two goods trains) whose presence may have distracted Tinsley and Meakin who was discussing the war with the two brakesmen.[10]

Animation of the series of events causing the crash.

At 6.34 am one of the signalmen, which it was never established, gave the "train out of section" bell to Kirkpatrick for the coal train which now stood in the up goods loop.[11] After giving train out of section, this was the point at which the "blocking back" signal should have been given to Kirkpatrick but neither man did this.[11] At 6.38 am the first of the expresses from Carlisle passed Quintinshill heading north. At 6.42 am Kirkpatrick "offered" the troop train to Tinsley. Tinsley immediately accepted this and four minutes later was offered the second northbound express from Gretna Junction.[8]. At 6.47 am Tinsley received the "train entering section" signal from Kirkpatrick for the troop train and offered it forward to Gretna Junction, having forgotten all about the local passenger train which was occupying the Up line. It was immediately accepted by Gretna Junction so Tinsley pulled "off" his Up home signal to allow the troop train forward.[8] Had he placed a lever collar on this signal as he should have done (and as Hutchinson should have checked) then Tinsley would not have been able to pull the signal lever.[11]

The troop train collided head on with the stationary local train on the up line at 6.49 am.[12] Just over a minute later, the second of the express trains ran into the wreckage. The wreckage also included the goods train in the down loop and a train of empty coal trucks in the up loop. At 6.53 Tinsley sent the "Obstruction Danger" bell signal to both Gretna and Kirkpatrick, stopping all traffic and alerting others to the disaster.[13].

Fire

A great number of men on the troop train were killed as a result of the two collisions and the disaster was made much worse by a subsequent fire. The great wartime traffic and a shortage of carriages meant that the railway company had to press into service obsolete Great Central Railway stock. These carriages had wooden bodies and frames, so had very little crash resistance compared with steel framed carriages, and were gas-lit using the Pintsch gas system.[14] The gas was stored in reservoirs slung under the underframe and these ruptured in the collision, the escaping gas igniting from the coal burning fires of the engines. The gas reservoirs had just been charged prior to leaving Larbert and this, plus the lack of available water, it was not until the morning of the next day that the fire was extinguished despite the best efforts of railway staff and the Carlisle fire brigade.[15]

The troop train had consisted of 21 vehicles and apart from the rear six, which had broken away during the impact and rolled back along the line a short distance, the entire train was consumed in the fire, as were four coaches from the express train and some goods wagons.[16] All four locomotives (the express was double headed) of the troop train, the local train and the express, were also badly damaged by fire and the intensity of the fire was so hot that all the coal in the tenders was consumed.[16]

Casualties

The overwhelming majority of fatalities were among the men of the Royal Scots and the precise number was not established as the roll list of the regiment was destroyed by the fire. Col. Druitt's official report gives an estimated total of 215 deaths and a further 191 injured.[17] Of the 500 soldiers of the 7th Battalion of the Royal Scots on the troop train, only 58 men were present for roll call at 4.00 pm that afternoon, along with seven officers.[18] In total, 226 people died and 246 were injured. The engine crew of the troop train also died in the first collision.[19]

Considering the double collision and the fire casualties in the other trains were lighter than may have been expected. On the local train two passengers died with none seriously injured; on the express seven passengers died, with a further 51 and 3 members of railway staff seriously injured.[17]

Funerals

The funeral procession passes Pilrig Church on its way to the cemetery.

A number of bodies were never recovered having been wholly consumed by the fire and when the bodies of the men of the Royal Scots were returned to Leith on 24 May they were buried together in a mass grave in Edinburgh's Rosebank Cemetery.[20]

The Rosebank Cemetery Memorial

The bodies were escorted by the 15th and 16th Battalions Royal Scots, the Edinburgh Pals battalions recently assembled and still undergoing training. The cortege took four hours to complete its task. A memorial to the dead troops was erected in Rosebank Cemetery in 1916.[21]

Among the coffins were four bodies which were unidentified. One coffin was simply labelled as 'little girl, unrecognisable' and another as 'three trunks, probably children'.[20] As no children were reported missing the railway company moved the bodies to Glasgow for possible identification but no one came forward to claim the bodies. The four were buried in Glasgow's Western Necropolis on 26 May.[20] The engine crew of the troop train were both from Carlisle and they were also buried on 26 May, at Stanwix Cemetery.[22]

Survivors

The surviving officers and men of the Royal Scots were taken to Carlisle on the evening of 22 May. The next morning they were redispatched on a new train to Liverpool but on arrival at Liverpool they were medically examined and all the Other Ranks and one officer were declared unfit for service overseas and they were returned to Edinburgh.[18] It was reported in the Edinburgh Weekly that on their march from the port to the railway station the survivors were mistaken for prisoners of war and pelted by some children.[23]

Investigations

Board of Trade inquiry

The first official investigation into the disaster commenced in Carlisle on 25 May and was conducted by Colonel E Druitt RE of the Railway Inspectorate on behalf of the Board of Trade. Col Druitt had already spent some time at the accident site and spent the day in Carlisle interviewing witnesses including both Meakin and Tinsley.[24] Both men were honest about their failures to abide by the rules and their generally lax behaviour. Col Druitt presented his report to the Board of Trade on 17 June 1915 and laid the blame squarely on Meakin and Tinsley.

This disastrous collision was thus due to want of discipline on the part of the signalmen, first by changing duty at an unauthorised hour, which caused Tinsley to be occupied in writing up the Train Register Book, and so diverted his attention from his proper work, secondly by Meakin handing over the duty in a very lax manner; and, thirdly by both signalmen neglecting to carry out various rules specially framed for preventing accidents due to forgetfulness on the part of signalmen.[1]

Druitt was also critical of Fireman Hutchinson for his failure to comply properly with rule 55,[11] and also of Alexander Thorburn, the stationmaster at Gretna who had responsibility for Quintinshill signal box and who, in Col Druitt's opinion, cannot have been unaware of the irregular shift changes operated by Meakin and Tinsley.[1]

Druitt also concluded that even had all the trains been lit by electricity then fire would still have occurred as the wagons of the goods train in the down loop caught fire.[25] He also concluded that had Quintinshill been equipped with Track circuiting then the accident would have been avoided as the electrical interlocking of the signals would have prevented Tinsley from pulling the relevant signal levers, but that with its simple layout and good visibility from the signal box Quintinshill was a low priority for track circuits to be installed.[1]

Coroner's inquest in England

The legal position was complicated by the fact that although the accident occurred in Scotland, some of the injured subsequently died in England where the law was different. In Scotland, deaths were investigated by the Procurator fiscal who if he found culpability on the part of anyone could order their arrest and charge with culpable homicide.[nb 4][27] In England the coroner investigates death and if the coroner's jury found that death was due to neglect then the coroner could indict charges of manslaughter against the named parties.[28] The coroner for Carlisle, Mr T S Strong, asked for guidance from the Home Office and was instructed to conduct inquests on those who had died in England in the normal way.[29] The inquest opened on 25 May but was immediately adjourned until 23 June to allow Col Druitt to finish his investigation.[30] After two days hearing evidence from, among others, Tinsley, Meakin and Hutchinson, Strong summed up the evidence to the 19 man jury. He concluded his summing up with:

If you find as a result of your deliberations that the rules and safeguards were broken by one or more of the railwaymen concerned, or in other words that they have been negligent, there remains one point which you must decide, and it is this.

Was that negligence of such a character—having regard to all the surroundings—as to be culpable negligence, or in other words gross negligence?

If so it was manslaughter.[31]

The jury retired and an hour later came back with a verdict that the 27 people who were the subject of the inquest had died due to the gross negligence of Tinsley, Meakin and Hutchinson. The coroner therefore committed all three to the next sitting of Cumberland Assizes on a charge of manslaughter; all three were granted bail.[32]

The verdict of the English inquest left Tinsley in an unusual position as he had already been arrested by the Scottish authorities and charged with culpable homicide and now faced a charge of manslaughter in England based on the same facts. After discussion between the Law Officers of England and Scotland it was decided to proceed against the three men in Scotland.

Trial of Tinsley, Meakin and Hutchinson

The trial of the three men started on 24 September 1915 in the High Court in Edinburgh. The Lord Justice General, Lord Strathclyde, presided over the trial; the Lord Advocate, Robert Munro KC prosecuted and the three men were defended by Condie Sandeman KC.[33]. Tinsley, Meakin and Hutchinson all pleaded not guilty to the charges of culpable homicide and breach of duty against them. The trial lasted a day and a half; after the prosecution had concluded their case, Sandeman submitted to the Lord Justice General that the was no case to answer by Hutchinson. This submission was accepted by the Lord Justice General and the jury were instructed to find him not guilty at the conclusion of the trial.[34] Sandeman called no witnesses on the part of Meakin and Tinsley but instead sought to persuade the jury that neither had been criminally negligent but that Tinsley had just had a momentary loss of memory.[35]

After Sandeman's speech, Lord Strathclyde summed up to the jury, ending:

At 6.43 on the morning of the day in question the men in the signal box at Quintinshill were asked to accept the troop train coming from the north. They accepted it. That meant that they gave the signal to the north that the line was clear and that the troop train might safely come on. At that very moment when the signal was given there was before the very eyes of the men in the signal box a local train which was obstructing the line on which the troop train was to run. One man in the signal box had actually left the train a few minutes before just at the time when it was being shunted on to the up line. The other man had a few minutes before directed the local train to leave the down main and go on to the up main.

That is the staggering fact that confronts you.

If you can explain that fact consistently with the two men having faithfully and honestly discharged their duties you should acquit them. If you cannot explain the staggering fact consistently with the men having faithfully discharged their duties then you must convict them.[36]

The jury retired to consider their verdicts at 12.40 pm and returned only eight minutes later finding Hutchinson not guilty as directed but finding Tinsley and Meakin guilty as charged.[37] After hearing mitigation on behalf of the two Lord Strathclyde sentenced Tinsley to three years Penal servitude and Meakin to eighteen months Imprisonment.[37]

Fatal accident inquiry in Scotland

The final legal inquiry into the disaster was held on 4 November 1915 in Dumfries and was an inquiry under the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895 into the deaths of the crew of the troop train. Presided over by Sheriff Campion it came to the same conclusion as the English inquest and the trial that if Meakin and Tinsley had followed the rules then the accident would not have happened.[38]

After the trial

After release, Tinsley went straight back to working on the Caledonian railway as a lampman[39] and porter at Carlisle. He remained in that post for over 30 years until retirement.[citation needed] He died in 1961. Meakin also returned to the railway, as a goods train guard. Some years later he was made redundant from that job and set himself up as a coal merchant, trading from Quintinshill siding, right next to the scene of the crash. In the Second World War, he worked in the Gretna munitions factory until he retired due to ill health.[40] He died in 1953.[39]

The pair were not the first signalmen to be convicted for their part in causing an accident; James Holmes was tried for manslaughter following the Thirsk rail crash of 1892 but was given an absolute discharge;[41] nor the last as Signalman Frost was jailed for two years for his part in causing the Connington South rail crash in 1967.[42]

Memorials

Remembrance Service, 2010

As well as the memorial in Rosebank Cemetery, there is a plaque at Larbert railway station, from where the soldiers originally departed.[43] Two memorials have been erected by the Western Front Association, the first in 1995, just to the south of the scene of the accident[44] and the second near to the site of the disaster was unveiled in September 2010.[45] A memorial to the unknown children was erected at the Western Necropolis in Glasgow in 2011.[46]

Annual remembrance services are held at Rosebank Cemetery attended by the Lord Provost of Edinbrugh, the Royal Scots association and others.[47][48]

Similar accidents

The Hawes Junction rail crash of 1910 also involved a busy signalman forgetting about a train on the main railway line. Likewise, at the Winwick rail crash of 1934, an overworked signalman forgot about a train in his section, and was misled by a junior.

See also


References

Footnotes

  1. ^ a b This total comprises 214 soldiers on the troop train, 9 passengers from the two passenger trains, 3 railway employees and 4 children, believed to be stowaways on the troop train. Col Druitt's official report into the accident gives the figure as 227 (he did not include the the 4 children),[1] but he compiled the report very soon after the accident and gave the number of troops killed as 215 which was later revised downwards by the army to 214, the figure which appears on the memorial in the Rosebank Cemetery in Edinburgh.
  2. ^ Normally the local train would not shunt at Quintinshill but a rule allowed for the train to be shunted at one of the intermediate stations or signalboxes if one or other of the night expresses from London to Glasgow were running late.[4]
  3. ^ On the line between Carlisle and Glasgow, Up is towards Carlisle and Down is towards Glasgow.
  4. ^ The charge of manslaughter is not known to Scottish law, culpable homicide is the equivalent.[26]

Notes

  1. ^ a b c d e Druitt 1915, p. 26.
  2. ^ "BBC On this day 8 October 1952". BBC. 2008. Retrieved 14 January 2012.
  3. ^ a b Rolt 1982, p. 208.
  4. ^ Rolt 1982, p. 207.
  5. ^ Nock 1980, p. 109.
  6. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 32.
  7. ^ Thomas 1969, pp. 34–35.
  8. ^ a b c Druitt 1915, p. 23.
  9. ^ Thomas 1969, pp. 35–36.
  10. ^ Nock 1980, p. 112.
  11. ^ a b c d Druitt 1915, p. 25.
  12. ^ Rolt 1982, p. 229.
  13. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 51.
  14. ^ Rolt 1982, pp. 209–210.
  15. ^ Rolt 1982, p. 211.
  16. ^ a b Druitt 1915, p. 28.
  17. ^ a b Druitt 1915, p. 30.
  18. ^ a b Thomas 1969, p. 60.
  19. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 45.
  20. ^ a b c Thomas 1969, p. 67.
  21. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 135.
  22. ^ Thomas 1969, pp. 67–68.
  23. ^ Hamilton 1969, p. 74.
  24. ^ Thomas 1969, pp. 71–72.
  25. ^ Druitt 1915, p. 27.
  26. ^ Gillon 2006, p. 34.
  27. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 68–69.
  28. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 68.
  29. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 69.
  30. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 72.
  31. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 108.
  32. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 109.
  33. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 110.
  34. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 113.
  35. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 116.
  36. ^ Thomas 1969, pp. 118–119.
  37. ^ a b Thomas 1969, p. 119.
  38. ^ Thomas 1969, p. 120.
  39. ^ a b Thomas 1969, p. 121.
  40. ^ Routledge 2002, p. 75.
  41. ^ Vaughan 1989, p. 17.
  42. ^ Vaughan 1989, p. 29.
  43. ^ Nicholl, Vivienne (27 June 2011). "Forgotten no more". Evening Times. Retrieved 15 January 2012.
  44. ^ "Commemorating the Gretna Railway Disaster" (Press release). National Library of Scotland. May 1995.
  45. ^ Cameron, John (29 September 2010). "Quintinshill Rail Disaster: unveiling of the Memorial Plaque". Western Front Association. Retrieved 15 January 2012.
  46. ^ "Memorial for child victims of UK's worst rail crash". BBC News. BBC. 27 June 2011. Retrieved 1 February 2012.
  47. ^ "The Royal Scots Association" (PDF). The Thistle; Journal of The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment). The Royal Scots Regiment. Summer 2010. p. 6. Retrieved 1 February 2012.
  48. ^ "The Royal Scots Association" (PDF). The Thistle; Journal of The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment). The Royal Scots Regiment. Summer 2011. p. 3. Retrieved 1 February 2012.

Sources

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