ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

INTRODUCTION This paper shall attempt a discourse on the connection between language and epistemology. If epistemology is traditionally referred to as the “theory of knowledge”, the question that the linguistic philosopher may be prompted to ask is “what is the connection between language and knowledge?” “Between language and ontology, is there a link?” If language is to be understood in general, as a veritable tool for forming, acquiring, analyzing, synthesizing, conceptualizing, clarifying, verifying, theorizing, evaluating, interpreting, criticizing and communicating our knowledge claims such that without language, we can neither think nor acquire knowledge, then the connection between epistemology and language which this paper purports to discuss emerges. But then, the question could be raised as to what extent can the claim that we can neither think (form thoughts) nor acquire knowledge outside of language be sustained? The methodology of this paper shall be thus: we shall attempt a discourse on the connection between language and epistemology; we shall attempt a discourse on some polemics regarding the nature of language vis-à-vis epistemology and here we shall be talking about the ordinary language discourse and the private language discourse respectively; we shall discuss the rationalist and the empiricist debate on the nature of language; we shall examine the relationship between language and thought and then conclude. ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY There is a strong link between language and knowledge. It is true that language is used for communication. It is a conventional sign designed for communication. It is a conventional sign because in every language, words, phrases, sentences and expressions all have meanings that are conventionally agreed upon by the speakers. See Uzoma, Anthony U, Philosophy: Mans Quest For Meaningful Living (Enugu: Auto-Century Publishing Company Limited, 1996), p. 15. That is why in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein warns that it is not the business of philosophers to change the language of a people and he contends (contrary to his earlier position in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus) that every proposition is meaningful when situated within “language-game” where such a proposition is used. In other words, it is in that “language-game’ that the meaning of the proposition has been conventionally agreed upon, and it is there that the meaning is locatable. Learning a new language means, inter alia, learning the meaning that the people (the speakers of the language) have conventionally given to words, phrases, sentences, expressions etc. in the language in question. Again, the relationship between language and knowledge is much more than that of communication. Language is not only used for communicating knowledge, it also plays an indispensable role in the acquisition of knowledge. Thoughts are the fabrics with which knowledge is constructed or fabricated. But thoughts cannot be formed without language. For language is not simply a vehicle for communicating thoughts, it is the matrix within which thoughts are formed, and without which they cannot be formed. Hence, no language no thoughts; no thoughts no knowledge. Whenever we retreat into ourselves and begin to think, we realize that we are doing so in a language and we can never think without doing so through a language. Thus, language is used both in the formation of concepts and knowledge as well as in communicating them. Uzoma Anthony, loc.cit. See also, Joseph Omoregbe, Epistemology: A Systematic and Historical Study (Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited, 1998),pp. 19-20. Again, the scope of language is also the scope of knowledge. In the preface to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein tells us that his aim in the book was to draw a limit to thought, by drawing a limit to language. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in www.philosophypages.com( accessed on January 1, 2013) He hereby underscores the inseparable link between language and thought, between language and knowledge. The scope of language is the scope of thought and of knowledge. The limit of language is the limit of thought, and the limit of thought is the limit of knowledge. The British analytic school sitting in Oxford and Cambridge separated language from knowledge and reduced the analysis of language into an end in itself rather than a mean, a medium for the formation and communication of thoughts and knowledge about the world. This school went as far as reducing the whole of the philosophical enterprise to linguistic analysis. A.J. Ayer for example taught that all the major philosophers in the past were primarily language analysts. This claim without doubt is a case of either a total misunderstanding of these philosophers or a deliberate attempt to distort facts on the part of Ayer. Bertrand Russell in a rebuttal of the British school wrote: Although I feel strongly about the importance of analysis, this is not the most serious of my objection to the new philosophy. The most serious of my objections is that the new philosophy seems to me to have abandoned, without necessity, that grave and important task which philosophy throughout the ages has hitherto pursued. Philosophers from Thales onwards have tried to understand the world. I cannot feel that the new philosophy is carrying out this tradition … I have never been able to feel any sympathy with those who treat language as an autonomous province. The essential thing about language is that it has meaning- i.e., that it is related to something other than itself. Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development ( London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), p.230. We agree with Russell that language is a medium for knowing the world and communicating such knowledge. Language is by its very nature related to something outside itself and that is its meaning. For if it does not relate to something outside itself it becomes meaningless for it would then convey nothing and communicate nothing. Therefore language can never be an end in itself as the British analytic school would have us hold. The moment it becomes an end in itself, it automatically becomes meaningless and useless. Similarly, when analysis of language become an end in itself instead of a means to an end, it also become meaningless purposeless, and useless. Hence, language is the matrix within which thoughts are formed and knowledge acquired. Without language we can neither form thoughts nor acquire knowledge. Cf. Bertrand Russell, loc.cit. Therefore, we can agree with Wittgenstein based on the reason given above that there can be no private language, i.e. a language that is invented by an individual, understood by himself alone, and used only by himself. He avers: can we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expressions to his inner experiences- his feelings, moods and the rest for his private use?... The individual words of this language refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), pp. 243-257. That would be impossible; it would defeat the very purpose of language, which is to communicate with others. A person could of course, invent some signs to indicate or remind himself of some feelings or sensations he is experiencing within himself and such signs would be understood by himself alone. Yet those signs would not be a language even if he converts them into sounds. They would remain signs, invented by him and intelligible only to himself. For, although language is a conventional sign, not every sign is language. Thus there can be private signs but there can be no private language. What about the case being adduced for soliloquy as private language? In soliloquy, a person speaks to himself, but in doing so he is using public language, not private language. We therefore disagree with E. A. Ruch and those philosophers who argue that there can be private language. Ruch maintains that “a language is meaningful even if nobody besides understands it.” E. A. Ruch, The ways of Knowing and Thinking (Roma: National University of Lesoto, 1972), p. 315. He argued that “a sign is a sign even when it signifies to nobody but its inventor.” Loc.cit. But as we have shown that every sign is not automatically a language just because language is a sign –a conventional sign. A private sign understood only by the inventor remains a sign but not a language. SOME POLEMICAL DISCOURSES ON THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE VIS-À-VIS KNOWLEDGE Here, we shall sample critically different perspectives or discourses on the nature of language vis-à-vis thought and knowledge in view of understanding their connection. 2.1 ORDINARY LANGUAGE DISCOURSE Ordinary language simply defined is “…the device we use for communicating with one another.” R. Lacey, Modern Philosophy: An Introduction (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 139. This definition though in exhaustive, affords us one way by which we can approach the analysis of the nature of language. In the art of communication, we do use language either as spoken or written words, gestures and symbols of one kind or another all of which are intended to signify to others something which we experience internally within ourselves or externally. And for communication to be effective, it is also essential that what our words and linguistic symbols signify must be understood by others. In other words, there ought to be cross-contextual communication. But then, the question of concern here is how the language device is formulated. E. A. Ruch had argued that “language is simply a conventional system of signs.” E. A. Ruch, The ways of Knowing and Thinking (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Ltd., 1977), p. 28. The fact of convention, I should like to point out here emphasizes the social and dynamic character of language itself. Hence, the question of determining the meaning of linguistic expressions by convention is controversial to some extent. Philosophers like Grice for instance, had argued that it is not only reference to some conventional criteria that will account for the meaning of linguistic signs and words but maintained that the speaker’s intention also affects the contextual interpretation of linguistic expressions. C. H. P. Grice, “Meaning”, in J.F. Rosenberg and C. Travis (eds.) Reading in the Philosophy of Language (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1971), p. 443. Again Donald Davidson, on the other hand, has argued that the concept of meaning is underpinned by our grasp of a clear conception of the relationship between sentences and the cognitions for their truth Donald Davidson, “Truth and Meaning” in J. F. Rosenberg & Co. (eds.), op.cit., p. 455. while Quine affirms that “…in point of meaning, a word may be said to be determined to whatever extent the falsehood of its content is determined.” W.V.O Quine, The Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 86. In any case, it is obvious that a system of communication in ordinary language is necessarily public since it excludes private interpretations of the symbols used in it. And for the autonomy of language to be maintained, one could also conceive that there must be some canons by which linguistic competence is judged and restrictions placed on the assignment of private meanings to the words and symbols of the language. Canons here could be made clearer with this explanation. When we analyze the linguistic elements of ordinary language, we discover that particular utterances have general characterizations by which they could be identified and associated with their objects. And this makes the misapplication of such utterances to be checked. The explanation adduced for this is that such linguistic elements are governed by rules. And that the knowledge of how to speak a language involves the mastery of these universal rules which render our use of the elements of that language regular and systematic. J.R. Searle, “The Verification of Linguistic Characterization” in C. Lyas (ed.) Philosophy and Linguists (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 242. Thus the claim is made that “the concept of language is rule governed.” Jonathan Bennett, Linguistic Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 2. P.F. Strawson has equally argued that the possession on the part of the fluent and correct speaker of a language, of the abilities to construct, interpret and criticize sentences implies the existence of a set or system of rules which the speaker has in some sense mastered. P.F. Strawson, Logico Linguistic Papers (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1991),p. 130 The above analysis on the claim that language is rule governed would help us understand and assess Wittgenstein’s contentions on the contrary in his rebuttal of the idea of private language wherein he argued that it is not rule-governed and as such, the meanings of the words in private language cannot be determined or consistently defined. 2.2 PRIVATE LANGUAGE DISCOURSE What is private language, and why does its possibility matter? A private language in the words of Wittgenstein is “a language whose words refer to what can only be known by the person speaking to his immediate sensations.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations Transl G.E.M. Auscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 89. The words of Wittgenstein’s imaginary private language refer only to the speaker’s immediate private sensations. For example, “I know what the word ‘toothache’ means, remarks the private linguist, it produces one particular image in my mind.” Rhees R. (ed.), “Wittgenstein’s Notes for Lectures on Private Experiences and Sense Data” in Philosophical Review. Vol. LXXVII, 1968, p. 242. The words of the private language here refer to elements of one’s private experience, pain. But if that is their reference, what is their sense? If Frege’s phrase may be appealed to here. Sometimes, Wittgenstein’s private linguist conceives of the experience itself, that is, the sensible intuition, as providing the concept. In this case the private linguist would assert that “the experience which I have seems, in certain sense, to take the place of a description of this experience …it is its own description.” Ibid., p. 227.The private linguist associates names with sensations and uses the names as descriptions for his private sensation. But the problem here is to affirm how this process of association is established. Since the private linguist is the only speaker of his language, there is therefore, no possibility of his relying on other persons so as to learn the correct association of names and the objects they designate as it is the case in ordinary or public language where the child or the person learning the language could be guided by other speakers of the language. In the private language situation, the lone speaker generates, and at the same time learns the correct association of names with his private sensations. Wittgenstein describes the process thus: One gives oneself a private ostensive definition of the private object by attending to the object, as it were, mentally pointing at it, while saying the word to oneself or writing it down one impresses upon oneself the connection between sign and sensation. G. E. Auscombe & G. H. Von Wrigert, Ludwig Wittgenstein ZETTEL (Berkley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 75. On the whole, the words of a private language are known only by the speaker and they refer to his private sensations. A private language requires the process of concept formation if the private linguist must describe his private experiences by ostension. Also, the private language of associating sensation with the private object is akin to the empiricist conception of language to some extent. And if that is the case, then the idea of privacy would not hold very strictly. Be that as it may, arguments have been advanced that in quite an ordinary sense, there can be private languages. In this case, it is claimed that a language can be private when it is devised to enable a limited number of persons to communicate with one another in a way that is unintelligible to anyone outside the linguistic group or “language game” or “conceptual scheme”. Again, people can also device and keep personal diaries in codes which no one else is meant to understand as Locke did. Jones O.R. (ed.), The Private Language Argument ( London: Macmillan &Co. Ltd., 1971),p. 5.What makes the reference to Locke prominent is because he also provides what has been considered the clearest statement of the view that, in another interpretation of the term ‘private’, not just some but all language is not merely contingently , but essentially private. For instance, Locke has argued that words in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them. That then which ideas are the marks of the ideas of the speaker. John Locke, Essays Concerning Human Understanding, edited by A.D. Woozley, Collius (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1964), ch.II, x. 8.Locke’s view here deals more appropriately with the issue of speaker’s intention which is, of course, a different problem with language generally. It should be understood that private ideas or intentions attached to words, particularly in ordinary language, do not affect the public conventional interpretation of the language. In short, the concept of autonomy of language renders Locke’s view that all language is contingently private forceless. It is also worthy of note, that a private code even of Locke’s type is not irreducibly private as to be taken to mean a private language. Such codes are rather a private method of transcribing some given language. And the wordings of such private diaries do not necessarily refer to only the private sensations of their author as it is implied in the case of the private language argument. A.J. Ayer, for instance, held that private languages, in the ordinary sense, are in general derived from public languages. And so even if there are any which are not so derived, they will still be translatable into public language. It is evident from the above definition that whether such a language is possible has philosophical importance because of its implication for epistemology and philosophy of mind as well. Some philosophers for instance, have thought that the only ‘matters of fact’ we really know are our own experiences. In other words, what we claim to know about the world of other people is based on our knowledge of our mental states, or private experiences. Again, it could also be taken for granted that our knowledge of our experiences can be expressed in language, at least to ourselves. And that the possibility of expression does not presuppose any acquaintance with the external world or other minds. This kind of view lies at the heart of the private language controversy because, whosoever accepts it would believe in the possibility of a private language whose words acquire meaning simply by being linked to private experiences. But as Anthony Kenny has rightly observed, if words are thought of as acquiring meaning as is presupposed in the private language scheme, a doubt may arise whether the samples from which one person has acquired his vocabulary are really like the samples from which another person has done so. Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein (London: Allen lane The Penguine Press, 1973), p. 179. The problem being highlighted here is that of incommunicable privacy of subjective experience. Words that refer to such experiences will not make any meaning to other minds since they cannot be known, neither would their truth conditions objectively verifiable or determined. THE RATIONALIST AND THE EMPIRICIST DEBATE ON THE NATURE OF LANGAGE In the attempt to understand the nature of language, the process by which it is learnt, and the connections that words or linguistic signs have with their objects, studies about the learning and development of language have usually focused on the child as a speaker and primarily on his spontaneous verbalizations. In the main, there are two sides to the debate on the issue namely, the rationalist and the empiricist camps. 3.1 THE RATIONALIST ARGUMENT ON THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE The rationalist argument simply states that one cannot really teach language, but can only present the conditions under which it develops spontaneously in the mind. J.P.B Allen & Buren P.V., Chomskey: Selected Readings (London: Oxford University Press, 1971),p. 134. This position reiterates the Platonic view that learning is largely a matter of drawing out what is innate in the mind. 3.2 THE EMPIRICIST ARGUMENT ON THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE The empiricist view about the learning of language on the other hand, holds that language is essentially an adventitious construct, taught by conditioning with inputs from the social-linguistic environment in which the language learner develops. Hacker Patrick, Insight and Imusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Metaphysics of Experience (London: Oxord University Press, 1972),p. 225. Thus, Herman Philips affirms that: To understand the phenomenon of language at all, we must suppose that children learn to perceive ordinary objects and phenomena before they learn a language, and that the data of an elementary level of perception precede conceptualization instead of being its product… Harman Philip, “The Absolute Network Theory of language and Traditional Epistemology” in Inquiry, vol. 33, June, 1990, p. 151. This is a representation of John Locke’s suggestion that the first stage in language learning is to stock our memory with objects. It is then the business of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas which it has present occasion for. Once the store of exemplars is established says Locke, children then begin by degrees to learn the use of signs. And when they have got the skill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate sounds, they begin to make use of words… John Locke, loc.cit.. For Locke then, “the use of words is to be the sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.” John Locke, op.cit., p. 1. Again, the method by which the private linguist learns his language as sketched by Wittgenstein in his philosophical Investigation is similar to the empiricist approach although slightly different. In the case of the private linguist, he associates names with sensations and uses the names as descriptions of his experiences. This better explained in Wittgenstein’s words thus: The private linguist gives himself a private ostensive definition of the private object by attending to the object, as it were, mentally pointing at it, while saying the words to himself, by this process, the private linguist impresses upon himself the connection between sign and sensation. Ludwig Wittgenstein, op.cit., p. 92. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT The relation of language and thought is another perspective by which the nature of language could be analysed. Here, Jay Rosenberg points out that “if thought is a representational system analogous to public language, then it cannot be appealed to explain representing the world.” Donald Davidson, “Truth and Meaning” in J. F. Rosenberg & Co. (eds.), op.cit., p. 16.. This argument has to do with the limits of language, that is, what can be expressed and expressed clearly when we use language to state facts. Milton. K. Munitch, The Ways of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishers Co. Ltd., 1979), p. 304. The pertinent question here is how to describe the kind of relation public language has to our thoughts and the world of fact. Our analysis of representation in this case must be conducted at a level that shows the distinction between the overt nature of language and the covert nature of thought. In other words, our thought process is a subjective experience that is not amenable to public scrutiny. Thus it is possible for one to utter P, yet in his thought he can assert or belief that P is not the case. The point being made here therefore is that it is not always the case that thought is a direct representational system analogous to public language. In the same vein, language is not a direct representational system corresponding to facts in the world that it purports to state in our discourse. In fact, a one-to-one correspondence representation of the elements of a sentence with the fact it describes can hardly be affirmed. Hence, it has been explained that “… the question as to what it means for a sentence to correspond to a fact or the question of whether a sentence describes a fact, is largely a conventional matter.” Bello A.G.A., “Correspondence to Fact”, (unpublished), p. 10. If that is the case, then the private language thesis which holds that “the private linguist is able to formulate words that can only be known to him” runs into difficulties because, conventions as pointed out earlier, only apply to the social nature of public language. CONCLUSION Having justifiably established in the foregoing, the connection between language and epistemology, I would like to conclude by reiterating that language is a veritable tool for forming, acquiring, analyzing, synthesizing, conceptualizing, clarifying, verifying, theorizing, evaluating, interpreting, criticizing and communicating our knowledge claims such that without language, we can neither think nor acquire knowledge and in this lies the link, the relationship and the connection between language and knowledge, between language and epistemology. 13