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2019, Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry
https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2019.vol1.no2.08…
6 pages
1 file
PREVIEW ONLY: FOR FULL ARTICLE, VISIT: https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2019.vol1.no2.08 Once esteemed as the highest form of knowledge, the legitimacy of metaphysics as a rational discipline has been severely challenged since the rise of modern science, particularly since it seemed that while the latter reached overall consensus, the disputes in the former seemed interminable. The question naturally arises whether metaphysics could ever achieve the status of a science. The following article presents the view that metaphysics is not nor could ever become a science in the sense of the modern "hard" sciences today because a) it seeks a different sort of knowledge, which b) cannot be acquired by the methods of modern science; and c) metaphysics serves a different cognitive purpose than the sort of knowledge that science can provide. It is, nevertheless, a rational subject, one in fact that supplies the necessary rational foundation for the positive sciences.
Philosophica (Belgium)
I examine the current state of the debate on the metaphysics of science (MS for short). In 1, I identify some of the main questions belonging to the MS, looking into the relationship between science and metaphysics. In 2, I expound the rise of the old wave in the MS, which endorses the belief that metaphysics is a guide to, or a heuristic for, science and outlines the stronger idea that metaphysics makes science possible. In 3, I examine the maximalist MS. This is a contemporary revival of the old wave, reformulating the claim that metaphysics makes science possible. In 4, I look into the new wave in the MS, which argues that science is a guide to metaphysics and, more radically, that metaphysics is to be motivated by, and restricted to, science. In 5, I briefly introduce my own minimalist MS, which contends that science sets the epistemic, methodological and ontological criteria which should work as desiderata of the MS. I close this chapter in 6 with some concluding remarks.
Philosophica, 2015
A renewed interest in the old problem of the relationship between science and metaphysics has been fuelled by the ongoing debate between naturalistic metaphysicians and non-naturalistic metaphysicians. However, I maintain that this debate is missing the mark because it is focused on the problem of the credibility (or lack of it)of a metaphysics that is not ‘scientific’, instead of focusing on the presence of metaphysics in science. In order to show that metaphysics pervades all stages of scientific inquiry, and after analysing the distinction between presuppositions and assumptions, I address the complex problem of the relation of metaphysics to truth and to experience. I advocate that there is an indirect relation of metaphysics to experience and that it is possible to choose between rival metaphysical theories. But metaphysics, according to my view, is not present in science merely as a background of presuppositions and assumptions. It is present at every step of the scientific inquiry and also in a later moment: the interpretation of the findings of science and the elaboration of unifying theories.
Pluralists in philosophy of science often regard metaphysical claims as uninformative and thus pointless for science. However, pluralists are also tolerant of the multiplicity of approaches that are and can be used in producing scientific knowledge. I argue that pluralism should welcome metaphysical discourses on their own grounds. This will be elucidated by the historical case study of Einstein's criticisms of the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Further, I argue that influential attempts to deflate metaphysics (e.g. Rudolf Carnap (1934 and Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino, and Kenneth Waters ) are misguided in rejecting metaphysics from their pluralist frameworks.
2006
The paper argues for three theses: (1) Metaphysics depends on science as a source of knowledge. Our current scientific theories commit us to certain metaphysical claims.
Modern Metaphysics, 2007
Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the fundamental nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, between substance and attribute, and between possibility and actuality. Reviewing these papers will set the scene for a REVIEW of the very popular KANTISM of Today. Metaphysics is the science of being and ask the question “What really exists?” The answer to this question has been sought for by mankind since the beginning of recorded time. In the past 2500 years there have been many answers to this question and these answers dominate our view of how physics is done. Examples of questions which were originally metaphysical are the shape of the earth, the motion of the earth, the existence of atoms, the relativity of space and time, the uncertainty principle, the renormalization of field theory and the existence of quarks and strings. we should explore our changing conception of what constitutes reality by examining the views of Aristotle, Ptolemy, St. Thomas Aquinas, Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Leibnitz, Compte, Einstein, Bohr, Feynman, Schwinger, Yang, Gell-Mann, Wilson and Witten ET AL https://cds.cern.ch/record/311040/files/9609160.pdf IE IS THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT SIMPLY A FIGMENT OF ALL OUR IMAGINATION? IT MAY NEVER BE REPAID IN FULL HENCE IT MAY FOLLOW THAT IN FACT IT DOES NOT EXIST THEREFORE: ""WHY WORRY?"" Metaphysics Peter van Inwagen Meghan Sullivan SEE PDF
Path of Science, 2016
The article concern is the problem of natural sciences-metaphysics relations. The criterion of metaphysical knowledge as the knowledge about fundamental objects is formulated. It is argued that natural sciences and mathematics do not meet this criterion. They cannot be metaphysics being engaged in the study of exclusively non-fundamental entities. The inference is made that only the speculative metaphysics (if such metaphysics is possible) has the means to solve metaphysical problems relying entirely on its own foundation.
Metascience: A Journal for History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science, 2013
Synthese
At the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophy of science defined itself mainly in opposition to metaphysics (Mach 1883; Duhem 1906; Carnap 1931), which was taken to be a field lacking rigorous methods, thus being hostage to arbitrariness and dogmatism (Hahn et al. 1929). Logical empiricism, first promoted in Vienna and Berlin in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, recommended abandoning metaphysical theories with their shaky epistemic status and suggested a new start based on the hypothesis of the unity of science (Hahn et al. 1929). According to logical empiricism, scientific knowledge is better justified than metaphysics because it rests on a solid foundation: the pillars of observation and logic. Metaphysical statements, which cannot be justified by observation or logic, were taken to be strictly speaking meaningless. Given this conception of metaphysics and science that has been dominant in much of the twentieth century, it may seem surprising, and even paradoxical, to open up a new field of research under the name of "metaphysics of science" or "scientific metaphysics", with the aim of pursuing metaphysical questions in the light of contemporary science or of interpreting contemporary science in metaphysical terms. How can it be legitimate to raise questions about the structure of reality revealed by the sciences in metaphysical terms? According to the doctrine of logical empiricism, metaphysical questions that arise about the objects of scientific research can only be addressed in a rational and coherent way once they have been translated into questions bearing on scientific theories, con
Metaphysicians seek a general account of what exits. So too do scientists. One would therefore expect metaphysics to be continuous with science, and for scientific theories to illuminate metaphysical questions. The history of ideas bears this out. Early Greeks such as Thales and Heraclitus and Empedocles founded a tradition of inquiry that is both scientific and philosophical. Atomism began as speculation about the nature of the physical world. Descartes and Leibniz made important contributions to both physics and ontology. Newton described his discipline as Natural Philosophy. Kant's theory of space and time demonstrates the commonality of topics among science and metaphysics by coming into direct conflict with the Theory of Relativity. Contemporary metaphysics, however, appears to have lost contact with scientific practice. One of the metaphysical problems discussed in this volume is whether a statue the same thing as the clay it is made from or a distinct thing. Another is whether colors are mind‐independent physical items. Science, it would seem, has produced adequate accounts of both statues and colors insofar as they are objects of scientific inquiry. We know the chemical structure of clay, how it reacts to forces, whether it will retain or lose its shape in various possible circumstances. If none of this information settles whether a statue and its clay are the same or different, we can expect no further help from scientific inquiry. Or again: we have an adequate understanding of how various frequencies of light are absorbed by and reflected from surfaces of things, how the light is focused by the lens of the eye on