Woodhead Commission

The Woodhead Commission (also Palestine Partition Commission) was a committee established by the British Government during the British Mandate for Palestine to examine the implementation of several proposals for the partition of Palestine. The Commission conducted its investigations from April to early August 1938, and published its conclusions on November 8, 1938, ultimately rejecting partition as unfeasible.

History

The Commission comprised Sir John Woodhead, together with Sir Alison Russell, A. P. Waterfield, and T. Reid. It was charged with examining the Peel Commission plan in detail, in order "to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas and the enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily under British Mandate" and "to examine and report on the economic and financial questions involved in partition upon which decisions will require to be taken." However, the appointment of the Commission was regarded by the Colonial Office as an instrument to free Britain from its obligation to the partition plan.Woodhead received secret instructions that he was to find partition to be impractical.Sir George Rendel, head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, did his utmost to ensure that the Commission would reach the "correct conclusion," by trying to influence the choice of personnel and placing his own memorandum before the Commission as evidence.

The Commission spent over three months in Palestine, taking evidence from witnesses in 55 sessions. However, no Arabs came forward to submit evidence. In their report, they examined three possible modifications of the Peel Commission proposal, which they called Plan A, B and C. These plans proposed the creation of a tiny Jewish state surrounded by a much larger Arab state and a British zone.

A Minority Report submitted by the Commission rejected Arab claims that the Jews had acquired the "best land" in Palestine: "That much of the land now in possession of Jews has become the best land is a truer statement...It was impossible not to be impressed when inspecting some of the bare rocky places where Jewish settlements have been or are in the course of being made. Such remarkable efforts may well disturb statistics."

The Commission found that a self-supporting Arab State could not be established and "it is only the Jewish contributions to tax revenue that have enabled Palestine to balance its budgets." As the Arab State would need the mandated territories for farming and the Jewish State would need them for industry, the Commission proposed a customs union.

Plan A

Woodhead Commission, Plan A

Plan A was the Peel plan, which proposed a coastal Jewish state, a British-mandated corridor from Jerusalem to Jaffa, and the remainder of Palestine merged with Transjordan into an Arab state.

Plan B

Woodhead Commission, Plan B

Under Plan B, the Jewish state would have 300,400 Jews and 188,400 Arabs (50,000 in the Haifa district, while 90,000 Arabs and 76,000 Jews would continue to live under British rule. It reduced the size of the Jewish State by adding Galilee to the permanently mandated area and the southern part of the region south of Jaffa to the Arab State.

Plan C

Woodhead Commission, Plan C

Plan C would limited the Jewish State to the coastal region between Zikhron Yaakov and Rehovot, while placing northern Palestine, including the Jezreel Valley, and all the semi-arid part of southern Palestine under a separate mandate. It recommended:

• A Jewish state of 1,258 square km, in two parts: The northern part would be a coastal strip 15–20 km wide from Tel Aviv to above Zichron Ya'acov, and the southern part would be a smaller region including Rehovot. The initial population would be about 226,000 Jews and 54,400 Arabs.

• An Arab state of 7,393 square km, consisting mostly of a segment approximating today's West Bank and Gaza Strip with a wide corridor connecting them. The Arab state would also include the city of Jaffa. The initial population would be 8,900 Jews and 441,100 Arabs.

• Three mandated territories under British control: all of the Galilee (initial population 77,300 Jews and 231,400 Arabs), an enclave including Jerusalem and Lydda (initial population 80,100 Jews and 211,400 Arabs), and the Negev region from north of Beersheva (initially 60,000 Arabs).

Conclusions

The report of the commission, published in London in November 1938, was entitled "Palestine Partition Commission Report", Command Paper 5854.

Two members of the Commission were in favor of Plan C, one favored Plan B and one declared that no practical plan could be devised.

Plans A and B were rejected because of the large number of Arabs in the proposed Jewish State, the need for population transfer, and the inclusion of Galilee in the Jewish State.

The Commission members declared that there were financial and economic difficulties "of such a nature that we can find no possible way to overcome them within our terms of reference." They suggested that the Arab and Jewish states not be given fiscal independence but instead the UK government accept "the very considerable financial liability involved".

Two members of the Commission added Notes of Reservation to the report. Russell argued that the plan was not in accord with the obligations to the Jews. Reid argued that all three plans were fatally flawed.

The report of the Woodhead commission was presented to Parliament and published on November 8, 1938. As a consequence, the government issued a policy statement that "the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable".

Economic federalism proposal

The Commission proposed a modified form of partition called "economic federalism" in which the two states would enter into a customs union with the territories that remained under mandate, leaving the Mandatory authorities to determine a fiscal policy. According to the report: "The customs revenue would be collected by the Mandatory, and the net surplus after meeting certain common charges would be distributed between the three areas according to an agreed formula, subject to periodic review...The Commission suggest that initially each area's share should be one-third...To enable the Arab State to balance its budget without subjecting it to external financial control, it should receive a supplementary share out of the share of the mandated territories, under conditions which will entitle it to share in the expansion of customs revenue resulting from an increase of prosperity in the rest of Palestine. This arrangement could be extended, if desired, to cover internal communications (railways, posts and telegraphs) thus removing certain obvious administrative difficulties consequent on partition. While this arrangement withholds fiscal autonomy from the Arab and Jewish states it seems to the Commission, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory basis for settlement, provided his Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the considerable financial liability involved."

Criticism

Former Colonial Secretary Leo Amery argued that partition had been rejected "for the wrong reasons." He said that the Peel plan was based on regions where Arabs and Jews were assigned to areas where they were already living, while fulfilling the Mandate required providing the Jews with sufficient territory for substantial immigration. Moreover, the implication was that a self-supporting Arab state must "continue to enjoy those amenities that Jewish enterprise and taxation had brought to undivided Palestine." According to Amery, no scheme could be implemented under such assumptions. Palestine: Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy, 1936-1945, Michael J. Cohen, pp. 164-165</ref>

Aftermath

In 1939, Britain invited the parties to London to participate in a third attempt to resolve the crisis, the St. James Conference (also known as the Round Table Conference of 1939). The recommendations were eventually rejected by both Jews and Arabs.