

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2023

○ Global Results
& Incidents

○ Trends in
Terrorism

○ 10 Years
of the GTI

○ The Sahel &
Expert Essays

Measuring the Impact of Terrorism

IEP
Institute for
Economics
& Peace



Quantifying Peace and its Benefits

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The GTI uses Dragonfly's TerrorismTracker database, which contains detailed and structured event records of every terrorist incident reported in open sources since January 2007. Dragonfly is a leading risk intelligence and data company that specialises in global security, geopolitics, crises and instability.

TerrorismTracker is the most comprehensive, current and methodologically robust dedicated open-source terrorism incidents database available. It is widely used for professional applications in countering terrorism, by law enforcement, government, military, in the private sector, in academia, and among insurers.

Further information about Dragonfly is available at www.dragonflyintelligence.com

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Executive Summary

This is the tenth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). This report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last decade. The calculation of the GTI score considers not only deaths but also incidents, hostages and injuries from terrorism, weighted over a five-year period.

The GTI report is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) using data from TerrorismTracker and other sources. TerrorismTracker provides event records on terrorist attacks since 1 January 2007. The dataset contains almost 66,000 terrorist incidents for the period 2007 to 2022.

In 2022, deaths from terrorism fell by nine per cent to 6,701 deaths and is now 38 per cent lower than at its peak in 2015. The fall in deaths was mirrored by a reduction in the number of incidents, with attacks declining by almost 28 per cent from 5,463 in 2021 to 3,955 in 2022. However, if Afghanistan was removed from the index, terrorism deaths would have increased by four per cent.

Afghanistan remained the country most impacted by terrorism for the fourth consecutive year, despite attacks and deaths falling by 75 per cent and 58 per cent respectively. The GTI does not include acts of state repression and violence by state actors and, as such, acts committed by the Taliban are no longer included in the scope of the report since they took control of the government.

The deadliest terrorist groups in the world in 2022 were Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates, followed by al-Shabaab, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM).

IS remained the deadliest terror group globally for the eighth consecutive year, recording the most attacks and deaths of any group in 2022. Despite this, terrorism deaths attributed to IS and its affiliate groups, Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK), Islamic State - Sinai Province (ISS) and Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), declined by 16 per cent. However, there has been a rapid increase in deaths attributed to unknown jihadists in the countries where ISWA operates, increasing by 17 times since 2017 to 1,766 terrorism deaths. Given the location, many of these are likely unclaimed attacks by ISWA. If most of the deaths caused by unknown jihadists were included as IS terrorism deaths, then the outcome would have been similar to 2021. Eighteen countries experienced a death from terrorism caused by IS in 2022, a slight decrease from 20 countries the year prior.

After the substantial falls in terrorism between 2015 and 2019, improvements have plateaued in the last three years. Highlighting the point, the number of countries experiencing deaths has remained almost constant for the last three years, ranging from 43 in 2020 to 42 in 2022. This is down from the peak of 56 countries in 2015. The number of countries experiencing increases and decreases in terrorism deaths

remained roughly the same in 2022, with 25 countries recording reductions, while another 24 countries recorded increases. Terrorism is dynamic and, although the overall change in the last three years has been minimal, there have been sharp rises and falls in terrorism in many countries during this period, notably Niger, Myanmar and Iraq.

Terrorist attacks became more deadly in 2022, killing on average 1.7 people per attack in 2022 compared to 1.3 deaths per attack in 2021. This is the first increase in lethality rate in five years.

Violent conflict remains the primary driver of terrorism, with over 88 per cent of attacks and 98 per cent of terrorism deaths in 2022 taking place in countries in conflict. All ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2022 were also involved in an armed conflict. Attacks in countries involved in conflict are seven times deadlier than attacks in peaceful countries.

The Sahel region in sub-Saharan Africa is now the epicentre of terrorism, with the Sahel accounting for more terrorism deaths in 2022 than both South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) combined. Deaths in the Sahel constituted 43 per cent of the global total in 2022, compared to just one per cent in 2007. Of particular concern are two countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, which accounted for 73 per cent of terrorism deaths in the Sahel in 2022 and 52 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. Both countries recorded substantial increases in terrorism, with deaths in Burkina Faso increasing by 50 per cent to 1,135 and in Mali by 56 per cent to 944. Attacks in these countries are also becoming more deadly, with the number of people killed per attack increasing by 48 per cent from 2021. Most attacks in these countries are attributed to unknown jihadists though both IS and JNIM operate in these countries. The escalation in violence in Burkina Faso has also spread to neighbouring countries, with Togo and Benin recording their worst GTI scores on record.

The increase in terrorism in the Sahel has been dramatic, rising by over 2,000 percent in the last 15 years. The political situation in the Sahel compounds this increase, with six coup attempts since 2021, of which four were successful. The underlying drivers are complex and systemic including poor water utilisation, lack of food, ethnic polarisation, strong population growth, external interventions, geopolitical competition, pastoral conflict, the growth of transnational Salafi-Islam ideology and weak governments. Most of the terrorist activity occurs along borders where government control is weakest. Significantly, of the 830 million people facing food insecurity globally, 58 per cent live in the

20 countries most affected by terrorism. Adding to the complexity, many criminal organisations increasingly represent themselves as Islamic insurgents, which partly accounts for attacks attributed to unknown jihadists.

North America had the largest regional improvement in score, while sub-Saharan Africa recorded the largest deterioration. North America consists of two countries, the US and Canada, with neither country having a high score; however, the region is the only region where no countries have a nil GTI score.

Sub-Saharan Africa recorded the largest increase in terrorism deaths, rising by eight per cent. Sixty per cent, or 4,023, of all terrorism deaths globally occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. Four of the ten countries with the largest deteriorations in GTI score are located in sub-Saharan Africa: Togo, Djibouti, Central African Republic and Benin. Terrorism deaths in sub-Saharan Africa increased by eight per cent, reversing the small improvement recorded in 2021.

The MENA region recorded only 791 deaths in 2022, a fall of 32 per cent and the lowest number in the region since 2013. Attacks almost halved in the last year, from 1,331 in 2021 to 695 in 2022. Underscoring the changing dynamics in terrorism, the region has dropped from 57 per cent of global terrorism deaths in 2016 to just 12 per cent in 2022. There has also been a substantial drop in suicide bombings in MENA. In 2016, suicide bombings resulted in 1,947 deaths; while in 2022, MENA recorded only six suicide bombings that killed eight people.

South Asia remains the region with the worst average GTI score in 2022. The region recorded 1,354 deaths from terrorism in 2022, a decrease of 30 per cent when compared to the previous year; however, if the improvement in Afghanistan was excluded, then terrorism deaths would have increased by 71 per cent. In Afghanistan, both the Khorasan chapter of IS and the emerging National Resistance Front (NRF) pose a serious threat. Afghanistan and Pakistan remain amongst the ten countries most affected by terrorism in 2022, with deaths in Pakistan rising significantly to 643, a 120 per cent increase from 292 deaths in 2021. The BLA were responsible for a third of these deaths in Pakistan, a ninefold increase from the prior year, making it the fastest growing terrorist group in the world.

In the West, the number of attacks continues to fall, with successive falls each year since 2017. Forty attacks were recorded in 2022, a decrease of 27 per cent when compared to the 55 attacks in 2021. However, the number of deaths more than doubled, albeit from a low base; from nine deaths in 2021 to 19 in 2022, with 11 of these occurring in the US. This was the first increase in terrorism deaths in the West since 2019. In Europe, Islamist extremists carried out two attacks in 2022. Attacks in the US remained low, with only eight attacks recorded in 2022. None were attributed to any known terrorist group. The UK recorded only four attacks and no deaths this year, the first year since 2014 that no deaths have been recorded; while Germany recorded the lowest number of attacks since 2015.

Ideologically motivated terrorism continues to be the most common type of terrorism in the West, with religiously - motivated terrorism declining by 95 per cent since its peak in 2016. All 14 ideologically-motivated deaths can be attributed to far-right terrorism.

Drones are rapidly evolving and changing the way conflicts are conducted. It is also an emerging trend in terrorist attacks,



with groups such as IS, Boko Haram and Houthi rebels using the technology for attacks. Current estimates suggest that 65 non-state actors are now able to deploy drones, which can be easily accessible in public marketplaces. They can travel up to 1,500 kilometres, be deployed in swarms, be used in targeted assassinations, hold biological weapons, require little training, and are highly accessible. Additionally, advances in AI will provide the crafts with launch-and-forget capabilities. At the time of writing, counter-measures to the use of drones by terrorists have not been sufficiently considered and will be an emerging area of concern in the near future.

"The Sahel region in sub-Saharan Africa is now the major epicentre of terrorism, with the Sahel accounting for more terrorism deaths in 2022 than both South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) combined."

Key Findings




Results

- ▶ Deaths from terrorism fell to 6,701 in 2022, representing a nine per cent decrease from the prior year. If Afghanistan was omitted, then terrorism deaths would have increased by four per cent in 2022.
- ▶ Attacks also decreased, by 28 per cent to 3,955, largely due to a fall in the intensity of conflict in the Middle East and Afghanistan.
- ▶ Terrorist attacks have become more deadly, killing on average 26 per cent more people per attack. The death rate rose to 1.7 people per attack in 2022, compared to 1.3 deaths per attack in 2021. This is the first increase in the lethality rate in five years.
- ▶ Terrorism deaths fell by 866 in Afghanistan in 2022, a 58 per cent improvement. This was after the Taliban gained control of the government in 2021 and ceased to be classified as a terrorist organisation.
- ▶ The Balochistan Liberation Army in Pakistan is the fastest growing terrorist organisation and was responsible for 233 deaths in 2022, a ninefold increase.
- ▶ Sub-Saharan Africa recorded the largest increase in terrorism deaths in 2022, while South Asia and MENA recorded the largest falls.
- ▶ Afghanistan remained the country with the highest impact from terrorism for the fourth year, followed by Burkina Faso and Somalia.
- ▶ The Sahel is the most impacted area of the world, representing 43 per cent of global terrorism deaths. The Sahel recorded seven per cent more deaths than the prior year.
- ▶ Four of the ten most impacted countries for terrorism in 2022 were in the Sahel region. Burkina Faso and Mali recorded substantial increases in terrorism deaths, increasing by 376 and 340 respectively.
- ▶ Burkina Faso had the largest increase in terrorism deaths, increasing from 759 to 1,135 deaths. This was followed by Pakistan where terrorism deaths increased from 292 in 2021 to 643 in 2022.
- ▶ IS and its affiliates remained the world's deadliest terrorist group in 2022. This is despite deaths attributed to the group and its affiliates declining by 16 per cent from 2,194 to 1,833 deaths, however its lethality rate per attack increased from 2.5 in 2021 to 2.9 in 2022.
- ▶ In 2022, the country most affected by IS terrorist attacks was Iraq, recording 183 attacks attributed to

the group, a decrease from 344 attacks in 2021.

- ▶ IS maintained its level of terrorist activity in Syria with approximately the same number of attacks, however these attacks resulted in more terrorism deaths by the group which increased to 344.
- ▶ In 2022, the number of countries suffering from terrorism deaths remained roughly the same, with 25 countries recording reductions, while 24 countries recorded increases.
- ▶ Of the 3,955 terrorist attacks recorded in 2022, 33 per cent were not attributed to a group.
- ▶ In 2022, over 88 per cent of terror attacks, and 98 per cent of deaths, occurred in conflict zones.



Trends in Terrorism

- ▶ Deaths from terrorism have fallen by over a third since its peak in 2015, with two of the largest decreases occurring in Iraq and Nigeria.
- ▶ The number of countries experiencing deaths has remained constant for the last three years, ranging from 43 in 2020 to 42 in 2022. This is down from the peak of 56 countries in 2015.
- ▶ Of the 163 countries included in the analysis, nearly three quarters or 121 countries recorded no deaths from terrorism in 2022, the highest number since 2007.
- ▶ In 2022, the 15 countries most impacted by terrorism were all suffering from conflict.
- ▶ Terrorist activity has been concentrated in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, with both the regions recording more terrorism deaths than MENA for the last four years.
- ▶ In MENA, deaths from terrorism have fallen by 42 per cent in the last three years and 32 per cent in the last year.
- ▶ As the conflict in Syria subsided, IS and its affiliates have shifted their focus to sub-Saharan Africa, and specifically the Sahel region.
- ▶ Deaths from terrorism in the Sahel accounted for 43 per cent of total terrorism deaths globally in 2022, compared to just one per cent in 2007.
- ▶ According to the World Risk Poll, Afghanistan and Burkina Faso are the countries most concerned by war and terrorism, with 62 per cent and 30 per cent of respondents selecting war and terrorism as the greatest threat to their daily safety, respectively.

- ▶ Six of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism are also amongst the 25 countries with the worst ecological threats and lowest resilience in the 2022 Ecological Threat Report, highlighting interdependency between ecological degradation and conflict.
- ▶ Of the 830 million people facing food insecurity globally, 58 per cent live in the 20 countries most affected by terrorism.
- ▶ There were two attacks by Islamic extremists in Europe. This is the lowest level since 2010. In total there were 79 attacks in Europe in 2022. Ten of these attacks occurred in Türkiye.
- ▶ The US recorded a significant improvement in its GTI score in 2022, recording its best score since 2011, although terrorism deaths did increase in 2022.
- ▶ Ideology continues to be the most prominent motivation behind terrorism in the West. There were 15 ideologically-motivated attacks, compared with just three religiously-motivated attacks.
- ▶ 2022 was the first year since 2014 that the UK has not had a death from terrorism.
- ▶ Attacks in Syria almost halved in 2022, from 354 in 2021 to 197; while terrorism deaths remained relatively static at 447 in 2022.
- ▶ In 2022, Canada recorded no attacks or deaths for the first time since 2013.

3

Ten Years of GTI - Terrorism in MENA

- ▶ The MENA region has seen a substantial decrease in terrorism over the past six years, with the proportion of global terrorism deaths in the region dropping from 57 per cent in 2016 to just 12 per cent in 2022.
- ▶ Despite the decrease in terrorism, MENA remains the least peaceful region in the world, according to the 2022 Global Peace Index. This trend is driven by prolonged conflicts in the region, affecting the countries' ability to establish the foundations for Positive Peace.
- ▶ Suicide attacks in MENA have fallen dramatically. In 2016, suicide bombings led to 1,947 deaths. In 2022, MENA recorded only six suicide bombings that killed eight people.
- ▶ Other types of terrorist attacks in MENA have seen only small changes in the last decade. The use of firearms has risen by 12 per cent, while the use of explosives has decreased by 14 per cent.
- ▶ Attacks targeting military and police have increased by 19 per cent since 2012. They are now the most common target, with 64 per cent of attacks directed at the military and police. This compares to an 11 per

cent decline in attacks on civilians, to 17 per cent.

- ▶ Syria has recorded the most terrorism deaths in MENA since 2020, while Iraq continues to record the most attacks.
- ▶ Impact of terrorism varies significantly within MENA. The countries most impacted by terrorism include Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria and Libya; while other countries have not recorded a terrorist attack in the last five years, such as Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Morocco.

4

Terrorism in the Sahel

- ▶ The Sahel has become increasingly more violent over the past 16 years, with terrorism deaths rising by over 2,000 per cent between 2007 and 2022. This increase in violence shows no sign of abating.
- ▶ The underlying drivers are complex and systemic including weak governance, ethnic polarisation, ecological insecurity, abuses by state security, pastoral conflict, the growth of transnational Salafi-Islam ideology, political instability, transnational crime, food insecurity and geopolitical competition.
- ▶ In conflict environments, terrorist groups prefer to target police, military and government institutions.
- ▶ Most terrorist activity is confined to border regions, where government activities are at a minimum.
- ▶ Terrorism's spatial dynamics in the Sahel are shifting from northeastern Nigeria to the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
- ▶ The increases in terrorist activity in Togo and Benin are part of a larger increase spreading from the Sahel to coastal West Africa, similar to surges seen in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso over the past few years.
- ▶ Governments in the state's worst affected by terrorism have experienced multiple coups and coup attempts.
- ▶ Violence against civilians is surging in Mali following the exit of French forces.
- ▶ The Sahel is quickly becoming a critical theatre for global geopolitical competition between Russia and the West.
- ▶ Burkina Faso and Mali accounted for 73 per cent of deaths in the Sahel and 52 per cent of deaths in sub-Saharan Africa.

About the Global Terrorism Index

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study analysing the impact of terrorism for 163 countries which covers 99.7 per cent of the world's population.

The GTI is based on data from Dragonfly's TerrorismTracker database and uses 31 December, 2022 as the cut-off date. Incidents are only included in the dataset if they are consistent with TerrorismTracker's definition of terrorism, which means recorded incidents may vary from other databases.

Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single, internationally-accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism and terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies. IEP accepts the terminology and definitions used by TerrorismTracker.

The GTI therefore defines terrorism as "the systematic threat or use of violence, by non-state actors, whether for or in opposition to established authority, with the intention of communicating a political, religious or ideological message to a group larger than the victim group, by generating fear and so altering (or attempting to alter) the behaviour of the larger group."¹

In understanding this definition, it is important to note that many governments perpetrate state terror against their citizens. However, as they are acting as the authority, these acts are not included in the GTI. For example, acts of the Taliban, which since August 2021 has been the government in Afghanistan, are no longer included. This exclusion in definition is not meant to disregard the seriousness or prevalence of any act of state terror. Such acts pose significant threats to peace and, as such, IEP tracks these through the *Political Terror Scale* contained in the Global Peace Index.

In line with this definition, TerrorismTracker does not include the following as acts of terrorism:

- Acts of warfare, either irregular or conventional,
- Criminal violence orientated exclusively for profit, even if they emulate terrorist tactics such as car bombings and beheadings,
- Violent anti-social behaviour,
- Civil unrest,
- Isolated acts of violence by unbalanced individuals such as active shooter incidents, unless there is clear evidence the motives of the attack are consistent with our definition of terrorism,²
- State purges and acts of state repression,
- War crimes and acts of genocide.

Given the significant resources committed to counter terrorism by governments across the world, it is important to analyse and aggregate the available data to better understand its various properties.

Examples of the information contained in this study are:


- The differing socio-economic conditions under which it occurs.
- The longer-term trends and how terrorism changes over time.
- The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and ideological aims of terrorist groups.
- The types of strategies deployed by terrorists, their tactical targets and how these have evolved over time.

In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to examine these trends. It also aims to help inform a positive, practical debate about the future of terrorism and the required policy responses.


2023 GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

MEASURING THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
1	Afghanistan	8.822	↔	29	Sri Lanka	4.839	↓ 4	56	Ethiopia	3.044	↓ 7
2	Burkina Faso	8.564	↑ 2	30	United States of America	4.799	↓ 2	57	Argentina	2.875	↔
3	Somalia	8.463	↔	31	Greece	4.793	↓ 2	58	Slovakia	2.784	↑ 38
4	Mali	8.412	↑ 3	32	Libya	4.730	↓ 5	59	Belgium	2.763	↑ 11
5	Syria	8.161	↑ 1	33	Palestine	4.611	↓ 1	60	Spain	2.712	↓ 5
6	Pakistan	8.160	↑ 3	34	France	4.419	↑ 2	61	Austria	2.677	↓ 8
7	Iraq	8.139	↓ 5	35	Germany	4.242	↓ 4	62	Japan	2.398	↑ 12
8	Nigeria	8.065	↓ 3	36	Nepal	4.134	↓ 2	63	South Arabia	2.387	↓ 9
9	Myanmar (Burma)	7.977	↑ 1	37	Algeria	4.083	↑ 3	64	Sweden	2.307	↑ 7
10	Niger	7.616	↓ 2	38	Tanzania	4.065	↓ 3	65	Switzerland	2.205	↓ 9
11	Cameroon	7.347	↑ 1	39	Burundi	4.051	↓ 6	66	Ecuador	2.198	↓ 8
12	Mozambique	7.330	↓ 1	40	Tunisia	3.989	↓ 1	67	Netherlands	2.120	↓ 8
13	India	7.175	↔	41	Peru	3.856	↓ 3	68	Jordan	2.033	↓ 8
14	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.872	↑ 2	42	United Kingdom	3.840	↓ 5	69	Australia	1.830	↓ 8
15	Colombia	6.697	↓ 1	43	Bangladesh	3.827	↓ 2	70	Uzbekistan	1.731	↑ 26
16	Egypt	6.632	↓ 1	44	Djibouti	3.800	↑ 52	71	Paraguay	1.605	↓ 7
17	Chile	6.619	↑ 1	45	Russia	3.799	↓ 1	72	Mexico	1.578	↓ 10
18	Philippines	6.328	↓ 1	46	New Zealand	3.776	↓ 4	73	Ukraine	1.535	↓ 10
19	Chad	6.168	↔	47	Côte d'Ivoire	3.747	↓ 4	74	Cyprus	1.392	↓ 8
20	Kenya	6.163	↔	48	Uganda	3.599	↓ 3	75	Malaysia	1.357	↓ 7
21	Iran	5.688	↑ 5	49	Norway	3.514	↑ 31	76	United Arab Emirates	1.241	↑ 20
22	Yemen	5.616	↓ 1	50	Tajikistan	3.438	↓ 3	77	Senegal	1.108	↓ 5
23	Türkiye	5.600	↔	51	Venezuela	3.409	↓ 5	78	Eswatini	1.058	↓ 5
24	Indonesia	5.502	↔	52	Lebanon	3.400	↔	=79	Bahrain	0.826	↓ 14
25	Israel	5.489	↑ 5	53	Italy	3.290	↓ 3	=79	Rwanda	0.826	↓ 3
26	Thailand	5.430	↓ 4	54	Canada	3.275	↓ 6	=79	South Africa	0.826	↓ 3
27	Togo	4.915	↑ 49	55	Central African Republic	3.194	↑ 12	=79	Uruguay	0.826	↓ 4
28	Benin	4.840	↑ 23								



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
83	Morocco	0.757	↓ 4	=93	Equatorial Guinea	0.000	↔	=93	Mongolia	0.000	↔
84	Romania	0.682	↓ 3	=93	Eritrea	0.000	↔	=93	Montenegro	0.000	↔
85	Brazil	0.599	↓ 2	=93	Estonia	0.000	↔	=93	Namibia	0.000	↔
86	Lithuania	0.508	↓ 1	=93	Finland	0.000	↓ 11	=93	Nicaragua	0.000	↔
=87	Ireland	0.291	↓ 1	=93	Gabon	0.000	↓ 4	=93	North Korea	0.000	↔
=87	Mautitania	0.291	↓ 1	=93	Georgia	0.000	↔	=93	Oman	0.000	↔
89	Vietnam	0.227	↓ 1	=93	Ghana	0.000	↔	=93	Panama	0.000	↔
=90	Angola	0.158	↓ 1	=93	Guatemala	0.000	↔	=93	Papua New Guinea	0.000	↔
=90	Denmark	0.158	↓ 1	=93	Guinea	0.000	↔	=93	Poland	0.000	↔
=90	Kosovo	0.158	↓ 1	=93	Guinea-Bissau	0.000	↔	=93	Portugal	0.000	↔
=93	Albania	0.000	↔	=93	Guyana	0.000	↔	=93	Qatar	0.000	↔
=93	Armenia	0.000	↔	=93	Haiti	0.000	↔	=93	Republic of the Congo	0.000	↔
=93	Azerbaijan	0.000	↔	=93	Honduras	0.000	↔	=93	Serbia	0.000	↔
=93	Belarus	0.000	↔	=93	Hungary	0.000	↔	=93	Sierra Leone	0.000	↔
=93	Bhutan	0.000	↔	=93	Iceland	0.000	↔	=93	Singapore	0.000	↔
=93	Bolivia	0.000	↔	=93	Jamaica	0.000	↔	=93	Slovenia	0.000	↔
=93	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.000	↔	=93	Kazakhstan	0.000	↔	=93	South Korea	0.000	↔
=93	Botswana	0.000	↔	=93	Kuwait	0.000	↔	=93	South Sudan	0.000	↔
=93	Bulgaria	0.000	↔	=93	Kyrgyz Republic	0.000	↔	=93	Sudan	0.000	↓ 9
=93	Cambodia	0.000	↔	=93	Laos	0.000	↔	=93	Taiwan	0.000	↑ 1
=93	China	0.000	↓ 25	=93	Latvia	0.000	↔	=93	The Gambia	0.000	↔
=93	Costa Rica	0.000	↔	=93	Lesotho	0.000	↔	=93	Timor-Leste	0.000	↔
=93	Croatia	0.000	↔	=93	Liberia	0.000	↔	=93	Trinidad and Tobago	0.000	↔
=93	Cuba	0.000	↔	=93	Macedonia (FYR)	0.000	↑ 2	=93	Turkmenistan	0.000	↔
=93	Czech Republic	0.000	↓ 4	=93	Madagascar	0.000	↔	=93	Zambia	0.000	↔
=93	Dominican Republic	0.000	↔	=93	Malawi	0.000	↔	=93	Zimbabwe	0.000	↔
=93	El Salvador	0.000	↔	=93	Mauritius	0.000	↔				
				=93	Moldova	0.000	↔				




TERRORIST INCIDENTS

The twenty most fatal terrorist attacks in 2022

- All attacks in 2022 scaled by number of fatalities
- Worst attacks in 2022

					DESCRIPTION		
1	COUNTRY	PAKISTAN	PROVINCE	BALUCHISTAN PROVINCE	DEATHS	195	Gunmen bombed and shot at two Frontier Corps buildings in a coordinated attack.
	DATE	2/2/22	GROUP	BALUCHISTAN LIBERATION ARMY (BLA)			
2	COUNTRY	SYRIA	PROVINCE	AL-HASAKAH GOVERNORATE	DEATHS	154	At least 200 assailants attacked Al-Sina prison, driving two explosive-ladens truck bombs into the outside wall of the prison before gunmen then stormed the facility as a riot took place inside. The attack lasted ten days until the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced they had regained control of the prison. At least 154 SDF members were killed. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack.
	DATE	20/1/22	GROUP	ISLAMIC STATE (IS)			
3	COUNTRY	SOMALIA	REGION	BANAADIR REGION	DEATHS	120	Two car bombs killed at least 120 people and wounded 300 outside the education ministry building. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that the ministry was responsible for a 'war on minds' that has removed Islam from schools and recruits students into militias.
	DATE	29/10/22	GROUP	AL-SHABAAB			
4	COUNTRY	BURKINA FASO	PROVINCE	SAHEL REGION	DEATHS	116	Gunmen killed at least 116 civilians in an attack on a village. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the area.
	DATE	12/6/22	GROUP	UNKNOWN - JIHADISTS			
5	COUNTRY	MALI	PROVINCE	MOPTI REGION	DEATHS	110	Gunmen killed at least 110 civilians in attacks on several villages. No group had claimed the attack at the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the region.
	DATE	19/6/22	GROUP	UNKNOWN - JIHADISTS			
6	COUNTRY	MALI	REGION	GAO REGION	DEATHS	100	Gunmen killed approximately 100 Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) fighters in Gao region. The battle lasted for approximately 24 hours and local media outlets said that there were casualties on both sides. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility attributing the attack to its 'Sahel Province'.
	DATE	7/12/22	GROUP	ISLAMIC STATE (IS)			
7	COUNTRY	SOMALIA	REGION	HIRSHABELLE STATE	DEATHS	59	Gunmen killed an unspecified number of Burundian soldiers during an attack on an African Union. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming to have killed 59 soldiers, but authorities had not released details on casualty numbers at the time of writing.
	DATE	3/5/22	GROUP	AL-SHABAAB			
8	COUNTRY	PAKISTAN	REGION	PAKHTUNKHWA PROVINCE	DEATHS	56	A suicide bombing killed at least 56 people and injured over 190 others in an attack on a Shia mosque. Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK) claimed responsibility.
	DATE	4/3/22	GROUP	ISLAMIC STATE - KHORASAN PROVINCE			
9	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	PROVINCE	KABUL PROVINCE	DEATHS	50	A bomb killed more than 50 civilians and wounded an unspecified number of others at a mosque. No individual or group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing, but based on the target, tactic, and location, Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK) was probably responsible.
	DATE	29/4/22	GROUP	ISLAMIC STATE - KHORASAN PROVINCE			
10	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	PROVINCE	BALKH PROVINCE	DEATHS	50	A bomb killed 50 civilians and wounded at least 100 more in an attack on a mosque during prayers. Islamic State - Khorasan province (ISK) claimed responsibility.
	DATE	21/4/22	GROUP	ISLAMIC STATE - KHORASAN PROVINCE			



					DESCRIPTION
11	COUNTRY NIGERIA	PROVINCE BORNO STATE	DEATHS 50		Gunmen killed at least 50 civilians after they accused them of informing on their movements to security forces. Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) claimed responsibility, saying it had targeted "spies".
	DATE 22/5/22	GROUP ISLAMIC STATE WEST AFRICA (ISWA)			
12	COUNTRY BURKINA FASO	REGION KOMPIENGA PROVINCE	DEATHS 50		Gunmen killed at least 50 civilians in an armed attack. No group had claimed the attack at the time of writing but jihadists operate in the area.
	DATE 25/5/22	GROUP UNKNOWN - JIHADISTS			
13	COUNTRY MALI	REGION GAO	DEATHS 42		Gunmen killed 42 soldiers and wounded 22 people in armed attack. No individual or group claimed the attack at the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the area.
	DATE 7/8/22	GROUP UNKNOWN - JIHADISTS			
14	COUNTRY NIGERIA	REGION BORNO	DEATHS 40		Gunmen killed at least 40 civilians in an armed attack. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but local media outlets said that Boko Haram was responsible.
	DATE 22/5/22	GROUP BOKO HARAM			
15	COUNTRY BURKINA FASO	CITY SAHEL REGION	DEATHS 37		Gunmen killed 27 soldiers and ten civilians while they were travelling to a nearby town in a supply convoy. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed responsibility.
	DATE 26/9/22	GROUP JAMAAT NUSRAT AL-ISLAM WAL MUSLIMEEN (JNIM)			
16	COUNTRY BURKINA FASO	REGION CENTRE-NORD REGION	DEATHS 35		A roadside bomb killed 35 civilians and wounded 37 others in an attack on a supply convoy. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the area.
	DATE 5/9/22	GROUP UNKNOWN - JIHADISTS			
17	COUNTRY MALI	REGION GAO REGION	DEATHS 70		Gunmen killed an unconfirmed number of civilians allegedly affiliated with Islamic State (IS) in coordinated attacks on villages in Gao region. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing but local media outlets said that Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) was responsible.
	DATE 5/12/22	GROUP JAMAAT NUSRAT AL-ISLAM WAL MUSLIMEEN (JNIM)			
18	COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN	CITY KABUL PROVINCE	DEATHS 30		At least seven gunmen and five suicide bombers mounted an attack on a Hindu festival in a Hindu temple. The attack lasted at least five hours when Taliban forces announced they had regained control of the temple. There were conflicting details about casualties but at least 30 civilians and Taliban fighters were killed and several others wounded. Islamic State - Khorasan Province claimed responsibility for the attack.
	DATE 18/6/22	GROUP ISLAMIC STATE - KHORASAN PROVINCE			
19	COUNTRY MALI	REGION GAO REGION	DEATHS 30		Gunmen killed around 30 civilians in an armed attack. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but local media outlets said that Islamic State (IS) was probably responsible.
	DATE 9/9/22	GROUP ISLAMIC STATE (IS)			
20	COUNTRY NIGERIA	REGION BORNO STATE	DEATHS 30		Gunmen killed at least 30 civilians and wounded six others in an armed attack. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but local media outlets said that Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) was responsible.
	DATE 21/5/22	GROUP ISLAMIC STATE WEST AFRICA (ISWA)			

20

20 GROUPS WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER OF DEATHS ATTRIBUTED IN 2022

Rank	ORGANISATION	DEATHS	ATTACKS	INJURED
1	Islamic State (IS)	1045	410	644
2	Al-Shabaab	784	315	1016
3	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	498	141	832
4	Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)	279	77	215
5	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	233	30	113
6	Islamic State West Africa (ISWA)	219	65	118
7	Boko Haram	204	64	51
8	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	137	90	187
9	Islamic State - Sinai Province	71	27	32
10	IPOB-ESN	57	40	16
11	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	40	54	150
12	Communist Party of India (Maoist)	39	61	30
13	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	17	6	23
14	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	16	17	37
15	New People's Army (NPA)	9	13	25
16	Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)	8	6	38
17	Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)	6	4	8
18	National Liberation Army (ELN)	5	28	77
19	Islamic Jihad	5	2	10
20	Balochistan Republic Army	4	1	8



Results

TERRORISM IN 2022

In 2022, terrorism deaths decreased by nine per cent to 6,701 fatalities, after remaining steady in the preceding four years. This is a decrease of 38 per cent from the peak in 2015, when 10,881 deaths were recorded. Terror attacks also decreased in 2022 for the first time since 2019, with a 28 per cent drop from 5,463 in 2021 to 3,955.

The reduction in terrorism deaths can be attributed to Afghanistan, with terrorism deaths decreasing by 866 following the Taliban gaining control of the government.

If Afghanistan was excluded from the figures, then terrorism deaths globally would have increased by four per cent. In contrast, Pakistan experienced a sharp increase in deaths, with the toll more than doubling from 292 in 2021 to 643 in 2022. Tunisia recorded no deaths for the first time since 2012.

Significant improvements were also recorded in the intensity of conflict in the Middle East, and especially in Iraq. However, while incidents decreased by 34 per cent in Syria, deaths only fell by ten per cent. Islamic State (IS) still poses a major threat and was responsible for the majority of the deaths in Syria.

A marginal increase in terrorism deaths was recorded in Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America. However, the latter two regions started from a very low base. Europe recorded eight terrorism deaths in 2021 and 27 in 2022, with 17 of these deaths occurring in Türkiye. North America recorded seven deaths in 2021 and 11 in 2022.

The Sahel is the region of the world most affected by terrorism, recording a noticeable deterioration in 2022 despite improvements in Nigeria and Niger. Both Burkina Faso and Mali recorded substantial increases in terrorism deaths, increasing by 50 and 56 per cent to 1,135 and 944 deaths respectively. Additionally, four of the ten countries in the Sahel have amongst the ten worst scores on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). Countries neighbouring the Sahel also experienced increased terrorist activity in 2022, with Benin and Togo recording above ten deaths for the first time.

In 2022, one more country improved than deteriorated, with 25 countries recording reductions in terrorism deaths, while 24 countries recorded increases and another 114 countries recorded no change in the number of deaths.


The GTI is comprised of four measures namely the number of attacks, the number of deaths, people wounded and hostages taken. The index uses a five-year weighting system to determine the level of impact for any given year. The weighting system accounts for the lingering effect of terrorism on a country's psyche. Please refer to the methodology section for further details on this.

Although the number of deaths from terrorism has declined, terrorism remains a major global threat. Terrorist attacks were more lethal in 2022, killing on average 1.7 people per attack, compared to 1.3 deaths per attack in 2021. This is the first increase in the lethality rate in five years. Terror attacks in 2022 are less lethal than a decade ago, when three people were killed in terror attacks on average.

Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of deaths for the five countries recording the most terrorism deaths in 2022. Of the five countries that experienced the highest levels of terrorism, all but one experienced an increase in the number of deaths.

FIGURE 1.1
Total terrorism deaths by country, 2021-2022

Total deaths from terrorism fell almost nine per cent from 2021 to 2022.




Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

FIGURE 1.2

Deaths from terrorism by country, 2022

Ten countries accounted for 85 per cent of deaths from terrorism.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Just ten countries accounted for 85 per cent of all terrorism deaths in 2022, as shown in Figure 1.2.

Burkina Faso recorded the most deaths in 2022. This is the first time that Burkina Faso has been the deadliest country, replacing Afghanistan who had held the position for the four prior years. Burkina Faso accounted for 17 per cent of all terrorism deaths globally, a significant increase from 2021 when the country accounted for ten per cent of the global total. Afghanistan's drop can largely be attributed to the Taliban taking control of the country after the fall of Kabul in August 2021. The GTI does not include acts of state terror.

Of the 3,955 terrorist attacks recorded in 2022, two thirds were attributed to a group. The countries with the highest number of attacks not attributed to a group were Burkina Faso, Mali and Iraq. Studies have shown that attacks that cause large numbers of casualties, as well as attacks causing very few deaths, tend to remain anonymous. At one end of the spectrum, terrorist groups have little incentive to claim minor acts of violence that could be seen as failures. At the other end, terror groups that inflict the most carnage can fear a backlash from both the government and the local population, hampering their recruitment efforts and causing increased counter-insurgency efforts against them.¹

Suicide bombings tend to be the most lethal form of attack, with the average attack killing six people in 2022. In 2022 there was a slight rise in the number of suicide bombings, with 60 incidents resulting in 358 deaths, compared to 51 suicide bombings that caused 409 fatalities in the previous year. However, the frequency of suicide bombings has been decreasing since its peak in 2017, when 339 attacks occurred. Armed attacks were the second most prevalent type of attack, with an average of 2.2 fatalities per attack.

Terrorism continues to become more concentrated, with 57 countries reporting a terror attack in 2022, compared to 59 in 2021 and 74 in 2015 when terrorism reached its peak. Highlighting this trend in increased concentration for terrorism, four of the five countries most impacted by terrorism experienced significant increases in terrorism deaths. Terrorism

was most concentrated in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa, where 65 per cent of attacks in the region took place in the ten countries in the Sahel.

Over 88 per cent of terror attacks in 2022 occurred in conflict zones.

INCREASES AND DECREASES IN TERRORISM

Figure 1.3 shows the countries that experienced the largest decreases in terrorism deaths in 2022. Afghanistan and Niger experienced the two largest falls. Deaths in Afghanistan fell by 65 per cent in 2022. The fall coincides with the Taliban takeover, following the fall of Kabul in August 2021. As the Taliban are now the state actor in much of Afghanistan, their attacks fall outside the scope of the GTI's definition of terrorism. In line with this definition, state purges and acts of state repression are excluded from incidents included in the GTI, but included in other measures, such as the *Political Terror Scale* indicator of the Global Peace Index (GPI).

Deaths in Niger fell by 79 per cent in 2022, after more than doubling in 2021. This decline was driven by a fall in deaths attributed to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWA), with the group recording a 98 per cent decline in the number of deaths in Niger between 2021 and 2022, although their activity did increase substantially in other areas of the Sahel.

Iraq recorded the third largest decrease, with a 68 per cent reduction in terrorism deaths in 2022; recording a total of 174 deaths which was the lowest in at least a decade. The improvement was driven by a two-thirds decrease in deaths attributed to IS. This was due to a combination of factors including leadership deaths, effective counter-terrorism operations by Iraq, and waning support for the IS movement.²


Figure 1.4 highlights the countries with the largest increases in terrorism deaths in 2022.

The country with the largest increase in terrorism deaths was

FIGURE 1.3

Largest decreases in deaths from terrorism, 2021–2022

Afghanistan had the largest decrease in the number of deaths from terrorism, reversing three years of consecutive increases.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Burkina Faso, where the number of people killed increased from 759 in 2021 to 1,135 in 2022. This is the first year that Burkina Faso has had more than 1,000 deaths caused by terrorism. While the number of attacks in Burkina Faso increased by 38 per cent between 2021 and 2022, the number of terrorism deaths increased by 50 per cent, also highlighting an increase in the lethality of the attacks. In 2022, attacks on average resulted in 3.7 deaths per attack, compared to 3.4 in 2021.


almost ninefold increase since 2021.³ Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK) activity also drove the increase in deaths in Pakistan, with deaths by TTP doubling and ISK deaths increasing sevenfold to 131 and 76 deaths, respectively.

In 2022, Pakistan recorded the second largest increase, with deaths more than doubling from the previous year. This significant increase was predominantly driven by a rise in attacks by the ethno-nationalist organisation the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) who were responsible for 233 deaths, an

FIGURE 1.4

Largest increases in deaths from terrorism, 2021–2022

Deaths from terrorism in Pakistan more than doubled between 2021 and 2022.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

TERRORISM GROUPS

The four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in 2022 were Islamic State (IS), Al-Shabaab, Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), as highlighted in Figure 1.5. These four groups were responsible for 3,129 terrorism deaths, representing 47 per cent of total terrorism deaths globally. Another 2,431 deaths or 36 per cent, were not attributed to any organisation. Three of these four groups were also the deadliest groups last year, with BLA replacing the Taliban this year.

In 2012, just prior to the large global increase in terrorist activity, these four groups were responsible for just under seven per cent of all terrorism deaths, highlighting the large global shifts in terrorism over the last decade.

Determining which terrorist groups are most active and responsible for the most deaths can be difficult, as many groups have regional affiliates and other groups work in partnership or partially under the same command. Terror groups have increasingly stopped claiming responsibility for attacks, making attribution challenging in certain cases.

For this report, IEP includes chapters and provinces of terrorist groups that are specifically affiliated under the same organisational name. For example, IS refers to Islamic State (also known as Daesh) as well as their affiliated chapters, such as the Khorasan Chapter and ISWA which are included. When specifically referring to the affiliate group, the chapter name will mainly be used.

BOX 1.1

The Taliban in Afghanistan

On 15 August 2021, the Taliban captured Afghanistan’s capital Kabul after years of insurgency. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, under President Ashraf Ghani, was overthrown and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan reinstated under the control of the Taliban.


As the Taliban are now the state actor in much of Afghanistan, their attacks fall outside the scope of the GTI’s definition of terrorism. In line with this definition, state purges and acts of state repression are excluded from incidents included in the GTI. However, they are included in other measures, including the *Political Terror Scale* contained in the GPI.

Islamic State (IS)


IS, including its affiliate groups, were the deadliest terror group of 2022. The number of deaths attributed to it has remained roughly the same, at about 2,000 deaths per year since 2019, although a 16 per cent improvement was recorded in 2022.

FIGURE 1.5
Four deadliest terrorist groups in 2022

Islamic State were the deadliest terrorist group of 2022.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations



IS is a Sunni extremist group which formed as an Al-Qaeda affiliate group in Iraq and Syria in 1999.⁴ Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, IS participated in the Iraqi insurgency. In 2014, the group declared itself a worldwide caliphate.⁵ IS primarily adheres to a global jihadist ideology, following an anti-Western interpretation of Islam, and promotes violence against those who do not align with their ideology including other forms of Islam.

The original aim of IS was to establish a Salafist-oriented Islamic state spanning Iraq, Syria and other areas of the Levant⁶. This expanded into other parts of the world through affiliate groups who promoted their ideology, including ISK in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and later ISWA which operates in the Sahel region. IS and its affiliates exploited tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq and Syria, using Sunni disenfranchisement to capture and consolidate its control over areas of Iraq and Syria. IS adopted similar tactics in the Sahel, taking advantage of political instability and local grievances as a means of recruiting followers.

However, it is increasing its focus on insurgency outside of the Levant through affiliates, particularly in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa.⁷ Recent propaganda distributed by IS has called for its supporters to migrate to Africa, ‘the land of jihad’ to build up a new base of operations there. This is the first time IS has called for a ‘hijrah’ or migration since the peak of the group’s activity in 2014-2015, highlighting that the African continent is now at the centre of the group’s current strategy.⁸

Changes since 2021

IS remained the world’s deadliest terrorist group in 2022, despite deaths attributed to the group and its affiliates slightly declining from 2,194 to 1,833 deaths.

In this report, IS is comprised of Islamic State, ISK, Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-SP) and ISWA. Attacks by IS and its affiliates represented 27 per cent of all terrorism deaths globally in 2022. Despite this, IS attacks fell from 865 in 2021 to 643 in 2022, a decrease of 26 per cent. Deaths mirrored this trend, declining almost 16 per cent between 2021 and 2022. In 2022, IS attacks occurred in five of nine regions: South Asia, MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, Russia and Eurasia, and Asia-Pacific.

The country most affected by IS terrorist attacks was Iraq, recording 183 attacks in 2022, a decrease from 344 attacks in 2021. IS maintained its level of terrorist activity in Syria with approximately the same number of attacks, however these attacks resulted in more terrorism deaths which increased to 344. Despite this, Afghanistan recorded the most IS-related deaths through ISK, with the country recording almost a quarter of IS casualties for 2022.

The deadliest attack attributed to IS in 2022 was a ten-day attack on Syria’s Al-Sina prison in January 2022. Two explosive-laden truck bombs were planted outside the walls of the prison, allowing at least 200 gunmen to storm the facility as a riot took place inside. At least 154 Syrian Democratic Forces personnel were killed and 120 more wounded. An additional 350 assailants were killed during the attack. IS later claimed responsibility for the attack, asserting the attack as an attempt to free thousands of their members being held in the prison.^{9,10} It was also the

deadliest attack attributed to any terror group in 2022.

IS also launched four attacks in the Russia and Eurasia region, resulting in one death, and a further two attacks in the Asia-Pacific region in 2022. The death in Russia and Eurasia occurred when an assailant with a knife killed a police officer near a mosque in Grozny, Russia. Security forces later stated that the perpetrator was affiliated with IS.¹¹ Three deaths were attributed to IS in the Asia-Pacific region related to two attacks in the Philippines. The first death was a civilian killed in an explosion on a bus, with the remaining two deaths in an armed attack on a construction site.^{12,13}

TABLE 1.1

Attacks and deaths by Islamic State and its affiliates, 2021–2022

Islamic State (IS) were the deadliest of the IS branches for the second consecutive year.

Group	2021		2022	
	Attacks	Deaths	Attacks	Deaths
Islamic State - Khorasan Province	190	543	141	498
Islamic State - Sinai Province	18	29	27	71
Islamic State (IS)	537	930	410	1,045
Islamic State West Africa (ISWA)	120	692	65	219

Tactics favoured by Islamic State

Suicide bombings continued to be the deadliest type of attack in 2022, although this type of attack was carried out less frequently. However, suicide bombings halved in 2022, with 13 attacks and 141 deaths recorded, compared to 22 attacks and 287 deaths the year prior. This is the lowest number of suicide bombings attributed to IS since 2014.

Armed attacks continued to be IS’ favoured tactic for the fourth consecutive year, followed by explosive attacks. In 2022, 398 armed attacks resulted in 1,098 deaths, compared with 520 attacks and 1,385 deaths in the previous year. Deaths from these attacks declined by 22 per cent.

Explosive attacks became more deadly in 2022, with deaths from explosives increasing to 721 deaths compared to 678 in 2021. The number of explosive attacks decreased from 264 in 2021 to 203 in 2022, however the lethality rate increased from 2.6 in 2021 to 3.6 in 2022.

The most common target for IS attacks continues to be the military, which represented 43 per cent of all IS attacks in 2022. However, civilians recorded the most casualties, with 690 civilian deaths in 2022.

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab, a Salafist militant group active in East Africa, first emerged in a battle over Somalia’s capital in the summer of 2006. As an Al-Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia and Kenya, al-Shabaab pursues Islamist statehood aspirations in Somalia

and was estimated to have between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters in 2019. Al-Shabaab gained global recognition following several deadly attacks concentrated around the capital city of Mogadishu, as well as attacks in the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda in the 2000s. African Union peacekeeping forces, known as the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), have been fighting al-Shabaab since 2007 with the help of US and United Nations (UN) support. In 2017, the first wave of US troops and airstrikes were deployed in Somalia in the fight against al-Shabaab.

Changes since 2021

In 2022, terrorism deaths attributed to al-Shabaab increased for the first time in six years, rising by almost 23 per cent from the prior year. Of the 784 deaths attributed to al-Shabaab in 2022, 93 per cent occurred in Somalia, with the remaining seven per cent occurring in Kenya. Al-Shabaab were also responsible for two incidents that occurred in Ethiopia, which resulted in no deaths. These are the group's only attacks in Ethiopia to date. Al-Shabaab are reportedly attempting to exploit Ethiopia's internal instability to expand its footprint in the region, following the civil war in Tigray.¹⁴

The total number of terror incidents attributed to al-Shabaab remained constant, only reduced by 15 attacks in 2022 to 315. Al-Shabaab's lethality rate is at its highest level since 2017, with attacks by the group killing 2.5 persons on average, compared to 1.9 in 2021.

Deaths attributed to al-Shabaab in Somalia increased by 23 per cent in 2022. This was mainly driven by an increase in terrorist activity in the capital, Mogadishu, with deaths from al-Shabaab attacks doubling between 2021 and 2022. Mogadishu has long been the epicentre of terrorist activity by al-Shabaab and in 2022, 26 per cent of al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia occurred in Mogadishu, resulting in 245 deaths. This includes the group's deadliest attack of 2022 when two car bombs, placed outside the education ministry building, killed at least 120 people. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, saying the ministry were responsible for a 'war on minds' that has removed Islam from schools and recruits students into pro-government militias.¹⁵

In Kenya terrorism deaths attributed to al-Shabaab increased marginally from 43 to 51 deaths in 2022. Most al-Shabaab deaths in Kenya in 2022 occurred in the Mandera county, close to the Somali border, which recorded 11 attacks in 2022, eight less than the year prior. This was followed by Lamu and Wajir counties, which collectively recorded 22 deaths. The deadliest attack in Kenya in 2022 occurred in Mandera county, where a roadside bomb killed 13 civilians when it struck a bus near the border with Somalia.

Tactics favoured by the Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab has consistently utilised bombings and armed assaults as its main modes of attack. Almost 63 per cent of terrorism deaths attributed to al-Shabaab in 2022 were the result of bombings, while armed assaults accounted for 32 per cent of deaths. The highest proportion of al-Shabaab attacks were directed at the military, followed by civilians. Overall, civilian deaths increased by a quarter between 2021 and 2022,

the first increase in civilian deaths in three years.

Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)

The BLA are an ethno-nationalist organisation who oppose the Pakistani government and ultimately seek to gain greater regional autonomy of the province of Balochistan in Pakistan's south-west, which borders Afghanistan and Iran.¹⁶ The group emerged in 2000 in response to growing resentment in Balochistan over perceived extortion by the government of the region's natural resources, as well as discrimination against the Balochi people.¹⁷ Since 2004, the BLA has used violent tactics, including armed and explosive attacks, against Pakistan to gain self-determination for the Baloch people and the separation of Balochistan from Pakistan.¹⁸ The group have been designated as a terrorist organisation by Pakistan, the UK and the US' governments.^{19,20,21} BLA largely targets security forces and civilians, mainly in ethnic Baloch areas of Pakistan.

Changes since 2021

Terrorism-related deaths attributed to BLA are now at their highest level in the last two decades, with 233 deaths recorded in 2022. This is a ninefold increase compared to the 26 deaths recorded in 2021. Terror attacks increased in the last year, by 76 per cent to 30 attacks. As a result, BLA's lethality rate increased to its highest level, with attacks by the group killing 7.7 people per attack in 2022, compared to 1.5 people per attack in 2021. Of the 233 deaths attributed to BLA in 2022, 95 per cent were of military personnel, with the remaining five per cent comprised of civilians, law enforcement personnel, educational figures, and mining personnel.

The deadliest attack attributed to BLA in 2022 occurred when gunmen bombed and shot at two separate security posts for the Frontier Corps in Pakistan in February 2022. No official death toll was confirmed however a statement from the BLA claimed they were responsible for the attacks and that they had killed 195 soldiers across both attacks.²² It is also the deadliest attack in Pakistan in 2022.

Tactics favoured by BLA

Explosive attacks are BLA's favoured tactic, comprising half of all the group's attacks in 2022, followed by grenade attacks at 33 per cent. In 2022, there were 14 explosive attacks that killed 212 people with a lethality rate of 15 deaths per attack. This compares with nine attacks the year prior. Deaths from these attacks were over 15 times higher in 2022 than in 2021, the highest number to date. This year marked the highest number of attacks against civilians by the group since 2010, with military attacks and deaths also at an all-time high.

Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)

JNIM was formed in 2017 in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa as a coalition of Salafi-jihadist insurgent groups including Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun and the Saharan branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.²³ Since its emergence JNIM has expanded across West Africa committing acts of violence against civilians, local security

forces and counter-terrorism operations, including international militaries and UN peacekeepers.²⁴ JNIM claims its aims are to incite Muslims to oppose oppression, expel occupying powers from the Sahel region, and implement Islamic governance. JNIM's leaders have declared its enemies to be France and other countries assisting France.²⁵

JNIM has successfully exploited local grievances with governments, as well as economic and social conditions, particularly in northern and central Mali to bolster recruitment.²⁶ Counter-terrorism efforts against JNIM have included France's now defunct Operation Barkhane, formed in 2014 with the aim of expelling insurgent groups from five countries namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. With French troops withdrawing from the region in 2022 due to their inability to work with the Malian government, who continued to negotiate with terrorist groups, JNIM is likely to continue its violent campaign across the Sahel.²⁷

Changes since 2021

After peaking in 2021, JNIM recorded a decline in attacks and deaths in 2022. JNIM were responsible for 279 deaths in 2022, a 28 per cent decrease compared with 2021. Terrorism-related incidents also fell by 14 per cent in 2022.

Of the 279 deaths attributed to JNIM in 2022, around 48 per cent occurred in Burkina Faso, while 43 per cent occurred in Mali. JNIM is continuing its campaign to expand its activities outside of the Sahel, carrying out attacks in Benin and Togo. An attack was recorded in Benin which resulted in one death in 2022, while in Togo there were three attacks resulting in the deaths of 25 people. This is the first recorded activity by the group in Togo.

In Mali, JNIM attacks fell by 49 per cent between 2021 and 2022. Most of the terrorist attacks in Mali in 2022 were directed at the military, however civilians comprised most of the casualties. Malian civilian deaths from JNIM attacks rose by 13 per cent between 2021 and 2022.

JNIM attacks in Burkina Faso accounted for 48 per cent of their total death toll in 2022. Attacks more than doubled, from 13 in 2021 to 34 in 2022, where the military and civilians were the main targets. The military represented 80 per cent of JNIM deaths in Burkina Faso, while civilians represented 16 per cent. JNIM's deadliest attack of 2022 occurred in Burkina Faso's Sahel province, where gunmen killed 27 soldiers and ten civilians while they were travelling to retrieve supplies.

Tactics favoured by JNIM

Armed attacks were the deadliest form of attack by JNIM. They accounted for 81 per cent of all deaths by the group, while only comprising half of the attacks in 2022.

The lethality rate from explosive attacks by JNIM increased for the first time in four years, from one death per attack in 2021, to almost two in 2022. Attacks rose slightly from 21 to 27 in 2022, while deaths from explosive attacks doubled and resulted in 51 deaths compared to 22 the year prior.

JNIM's usual targets are the military, representing over half of JNIM casualties in 2022. Civilians followed, accounting for 38 per cent of the group's deaths in 2022. However, civilian deaths also declined by 38 per cent compared to 2021. JNIM targeted far less police and prisons this year, with casualties from this group falling from 72 in 2021 to only seven in 2022.

10

COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Table 1.2 highlights the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in the 2023 GTI, and how their ranks have changed since 2011.

The GTI recorded a nine per cent decrease in the number of deaths from terrorism in 2022 compared to the prior year. The ten countries most impacted by terrorism were the same countries as in 2021, however the ranking has changed for six of the ten countries. Afghanistan maintained its position as the most impacted country by terrorism, for the fourth consecutive year. It was followed by Burkina Faso, which rose from fourth to second place. Somalia maintained its third-placed rank for the sixth consecutive year.

Mali moved up three places and Pakistan moved up four places to be the fourth and sixth on the index respectively; while Iraq dropped four places to seventh. This is Somalia's seventh

consecutive appearance amongst the five most impacted countries.

The countries with the largest deterioration in rank since 2011 were all located in the Sahel region - Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Highlighting the extent of their deterioration, all were ranked outside of the 20 countries most impacted by terrorism in 2011.

Only three out of the ten most affected countries recorded a decline in their scores from 2021 to 2022. The largest deterioration was seen in Pakistan, followed by Burkina Faso. On the other hand, Iraq recorded the biggest improvement, with a nearly five per cent increase in its score. Afghanistan also saw a notable improvement of almost four per cent, which was the largest improvement for the country since 2011.

TABLE 1.2

Ten countries most impacted by terrorism, ranked by GTI score

Afghanistan had the highest impact of terrorism for the fourth consecutive year.

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	3	3	3	4	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Burkina Faso	113	113	111	108	52	30	21	15	7	6	4	2
Somalia	5	7	7	7	8	5	3	3	3	3	3	3
Mali	41	23	19	21	16	13	10	9	8	7	7	4
Syria	20	4	4	5	6	7	7	8	6	5	6	5
Pakistan	2	2	2	2	4	4	5	5	5	8	10	6
Iraq	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	7
Nigeria	8	5	5	3	2	2	4	4	4	4	6	8
Myanmar	17	21	24	29	39	42	40	42	23	24	9	9
Niger	49	57	44	34	20	19	18	19	14	12	8	10

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Afghanistan

GTI RANK
1


GTI SCORE
8.822

633  DEAD
897  INJURED
225  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



In 2022 Afghanistan remained the country most impacted by terrorism, holding this position for the fourth consecutive year. Despite this ranking Afghanistan recorded 633 deaths, its lowest number of terror-related deaths since 2007.

Terrorist incidents in Afghanistan fell by 75 per cent, and there were 58 per cent less deaths compared to the year prior. Out of all the deaths caused by terrorism worldwide in 2022, nine per cent occurred in Afghanistan, which is a decrease from the 20 per cent recorded the previous year. Civilians accounted for over 32 per cent of these deaths.


In 2022, terrorism was widespread in Afghanistan with terrorist incidents recorded in 26 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. The highest number of deaths from terrorism occurred in Kabul province, with most of these deaths resulting from attacks by the Khorasan Chapter of Islamic State (ISK). Although Kabul remained the province most affected by terrorism for the ninth consecutive year, the number of deaths there more than halved from 549 in 2021 to 217 in 2022. The number of suicide bombings also decreased significantly in 2022, with only seven suicide bombings recorded compared to 11 in 2021. The total number of deaths caused by these bombings was 78, which is a 72 per cent decline from the 276 deaths recorded the previous year.

In 2022, bombings were the deadliest form of terrorist attack and resulted in the deaths of 434 people, compared to 186 fatalities caused by armed attacks.

Following the Taliban's takeover of power after the fall of Kabul in August 2021, ISK emerged as the most active terrorist group in Afghanistan. They were responsible for 115 incidents and 422 deaths in 2022, accounting for almost 67 per cent of total terrorism-related deaths in the country for the year. ISK were responsible for the country's deadliest attacks of the year, each resulting in the deaths of 50 civilians, when explosives were detonated at two Shia mosques in separate events in April 2022.

While the impact of terrorism has decreased significantly, it does not mean peace has been restored in Afghanistan. The GTI does

Worst attacks



KABUL

A bomb killed more than 50 civilians and wounded an unspecified number of others at Khalifa Sahib mosque in Darulaman, Kabul, Kabul province at around 1400hrs on 29 April. Local news outlets reported that some locals had said it was a suicide bombing, but police had not confirmed the type of explosion at the time of writing. No individual or group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing, but based on the target, tactic, and location, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK) was probably responsible.

not include acts of state repression and violence by state actors and, as such, acts committed by the Taliban are no longer included in the scope of the report. However, experts report evidence of repression and violence especially towards women, the media, former government officials and human rights officials.²⁸

ISK is likely to exploit tensions between Afghans and the Taliban to bolster their numbers, as the Taliban struggles to provide adequate food supplies and maintain the economy. Since they took power, more than 90 per cent of the population has been suffering from some form of food insecurity. This is exacerbated by Western suspension of aid and international organisations, which had been crucial to the economy and public health sector.²⁹

Additionally, counter-terrorism agencies remain concerned that the Taliban may be supporting terrorist organisations, particularly al-Qaeda, and that Afghanistan could become a safe haven for terrorists. In July 2022, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in a US drone strike in Kabul.³⁰ Intelligence reports suggested that Zawahiri was living in the home of a Taliban aide, and that other al-Qaeda leaders were based elsewhere in the country.³¹ The perceived state support of terrorism could further prevent Afghanistan from accessing international markets, or the aid needed to provide food and health care services to its citizens, further exacerbating its humanitarian crisis.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Burkina Faso

GTI RANK
2


GTI SCORE
8.564

1,135 DEAD
496 INJURED
310 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



Terrorism incidents in Burkina Faso rose between 2021 and 2022, from 224 to 310 incidents, marking the highest number of attacks ever recorded in the country. Similarly, terror-related deaths increased by 50 per cent compared to the previous year, with over half of the 1,135 deaths in 2022 being civilians. Burkina Faso recorded the highest number of deaths of any country in 2022, marking the first time the country has had a death toll of over 1,000 people.


The regions near Burkina Faso's borders with Niger, Benin and Mali experienced the most terror attacks, accounting for 71 per cent of all attacks in 2022. Of the country's 1,135 deaths in 2022, 448 occurred in the Sahel region. This includes the country's deadliest attack of 2022, when at least 116 civilians were killed in an attack on a village in June. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, however, jihadists are known to operate in the area. This was the fourth, most-deadly attack in the world in 2022.

Civilians were the most targeted group for the fourth consecutive year, accounting for 642 deaths or over 57 per cent of all terror-related deaths in the country. This is an increase of 29 per cent from the year prior, when 497 civilians were killed in attacks.

JNIM continue to be the most prominent terrorist group in Burkina Faso. While deaths caused by JNIM in Burkina Faso dropped by 35 per cent to 134 in 2022, attacks more than doubled between 2021 and 2022. This indicates a fall in the lethality of JNIM attacks in Burkina Faso this year, with the group responsible for 3.9 deaths per attack in 2022, a significant decrease from 15.9 deaths per attack in. JNIM's preferred tactic remains armed assault, with 80 per cent of the victims of their attacks military personnel.

While JNIM claimed responsibility for more terror attacks than any other group in Burkina Faso in 2022, 88 per cent of attacks and 87 per cent of deaths were linked to unknown jihadists. This puts Burkina Faso amongst the countries with the highest rates of unclaimed terrorist attacks and deaths globally. With JNIM and IS active in the region, it is feasible to assume that most of these attacks were carried out by these groups.

Worst attacks



SAHEL REGION

Gunmen killed at least 116 civilians in an attack on the village of Seytenga, Seno province, Sahel region on the night of 12 June. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the area.

While Burkina Faso continues to cooperate with other Sahel countries in counter-terrorism efforts, they have failed to curb the threat of jihadist groups such as JNIM. Burkina Faso's deterioration in the GTI mirrors its poor performance in the 2022 GPI, with the country falling 12 places to 146, the third highest fall in peacefulness globally. Burkina Faso's political instability and high state of tension culminated in a coup in September 2022, the country's second in a year.³² This increased internal conflict has diverted the attention of security forces towards combating Islamist insurgency, and weakened efforts to maintain law and order.³³

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Somalia

GTI RANK
3


GTI SCORE
8.463

755 DEAD
1,001 INJURED
299 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



In 2022, terrorist attacks in Somalia decreased from the previous year, recording a fall of almost ten per cent to 299 incidents. However, deaths from these attacks rose by 14 per cent to 755 deaths, the highest number since 2019, reversing five years of consecutive improvement. This indicates an increase in the lethality of attacks, with an average of 2.5 fatalities per attack in 2022, compared to 1.9 deaths per attack in 2021.

Al-Shabaab remains the deadliest terrorist group in Somalia, responsible for 733 deaths or 97 per cent of all terror-related deaths in the country in 2022. This is an increase of 23 per cent compared to the previous year, when the group were responsible for 596 deaths.


In 2022, al-Shabaab targeted primarily military personnel, as well as civilians and government officials. Military deaths accounted for 38 per cent of terrorism deaths attributed to the group, followed by government officials at 30 per cent and civilians at 14 per cent. Attacks by the group are now at their most lethal level since 2017, killing on average 2.5 people per attack compared to 1.9 in 2021.

Al-Shabaab's attacks have mostly occurred in Somalia's southern provinces. Most attacks occurred in the provinces of Shabeellaha Hoose and Banaadir, with the latter containing the country's capital Mogadishu. Notably, 49 per cent of al-Shabaab's attacks in 2022 occurred in these provinces.

In 2022, Somalia's most devastating terrorist attack occurred when two car bombs placed outside the education ministry building killed at least 120 people in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab justified the attack by accusing the ministry of being responsible for a 'war on minds' that has removed Islam from schools and recruited students into pro-government militias. This was also al-Shabaab's deadliest attack of 2022.

After a prolonged electoral process, former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as Somalia's president in May 2022.³⁴ In a change of counter-terrorism strategy, individuals with previous connections to violent extremism have been appointed to positions of authority.³⁵ Muktar Robow, a co-

Worst attacks



MOGADISHU

Two car bombs killed at least 120 people and wounded 300 outside the education ministry building. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that the ministry was responsible for a 'war on minds' that has removed Islam from schools and recruits students into militias.

founder and former deputy leader of al-Shabaab became Minister for Religious Affairs.³⁶ It remains to be seen what impact this will have on terrorism in Somalia.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Mali

GTI RANK

4

GTI SCORE


8.412

944  DEAD


376  INJURED

272  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



In 2022, Mali recorded its highest number of deaths due to terrorism in the last decade, even as the number of attacks decreased. Despite the country's focus on restoring constitutional order and civilian rule following the coup of May 2021, security responses and strategies have been ineffective in protecting Malians from violent attacks by extremist groups. This has particularly been the case in the country's north, centre and around its capital city Bamako.³⁷


While the number of attacks decreased by 20 per cent, the number of deaths increased by over 50 per cent, resulting in a substantial increase in the lethality of attacks. In 2022, terrorist attacks in Mali killed on average 3.5 people per attack, compared to 1.7 people per attack the previous year. This trend of increasing deaths began in 2015, with the declaration of a state of emergency following the Radisson Blu Hotel attack in Bamako.

In 2022, both the military and civilians were targeted in the majority of terrorist attacks, with 98 attacks against each group. Civilians accounted for over 64 per cent of deaths or 607 deaths, followed by the military at 20 per cent or 188 deaths. The deadliest attack was an armed assault on several villages in the Mopti region, resulting in the deaths of 110 civilians. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attack, it is suspected that jihadists operating in the region were responsible.³⁸

The tri-border area, encompassing Mali's border with Niger and Burkina Faso, continues to be the most-plagued area for terrorist attacks, representing over 60 per cent of Mali's attacks in 2022. The Gao region, which shares a border with both Niger and Burkina Faso, recorded 494 deaths in 2022, over triple the fatalities in the region in 2021.

In 2022, IS overtook JNIM as the most prominent group in Mali, with deaths attributed to IS being twice as high as JNIM deaths. 2022 marked the highest number of IS attacks and deaths in Mali ever, with 19 attacks and 243 deaths. However, 61 per cent of Mali's total deaths for the year were caused by unknown jihadist groups.

Worst attacks



Civilians comprised over half of IS' total deaths in Mali in 2022, and were the target of 63 per cent of attacks attributed to the group. Military personnel were the target of only five IS attacks in Mali in 2022, with these attacks resulting in seven deaths. Armed assaults involving firearms were the favoured tactic of IS in Mali in 2022, with this accounting for almost 90 per cent of IS attacks in the country. IS used explosives in only two attacks in the country in 2022, resulting in three deaths.




The failure of Operation Barkhane to curb Islamic insurgency, continued political instability in the aftermath of the May 2021 coup, the departure of French military forces, and engagement from Russia's Wagner Group have all had a severe impact on stability and security in Mali in 2022. The deployment of Russian security forces in Mali, in particular, has strained relations with its foreign partners including the US, France, Germany, the UK, and the wider European Union.³⁹ Should Russian forces withdraw from Mali, in order to bolster their efforts in Ukraine, it could have unforeseen impacts on the country's counter-terrorism efforts; especially with Mali distancing itself from other countries that had provided foreign aid in the past.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Syria

GTI RANK
5


GTI SCORE
8.161

447  DEAD
451  INJURED
197  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



Terrorism in Syria continues to decline, following the tenth anniversary of the Syrian conflict in 2021. In 2022, 447 terror-related deaths were recorded in Syria, a decrease of ten per cent from the previous year. The number of terrorism incidents mirrored this trend on a larger scale, almost halving during this period to 197 attacks, the lowest level in three years.


The military remains the most common target for attacks as well as the group with the most casualties, followed by civilians. Syria's deadliest terror attack of 2022 was the ten-day attack on Al-Sina prison, during which IS attempted to free thousands of their members who were being held in the prison. At least 154 Syrian Democratic Forces personnel were killed and 120 more wounded, with an additional 350 assailants killed, during the attack which IS claimed responsibility for.^{40,41} It was the second deadliest attack attributed to any terror group in 2022.

The northern and eastern border provinces were the areas most affected by terrorism in 2022, with 47 per cent of attacks occurring in the Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo governorates. This is a decrease of 41 per cent from the previous year. Deir ez-Zor retained its position as the governorate with the highest number of terror attacks with 65 attacks, followed by Daar governorate at 31 attacks. However, the Al Hasakah governorate recorded the highest number of fatalities at 184 deaths, 41 per cent of Syria's total for the year.

IS remained the deadliest terrorist group in Syria for the ninth consecutive year, accounting for 77 per cent of total deaths and 52 per cent of incidents. While attacks by IS fell by eight per cent, deaths rose by 42 per cent when compared to the year prior, indicating an increase in the lethality of IS attacks. In 2022, IS attacks killed on average 3.3 persons per attack, compared to 2.2 persons in 2021. IS continues to shift its focus from targeting civilians to military personnel, who comprised almost 86 per cent of IS' casualties in 2022. However, 40 per cent of all attacks in Syria were not attributed to an organisation.

Despite the majority of IS attacks being committed using firearms, IS' explosive attacks were far more lethal, killing on

Worst attacks



AL-HASAKAH GOVERNORATE

At least 200 assailants attacked Al-Sina prison, driving two explosive-ladened truck bombs into the outside wall of the prison before gunmen then stormed the facility as a riot took place inside. The attack lasted ten days until the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced they had regained control of the prison. At least 154 SDF members were killed. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack.

average 3.6 people per attack. Armed attacks accounted for 44 per cent of deaths caused by IS in 2022, down from 74 per cent the year prior. There was one suicide bombing by IS in 2022, the first in Syria in two years, which killed four civilians in the Daraa governorate.

Despite US and Syrian military forces reclaiming the final territorial stronghold of IS in Syria in 2019, IS has maintained a low-level insurgency. The attack on Al-Sina prison took the international coalition and Syrian Defence Forces by surprise, demonstrating that IS is still a substantial threat to peacefulness.⁴² With IS continuing to exploit tensions from counter-insurgency strategies led by Western countries, the success of counter-terrorism measures will depend on the capacity of security forces to manage its continued threat.⁴³

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Pakistan

GTI RANK
6


GTI SCORE
8.160

643 DEAD
802 INJURED
298 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



The impact of terrorism increased significantly in Pakistan, with the number of deaths from terrorist attacks doubling compared to 2021. This is the third consecutive year where an increase in terrorism deaths has been recorded and the largest year-on-year increase in the last decade. The number of terror-related incidents remained relatively steady, with 206 incidents in 2021 and 298 in 2022, highlighting an increase in lethality to 2.2 people killed per attack on average.


Pakistan's military continued efforts to disarm and eliminate terrorist sleeper cells via Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad; with the military the most common target of attacks, with 55 per cent of all terror-related deaths being military personnel. Terrorism continues to be largely concentrated along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, with 63 per cent of attacks occurring in this area. Overall, deaths in this area amounted to 74 per cent of Pakistan's total terrorism deaths in 2022.

The BLA overtook the Islamic resistance group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the deadliest terrorist group, with BLA accounting for 36 per cent of terror-related deaths in Pakistan in 2022. Overall, terrorism-related deaths by BLA increased almost ninefold between 2021 and 2022, while attacks almost doubled during the same period.

Pakistan's deadliest terrorist attack of 2022 occurred when gunmen bombed and shot at two separate security posts for the Frontier Corps in Balochistan province in February 2022. No official death toll was confirmed, however a statement from the BLA claimed responsibility for the attacks and that they had killed 195 soldiers across both attacks.^{48,49} This was the deadliest terrorist attack globally in 2022.

This year marked a resurgence, after a period of decline, for terror groups that were historically amongst Pakistan's deadliest including IS, ISK and the BLA. Attacks by the BLA rose by 77 per cent, compared with the year prior. ISK recorded 23 incidents and 78 deaths in 2022, almost triple the number of attacks and a sevenfold increase in deaths when compared to the previous year. However, this was from a low base, with nine attacks and ten deaths attributed to ISK in the country in 2021. This marked

Worst attacks



the first time since 2015 that ISK attacks rose above 20 attacks in a single year.

Attacks by ISK occurred along the Afghanistan border with 13 attacks occurring in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, followed by Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa with eight, and Balochistan with two. ISK's deadliest attack in Pakistan in 2022 occurred in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, when a suicide bombing killed at least 56 people in an attack on a Shia Mosque during Friday prayers.⁵⁰

Now that the Taliban are in control of neighbouring Afghanistan, with reports suggesting leaders of terrorist groups such as TTP are using Afghanistan as a safe haven, it is likely that terrorist activity will continue along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border despite counter-terrorism efforts.⁵¹

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Iraq

GTI RANK
7


GTI SCORE
8.139

174  DEAD
339  INJURED
401  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



Iraq recorded 401 terrorist attacks in 2022, the second highest of any country. However, this is a decrease of 54 per cent when compared to the previous year, evidence of the continued improvement that has been occurring in Iraq for some years. The number of deaths from terrorism mirrored this trend, with Iraq recording 174 deaths in 2022, a fall of 68 per cent when compared to the previous year. Overall, deaths from terrorism in Iraq have decreased by over 97 per cent from their peak in 2007.

For the third consecutive year, the military were the target of the majority of Iraq's terrorist attacks and recorded the most casualties of any group, accounting for 61 per cent of all deaths in Iraq in 2022 with 107 personnel killed. The number of attacks against the military, however, fell by 60 per cent when compared to 2021, with the number of military casualties now at their lowest level since 2007. Civilian fatalities are also at their lowest level, falling 81 per cent from 164 in 2021 to 32 in 2022.


Attacks were recorded in 16 of Iraq's 19 governorates in 2022, with the north-eastern governorate the most affected. The governances of Diyala, Sala ad-Din and Kirkuk made up 51 per cent of all terrorist attacks in the country.

Terrorist activity in Iraq continues to be dominated by IS, with the group accounting for 76 per cent of all deaths in 2022. However, IS attacks and deaths have more than halved in the last year, with deaths from IS falling by 71 per cent to the lowest level since 2007. IS were likely responsible for the deadliest attack in Iraq in 2022, when gunmen killed 11 soldiers in a strike on army headquarters in January 2022. No group claimed responsibility, however security forces attributed the attack to IS.⁴⁴

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) were the only other group active in Iraq in 2022. PKK were responsible for 29 attacks in 2022, which resulted in nine deaths. This is an increase in activity but a decrease in deaths, with 23 attacks and 21 deaths recorded in 2021.

Another 189 attacks and 33 deaths in Iraq were not attributed to any organisation.

Worst attacks



DIYALA GOVERNORATE

Gunmen killed eleven soldiers in an attack on army headquarters in Diyala governorate on 21st of January. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but security forces said Islamic State (IS) was responsible.

While IS activities have significantly declined since the Iraqi government declared the military defeat of IS in Iraq in 2017, the group's threat to the security of the region has not disappeared. Though the group remains unable to hold territory, IS continues to wage a low-level insurgency that regularly causes injury and death in remote mountain and desert areas of Iraq.⁴⁵ Instability continues, following demonstrations that resulted in the resignation of the Iraqi government in 2019 and eventual appointment of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as prime minister. Protesters had demanded basic improvements to everyday life, namely improved public services and employment opportunities, which the Iraqi government continues to struggle to deliver.⁴⁶ IS and other militant groups are likely to exploit this instability for their own gain in the years to come.⁴⁷

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Nigeria

GTI RANK
8


GTI SCORE
8.065

385 DEAD
147 INJURED
120 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



The impact of terrorism continues to decline in Nigeria; with total deaths falling by 23 per cent, decreasing from 497 in 2021 to 385 in 2022. The number of terrorist attacks in Nigeria also fell considerably, with 120 incidents recorded in 2022 compared to 214 in 2021. This is the lowest number of terror attacks and deaths since 2011.

The military overtook law enforcement as the most targeted group in 2022. Military personnel were targeted in a quarter of all attacks, followed by civilians at 24 per cent, and law enforcement at 18 per cent. Despite this, half of all terrorism deaths in Nigeria in 2022 were civilians. Civilian deaths increased 78 per cent from 2021 to 196 deaths; while military deaths dropped considerably, falling 74 per cent from 2021 to 58 deaths in 2022.


ISWA continues to be the deadliest terrorist group in Nigeria for the third consecutive year. The group's lethality rate increased for the first time in two years, from just over three deaths per attack in 2021 to 3.7 deaths per attack in 2022. ISWA recorded its lowest number of attacks and deaths since 2020, at 57 attacks and 211 deaths in 2022, a decline of 28 per cent in attacks and 13 per cent for deaths when compared to the previous year. The lethality of ISWA's attacks increased for the first time in two years, from just over three deaths per attack in 2021 to almost 3.6 deaths per attack in 2022.

The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a pro-Biafra secessionist movement based in Southeast Nigeria.⁵² Its aim is to establish an independent state of Biafra. In 2017, the Nigerian government proscribed the group as a terrorist organization.⁵³

In recent years, IPOB has been linked to several attacks, which have been attributed to its paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (IPOB-ESN).⁵⁴ In 2022, IPOB-ESN were suspected of 40 attacks and 57 deaths. This is an increase from the 26 attacks and 34 deaths attributed to the group in the previous year. IPOB has not claimed responsibility for any of these attacks.

Despite the proscription of the group, since its emergence in 2012, IPOB has had a focus carrying out peaceful actions towards achieving its aim of a sovereign state in Nigeria's southeast.⁵⁵ Today, many IPOB members, supporters, and followers continue to work peacefully towards this goal. Boko Haram's attacks almost halved within the last year, while deaths attributed to the group increased slightly from 69 in

Worst attacks



BORNO STATE

Gunmen killed at least 50 civilians after they accused them of informing on their movements to security forces. Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) claimed responsibility, saying it had targeted 'spies'.

2021 to 72 in 2022. This is the lowest number of attacks by the group for over a decade.

Boko Haram's decline has resulted in a substantial improvement in terrorism in Borno State, which experienced a decrease of 12 per cent in terrorism-related deaths when compared with the year prior. Attacks in the state also decreased from 91 to 48 respectively, a decrease of 47 per cent. ISWA is now the most prominent group in Borno State, recording 40 incidents that resulted in 168 deaths in 2022, compared to Boko Haram's six incidents and 63 deaths. The state, however, remains the hardest-hit region in Nigeria for terrorism, accounting for 60 per cent of all terror-related deaths in 2022. The deadliest terror attack of the year occurred in Borno State, when gunmen killed 50 civilians who were accused of informing on the terrorists' movements to security forces. ISWA claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it had targeted 'spies'.⁵⁶

The conflict between ISWA and Boko Haram that culminated in the death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in May 2021, continued into 2022. Severe defeats, mass defections of operatives to ISWA, as well as counter-terrorism efforts by the Nigerian government and foreign military forces, have significantly weakened Boko Haram's impact in Nigeria. As a result, ISWA has become significantly stronger and continues to expand its area of activity in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region.⁵⁷ Activity by terrorist groups such as ISWA is expected to increase in the lead up to, and following, February's presidential elections, as groups exploit tensions caused by the elections.⁵⁸

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Myanmar (Burma)

GTI RANK
9


GTI SCORE
7.977

415 DEAD
349 INJURED
755 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



In 2022, terrorist attacks in Myanmar increased for the second consecutive year, from 714 attacks in 2021 to 755 attacks in 2022. This is the highest level seen in Myanmar in the last two decades.

Terrorism-related deaths increased by 27 per cent in the past year, rising from 326 in 2021 to 415 in 2022. Government and political figures continue to be the group most impacted by terrorism in Myanmar, as the targets of 30 per cent of attacks and comprising 41 per cent of fatalities this year. However, attacks targeting civilians were more lethal than attacks targeting government officials, with the former killing on average one person per attack, compared to the latter which killed 0.7 people per attack in 2022.

Yangon continues to be the epicentre of terrorism in Myanmar, with almost 70 per cent of terrorist attacks and over half of the terrorism-related deaths occurring within Yangon. The Tanintharyi region recorded a fivefold increase in attacks and an eightfold increase in deaths, the largest of any region. The Kachin region recorded the most lethal attacks of all the regions in Myanmar, with a rate of 1.8 deaths per attack, compared with the national rate of 0.6 deaths per attack. There was a small decrease in the use of explosive weapons, which declined four per cent, whilst firearms use increased 33 per cent.

Terror attacks in Myanmar occurred in the context of ongoing civil conflict, following February 2021's military coup and the subsequent rebellion by democratically-elected government officials and ethnic-armed groups. The GTI does not include acts of state repression and violence by state actors and, as such, acts committed by the military junta are not included in the scope of the report. However, experts report evidence of repression and violence especially towards protestors, ethnic minority groups, former government officials and civil society leaders.⁵⁹

Worst attacks



KACHIN STATE

A suicide bomber killed at least 15 officials in an attack on the Kachin State government office in Myitkyina city, Kachin state at around 1815hrs on 26 October. Local media outlets reported that the attacker drove his motorcycle into the compound before detonating the bomb.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Niger

GTI RANK
10


GTI SCORE
7.616

198 DEAD
118 INJURED
54 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2007



Deaths by weapon



Attacks by target



The impact of terrorism fell significantly in Niger in 2022, with both attacks and deaths falling to their lowest levels since 2019. In 2022, Niger recorded 198 deaths from terrorism, a 67 per cent decrease compared to the 595 deaths recorded in 2021. Civilians accounted for 60 per cent of casualties, resulting in Niger becoming the country with the sixth-highest civilian death toll in 2022.


Niger's deadliest attack of 2022 occurred in five villages in the Diffa region, when gunmen killed 21 civilians in an armed attack. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, however Boko Haram and ISWA operate in the region.⁶⁰

The Tillaberi province continues to record the highest number of attacks and deaths, despite deaths falling by more than 68 per cent between 2021 and 2022. Being the closest region to the unstable tri-border area shared with Mali and Burkina Faso, the Tillaberi region has been the hard hit by the Islamic insurgency in the Sahel. Terrorist attacks occurred in five of Niger's eight regions, with Tillaberi recording 44 per cent of the country's terrorist attacks and 60 per cent of its casualties. Deaths in the Diffa region rose by 38 per cent to its highest level in two years; driven by its proximity to Nigeria's epicentre of terrorism, the Borno region, with which it shares a border.

Boko Haram overtook IS as the deadliest terrorist group in Niger in 2022. Attacks by Boko Haram killed 44 people in 2022, compared to 18 in 2021. Boko Haram was responsible for five attacks, all located in the Diffa region. Deaths as a result of Boko Haram attacks accounted for 22 per cent of the total casualties in Niger. The lethality of Boko Haram's attacks in Niger are now at their highest. In 2022 the group executed five attacks with on average 8.8 deaths per attack. This compares with eight attacks in 2021, averaging 2.3 deaths per attack. All of the 44 casualties of Boko Haram attacks in 2022 were civilians.

IS were responsible for 31 deaths in 2022, with 23 per cent attributed to its West African division. Over 70 per cent of the attacks in Niger in 2022 were not claimed by any known terrorist group.

Worst attacks



DIFFA REGION

Gunmen attacked five villages in Diffa commune, Diffa department, Diffa region on the night of 8 March. They killed 11 civilians in Lada, six in Fiego, two in Boula Tembe and two in Ngarwa. No group had claimed the attack at the time of writing, but Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) operate in the region.

Like other countries in the Sahel region, Niger faces a significant threat to its national security from growing Islamic extremist groups. Boko Haram have increased their presence in Niger, having been driven out of Nigeria's Borno State due to its conflict with ISWA.

2

Trends in Terrorism

TRENDS SINCE 2007

Figure 2.1 shows that there have been several distinct phases in terrorist activity over the past fifteen years. In 2007 and 2008, most terrorist activity was concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to the US and its allies’ interventions. This impacted Pakistan, which registered increased terrorist activity between 2008 and 2013. After the events of the Arab Spring, and the emergence of IS, there was a surge in terrorism across the Middle East. This started in 2013, most notably in Syria and Iraq, and concurrently in Nigeria. At the peak in 2015, over 10,000 people were killed in terrorist attacks in a single year. The Sahel region has also experienced a significant increase in the number of terror attacks and fatalities over the past five years.

From 2016, deaths from terrorism started to decrease. Iraq recorded a sharp decline in terrorism from 2017 onwards. Afghanistan meanwhile saw an increase in terrorism between 2016 and 2021, followed by a significant decrease in 2022, after the Taliban seized control of the government. In the last four years, the Sahel has experienced a significant increase in


terrorist activity and deaths, particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali and Somalia. This region is now recording more deaths from terrorism than MENA.

Although, deaths from terrorism have declined in the past five years, the declines were minimal between 2018 and 2021, with the number of deaths remaining consistent. However, within the last year, deaths from terrorism decreased by nine per cent, to the lowest level recorded since before 2017. The most notable shift has been from MENA to the Sahel in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2022, terrorism deaths in the Sahel accounted for 43 per cent of total terrorism deaths globally, compared to just one per cent in 2007. The Sahel is now the epicentre of global terrorism.

Overall, deaths from terrorism have declined by 38 per cent since the peak in 2015, with Iraq and Nigeria recording the largest decreases. Deaths in Nigeria peaked in 2014 at 2,101 deaths before declining in five of the subsequent nine years. After recording 865 deaths in 2020, deaths from terrorism in Nigeria decreased by 43 per cent in 2021 and 35 per cent in 2022. Despite these improvements, Nigeria still faces a significant threat posed by armed extremist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWA.

FIGURE 2.1
Deaths from terrorism, 2007–2022

Total deaths have decreased 38 per cent from their peak in 2015.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Deaths from terrorism in Iraq have fallen significantly since their peak in 2016. Deaths have dropped by 68 per cent since that time, the largest fall recorded by the GTI. The winding down of the Syrian civil war, the collapse of IS, and increased counterterrorism coordination at both the state and international levels, have all played a part in reducing the impact of terrorism globally. Since 2007, two other notable decreases in terrorism deaths were recorded in Afghanistan and Yemen.

As the conflict in Syria subsided, IS and its affiliates have shifted their focus to sub-Saharan Africa and more specifically countries

of the Sahel such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon. The Sahel has become increasingly violent during this period, with deaths increasing by more than 21 times between 2007 and 2022. Burkina Faso, Mali and Nigeria recorded the largest increases of 1,135, 942 and 356 more deaths respectively in 2022 than in 2007. Groups such as IS continue to wage a violent campaign in the region. Terrorism deaths in the Sahel accounted for 43 per cent of total terrorism deaths globally in 2022, compared to just one per cent in 2007. Figure 2.2 shows the shift of terrorism away from MENA and towards the Sahel and, more specifically, the tri-border region between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

FIGURE 2.2

Most significant changes in deaths from terrorism, 2020–2022

Terrorism has shifted from MENA to the Sahel within the last two years.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

"Deaths from terrorism have fallen by over a third since the peak in 2015, with two of the largest decreases occurring in Iraq and Nigeria."

In the West, total terrorism-related deaths peaked in 2016 when 194 people died, while terrorist attacks peaked a year later at 176 incidents. Most of these deaths were caused by Islamic jihadists. Religiously motivated terrorism has subsided significantly in the last five years, while ideologically motivated terrorism has fluctuated. In 2018, the number of both deaths and incidents caused by ideological terrorism was higher than any other form of terrorism in the West. In 2022, there were 15 ideologically motivated attacks, compared with just three religiously motivated attacks.

The number of countries experiencing terrorism-related deaths has remained constant for the last three years, ranging from 43 in 2020 to 42 in 2022. Of the 163 countries included in the analysis almost three quarters, or 121 countries, recorded no deaths from terrorism in 2022. This is the highest number of countries to record no deaths since 2007.


Conflict has been the primary driver of terrorism since 2007.

There were 137,009 terrorism-related deaths between 2007 and 2022. Of these deaths, 97 per cent, or 132,863, occurred in countries involved in conflict. In 2022, the 16 countries most impacted by terrorism were all defined as in conflict.¹ Chile was ranked 17 on the GTI and was the most impacted non-conflict country. Chile experienced 1,170 terror attacks resulting in 20 deaths between 2012 and 2022, with most of the attacks and half of these deaths occurring within the last two years.

Figure 2.4 illustrates the trend in deaths from terrorism by conflict type. In 2022, 98 per cent of terrorism deaths occurred in countries experiencing some level of conflict, down slightly from 99 per cent in 2021. The concentration of terrorism deaths in conflict zones has remained above 95 per cent since 2015. Terror attacks in countries in conflict also tend to be deadlier than those committed outside conflict zones. Attacks in countries in conflict killed almost two people per attack in 2022, compared to 0.3 people per attack outside of conflict zones.

FIGURE 2.3
Distribution of deaths by terrorism, 2007–2022


42 countries recorded at least one death from terrorism in 2022.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.4
Deaths from terrorism by conflict type, 2007–2022

In 2022, 98 per cent of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries currently experiencing conflict.



Source: UCDP; Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Countries with the highest number of battle-related deaths since 2012, including Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen, also have very high levels of terrorism. Conversely, there are several countries with relatively high levels of terrorism that are not currently part of an active conflict within their own borders, such as Benin and Togo. However, none of these countries are ranked higher than 16 on the index.


is also one of many tactics employed by insurgencies and paramilitaries in a civil conflict. For example, terrorist groups like IS and Boko Haram carry out conventional military attacks in the context of their respective conflicts, as well as undertaking extensive terrorist activity.

Countries involved in conflict are more susceptible to terrorism, in part because of the lack of a fully functioning state. Terrorism

Figure 2.6 shows a correlation between the impact of terrorism and state violence against civilians. Countries with high levels of civilian victimisation are often in a state of civil war and experiencing high rates of terrorism.

FIGURE 2.5
Lethality rate, conflict and non-conflict countries, 2007–2022


Terrorist attacks in conflict countries are deadlier on average than attacks in non-conflict countries.



Source: UCDP; Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.6
GTI scores versus frequency of violence against civilians, 2022

Countries with high rates of terrorism are more likely to experience high levels of civilian victimisation.



Source: ACLED; IEP calculations

BOX 2.1

Definition of the West

This sub-section looks at terrorism in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania, using the term ‘the West’ as a shorthand for this group of countries. The term ‘the West’ is contested and has strong political and emotional connotations, so it is important to make clear how this term is defined in the 2023 GTI.

While there is no one fixed definition of the West, IEP’s definition of the West encompasses the following countries:

Australia	Denmark	Iceland	New Zealand	Sweden
Austria	Finland	Ireland	Norway	Switzerland
Belgium	France	Italy	Portugal	United Kingdom
Canada	Germany	Netherlands	Spain	


TRENDS IN THE WEST

IEP groups terrorist organisations and ideologies into three broad categories: ideological, nationalist/separatist, and religiously motivated terrorism. For example, far-right terrorism is classified as a form of ideological terrorism. There are also organisations that fall outside of this categorisation, such as environmental and animal rights-related terrorism, although they could be classified as political as they ultimately have a political aim. While there can be overlap between these categories, the vast majority of terrorist groups have a primary purpose and self-understanding that fits into at least one of these three groups. However, there are also attacks that occur where the motivation is unclear.

Figure 2.7 depicts terror attacks in the West by motivation since 2007. Terrorism in the West represents only a small fraction of total terrorism in the world. Between 2007 and 2022 there were 137,009 deaths from terrorism globally. Of these, 885 occurred in the West, or just 0.65 per cent of the total. However, terrorism in the West is notable because it occurs almost entirely outside the context of an *ongoing conflict* or war. Outside of the West, 98 per cent of all deaths from terrorism took place in countries involved in an *ongoing conflict* in 2022.

FIGURE 2.7
Terror attacks in the West by motivation, 2007–2022

Since 2015, there have been more ideological terror attacks than religious attacks.




Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Since 2007, 55 per cent of fatalities in the West have occurred from religious attacks. The deadliest religious attack in the West since 2007 was an attack in Paris in November 2015, which resulted in at least 130 fatalities. This was followed by an attack in Nice on Bastille Day of 2016, that killed 87 people. Both attacks were claimed by IS. Ideologically motivated terrorism accounted for 31 per cent of all fatalities over this period, with far-right groups accountable for all 273 of these deaths. Notable attacks include an attack in Norway by a far-right terrorist in 2011 which killed 77 people, as well as the Christchurch Mosque attacks of March 2019 which resulted in 51 deaths.

FIGURE 2.8
Terrorist fatalities in the West by motivation, 2007–2022

Since 2007, over half the fatalities from terrorism have been from religiously motivated groups. This is followed by deaths from ideologically motivated attacks which accounts for 31 per cent.



Source: Dragonfly Terrorism Tracker, IEP calculations

RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

The deadliest form of terrorism in the West over the past decade has been religious terrorism, which has almost exclusively taken the form of radical Islamist terrorism. Islamist terrorist groups, or lone actors inspired by jihadist groups, were responsible for 484 deaths from terrorism in the West since 2007. The most notable surge in Islamist terrorism in the West occurred between 2015 and 2017, with 65 attacks and 402 deaths occurring in this period across 12 countries. This correlates with the rise of IS.

Three attacks were committed by religious groups in the West in 2022, resulting in three fatalities. This represents a slight increase in deaths compared to the previous year, which recorded three attacks and two deaths.

Whilst religiously motivated terrorism has been the deadliest form of terrorism in the West over the past decade, it has not been consistently the most common form. Since 2012, there have been over three times more ideologically motivated attacks than religiously motivated terrorist attacks.


NATIONALIST/SEPARATIST TERRORISM

Prior to 2015, nationalist or separatist terrorism was the most common form of terrorism in the West, after which it was overtaken by religious and ideological terrorism. At the peak of activity in 2017, there were 62 attacks conducted by separatist groups resulting in one death. Deaths attributed to separatist groups peaked in 2009 at six deaths. Separatist groups have not had a death toll higher than three within the last decade. In 2022, eight attacks were attributed to separatist terrorist groups, with no fatalities as a result; a slight increase of one attack more than the year prior.

The UK, Spain and France recorded the highest levels of separatist terrorism in the West, recording 218, 67 and 56

FIGURE 2.9
Far-left and far-right terrorist attacks in the West, 2007–2022

While far-left groups commit more attacks, attacks by far-right groups result in significantly more deaths.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

attacks respectively since 2007. The UK also had the highest overall fatalities as a result of separatist attacks; with ten deaths in this period, compared to seven in Spain and just two in France.

The most active and deadliest separatist group in the West is Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), who have been responsible for 70 attacks and eight deaths since 2007. However, the group's activities reduced significantly following a ceasefire declared in 2010, with only two attacks in the years afterwards. The Irish Republican Army and its splinter groups, who are based in the UK and Ireland, recorded the second highest number of attacks with 62 attacks since 2007. This was followed by Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) in France, who were responsible for 37 attacks.

IDEOLOGICAL TERRORISM

Ideological terrorism continues to be the most prominent and deadliest form of terrorism in the West for the third consecutive year. Ideological terrorism in the West can be broadly divided into two sub-ideologies, far-left terrorism and far-right terrorism. Ideological terrorism has increased steadily over the last decade, with 37 per cent of attacks in the West in 2022 attributed to ideologically motivated groups and individuals. Ideological terrorism experienced a significant decline in 2022, with the number of attacks falling by 60 per cent to 15 attacks. This is the lowest number of ideologically motivated attacks since 2015. However, deaths by ideologically motivated groups have returned to their pre-2021 levels; with 14 deaths recorded in 2022, up from two the year prior. All 14 deaths were attributed to individuals possessing far-right views. The deadliest attack occurred in the US, when a gunman possessing far-right and white supremacist views killed ten civilians at a supermarket in Buffalo, New York.²

Seven countries experienced at least one instance of ideological

terrorism in 2022; being the US, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Belgium and the UK.


While the motivation can be inferred, most attacks driven by a left or right ideology are perpetrated by individuals or groups with no formal affiliation to a recognised organisation. Figure 2.10 shows that of the 399 attacks in the West from far-right and far-left groups, 93 per cent were perpetrated under no formal affiliation. No group claimed responsibility for any ideologically motivated attack in 2022.

Some security agencies, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), have responded to the trend highlighted in Figure 2.10 by moving away from attributing terrorist activities to left-wing or right-wing groups. Instead, they focus on ideologically motivated extremism and religiously motivated extremism. The change in terminology addresses the fact that left-wing and right-wing groups hold similar attitudes, such as scepticism towards government and capitalism. Secondly, the change responds to a growing trend where no group or individual claims responsibility for an act of terrorism, with the focus instead on disruption.

"Ideology continues to be the most prominent motivation for terrorism in the West. There were 15 ideologically motivated attacks, compared with just three religiously motivated attacks."

FIGURE 2.10
Far-left and far-right affiliations

No group has claimed an ideological attack in the West since 2020.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

TERRORISM AND ECOLOGICAL THREATS

Many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, currently face severe ecological changes. These ecological issues are more likely to exist in conflict settings and intersect with terrorism, with climate change acting as a multiplier for these issues.

IEP produces the Ecological Threat Report (ETR), which analyses ecological threats in 228 independent states and territories; assessing threats related to food risk, water risk, rapid population growth and natural disasters. The report provides further insight into conditions affecting conflict and terrorism. The ETR defines a country as facing catastrophic threat if it exceeds one or more of the following thresholds:

- **Food Security:** More than 65 per cent of the country's population could not afford food for their families in the past year.
- **Natural Disasters:** More than 50 lives lost per 100,000 or more than 3,000 displacements per 100,000 people per year, on average, due to natural events since 2016.
- **Population:** More than 70 per cent increase in population predicted by 2050.
- **Water Stress:** More than 20 per cent of the population do not have access to clean drinking water.

The 2022 ETR found that 127 states and territories matched one or more of the aforementioned criteria. Without concerted international action, current levels of ecological degradation will substantially worsen, even without climate change; thereby intensifying a range of social challenges including malnutrition, forced migration and illness. Current conflicts will escalate and multiply as a result, creating further global insecurity. The degradation of resources leads to violence, and violence leads to the degradation of resources.³

The 2022 ETR identified 27 hotspot countries that face catastrophic ecological threats, while also having the lowest

levels of societal resilience. These hotspot countries are clustered in three regions: sub-Saharan Africa, MENA and South Asia. These regions are also the most impacted by terrorism, with six of the most impacted countries from terrorism being amongst the 27 hotspot countries, as shown in Table 2.1.

While the relationship between terrorism and ecological threats has been largely underexplored, it is recognised that a relationship exists between ecological threats, climate change and peacefulness. While ecological threats are not the single cause of terrorism, they are a threat multiplier, able to destabilise a society and create an environment that terrorist groups can exploit and thrive in.⁴ Additionally, the interplay between ecological threats and socio-economic dynamics may lead a country into a vicious cycle of progressively greater adversity. Ecological threats interact and converge with other existing risks, as well as state weaknesses and pressures, a context which can increase the likelihood of fragility or terrorism.⁵

Turmoil that arises after a catastrophe creates or exacerbates vulnerabilities within a state, which terrorist groups might exploit. Pre-existing vulnerabilities, both political and societal, largely determine the extent to which a country can recover from the shock of a natural disaster. Disasters also expose governments to greater scrutiny and can exacerbate pre-existing divisions. As such, a government's ability to provide security and maintain control in disaster-afflicted areas can suffer significantly in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

Food insecurity acts as both a consequence and a driver of instability.⁶ Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest proportion of its population living with catastrophic food insecurity globally, a proportion that is 14 times higher than in the next most affected region of MENA.⁷ Not only does food insecurity have a significant impact on health and livelihoods, it also poses

TABLE 2.1

ETR hotspot countries most impacted by terrorism, 2022

Country	GTI Score	GTI Rank	Total No. of Catastrophic Threats	Catastrophic Threats
Afghanistan	8.822	1	3	Natural Disasters, Population, Water Risk
Somalia	8.463	3	4	Food Security, Natural Disasters, Population, Water Risk
Mali	8.412	4	2	Population, Water Risk
Syria	8.161	5	3	Food Security, Natural Disasters, Population
Iraq	8.139	7	3	Natural Disasters, Population, Water Risk
Nigeria	8.065	8	3	Food Security, Population, Water Risk
Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.872	14	3	Food Security, Population, Water Risk
Chad	6.168	19	4	Food Security, Natural Disasters, Population, Water Risk
Yemen	5.616	22	4	Food Security, Natural Disasters, Population, Water Risk

challenges to political stability and increases the risk of terrorism. Terrorist organisations attempt to channel citizens' grievances against the government into violent action.⁸

Of the 830 million people facing food insecurity globally, 58 per cent live in the 20 countries most affected by terrorism.

Many of the countries most affected by terrorism are also the most vulnerable in terms of the availability of water. The ETR found that countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali and Chad, who all score poorly on the GTI, will face increased water stress by 2040.

As scarcity intensifies, water will become more relevant as a

possible aggravator of terrorism. Water incidents alone, on average, have increased threefold between 2000 and 2022; with water being the focus of terrorism due to its strategic value. Iraq has had the highest number of historical conflicts over water, followed by Somalia, Yemen and Sudan, all of which have faced significant levels of terrorism over the last two decades.

Many recorded instances of violence by non-state groups focus on perceived inequalities associated with water development projects and allocations, in terms of relative or absolute deprivation.¹² Additionally, water infrastructure can be a target for terrorism. For instance, in Iraq in 2003 terrorists bombed the main water pipeline in Baghdad; while in 2017 the Taliban destroyed the Shorabak dam in Kandahar Province in Afghanistan, flooding agricultural lands.¹³ Additionally, weak internal governance prevents the improvement of water management systems.

BOX 2.1

Food insecurity and terrorism in Somalia

The 2022 ETR found that most of Somalia's population faces severe food insecurity. According to the UN Assistance Mission to Somalia, malnutrition rates are among the highest in the world, with the number of children receiving treatment for malnutrition rising by 300 per cent in the first six months of 2022.⁹

The unrelenting drought, internal violence, economic instability and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have contributed to the food security crisis. Somalia is entirely dependent on Ukraine and Russia for wheat imports, with the country importing 70 per cent and 30 per cent of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia respectively.¹⁰ With the poorest communities in Somalia spending over 60 per cent of their income on food, the surge in food prices due to shortages produced by the Ukraine war will threaten the lives of millions of Somalis.¹¹

Somalia is also the country second most impacted within sub-Saharan Africa by terrorism, and the fourth globally. Terrorist groups active in Somalia have the potential to exploit the growing food crisis, with the most prominent group being al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is the most active terrorist group in Somalia, responsible for 85 per cent of terror attacks within the last decade. The group controls more than 20 per cent of the country, with thousands of members governing rural areas, extorting taxes and providing health, educational and judicial services, thereby undermining the authority and legitimacy of the government.

The growing food crisis provides the ideal environment for militant groups, such as al-Shabaab, to provide resources and further legitimise their intervention; undermining state actions, increasing social grievances and mobilising affected individuals to join terrorist organisations.

"Six of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism are also among the 25 countries with the worst ecological threats and lowest resilience in 2022's Ecological Threat Report, highlighting the interdependency between ecological degradation and conflict."

PERCEPTIONS OF WAR AND TERRORISM

An initiative of the Lloyd's Register Foundation, the World Risk Poll is a global survey that includes a measure of the top concerns to respondents in terms of their daily safety. Figure 2.11 displays the regional distribution of those who answered war and terrorism to the question "What is the greatest source of risk to your safety in your daily life?" On average, three percent of people surveyed across the globe indicated that war and terrorism were the greatest source of risk to safety in their daily lives in 2021. It must be noted that this poll was conducted in 2021, prior to the start of the war in Ukraine.

The country with the highest number of respondents to select war and terrorism as the biggest threat to their daily safety was Afghanistan, with 62 per cent, the only country to record a score higher than 50 per cent. Other countries with high scores included Burkina Faso with 30 per cent and Armenia at 29 per cent. These countries were followed by Iraq and Myanmar, both with 15 per cent. Of the 121 countries surveyed by the World Risk Poll, 28 countries had no respondents selecting war and terrorism as the biggest threat to their daily safety. This included Chile and Indonesia, who are among the 25 countries most affected by terrorism. Surprisingly, only seven per cent of Ukrainian respondents selected war and terrorism as the biggest risk to their daily safety just prior to the war in 2021.

On average, 12 per cent of South Asian respondents rated war and terrorism as the top concern to their daily safety, the highest of all regions. In comparison, just 0.28 per cent of Central America and Caribbean respondents perceive war and terrorism as the biggest threat to their daily safety, the lowest of all regions. Six and one per cent of respondents in Russia and

Eurasia and Europe indicated war and terrorism as their top concern respectively.


While North America has the second worst GTI regional score, it has the third lowest level of concern about war and terrorism. It should be noted though that North America consists of only two countries, the US and Canada. Just 0.7 per cent of US respondents selected war and terrorism as the biggest threat to their daily safety.

In 2021, just 0.8 per cent of citizens in Togo perceived war and terrorism to be a major threat to their daily safety. However, Togo had the second highest increase in GTI score within the last year, although this was from a very low base. Conversely, respondents in Germany and Spain recorded significant levels of concern about the impact of war and terrorism on their daily safety, at eight and five per cent respectively, while also recording some of the largest decreases in GTI score between 2021 and 2022.

FIGURE 2.11

Percentage of population by region that ranked war and terrorism as their top concern, 2021

In 2021, 12 per cent of the citizens of countries in South Asia perceived war and terrorism to be the biggest threat to their daily safety, compared to just 0.28 per cent in the Central America and Caribbean region.




Source: World Risk Poll; IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.12

GTI score versus percentage of population that ranked war and terrorism as their top concern

The percentage of people who selected war and terrorism as the biggest risk to their daily safety has a positive correlation of 0.39 with the country's GTI score.



Source: World Risk Poll; Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

The World Risk Poll's data about war and terrorism, and the 2023 GTI scores, have a correlation of 0.39; meaning that higher levels of fear of violence and terrorism are more likely to be reported in countries with the worst GTI scores. Of the ten countries most concerned about war and terrorism, five are among the ten countries most affected by terrorism in 2023, namely Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Myanmar and Mali. Despite having the largest increase in the number of terror-related deaths this year, only three per cent of Pakistani respondents selected war and terrorism as the biggest risk to daily safety. Armenia reported a significant level of concern about war and terrorism, despite recording only one terrorist incident within the last decade. This is likely driven by more of a fear of war and conflict than terrorism, given the survey was conducted in the wake of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, a conflict that remains an ongoing threat to daily safety.¹⁴

The discrepancy between reported fear of terrorism and GTI scores may be due to respondents' fears of other factors which outweigh these concerns, or that war and terrorism only affect a small proportion of the country's population. For example, India has a number of low-level conflicts in some of the border areas of the country, however the vast majority of the population live outside of these areas. Respondents may also be desensitized to violence in their countries, especially younger respondents who have grown up alongside constant turbulence. The World Risk Poll also does not score results from some countries significantly impacted by terrorism, such as Somalia and Syria.

"According to the World Risk Poll, Afghanistan and Burkina Faso are the countries most concerned by war and terrorism, with 62 per cent and 30 per cent of respondents selecting war and terrorism as the greatest threat to their daily safety, respectively."

REGIONAL TRENDS

The impact of terrorism fell in seven of the nine regions in 2022. The largest improvement occurred in North America, with Canada recording zero attacks and deaths for the first time since 2013. South America and South Asia followed, recording falls of 69 per cent and 30 per cent in deaths respectively. Russia and Eurasia recorded no change in their GTI score in the past year. Table 2.2 shows the regions of the world by their average GTI score for 2022, as well as changes in score for the last decade and the previous year.

TABLE 2.2

GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Average Score	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
South Asia	5.280	-0.842	-0.287
North America	4.037	1.433	-0.441
Middle East and North Africa	3.389	-1.094	-0.198
South America	2.608	0.264	-0.305
sub-Saharan Africa	2.603	0.621	0.092
Asia-Pacific	1.833	-0.080	-0.177
Europe	1.401	-0.289	-0.003
Russia and Eurasia	0.875	-2.185	0.000
Central America And Caribbean	0.131	-1.056	-0.069

North America consists of two countries, the US and Canada, with neither country having a high score, however the region is the only region where no countries have a nil score for

terrorism. In terms of attacks and deaths, the North America region had the second and third lowest. In 2022, there were eight terrorist attacks and 11 deaths, all occurring in the US.

South Asia continues to be the most impacted region globally by terrorism, a position it has held since 2007. Similarly, Central America and the Caribbean remained the least impacted region by terrorism in 2022 for the tenth consecutive year.

A total of 33 terrorism deaths have been recorded in the Central America and the Caribbean since 2007, with 24 per cent of those occurring in 2009. The region has not recorded an attack since 2019 and no deaths from terrorism since 2018. However, while the region has recorded the least loss of life from terrorism, it has suffered greatly from other forms of violent conflict, most prominently an increase in homicide associated with organized crime and drug-related violence.


Between 2007 and 2022, the largest number of deaths from terrorism was recorded in the MENA region, at more than 51,500 deaths. South Asia recorded over 39,000 deaths during the same period, with another 35,200 occurring in sub-Saharan Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa had the most lethal terrorist attacks, averaging three people killed per attack respectively. There were more terrorist attacks than total deaths from terrorism in Asia-Pacific, Central America and the Caribbean, Europe, South America, and Russia and Eurasia between 2007 and 2022. Figure 2.13 shows total deaths and attacks for all regions from 2007 to 2022.

FIGURE 2.13

Attacks and deaths from terrorism by region, 2007–2022

The largest number of deaths was recorded in the MENA region, with over 51,500 deaths from terrorism since 2007.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Although MENA has had the highest overall number of deaths from terrorism since 2007, the region has recorded a substantial decline in the last five years. Deaths in MENA have fallen by 32 per cent since 2021, reaching the lowest level since 2007.


More recently, terrorist activity has been concentrated in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, with both regions recording more terrorism deaths than MENA for the last five years. Collectively, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for almost 80 per cent of terrorism deaths in 2022. Figure 2.14 shows the trend in terrorism deaths for these three regions since 2007.

Methods and tactics used by terrorist organisations varied by region. In most regions the weapon used in most attacks was explosives, followed by firearms.

Bombings and explosions were the most common tactic globally. These attacks accounted for 67 per cent of all attacks in MENA since 2007. MENA recorded over 15,500 bombings and explosions between 2007 and 2022, followed by South Asia with 10,556 attacks with explosives as the primary weapon. Sub-Saharan Africa and North America were the only regions where firearms were the most common tactic used, accounting for 52 per cent and 30 per cent of attacks respectively.

FIGURE 2.14
Trend in terrorism deaths by region, 2007–2022


The number of deaths in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia has exceeded those in MENA since 2018.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.15
Type of attack by region, 2007–2022

Explosives and firearm assaults are most the common weapons used in terror attacks in most regions.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Asia-Pacific

TABLE 2.3

Asia-Pacific GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
Myanmar	7.977	9	2.396	0.408
Philippines	6.328	18	-0.884	-0.458
Indonesia	5.502	24	0.267	0.010
Thailand	5.430	26	-2.070	-0.296
New Zealand	3.776	46	3.776	-0.594
Japan	2.398	62	0.715	0.939
Australia	1.830	69	1.830	-0.605
Malaysia	1.357	75	-0.821	-0.504
Vietnam	0.227	89	0.227	-0.180
Cambodia	0	93	-1.956	0
China	0	93	-5.010	-1.861
Laos	0	93	0	0
Mongolia	0	93	0	0
North Korea	0	93	0	0
Papua New Guinea	0	93	0	0
Singapore	0	93	0	0
South Korea	0	93	0	0
Taiwan	0	93	0	-0.227
Timor-Leste	0	93	0	0
Regional Average			-0.080	-0.177

Eight countries in Asia-Pacific improved in 2022, while three deteriorated. This resulted in the impact of terrorism falling in the Asia-Pacific region for the fourth consecutive year. A further eight countries showed no change in score last year. Myanmar, Japan and Indonesia were the only countries in the region to record a deterioration in the impact of terrorism over the past year. Overall, the region improved by nine per cent within the last year, the fifth largest improvement of all the regions in 2022. The average impact of terrorism in the region is now at its lowest level since 2013.

Myanmar was the most impacted country by terrorism in the region for the second consecutive year, recording 755 attacks and 415 deaths in 2022. This is a decline of six per cent in attacks and 27 per cent in deaths when compared to the year prior. Despite remaining the second most impacted country in the region, the Philippines recorded its lowest level of terrorism since the inception of the GTI. It had 20 attacks and 18 deaths occur in 2022, a fall of 68 and 65 per cent respectively when compared to the year prior.

Japan recorded the largest deterioration in GTI score in the region, the country's first such result since 2019. However, this was from a low base, with Japan's only attack and death being the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in July 2022.

Indonesia recorded the lowest number of attacks since 2014, with seven attacks resulting in 25 deaths. This is a fall of 56 per cent in attacks, while deaths rose by one when compared to the year prior. Attacks in Indonesia are now at their most lethal, with an average of 3.6 deaths per attack, compared with 1.5 deaths per attack in 2021.

China recorded the largest improvement in the region in 2022, followed by Australia and New Zealand. China has not recorded a single attack or death in five years. Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, Mongolia, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, South Korea, Taiwan and Timor-Leste have not recorded a terrorist incident since 2017 and hold a score of zero.

Central America and the Caribbean

TABLE 2.4

Central America and the Caribbean GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
Mexico	1.578	72	-1.397	-0.825
Costa Rica	0	93	0	0
Cuba	0	93	0	0
Dominican Republic	0	93	0	0
El Salvador	0	93	-2.564	0
Guatemala	0	93	-3.885	0
Haiti	0	93	0	0
Honduras	0	93	-2.408	0
Jamaica	0	93	-0.291	0
Nicaragua	0	93	-1.058	0
Panama	0	93	-1.058	0
Trinidad and Tobago	0	93	0	0
Regional Average			-1.055	-0.069

Mexico was the only country to record any terrorist activity since 2015, as the poorest performing country in the region since 2007.

No countries deteriorated in the region, with 11 of the 12 countries recording a score of zero on the 2023 GTI meaning that they have not experienced a single terrorist incident in five years.

Over the last decade, seven of the 12 countries in the region recorded an improvement in their GTI score, with the remaining five countries recording no change and no terrorist activity. The Central America and Caribbean region had the third highest average improvement in impact of terrorism over the past decade. However, it did start from a low base.

Mexico recorded an overall improvement in its GTI score over the past year, moving from 60th place in 2021 to 72nd place in 2022. This is the largest improvement that Mexico has seen since 2015 and was driven by Mexico not recording a terror attack since 2019.

Terrorism in Mexico has historically been ideologically

motivated, with criminal activity by cartels not included as terrorism in this report. Violence against politicians and journalists also continues to threaten Mexico, with many assassinations committed. At least 13 journalists were killed within the first eight months of 2022, the highest number the Committee to Protect Journalists has ever documented in Mexico within a single year.¹⁵ Mexico's homicide rates remain amongst the highest in the world, with more than 26,000 Mexicans murdered in the first ten months of 2022, highlighting significant and continuing levels of violence within the nation.¹⁶ While terrorism in Mexico has declined, cartel activity continues to dominate the criminal landscape.¹⁷

The remaining 11 countries in Central America and Caribbean have remained unaffected by terrorism since 2017, even though El Salvador and the Central America region more widely regularly register the highest homicide rates in the world.

El Salvador and Honduras have recorded no terrorist attacks since 2010.

Europe

Nineteen of the 36 countries in Europe recorded improvements in the impact of terrorism over the past year. Europe is the third best performing region, after Russia and Eurasia, and Central America and Caribbean. Four countries deteriorated last year, namely Sweden, Belgium, Norway and Slovakia, while another thirteen countries recorded no change in score. Sixteen European countries have not experienced a single terrorist attack since 2017. Of the 78 attacks in Europe in 2022, only 21 per cent or 16 attacks were claimed by known terrorist groups.

Europe recorded 27 deaths from terrorism in 2022, of which 17 occurred in Türkiye. Türkiye remains the most affected country in Europe, although its score has substantially improved due to a significant reduction in deaths and attacks in the four years prior to 2022. Deaths from terrorism in the country increased from six deaths in 2021 to 17 in 2022, the first increase since 2015, however this was not enough to offset the gains made in the four years prior. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) were responsible for all ten attacks and 17 deaths in Türkiye in 2022.

Greece continues to be the second most affected country in Europe, with the country recording 35 attacks in 2022, a decline of 34 per cent from 53 attacks in 2021. While Greece recorded the most terror attacks in Europe in 2022, it has not had a single terrorism-related death since 2013. No group claimed responsibility for any attack in Greece this year, with all 35 attacks attributed to unknown far-left or anarchist groups. Most terror attacks in Greece in 2022 targeted police and prisons, followed by government and political institutions and figures. Attacks targeting these groups fell by five per cent when compared to the year prior.

France recorded the third highest number of terror attacks in the region in 2022, after Greece and Türkiye. The country also experienced the third highest overall impact of terrorism in Europe. France had its first increase in terror attacks and deaths since 2017, from seven attacks and one death in 2021 to nine attacks and four deaths in 2022. France has recorded at least one terrorist attack every year since 2007. The deadliest attack

TABLE 2.5

Europe GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
Türkiye	5.600	23	-1.787	-0.078
Greece	4.793	31	0.765	-0.098
France	4.419	34	0.060	-0.154
Germany	4.242	35	1.022	-0.503
United Kingdom	3.840	42	-0.729	-0.713
Norway	3.514	49	-2.060	2.407
Italy	3.290	53	0.054	-0.391
Slovakia	2.784	58	2.275	2.784
Belgium	2.763	59	1.936	1.020
Spain	2.712	60	-0.545	-0.145
Austria	2.677	61	1.157	-0.580
Sweden	2.307	64	0.848	0.701
Switzerland	2.205	65	0.685	-0.572
Netherlands	2.120	67	2.120	-0.592
Cyprus	1.392	74	0.566	-0.537
Romania	0.682	84	0.682	-0.376
Lithuania	0.508	86	0.508	-0.318
Ireland	0.291	87	-1.829	-0.217
Denmark	0.158	90	-0.669	-0.133
Kosovo	0.158	90	-3.079	-0.133
Albania	0	93	-0.826	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	93	-1.974	0
Bulgaria	0	93	-4.255	0
Croatia	0	93	0	0
Estonia	0	93	-1.820	0
Hungary	0	93	-0.291	0
Iceland	0.000	93	0	0
Latvia	0	93	0	0
Montenegro	0	93	-0.508	0
Poland	0	93	0	0
Portugal	0	93	0	0
Serbia	0	93	-2.450	0
Slovenia	0	93	0	0
Macedonia (FYR)	0	93	0	-0.158
Czech Republic	0	93	0	-0.291
Finland	0	93	-0.227	-1.006
Regional Average			-0.288	-0.002

in the country in 2022 occurred when a gunman killed three civilians in an attack on a Kurdish cultural centre in Paris. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but local media outlets said the gunman held far-right beliefs and a hatred of migrants.¹⁸ Of the remaining eight attacks in France in 2022, five were committed by the separatist group Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), a further two by unknown far-left groups and the last attack by an unknown jihadist group.

Slovakia recorded its first terror attack in ten years in 2022, driving the significant increase in its GTI score. The attack

occurred when a gunman killed two civilians outside a bar popular with the LGBTQ+ community in Bratislava. Local media reported that the gunman was the son of a former far-right politician, who had published a manifesto expressing homophobic and anti-Semitic views.¹⁹ Norway followed Slovakia with the second largest deterioration in Europe in 2022, recording its first attacks since 2019. Two civilians were killed by a gunman, in an act of Islamist terrorism, outside hospitality venues frequented by LGBTQ+ community members before a Pride parade was due to take place in Oslo.²⁰

Finland recorded the largest improvement in score in 2022, followed by the UK and the Netherlands. Finland has not recorded a terror attack since 2017, while the Netherlands and UK have not had a terrorism death for three years and one year respectively. This is the first year the UK has not had a death from terrorism since 2014.

Middle East and North Africa

TABLE 2.6

Middle East and North Africa GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
Syria	8.161	5	-0.077	-0.100
Iraq	8.139	7	-1.461	-0.385
Egypt	6.632	16	0.827	-0.321
Iran	5.688	21	-0.001	0.544
Yemen	5.616	22	-2.482	-0.270
Israel	5.489	25	-0.220	0.714
Libya	4.730	32	-0.716	-0.393
Palestine	4.611	33	-0.019	-0.125
Algeria	4.083	37	-2.613	-0.343
Tunisia	3.989	40	0.644	-0.468
Lebanon	3.400	52	-1.766	-0.180
Saudi Arabia	2.387	63	-1.204	-0.719
Jordan	2.033	68	-0.508	-0.557
United Arab Emirates	1.241	76	1.241	1.241
Bahrain	0.826	79	-2.995	-1.315
Morocco	0.757	83	-3.271	-0.397
Sudan	0	93	-5.397	-0.890
Kuwait	0	93	-1.357	0
Oman	0	93	-0.508	0
Qatar	0	93	0	0
Regional Average			-1.094	-0.198

MENA recorded an overall improvement of six per cent in its score in 2022; with 14 countries improving, three deteriorating and three recording no change. United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel and Iran were the countries who recorded a deterioration. This is the fifth consecutive year that the region has recorded an improvement.

Since the defeat of IS, MENA's share of the global total of

fatalities has dropped substantially. In 2022, MENA accounted for only 11 per cent of total deaths, behind South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Only ten terrorist groups claimed responsibility for attacks in the region in 2022, with 45 per cent or 315 attacks remaining unclaimed by any known group.

In MENA, the largest improvement in fatalities last year was in Iraq, which recorded 174 terrorism deaths, 366 fewer deaths than in 2021, a decline of 13 per cent. The principal driver of these improvements was the reduction in armed attacks, which fell by 36 per cent. Despite this fall in deaths, Iraq is the second most impacted country in MENA by terrorism and the seventh globally.

Syria overtook Iraq as the most terrorism-impacted country in the region. Terrorism in Syria escalated in 2012, with over 1,000 deaths recorded after the events of the Arab Spring and the emergence of IS. The country subsequently improved until 2018, when 323 terrorism deaths were recorded, before deteriorating again to 2020 when 746 terrorism deaths were recorded. In 2022, terrorist attacks in Syria almost halved, dropping from 354 in 2021 to 197, while terrorism deaths remained relatively static, recording 494 in 2021 to 447 in 2022.

The UAE recorded the largest deterioration in score in MENA this year, recording its first terror attack in seven years. UAE air defences intercepted and destroyed four drones launched by an Iraqi terror group called named Awliya al-Waad al-Haq, or The True Promise Brigades. No one was killed and the group stated they had launched the attack in retaliation for the UAE's policies in both Iraq and Yemen.²¹

Israel and Iran also recorded deteriorations in score, driven by significant increases in terrorism deaths within the last year. Israel recorded 23 attacks and 28 deaths in 2022, an increase from 18 attacks and one death in 2021. This is most attacks and deaths recorded in Israel in three years. Iran recorded seven attacks resulting in 42 deaths this year, compared to just six attacks killing three the year prior. The increase in deaths was driven by an increase in activity by IS, who were responsible for 29 per cent of attacks and 48 per cent of deaths in the country this year.

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Sudan have not recorded any terror attacks since 2018.

North America

TABLE 2.7

North America GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
United States	4.799	30	0.481	-0.220
Canada	3.275	54	2.384	-0.663
Regional Average			1.432	-0.441

North America recorded the largest improvement in GTI score in 2022, with the region's score falling by ten per cent within the last year. This was driven by Canada recording no attacks or

deaths for the first time since 2013. Deaths from terrorism rose slightly in the US, from seven deaths in 2021 to 11 deaths in 2022. Attacks remained static, with eight attacks recorded for the second consecutive year. Overall, the lethality rate of attacks in North America rose from 0.9 deaths per attack in 2021 to 1.4 deaths per attack in 2022, the highest level since 2018.

This year saw a reversal of the downward trend in terrorism in the US, albeit by a small margin, from seven attacks and three deaths in 2021 to eight attacks and 11 deaths in 2022. This is the highest death toll in the country in three years. The deadliest attack in the US in 2022 occurred when a gunman killed ten civilians at a supermarket in Buffalo, New York. The gunman stated in his manifesto that he was targeting the Black community, revealing his white supremacist views. Authorities declared the incident a racially motivated, domestic terror attack as a result.²²

Over the past decade in the US there has been a shift away from religiously motivated terrorism towards ideologically motivated terrorism. Since 2007, there have been 60 attacks in the US which IEP attributes to ideologically motivated groups and individuals, compared to 14 attacks attributed to religiously motivated groups. The shift from religious to ideological terrorism has grown since 2017. This has also been mirrored by a shift away from terrorism affiliated with specific groups, towards individuals and groups driven by a specific ideology but who are not formally affiliated with an organised group. Of the 119 attacks recorded between 2007 and 2022, just 15 were affiliated with a specific terrorist group.

Russia and Eurasia

TABLE 2.8

Russia and Eurasia GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
Russia	3.799	45	-3.691	-0.419
Tajikistan	3.438	50	-0.855	-0.544
Uzbekistan	1.731	70	-0.110	1.731
Ukraine	1.535	73	-2.255	-0.766
Armenia	0	93	-0.158	0
Azerbaijan	0	93	-2.408	0
Belarus	0	93	-4.567	0
Georgia	0	93	-4.277	0
Kazakhstan	0	93	-3.956	0
Kyrgyz Republic	0	93	-2.008	0
Moldova	0	93	-1.938	0
Turkmenistan	0	93	0	0
Regional Average			-2.185	0

The average GTI score remained static in the Russia and Eurasia region, with three countries recording improvements and only Uzbekistan declining. Overall, the region recorded six terrorist attacks and two deaths in 2022, up from one attack and two deaths in 2021. The number of people killed in terrorist attacks in the region has fallen in four of the past five years, with the

death toll remaining static between 2021 and 2022. Deaths are down 99 per cent from the peak of 323 deaths in 2010. Eight of the 12 countries in the region received scores of zero in 2022, meaning that they have not registered a terrorist attack in the past five years.

Russia remains the country most affected by terrorism in the region, however it has recorded a strong improvement in its score within the last decade and the third largest within the last year. Russia recorded the regions two deaths in 2022, the same number of deaths as the year prior. This is a 99 per cent decline in deaths compared to the peak of terror activity in Russia in 2010, when 327 attacks and 274 deaths were recorded.

Ukraine reported the largest improvement in its GTI score in the region in the past year. Ukraine recorded no terror attacks for the second consecutive year, with the country not registering a death from terrorism since 2018. The GTI does not include acts of warfare and, as such, the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is not included in Ukraine's GTI score. The impact of the war in Ukraine is covered in the Global Peace Index's indicators.

Tajikistan followed Ukraine by recording the second largest improvement in GTI score in the region in 2022, with attacks halving and terrorism deaths falling from ten in 2021 to zero in 2022. The country's only attack in 2022 occurred when at least seven rockets were fired from the Takhar province in Afghanistan across the Panj River into Tajikistan's Khatlon province. ISK claimed responsibility, saying it had targeted Tajik security forces.²³

South America

TABLE 2.9

South America GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
Colombia	6.697	15	-0.689	-0.391
Chile	6.619	17	3.815	0.085
Peru	3.856	41	-1.001	-0.608
Venezuela	3.409	51	1.000	-0.591
Argentina	2.875	57	0.065	0.102
Ecuador	2.198	66	1.907	-0.565
Paraguay	1.605	71	-0.959	-0.544
Uruguay	0.826	79	-0.064	-0.493
Brazil	0.599	85	-0.227	-0.351
Bolivia	0	93	-0.950	0
Guyana	0	93	0	0
Regional Average			0.263	-0.305

There was an overall improvement in the impact of terrorism in South America during the past year, with seven countries improving their score and two recording no change. Chile and Argentina were the only countries in the region to deteriorate between 2021 and 2022. Total deaths from terrorism fell by 69

per cent, from 97 in 2021 to 30 in 2022, the lowest yearly death toll in the region for at least the last decade. However, the overall level of terrorism remains much higher than a decade ago with Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile and Argentina increasing their levels of terrorism in 2022 compared to 2012. In total there have been 1,919 deaths from terrorism in South America since 2007, the sixth lowest total of any region.

Colombia has the highest impact of terrorism in the region, a position it has held for the past decade, despite a minor improvement between 2012 and 2022. Deaths from terrorism declined from 78 in 2021 to 21 in 2022, with the number of incidents also declining from 75 to 45. Of the deaths recorded in 2022, 16 were attributed to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with the National Liberation Army (ELN) responsible for the remaining five deaths. However, the ELN were responsible for more incidents than the FARC, launching 62 per cent of attacks in 2022.

Terror attacks and deaths in Columbia are at their lowest level since 2008. The peace agreement signed in late 2016 between the government and FARC reduced terrorist attacks significantly, with only seven FARC attacks recorded that year. Attacks by the group have since increased every year until 2019, when FARC committed 140 terrorist attacks in Columbia. Break-away elements from FARC and ELN were not satisfied with the peace accord and refused to lay down their arms. ELN and FARC dissidents agreed to a temporary truce in December 2022, as they conduct peace negotiations in Venezuela.²⁴

Peru recorded the largest improvement in the region in 2022, recording no deaths or attacks for the second time since 2007. After recording no attacks in 2020, one attack occurred in the country in 2021. In this attack Shining Path gunmen targeted two bars, killing 16 civilians, with their motives tied to the upcoming presidential election.²⁵ Tensions eased in 2022, following the election, with Peru's terror attack toll returning to zero. Given the 2023 GTI only covers until 31 December 2022, the impact of the outbreak of violence in January 2023 in Peru will be covered in the next edition of the GTI.²⁶ Venezuela followed Peru as the country with the second largest improvement in the region, recording a 15 per cent improvement to their score in the last year. Like Peru, Venezuela also recorded no deaths or attacks in 2022, for the first year since 2019.

South Asia

Although South Asia recorded an improvement in its GTI score, it recorded the highest average GTI score of any region, a position it has held throughout the last decade. Its average regional GTI score improved for the first time in four years, driven by a decline in terror attacks and deaths in Afghanistan. Despite this, Afghanistan continues to be the most impacted country in the world for terrorism. Pakistan was the only country in the region to record a deterioration in score in 2022, with its score improving by three per cent. Elsewhere in the region, five countries registered an improvement in score and one country, Bhutan, has recorded no activity for the last five years.

In 2022, 20 terror groups were active in the region, with ISK

TABLE 2.10

South Asia GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
Afghanistan	8.822	1	-0.312	-0.308
Pakistan	8.160	6	-0.992	0.308
India	7.175	13	-0.640	-0.259
Sri Lanka	4.839	29	-0.605	-0.598
Nepal	4.134	36	-1.005	-0.578
Bangladesh	3.827	43	-0.627	-0.579
Bhutan	0	93	-1.719	0
Regional Average			-0.843	-0.288

accounting for the most attacks of any group with 138 attacks. ISK were also the deadliest group in the region in 2022, recording 498 deaths. Overall, 39 per cent of attacks and almost a quarter of all deaths were not claimed by any terror group. Sri Lanka recorded the largest improvement in score in the region, with the country recording no attacks or deaths for the second consecutive year. Bangladesh was the second most improved country in regards to the impact of terrorism, followed closely by Nepal, with both countries recording two attacks and no deaths in 2022.

The South Asia region is home to two of the ten countries with the worst GTI scores, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of the seven countries in the region, only Bhutan has a GTI score of zero, meaning that it has not recorded a terrorist attack in the past five years.

Although Afghanistan improved in 2022, it remains the most terrorism-impacted country. In 2022, Afghanistan recorded a 58 per cent decline in terrorism deaths, from 1,499 to 633. Attacks mirrored this trend, falling by 75 per cent to 225 attacks in 2022. This significant decline in attacks and deaths was driven by the Taliban reclaiming control over Afghanistan, following the fall of Kabul in August 2021. The GTI does not include acts of state repression and violence by state actors and, as such, acts committed by the Taliban are no longer included in the scope of the report.

Pakistan remained the second most impacted country in the region in 2022. When compared with the previous year, Pakistan saw the number of attacks increase by 45 per cent to 298 attacks. The number of deaths mirrored this trend with Pakistan recording 643 deaths in 2022, an increase of 351 deaths. This year saw Pakistan overtake Afghanistan as the country with the most terrorist attacks and deaths in South Asia, a position held by the latter since 2017.

Sub-Saharan Africa

The average GTI score deteriorated slightly in sub-Saharan Africa in 2022, making it the only region to deteriorate globally. Of the 21 countries that recorded a deterioration between 2021-2022, seven were in the sub-Saharan region. Nineteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa recorded an improvement in their GTI score in 2022, while 18 countries have not recorded a

terror attack in the last five years. Terror attacks in the region dropped to 1,332, compared to 1,445 in 2021, a decrease of eight per cent. Conversely, deaths rose by eight per cent to 4,023 in 2022, compared to 3,719 the year prior, indicating an increase in the lethality of attacks across the region.

In total, over 35,000 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in the region since 2007.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Benin had the largest increase in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks. Burkina Faso had the largest increase in deaths from terrorism, rising by almost 50 per cent when compared to 2021, with 1,135 terrorism deaths in 2022. This is the highest terrorism death toll recorded in the region. Burkina Faso is also the only country to exceed 1,000 deaths in 2022. Although 87 per cent of deaths and 88 per cent of attacks were attributed to either unknown groups or to unspecified Islamic extremists, it is suspected that these attacks could be the work of either IS or JNIM who were active in the country in 2022. There were ten deaths attributed to IS and 134 attributed to JNIM in 2022. The increase in terrorist activity in Burkina Faso is part of a larger increase across the Sahel region, with similar surges seen in Mali over the past few years.

Djibouti recorded the largest deterioration in GTI score in the region within the last year, after experiencing the country's first attack in eight years. Seven soldiers were killed in an armed attack in October 2022 at an army base. Djibouti's Ministry of Defence stated that the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) were responsible, however the group claimed a splinter group had mounted the attack.²⁷ Benin and Togo also recorded significant deteriorations in their scores in 2022, driven by the spread of jihadist extremist activity from the neighbouring Sahel region. All 17 attacks and 44 deaths that occurred in Benin and Togo in 2022 were attributed to Islamic extremist groups including JNIM.

Somalia remained the country with the second highest GTI score in the region, and ranked as the country with the third worst GTI score in the world in 2022. Deaths in Somalia rose from 661 in 2021 to 755 in 2022, an increase of 14 per cent, and the highest number of deaths in a year since 2018. Al-Shabaab continues to be the most prominent terror group in Somalia, with 97 per cent of deaths resulting from al-Shabaab attacks in 2022. However, this is still considerably lower than during the peak of the group's activity in 2017, when over 1,469 deaths were attributed to them.

Ethiopia was the most improved country in the region in 2022, with the country continuing to record zero terrorism-related deaths for the sixth consecutive year. Al-Shabaab were responsible for two attacks in Ethiopia in 2022, however no deaths were recorded. Nigeria recorded the largest decrease in the number deaths from terrorism in the region in 2022. Deaths fell by almost a quarter, from 497 in 2021 to 385 in 2022, and are now at their lowest level in Nigeria since 2011. This fall in deaths was driven by a marked decrease in deaths attributed to ISWA, with the group being responsible for 57 attacks in 2022, compared to 79 in 2021.

Mozambique's GTI score fell by just two per cent in 2022, after the country recorded the largest fall in deaths in a single year in 2021. Despite this improvement in score, attacks and deaths rose by 50 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively, continuing the trend of increasing terrorist activity established prior to 2021.

TABLE 2.11

Sub-Saharan Africa GTI score, rank and change in score, 2012–2022

Country	Overall Score	Overall Rank	Change 2012-2022	Change 2021-2022
Burkina Faso	8.56	2	8.564	0.283
Somalia	8.46	3	0.499	0.034
Mali	8.41	4	2.916	0.243
Nigeria	8.06	8	-0.034	-0.205
Niger	7.62	10	4.441	-0.242
Cameroon	7.35	11	4.117	-0.120
Mozambique	7.33	12	7.039	-0.153
Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.87	14	1.035	-0.024
Chad	6.17	19	5.109	-0.202
Kenya	6.16	20	-0.526	-0.068
Togo	4.91	27	4.915	3.673
Benin	4.84	28	4.840	1.240
Tanzania	4.06	38	4.065	-0.595
Burundi	4.05	39	-0.685	-0.666
Djibouti	3.80	44	3.800	3.800
Côte d'Ivoire	3.75	47	-0.492	-0.556
Uganda	3.60	48	-1.036	-0.593
Central African Republic	3.19	55	-0.978	1.294
Ethiopia	3.04	56	-1.997	-0.714
Senegal	1.11	77	-1.110	-0.470
Eswatini	1.06	78	0.266	-0.462
Rwanda	0.83	79	-2.853	-0.415
South Africa	0.83	79	0.826	-0.415
Mauritania	0.29	87	-3.076	-0.217
Angola	0.16	90	-2.207	-0.133
Gabon	0	93	0	-0.291
Botswana	0	93	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	93	0	0
Eritrea	0	93	-3.141	0
Ghana	0	93	0	0
Guinea	0	93	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	0.00	93	-2.270	0
Lesotho	0	93	0	0
Liberia	0	93	0	0
Madagascar	0	93	-2.365	0
Malawi	0	93	0	0
Mauritius	0	93	0	0
Namibia	0	93	0	0
Republic of the Congo	0	93	0	0
Sierra Leone	0	93	-2.365	0
South Sudan	0	93	0	0
The Gambia	0	93	0	0
Zambia	0	93	0	0
Zimbabwe	0	93	0	0
Regional Average			0.620	0.092

3

10 years of Global Terrorism Index Terrorism and Peace in MENA (2012–2022)

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the impact of terrorism in the MENA region has declined significantly. As shown in Figure 3.1, at its peak in 2016 MENA accounted for 57 per cent of all deaths from terrorism globally. By 2022 this number had fallen to 12 per cent. This period coincides with the rise and fall of Islamic State (IS).¹ As terrorism has decreased, the tactics and targets used have changed. There has been a significant decline in suicide attacks, but an increase in the use of firearms and an increase in attacks on military and police personnel.


The decline in terrorism in MENA since 2017 has not been associated with the same level of improvement in peacefulness, with the region remaining the least peaceful in the world according to the GPI. In 2022, the region's level of peace was lower than it was a decade earlier, recording a five per cent drop; however, since 2017 there has been a minor improvement

of two per cent. Prolonged conflicts in a number of countries in the region have hindered a stronger improvement, and these also impede the ability to establish foundations of peace. In the past decade every indicator for the *Ongoing Conflict* domain of the GPI deteriorated in MENA. Countries experiencing prolonged conflict suffered indirect losses such as limited government effectiveness, reduced economic resilience and reduced access to public services, which both directly and indirectly affect future peacefulness.

On a more positive note, peace has been improving in the region since 2019, with 14 countries improving their GPI scores compared to only six that deteriorated. Libya, Israel, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia recorded the biggest improvements between 2019 and 2022. The indicators that recorded the biggest improvement were *impact of terrorism*, *deaths from internal conflict* and *intensity of internal conflict*.

FIGURE 3.1
Deaths from terrorism in MENA vs rest of the world, 2012–2022

Over the past 10 years, deaths from terrorism in MENA decreased from 57 per cent of all deaths globally in 2016 to 12 per cent in 2022.




Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

FIGURE 3.2

Indexed trend in MENA in peacefulness (GPI score) and terrorism (GTI score), 2012–2022 (2012=1)

Terrorism in MENA improved since 2012 but peacefulness deteriorated.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

CHANGES IN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM IN MENA, 2012–2022

COUNTRIES

The GTI score for the MENA region has improved in the past decade by 24 per cent. However, the decade was marked by large fluctuations, with terrorism peaking with IS’s ascendancy and falling with the organisation’s decline. Figure 3.3 shows that terrorism in MENA over this period has been concentrated in many countries. In 2012 and 2022, Syria and Iraq were the countries most impacted by terrorism in the region. Nevertheless, Iraq improved over six places on the global GTI ranking and Syria by one.

GROUPS


The three deadliest terrorist groups in the past decade have been IS, Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-SP) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. IS emerged from al-Qaeda in Iraq and capitalised on the growing instability in Iraq and Syria. In 2013, it declared the formation of a caliphate. In 2014, a US-led coalition began targeting IS with airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. In 2015, IS affiliates and supporters carried out more attacks beyond these two countries including in Türkiye, France, Egypt, and the US. By the end of 2017 IS had lost control of 95 per cent of its claimed territory, and by 2019 it lost its last claimed territory.²

While IS activities have significantly declined in the past four years, the group’s threat to the security of the region is still felt.³ In 2022, 42 per cent of terrorist incidents in MENA were carried

FIGURE 3.3

Change in GTI score, 2012–2022

Most countries in MENA saw an improvement in GTI score, including Iraq, Syria and Yemen.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

out by IS, 21 per cent by jihadists, 17 per cent by Shia militia and 20 per cent by other groups. Since losing territory in Iraq and Syria, IS has shifted to covert tactics, operating through secret networks and maintaining an insurgent presence in rural areas.⁴ Beyond Iraq and Syria, IS affiliate groups and supporters across the MENA region remained active in 2022, including in Egypt and Libya.

Military defeats over the past few years have led to the decline of the IS core in Iraq and Syria. In 2022, the leaders of both al-Qaeda and IS were killed. IS leader Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi was killed by US Special Operation Forces in February 2022 in north-western Syria.⁵ Qurayshi was the fourth jihadi leader to die in a US operation in recent years, after Osama bin Laden in 2011 and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in 2019. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in July 2022 in Kabul, where he had been living for several months. The killing of al-Zawahiri has seemingly weakened the organisation's


central leadership and brought uncertainty to its various branches. At the time of his death the group had been gradually moving towards a decentralised structure. As of February 2023, Saif al-Adel has been identified by the U.N. as the new Al-Qaeda leader.⁶

WEAPONS

An increase in deaths from suicide attacks coincided with the rise of IS in the region in 2012. The highest number of suicide attacks occurred in 2014, with 162 incidents. In 2016, suicide bombings led to 1,947 deaths, the highest number in one year. Since the functional end of the claimed IS caliphate in 2017, the number of suicide bombings has been steadily declining. In 2022, MENA recorded only six suicide bombings, which killed eight people.

FIGURE 3.4
Deaths by major terrorist groups, 2012–2022

Islamic State claimed 57 per cent of all terrorism related deaths between 2012 and 2022.




Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Note: Calculations for deaths resulting from terrorist attacks carried out by Particular groups are based on TerrorismTracker data where name of perpetrator group is determined.

FIGURE 3.5
Deaths from suicide attacks , 2012–2022

Deaths from suicide bombings in MENA peaked in 2016.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

As depicted in Figure 3.6, the weapons used in 2012 and 2022 have changed. In 2012, 66 per cent of all attacks utilised explosives; with grenades, missiles, mortars, and rockets being among the most common. Firearms were the second most frequently used weapon in the MENA region, accounting for 31 per cent of all attacks. Incendiary devices and firebombs each accounted for only 0.3 per cent of attacks.


The frequency of weapons used in attacks has shown some minor changes from 2018 onwards. The use of explosives declined from 66 per cent in 2012 to 52 per cent in 2022, while the use of firearms increased from 31 per cent to 43 per cent. Terrorists in 2022 also utilised more knives and other offensive objects, with their usage rising from 0.3 per cent in 2012 to three per cent in 2022.

TARGETS

As shown in Figure 3.7, the targets of terrorist attacks have changed between 2012 and 2022 in the MENA region. In 2012, 30 per cent of all attacks targeted civilians, but this has declined to 17 per cent in 2022. On the other hand, the number of attacks targeting military and police increased from 45 per cent in 2012 to 64 per cent in 2022. This could be due to the overall weakening of groups; they are living within communities and need to strategically keep parts of the population on side. Focusing attacks on government or military targets allows for more strategic use of limited resources, and potentially builds legitimacy for the group within the civilian population.

FIGURE 3.6
Trends in weapons used, 2012 and 2022


Explosive attacks in MENA decreased, while armed attacks increased.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

FIGURE 3.7
Targets of terrorist attacks, 2012 and 2022

Between 2012 and 2022 there was an increase in terrorists attacks targeting military and police.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRORISM AND PEACE

Although the MENA region has seen a decrease in the impact of terrorism in the past decade, especially from 2017 onwards, it has not resulted in greater peace. In fact, the region's

peacefulness, as measured by the GPI and the PPI (see Box 3.1), has declined over the same period, although some improvement has been recorded since 2017.

BOX 3.1

Positive and Negative Peace

There are two common conceptions of peace — Negative Peace, or actual peace, and Positive Peace, the conditions that sustain peace. IEP's definition of Negative Peace is understood as the absence of violence or fear of violence — an intuitive definition which enables us to measure peace more easily.

Measures of Negative Peace are the foundation of the IEP's flagship product, the Global Peace Index.

However, while GPI tells us how peaceful a country is, it does not tell us what or where we should be investing in to strengthen or maintain levels of peace.

This leads us to Positive Peace, derived empirically from the data contained within the Global Peace Index. Positive Peace provides a framework to understand and address the many, complex challenges the world faces.



GLOBAL PEACE INDEX – NEGATIVE PEACE

The GPI ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. The GPI is the world's leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies.

The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per cent of the world's population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources. It measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of societal *Safety and Security*, the extent of *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict*, and the degree of *Militarisation*.

POSITIVE PEACE INDEX – POSITIVE PEACE

Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. The same factors also lead to many other desirable socio-economic outcomes. Higher levels of Positive Peace are statistically linked to greater income growth, better environmental outcomes, higher levels of wellbeing, superior developmental outcomes and stronger resilience. Positive Peace is a gauge of societal resilience, or the ability to shield its citizens from shocks and to promote the recovery of the socio-economic system in their aftermath.

IEP has empirically derived the PPI through analysis of almost 25,000 economic and social progress indicators to determine which ones have statistically significant relationships with peace as measured by the GPI.

The Pillars of Positive Peace

This graphic provides a visual representation of the factors that constitute Positive Peace. All eight factors are highly interconnected and interact in varied and complex ways.



In previous editions of the GTI, IEP has explored the relationship between terrorism and peace by comparing PPI and GPI indicators of OECD and non-OECD countries. Such analysis has shown that the relationships between peace and terrorism are dependent on this context. Table 3.1 shows the correlations between different aspects of peace in these two categories, as well as their calculations for the MENA region.

MENA indicators that correlated with terrorism included *conflict, political terror scale* and *internal peace*. In 2022, MENA remained the least peaceful region in the world for the seventh consecutive year, despite recording improvements in peacefulness since 2019. Over the past decade the region improved in the impact of *violent demonstrations, militarisation, nuclear and heavy weapons*, as well as *free flow of information* and *gender inequality*.

TABLE 3.1

Correlations with terrorism in OECD countries and the rest of the world

Political terror and intensity of internal conflict is correlated with terrorism in both OECD countries and the rest of the world.

Index	Indicator	OECD	Rest of the world	Change in MENA GPI (2012–2022) PPI (2012–2020)	Percentage change (%)
PPI	Individuals using the Internet	0.34	0.28	Improved	-34.5
GPI	Nuclear and Heavy Weapons	0.47	0.21	Improved	-19.5
GPI	UN Peacekeeping Funding	0.39	0.06	Improved	-16.3
GPI	Violent Demonstrations	0.37	0.40	Improved	-15.7
PPI	Gender Inequality	0.34	0.32	Improved	-11.1
PPI	Free Flow of Information	0.39	0.28	Improved	-9.3
GPI	GPI Militarisation domain	0.53	0.24	Improved	-3
PPI	Acceptance of the Rights of Others	0.49	0.43	Improved	-1.9
GPI	PPI Neighbouring Countries Relations domain	-0.06	0.32	Improved	-0.9
PPI	Law to support equal treatment of population segments	0.40	0.27	-	0
PPI	PPI Overall Score	0.27	0.35	-	0
PPI	Youth not in employment, education or training (NEET)	0.62	0.18	Deteriorated	0.1
PPI	External Intervention	0.10	0.31	Deteriorated	0.5
PPI	Equitable Distribution of Resources	0.38	0.30	Deteriorated	1.2
PPI	PPI – Attitudes domain	0.45	0.40	Deteriorated	1.3
PPI	PPI High Levels of Human Capital pillar	0.31	0.22	Deteriorated	1.4
PPI	PPI Institutions domain	0.10	0.30	Deteriorated	1.9
GPI	GPI Safety & Security	0.54	0.45	Deteriorated	2
PPI	PPI Low Levels of Corruption pillar	0.20	0.34	Deteriorated	2.2
PPI	Exclusion by socio-economic group	0.50	0.23	Deteriorated	2.3
PPI	Group grievance	0.35	0.50	Deteriorated	2.4
PPI	Access to public Services	0.35	0.32	Deteriorated	2.5
PPI	Freedom of the Press	0.42	0.16	Deteriorated	2.8
PPI	Rule of law	0.18	0.30	Deteriorated	2.9
PPI	Quality of information	0.33	0.13	Deteriorated	3.9
PPI	Factionalised elites	0.32	0.38	Deteriorated	4.1
GPI	Intensity of Internal Conflict	0.47	0.55	Deteriorated	4.5
GPI	Violent Crime	0.44	0.27	Deteriorated	4.7
GPI	GPI - Internal Peace domain	0.52	0.61	Deteriorated	5.1
PPI	Equality of opportunity	0.40	0.20	Deteriorated	5.2
GPI	Political Instability	0.22	0.35	Deteriorated	5.7
GPI	Access to Small Arms	0.53	0.27	Deteriorated	6.1
GPI	Political Terror Scale	0.55	0.57	Deteriorated	6.2
GPI	Military Expenditure (% GDP)	0.39	0.19	Deteriorated	7.6
GPI	Perceptions of Criminality	0.38	0.04	Deteriorated	12.6
GPI	Ongoing Conflict	0.31	0.68	Deteriorated	16.3
GPI	Deaths from External Conflict	0.40	0.15	Deteriorated	16.9
GPI	Deaths from Internal Conflict	0.29	0.77	Deteriorated	18.7
GPI	Refugees and IDPs	0.37	0.29	Deteriorated	19
GPI	Internal Conflicts Fought	0.21	0.67	Deteriorated	45.1
GPI	External Peace	0.44	0.35	Deteriorated	66.9

Source: IEP

CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL PEACE INDEX IN MENA

Figure 3.8. shows the percentage change of the average score of the 23 indicators in the GPI between 2012 and 2022 for the MENA region. Only nine indicators improved, while 14 deteriorated. The largest improvements in peace in the region occurred in the indicators related to *Militarisation*, such as *nuclear and heavy weapons*, *UN peacekeeping funding*, *weapons imports*, *terrorism impact* and *violent demonstrations*.

The rise in violent conflict in the region was preceded by a wave of *violent demonstrations* in the 2010s, including the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. In MENA, eight countries recorded a deterioration in their *violent demonstrations* scores with the onset of the Arab Spring but returned to previous average levels by 2013 and 2014. Violent demonstrations in Syria, Iraq and Yemen preceded the onset of conflict. These developed into full-scale conflicts which, as of 2022, led to the displacement of 13 million people in Syria⁷ and 6.2 million from Iraq⁸. Concurrently, *political instability*, *deaths from internal conflict*, *people's perceptions of criminality* and *deaths from external conflict* all deteriorated. Ironically, some of the countries with the biggest improvements in *nuclear and heavy weapons* experienced such improvements because they were in open conflict and the fighting depleted their stockpiles. This was the


case in Syria and Libya. This also applied to countries suffering from financial stress, as it was difficult for them to purchase new weapons, such as in Egypt and Iran.

The increase of conflict in the MENA region over the last decade is significant. There is a strong link between conflict and terrorism because as the intensity of the conflict increases, violence against both the police and military becomes more acceptable, as is violence against civilians who are perceived to be associated with the enemy. Other than a higher intensity of general violence, there are also larger concentrations of weapons which are outside the control of the government, a lack of state control over the territory and perceived grievances. Countries involved in conflict are more susceptible to terrorism, in part because of the lack of a fully functioning state. Terrorism is also one of the many tactics employed by insurgencies and paramilitaries in a civil conflict. Figure 3.9 shows that 80 per cent of all terrorist attacks occur within 50 kilometres of a conflict.

In 2022, the MENA region remained the least peaceful region in the world for the seventh consecutive year, despite improvements since 2019. The *intensity of internal conflict* in the region showed a marginal improvement of one per cent when compared to 2021. Despite this overall trend, there were still high levels of conflict in some parts of the region

FIGURE 3.8
Percentage change by GPI indicator, MENA, 2021–2022

External and internal conflict indicators have deteriorated the most since 2012.




Source: IEP
 Note: A negative change is an improvement in GPI.

FIGURE 3.9

Proximity of terrorist attacks from armed conflict

Eighty per cent of terrorist incidents occur within 50 km of violent conflict.



Source: Dargongfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations

particularly in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iran, where the conflict recorded its maximum level with a score of five.

As shown in Table 3.2, Yemen, Syria and Libya drove the regional deterioration in peacefulness over the past decade.

CHANGES IN THE POSITIVE PEACE INDEX IN MENA

Figure 3.10 shows percentage changes in PPI indicators in the MENA region. Positive Peace can be used as a predictor of future improvements or deteriorations in peace many years in advance, thereby giving the international community forewarnings and time to act. Through the modelling of the relationship between the PPI and the actual peace of a country, as measured through the GPI, it is possible to predict future large declines in peace.

MENA's regional average PPI score remained unchanged between 2012 and 2020. However, significant alterations were observed in many Positive Peace indicators. Of the indicators, 12 improved between 2012 and 2020, with the most notable being *individuals' access to the internet*, which improved by 35 per cent. This was followed by a ten per cent improvement in the *free flow of information*, and an 11 per cent improvement in *gender inequality*. Despite these advances, the region experienced negative trends in 20 other indicators, including *government effectiveness*, *factionalised elites*, *regulatory quality*, *GDP per capita*, *rule of law*, and *sound business environment*.

The effects of war on Positive Peace are evident. Although 15 countries improved and only five deteriorated, the falls were so significant they cancelled the improvements in the other countries. These five countries were mainly responsible for the deterioration in the 20 indicators that deteriorated.

The largest deteriorations in PPI occurred in countries suffering from conflict, which were Libya, Yemen and Syria.

TABLE 3.2

MENA, change in GPI indicators, 2012 to 2022

Seven countries in MENA recorded improvements in GPI since 2012. Syria and Yemen recorded the largest deteriorations.

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Change in Score	Overall Rank
20	Yemen	3.394	0.785	162
19	Syria	3.356	0.722	161
16	Libya	2.93	0.463	151
4	United Arab Emirates	1.865	0.232	60
14	Lebanon	2.615	0.221	138
2	Kuwait	1.739	0.128	39
15	Iran	2.687	0.123	141
18	Iraq	3.157	0.072	157
11	Egypt	2.342	0.04	126
8	Bahrain	2.085	0.017	99
10	Saudi Arabia	2.288	0.014	119
5	Oman	1.889	0.001	64
1	Qatar	1.533	-0.001	23
7	Tunisia	1.996	-0.04	85
3	Jordan	1.849	-0.075	57
6	Morocco	1.969	-0.102	74
17	Sudan	3.007	-0.11	154
13	Israel	2.576	-0.185	134
9	Algeria	2.146	-0.253	109
12	Palestine	2.552		133
Regional Average		2.399	0.108	

Source: IEP


Note: A negative change is an improvement in GPI.

"Despite the decrease in terrorism, MENA remains the least peaceful region in the world, according to the 2022 Global Peace Index (GPI). This trend is driven by prolonged conflicts in the region, affecting the countries' ability to establish the foundations for Positive Peace."

FIGURE 3.10

Percentage change by PPI indicator, 2012–2022

MENA improved in 12 PPI indicators and deteriorated in 20. One indicator did not record any change.



Source: IEP
 Note: A negative change is an improvement in PPI.

As the war in Syria intensified, Positive Peace deteriorated markedly between 2012 and 2017, before improving slightly to 2022. Trends in Positive Peace in Syria within the last decade are mostly driven by deteriorations in the *equality of opportunity* indicator which has deteriorated by 25 per cent, followed by a 23 per cent fall the *rule of law* indicator. The Syrian civil war devastated the physical and economic infrastructure of the country. Social resilience was severely impacted, with 6.8 million Syrians having left the country and another 6.7 million displaced within Syria. Despite this, there have also been some positive developments in the scores for some of the PPI indicators. For example, *access to internet* has improved in Syria by 11 per cent since 2012, while *freedom of the press* improved by seven per cent, although off a very low base.

Positive Peace has also deteriorated in Yemen over the past decade. Yemen has consistently ranked among the countries with the lowest PPI scores globally; however, the civil war has caused it to deteriorate further. The country has been split by a north-south divide that led to a civil war in 1994, and then subsequently to another armed conflict between the government and Houthi rebels in 2009. This escalated to a full civil war in 2014, which became internationalised with the intervention of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2015. The *ongoing conflict* and *political instability* have caused widespread displacement and food insecurity, and have hindered the country's ability to address its socio-

economic challenges. Yemen's PPI has deteriorated by seven per cent since 2012. Yemen has also seen deterioration in the *Free Flow of Information* domain, where the *quality of information* indicator recorded a 58 per cent deterioration. The *regulatory quality* indicator saw a 27 per cent deterioration, while the *equality of opportunity* indicator deteriorated by a 25 per cent.

In April 2022, the conflict in Yemen saw a positive development when Saudi and Houthi forces agreed to a truce that lasted several months. While the truce did not hold and there were renewed attacks by Houthi forces on energy infrastructure, the feared resumption of full-scale war has not transpired at the time of writing. The UN peace process remains stalled, while back-channel negotiations between the parties on a new truce appear more promising.

Between 2012 and 2020, the scores for all three Positive Peace domains deteriorated for Libya, as did all eight pillars. The country recorded a deterioration of 12 per cent in its Positive Peace score between 2012 and 2020. The indicators with the largest deteriorations were *government openness and transparency*, deteriorating by 67 per cent since 2012, and *freedom of the press* by 35 per cent. This was brought about by the civil war which has effectively seen the country controlled by militias with competing interests, after the fall of the government of Muammar Gaddafi. In 2020, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the combatants, although

TABLE 3.3

MENA, change in PPI indicators, 2012 to 2020

Seven countries in MENA recorded improvements in GPI since 2012. Syria and Yemen recorded the largest deteriorations.

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Change in Score	Change in Score (%)	Overall Rank
16	Libya	4.097	0.421	11.5	152
20	Yemen	4.542	0.309	7.3	161
19	Syria	4.304	0.245	6	157
12	Lebanon	3.554	0.157	4.6	105
10	Jordan	3.189	0.047	1.5	83
7	Bahrain	3.106	-0.004	-0.1	72
5	Tunisia	2.865	-0.01	-0.3	54
13	Palestine	3.556	-0.016	-0.4	106
17	Iraq	4.103	-0.035	-0.8	154
4	Qatar	2.693	-0.028	-1	49
9	Morocco	3.177	-0.032	-1	80
6	Oman	2.866	-0.046	-1.6	55
11	Algeria	3.386	-0.083	-2.4	96
18	Sudan	4.214	-0.122	-2.8	155
1	Israel	2.234	-0.066	-2.9	34
14	Iran	3.567	-0.12	-3.3	108
15	Egypt	3.596	-0.142	-3.8	114
3	Kuwait	2.658	-0.126	-4.5	46
8	Saudi Arabia	3.158	-0.182	-5.4	79
2	United Arab Emirates	2.297	-0.138	-5.7	37
Regional Average		3.358	0.001		

Source: IEP

Note: A negative change is an improvement in PPI.

peace remains fragile to this day. The future for Libya is uncertain due to deep divides within the ruling class. Chronic instability makes it difficult for governance to improve and social resilience to be strengthened.

Despite the formation of a national unity government in 2021, the political situation in Libya remains tense, with effectively two governments existing in different parts of the country. Violent clashes were recorded in Libya's capital Tripoli as recently as August 2022.⁹

4

The Sahel

SUMMARY

The Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa is facing the effects of increased political instability, amplified geopolitical tensions, and the use of hard counterterrorism measures to deter and destroy the rising threat from Salafi-jihadi groups.

The Sahel region faces many converging and complex social, economic, political and security challenges. These are likely to continue to undermine the conditions necessary for Positive Peace, trapping the Sahel in a cycle of violence and vulnerability.

The inability of several Sahelian governments to provide effective security has encouraged terrorist groups to continue their activities by controlling territory and making the Sahel increasingly more violent. Salafi-jihadis and bandits have looked to exploit socio-economic, political vacuums as well as grievances.

Although the Sahel has seen the steepest increases in terrorism deaths, the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa is also seeing steady increases, with terrorism deaths rising from 472 in 2013 to 1,159 in 2022. The countries with the largest increases in terrorist activity are Mozambique and Somalia, where terrorist

attacks have increased forty-fold in Mozambique and 96 per cent in Somalia since 2013.

Fig 4.1 shows all terrorism deaths from sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorism-related deaths recorded in 2022 in these two countries were 1,135 and 944 in total respectively, producing a combined 53 per cent increase from 2021. Deaths in these two countries alone account for 73 per cent of deaths across the Sahel and 52 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.

BOX 4.1

The Sahel


Definitions of the Sahel vary. In this analysis, the Sahel region denotes the semi-arid region of western and north-central Africa, which is comprised of parts of 10 countries:

- Burkina Faso
- Cameroon
- Chad
- The Gambia
- Guinea
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Senegal

FIGURE 4.1

Deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa 2007–2022

Since 2012, the Sahel has comprised most deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.




Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

FIGURE 4.2

Sahel as a percentage of global terrorism deaths

The Sahel has comprised an increasing amount of terrorism deaths globally over the last ten years.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

Terrorist groups such as IS and JNIM continue violent campaigns in the region, with the Sahel producing 43 per cent of terrorism deaths globally in 2022, compared with just one per cent in 2007. This is despite only representing 22 per cent of incidents in 2022. As Figure 4.2 shows, the Sahel is increasingly representing more terrorism deaths than any other region globally.

"The Sahel has become increasingly more violent over the past 16 years, with terrorism deaths rising by over 2,000 per cent between 2007 and 2022. This increase in violence shows no sign of abating."

TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL: CONTEXT

Terrorism usually occurs as a tactic within a conflict setting, used by groups looking to bring about political change. Several factors have fuelled the current crisis in the Sahel including climate change, poor governance, ethnic polarisation, abuse by state security, pastoral conflict, the growth of transnational Salafi-Islam ideology, conflict over natural resource extraction (particularly gold), and the presence of external actors (like France), have all played a part.


The February Revolution in Libya, which led to the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011, precipitated a chain of events throughout North Africa and the Sahel. Qaddafi's violent removal, after 42 years, empowered the Tuareg separatist movement. Ethnic Tuareg soldiers who had been part of the Libyan army returned to Mali. Salafi-jihadis joined to play an important role in the 2012 Tuareg uprising in Mali, which eventually led this group to capture Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. The Salafi-jihadis were ultimately defeated, and the Islamic Emirate of Azawad split.¹

Failure to properly resolve the conflict in Northern Mali, by addressing its root causes, only increased tensions. It gave rise to political, social and economic problems that spread from the north, causing intercommunal violence in the Mopti and Ségou regions between Dogon and Fulani. This also exacerbated instability in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger increasing intercommunal violence and jihadi activity.

Figure 4.3 shows a significant increase in deaths from conflict across the Sahel from 2011 onwards. This is likely driven by the onset and increasing severity of conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Burkina Faso.

FIGURE 4.3
Sahel conflict deaths

The Sahel has seen steadily increasing deaths from conflict since 2011, with a severe spike from 2017 onwards.



Source: ACLED

Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had been looking to frame the struggle as part of a broader ideological, theological, political, social, economic and cultural movement. Over the last decade, AQIM reframed its engagement to gain support from elements within the Tuareg, leading it to form ties with groups such as Ansar al-Dine and

al-Murabitoun.² The peak of their activity occurred between 2015 and 2017, after which time terrorism decreased quickly, with no terrorist incidents being reported in the last five years. The decline corresponded with the rise of IS in sub-Saharan Africa as well as ISWA.

The rise of IS in Iraq and Syria, and its intention to have regional hubs, led to the formation of ties with local actors such as Boko Haram. In turn, this led to the emergence of ISWA and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).

Ecological degradation has affected the security environment, forcing people to search for new grazing routes, arable land and water facilities. This has created conflict between pastoralists and farmers, in turn creating general security issues. Conversely, when looking at Northwest Nigeria, the terrain is conducive to support an insurgency, as the forests provide both security but also sources of revenue.³

Two types of terrorist groups have historically operated in the Sahel. Firstly, groups focussed on local issues, who frame their actions through an ethnic-nationalist-religious paradigm such as Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun and the Katiba Macina. However, these groups are no longer active and have been subsumed into the second category of groups, transnational jihadist groups. These groups have official links to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. Across the Sahel, 22,074 people were killed in 6,408 terror attacks between 2007 and 2022.

Over the past decade, the Sahel's terrorism environment has gone through several changes as new groups emerged and others merged as they adapted to local, regional and international counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. These changes have given rise to what has been termed the 'jihadisation of banditry,' as criminal groups look to use religion to defend their criminal actions.⁴ Some of these groups have chosen to align themselves with the global al-Qaeda franchise or the Islamic State franchise, which may also help explain the increase in violence. Most attacks occurred in border regions, where governmental control is generally low and the military tends to operate out of fortified bases.

With its challenging terrain, distinct local practices and porous borders, local leaders in the Sahel have tremendous autonomy. They operate as political entrepreneurs, making calculated decisions as to where to operate, how and against whom. They exhibit greater willingness to negotiate or shift allegiances.⁵ The implications for the security environment are substantial, as the head of a terrorist group may not be theologically wedded to the transnational jihadi networks. This varied operating context raises the prospect of a larger shift in jihadi strategic thinking. Historically, jihadis' commitment to ideological purity weakened their ability to build and hold a state, but this pragmatic shift raises the prospect of sustained, low-intensity conflict that would facilitate a future takeover.⁶

Weak governance is at the core of the persistent inability by successive Malian governments to resolve differences amicably;

and gave rise to the emergence of the Dogon, Fulani and Bambara Militias. Communities were compelled to arm themselves to ensure their safety, as the government could not protect them. Similar developments occurred in Burkina Faso, between the Mossi and the Fulani, leading to several clashes. The most notable example of how events have deteriorated was an incident in January 2019, when a Koglweogo group attacked a Fulani village and killed over 40 people.⁷ Increased intercommunal violence has led to further recruitment by jihadi groups, particularly IS and JNIM.

Many countries in the Sahel region, now at the epicenter of global terrorism, only began to experience terrorism in recent years. Burkina Faso, now placed second on the GTI, only recorded its first terrorist attack in 2015. Chad had not experienced a terrorist attack for five years prior to 2015, however the last five years have resulted in 210 terrorism deaths.

The Sahel is facing some of the most challenging effects of ecological degradation. These include poor food security, lack of adequate water and high population growth, including some of the fastest population growth rates globally. Climate change will act as an amplifier for these existing ecological threats. With dwindling resources and high population growth, migration is not a simple solution for many, as not only must they navigate treacherous terrain but criminal groups, terrorist groups and others looking to capitalise on the vulnerable. Resource competition between pastoralist and farming communities has led to intercommunal violence and ethnic polarisation. A one-degree temperature change has increased the probability of conflict in areas with mixed pastoral and agricultural use by 54 per cent, compared to a 17 per cent increase in non-mixed use areas.⁸

Based on IEP's 2022 Ecological Threat Report, water risk is the most severe catastrophic threat for six countries in the Sahel, followed by food risk for three countries. Rapid population growth is a threat multiplier for all countries in the region. Niger has the highest projected population growth, with growth of 184 per cent predicted by 2050, an increase from 25.1 million people to 65.5 million. The Sahel holds the world's highest concentration of hotspot countries, which are the countries most likely to collapse when exposed to further shocks. Six of the ten countries within the Sahel are classified as "hotspots", meaning they have low levels of resilience and a high or extremely high catastrophic threat score. These countries are Chad, Cameroon, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. Many of these areas are already experiencing armed conflict. Figure 4.4 demonstrates the correlation between high levels of famine risk and terror attacks.


Terrorism and some of the broader intercommunal violence in the region can also be linked to natural resource exploitation, specifically gold. A rich vein of gold spanning much of the Sahel was discovered in 2012 in Sudan. Artisanal gold mining has rapidly expanded across the region in the decade since, especially in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Gold is central to the conflict dynamics in some of these areas, which often lack significant state presence or control. The revenue raised is potentially critical to funding group activities; however, control of the territories where gold is mined and transported is perhaps more crucial, as this control imbues actors with resources which can be used to influence the local population.⁹ From 2018 onwards, attacks in Burkina Faso have increasingly targeted artisanal gold mines and areas around the mines.

Gold is ideal for illicit smuggling, as it is difficult to trace and

FIGURE 4.4

Deaths from terrorism compared to famine risk across the Sahel

Most deaths from terrorism occurred in states and regions ranked as having high famine risk. The black indicates terrorist attacks.




Source: FEWS; Dragonfly TerrorismTracker

FIGURE 4.5

Terror deaths and gold mines

Terrorism deaths in the Sahel are more likely in areas with established gold mines.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; US Geological Survey

highly valuable. From mines in Mali and Burkina Faso, gold can be smuggled into Togo before being exported. With its value potentially in the billions, even a small amount of gold could be highly lucrative to jihadi groups.¹⁰ The junta in Burkina Faso announced the closure of artisanal gold sites in July 2022, partly to restrict jihadist groups access to funds. It is unclear what effect this may have on access to gold mining. Similar attempts in the past have been counterproductive, as jihadist groups have used closures to gain popular support from local communities that depend on the mines.¹¹

TERRORIST STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

The Sahel faces security challenges from ethnic-nationalist insurgent groups, terrorist organisations and criminal enterprises. There have been previous periods of cooperation, collaboration and peace between the groups, especially JNIM and IS, as well as intense fighting. Many smaller groups have amalgamated under one group, and others have coordinated to carry out attacks.

A close look at the actions of key jihadi groups in the region points to varied strategies and tactics based on the group. Studies suggest that al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM uses pastoral populism to form alliances, whereas ISWA employs a more hierarchical system.¹² The pastoral populism model resonated with many Fulanis, as it highlights and exploits Fulani grievances on taxes, corruption, injustice, lack of resources and discrimination.¹³

The ISWA model involves more extreme acts of violence and brutality, including a greater targeting of civilian populations. Under the ISWA model, combatants are given the right to do as they please with the spoils that they get from an attack.¹⁴


Tactically groups in the Sahel prefer different attack methods

than MENA and elsewhere, where use of explosives dominates. In the Sahel, as Figure 4.6 shows, firearms are the primary weapon used in 70 per cent of attacks compared to explosives. This is in line with the general pattern of group formation, with groups often forming from localised militias who then align themselves or franchise with al-Qaeda or Islamic State. This process is also aligned with the spatial dynamics of attacks, whereby these groups predominantly operate in rural areas without significant state control, rather than urban centres where largescale explosive attacks on civilians are more likely.

FIGURE 4.6

Weapons used in terror attacks in Sahel

Firearms are the most used weapon in terror attacks in the Sahel.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

THE KILLING OF LOCAL LEADERS

A pattern seems to be emerging in the Sahel whereby terrorist groups target chiefs, mayors, council members and religious leaders to create a power vacuum in the area they seek to dominate. Such tactics add to political, economic, social and cultural chaos, as these leaders not only administer, manage and oversee many institutions and systems, they coordinate between local, regional and national governments and the people.¹⁵ An additional benefit of this tactic for Islamists is that the resulting power vacuum leads to local power struggles between different actors all vying for supremacy. This leads the government and military to respond with greater force and policies that can deplete local economies.

KINETIC COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES


Since the 2012 Tuareg uprising in Mali, the Sahel has seen an increase in the use of hard kinetic counterterrorism measures as governments, with the support of the international community, have challenged non-state actors. National defence forces and internationally-led engagement, either through Operation Serval or the AU peacekeeping missions (for example the African-led International Support Mission to Mali or AFISMA), have led to the killing of many terrorists including Abdelmalek Droukdel, the former head of AQIM and a member of AQ's "management committee."¹⁶ However, decapitation programmes (i.e. targeted assassinations of group leaders), have created different challenges including internal competition for leadership, and often periods of more intense violence to cement their authority.¹⁷

International forces, and the training given to local security forces, have produced mixed results. It is hard to estimate the

FIGURE 4.7

Terrorist groups and their campaign to promote instability

A tactic of terrorist groups is to foster instability by demanding obedience or killing local leaders creating a power vacuum to fill.



Source: IEP


impact or success of these operations; as the regions where Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali border each other, and counterterrorism efforts were focused, also experienced the most terror attacks, accounting for 81 per cent of all terrorism deaths, across those states in 2022. Figure 4.8 illustrates the levels of terrorism deaths in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger by region.

The exit of French troops and disbanding of Operation Barkhane has left MINUSMA with limited operational capacity, and has given way to Russian intervention in Mali's counterterrorism

FIGURE 4.8

Terror deaths across tri-border regions

Terrorism deaths are concentrated in the regions where Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger border each other.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

operations. This seems to have encouraged a more offensive approach from Malian forces, who are seeking to regain control of territory rather than focus on defending cities and towns.

THE SAHEL IN 2022


The spatial dynamics of terrorism have changed over the last two years in the Sahel. Previously, northeastern Nigeria along with Chad, Cameroon and Niger was the epicentre of terrorist

activity, with ISWA and Boko Haram responsible for most of this.

Since 2020, deaths from terrorism have declined in Nigeria's Borno State and the neighbouring areas of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Meanwhile deaths have rapidly intensified in the tri-border regions of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (also known as Liptako-Gourma), driven by the growth of IS affiliates and JNIM. Between 2012 and 2022 Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger became the epicenter of Sahelian terrorism.

FIGURE 4.9
Terror deaths in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 2012–2022


Terrorism deaths have escalated dramatically in these countries in the past decade to become the epicentre of global terror.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

FIGURE 4.10
Change in deaths from terrorism in the Sahel, 2020–2022

Deaths across the Sahel have increasingly intensified in the tri-border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.



Source: FEWS; Dragonfly TerrorismTracker

Terrorism continued to spread geographically from the Sahel into neighbouring coastal West Africa. The largest increases in terrorism were in Togo and Benin, countries that had been previously unaffected; although the number of terrorism deaths were relatively small when compared to neighbouring countries in the region.

Togo experienced its largest terror attacks since 2007, the first year of tracking terrorism events, in May. Jihadi terrorists, believed to be JNIM, attacked Togolese military posts killing eight soldiers. In July, coordinated attacks on multiple villages in the area bordering Burkina Faso killed at least 15 civilians.¹⁸ As a result of these attacks, Togo recorded the second largest increase in GTI score globally, rising 49 places to rank 27th overall. Benin also suffered its worst recorded year, rising 23 places to 28th overall in the GTI.

This marks the further transnationalisation of terrorism across the Sahel, and beyond to coastal West Africa. Groups like IS and JNIM are also seeking safe havens and new theatres of operations. Many of these new areas are demographically, economically and ecologically similar to regions in Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and elsewhere, from which jihadi groups initially emerged over a decade ago. This trend is not uniform however, as Niger and Nigeria both recorded improvements in their scores. Other Sahelian states such as Mauritania, Senegal and the Gambia continue to experience little-to-no terrorism.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Military coups are on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2020 and 2022 there were 13 coup attempts, seven of which were successful.

Coups are products of systemic failures relating to poor governance, corruption, mismanagement and poverty. Instigators of coups frequently claim that their actions seek to address these structural problems.¹⁹ The consequence of

rampant corruption in government institutions is a failure to provide society with basic services that are fueling internal conflict and making the state vulnerable to outside influences. In Mali, for example, corruption has allowed a patronage system to blossom, and ultimately undermined security and development efforts. The country remains near the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI).²⁰ Lower levels of HDI indicate weaker governance as well as opportunities for terror groups to sow anti-government sentiment and gain support and recruits.

Instability has increased further in Burkina Faso with two coups in 2022. The second coup in October 2022 was triggered by the inability of the first junta to manage the growing crisis caused by terror attacks.²¹ The intersection of political instability and terrorism is not always clear. In some cases, regimes may become stronger through accumulation of power to counter terror groups. In others, regimes unable to effectively protect civilians may be fatally weakened, as in Burkina Faso. The ongoing cycle of political instability, coups, ecological degradation and destabilizing violence augurs poorly for the future of Burkina Faso and counterterrorism more broadly.


COUNTER TERRORISM AND CYCLES OF VIOLENCE

State counterterrorism efforts are needed to tackle violent extremism. However, if heavily securitised or poorly targeted, such efforts can escalate violence further and alienate the affected population. Further, attacks on civilians by state armed forces, pro-government militias or private military contractors can act as a recruitment tool for terrorist groups, deepen local and intercommunal conflicts, or build anti-regime sentiment. Figure 4.12 shows this relationship.

In the Sahel, particularly Mali and Burkina Faso, there has been an increase in government-led attacks resulting in civilian casualties. In 2021, 158 civilians were killed by state or

FIGURE 4.11
Coup's and coup attempts in sub-Saharan Africa, 2010–2022

Coup attempts and successes have surged since 2021 mainly in the Sahel.



Source: Cline Center Coup Event Dataset

paramilitary forces, which increased to 1,058 civilians in 2022.²² This is roughly the same number of people killed in terrorist attacks in Mali. Similar increases in civilian casualties can be seen in deaths caused by terrorist attacks as well, refer to Figure 4.13.

This increase in violence against civilians points to an overall intensification of conflict in Mali. This increase in civilian

deaths could be explained, at least in part, by the withdrawal of French forces as part of Operation Barkhane. As Figure 4.13 shows, the Malian army were responsible for 845 civilian deaths in 2022, a significant increase from 20 civilian deaths in 2021; while IS and JNIM were responsible for 221 deaths, also a significant increase from the 75 terrorism deaths they caused in 2021.²³

FIGURE 4.12
Counter terrorism and cycles of violence

A representation of key correlations within the GTI from the analysis of over 5,000 socio-economic datasets. Arrows depict flows of influence.





FIGURE 4.13
Actors perpetrating violence against civilians in Mali

The Malian Armed forces have perpetrated most of the violence against civilians in 2022.



Source: ACLED; Dragonfly TerrorismTracker

GEOPOLITICS

Since 2012, several security operations have taken place in the Sahel. These include an EU Training Mission, French-led counterterrorism operations (such as Operation Serval, Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Initiative), and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In addition, the G5 Sahel Initiative and other unilateral, security operations (including an increase in private entities) have been brought in to help end the insecurity.

France began to withdraw from Mali in February 2022, as relations between the military junta and France deteriorated, with Operation Barkhane criticised for failing to stem the tide of jihadist insurgency. French forces fully withdrew by August 2022, deploying to neighbouring Niger, before President Emmanuel Macron announced the end of Operation Barkhane in November 2022.²⁵ In January 2023, the junta in Burkina Faso announced that all French troops must leave the country within weeks.²⁶ France remains deployed in Chad and Niger, but only operating in conjunction with national armies.²⁷ The withdrawal of Operation Barkhane also leaves the future of MINUSMA in doubt, with contributing nations withdrawing peacekeepers who had previously worked with and been protected by French soldiers.²⁸ Despite some success in delivering security to urban centers across Mali, both Barkhane and MINUSMA have largely failed to expand their operations to rural areas where jihadi groups now dominate.²⁹

Russian involvement in the Sahel has significantly increased, with the region becoming an important theatre for their rivalry with the West. The Russian government, through their private military contractor the Wagner Group, deployed to Mali in December 2021 and operate alongside Malian forces in counterterrorism operations, Russia is now also Mali's preferred security partner. Wagner troops are also potentially involved in operations against jihadist groups in Burkina Faso.

Across the Sahel there have been shifts in sentiment towards great powers; with the Gallup World Poll showing support for Russia and the US has rapidly increased. Positive sentiment towards Russia has increased 35 per cent in Mali since 2017; with smaller but significant increases across the Sahel, except in Guinea where it dropped by six per cent. Support for the US also increased in all countries in the region, bar Senegal where it dropped five per cent.³⁰

Meanwhile, France is now highly unpopular across many of its former colonies in the Sahel, with 59 per cent of Malians holding negative views about France. Many other former French colonies fighting ongoing insurgencies also hold net negative perceptions, with the exceptions of Niger and Benin. A new wave of anti-colonial populism has surged in West Africa, and has been utilised by military leaders of the juntas in both Mali and Burkina Faso.³¹


There are signs that geopolitical rivalries between France and Russia could hamper efforts to address the terrorism crisis in the Sahel, with counterterrorism cooperation between neighbouring states now subject to divisions between those states supported by Russia or France.³²

CONCLUSION

Within the Sahel, there is a nexus between systemic failures, violent conflict, resource degradation and pervasive insecurity. The countries suffering from the worst ecological degradation are also among the most violent. It is unlikely that the current actions taken by local governments and the international community will be enough to reverse the vicious cycles of conflict, insecurity and resource degradation in the Sahel. It appears the epicenter of Sahelian terror is firmly situated within the conflicts in Mali and Burkina Faso, which continue to worsen, while moving into Benin, Togo and coastal West Africa. Local and regional terrorist actors continue to adapt their

FIGURE 4.14
Changes in the approval of the US and Russia in the Sahel

Changes in approval rates of Russia and the US have significantly improved since 2017.




Source: Gallup

FIGURE 4.15

Sentiment towards former colonial power

Approval of France is net negative across most the Sahel.



Source: Afrobarometer

tactics, looking to exploit political vacuums. Increases in their activities and the lethality of their campaigns suggest groups like JNIM are shifting from terrorism to insurgency. The expansion of activities in Burkina Faso, as well as the spread into Benin and Togo, points towards broadening jihadist and terrorist activity in the Sahel that is likely to further destabilize the region.

Addressing the multiple crises in the region calls for a systemic approach, where key elements within the system are identified and addressed in a systematic manner, to create a better outcome overall. One way to address this insecurity is through the development of Positive Peace; empowering moderate, local leaders to hold political positions, which raises the prospect of working through established institutions to address the needs of the people.



EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

Terrorist Digitalis: Preventing Terrorists from Using Emerging Technologies

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INTRODUCTION:

Terrorists are great believers in technology and have a historical track record of embracing it.¹ Most recently, terror groups have begun employing drones and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Both can be harnessed to respond effectively to multiple security challenges,² but they also hold the potential to unleash a dystopian future envisioned by apocalyptic books and films. This piece outlines the challenges posed by terrorists' use of emerging technologies, in particular drones and AI, and will offer some policy measures to counter this threat.

Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) have been identified as one of the key terrorist threats by the United Nations (UN) Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee. UAS are remotely piloted, pre-programmed, or controlled airborne vehicles. They are also referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or more commonly drones.

First used during World War I and further developed during the Cold War the terror attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent "Global War on Terror"³ greatly increased their use. Within the military, drones are used for surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting support and direct or indirect attacks. From 2001-2002, strikes in Afghanistan³ and Yemen⁴ marked the start of increasingly drone-oriented military operations. Drones are currently the "weapon of choice" for tracking and striking insurgents and terrorists. The current Russia-Ukraine conflict has been described as the "first full-scale drone war"⁵.

Today, state and non-state actors possess the ability to acquire drones and can assemble and operate commercial-off-the-shelf drone technology (COTS). There are 113 states with a military drone programme⁶ and conservative estimates maintain that 65 non-state actors are now able to deploy drones.⁷ The market for civilian mini and micro drones weighing between 200 g to 50 kg has multiplied, by 2024 the drone market could reach nearly USD 43 billion.⁸

THREATS POSED BY UAS

UAS are attractive for terrorists because they are affordable and require minimal training. Terrorists have deployed drones to attack state military assets, diplomatic sites, international trade, energy infrastructure, and civilian centres. State sponsorship of terrorist groups has also helped increase the number of drone attacks.⁹

Drone strikes are being deployed by armed non-state actors for reconnaissance, lethal attacks and targeted assassinations, within and outside zones of armed conflict, with devastating humanitarian consequences for affected civilian populations.¹⁰ While high-technology military armed drones still remain largely inaccessible to non-state actors (e.g. MQ-9 Reaper, RQ Global Hawk), the possibility to weaponize civilian drone technology provides terrorists with some limited-air-based military capacity.¹¹

DEPLOYMENT AND ACCESS TO UAVS

Weaponized UAS are increasing in range and precision. Rogue actors can strike targets further away. Drones can travel up to 1,500 km, ideal for attacks on military targets deep within state territory. Also, civilian infrastructure, located far from conflict zones, is now increasingly vulnerable. Since 2020, energy infrastructure, international shipping, international airports, and capital cities have all been targeted by drones.¹²

On the horizon is the growing issue of saturation drone strikes. Working in partnership with other unarmed UAVs, weaponised drones can be used to pin-point and destroy air defence systems, opening the gates for an incoming volley of rockets, missiles, and other armed drones. By combining downloadable software and online tutorials drone users can launch rudimentary 'swarms' -- between five and ten drones can be 'hooked-up' to a single device.

Governments' worldwide will also face a significant national security threat in adversarial use of small,

unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS). Technology to produce swarms represents a multi-layered and unmanageable new threat. Current US DOD strategy includes some ways to confront drones; however, it has no strategy to solve future armed drone swarms.¹³ To thwart sUAS attack swarms, militaries worldwide must confront and reassess their respective technical, legal and doctrinal issues.

Terrorists use of UAS is facilitated by: (1) the unregulated civilian market and the ability to acquire tech in the Dark web¹⁴; (2) the availability of unsecured explosives, used as payloads; (3) easy access to explosive precursors; and (4) the access to technical expertise via the internet and social media.¹⁵

NON-STATE ACTOR USE OF UAS

Multiple non-state actors have used drones in combat, including Boko Haram, Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthi rebels, and ISIL. Smaller drones are used for intelligence, surveillance, and electronic warfare measures, and assist in target acquisition to increase precision and lethality from ground-based systems. Drones are used as decoys to distract while strikes are directed elsewhere. Drones also perpetuate the psychological dimension of terrorism by spreading fear.

ISIL employs UAVs in conflict zones to discharge small grenade-size bombs. ISIL conducted attacks with drones to kill enemy combatants in northern Iraq.¹⁶ They formed an "Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahedeen" unit.¹⁷ In 2017, ISIL pinned down Iraqi security forces for 24-hours in Syria by executing 70 drone missions¹⁸ Houthi rebels in 2019 made headlines when their drones helped knock off nearly 6 percent of the world's oil supply with their targeted attacks on Saudi oil refineries.

Reports from the Monitoring Team (MT) maintained that in 2021, affiliates of ISIL and al Qaida demonstrated a growing UAS capability in parts of West and East Africa. Al-Shabaab, in East Africa, uses drones for reconnaissance and surveillance and could conceivably launch attacks on civil aviation.¹⁹

Drones can be armed with Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear agents.²⁰ In 2015, a drone with radioactive sand targeted the roof of the Japanese Prime Minister's office. In 2019, France's UCLAT²¹ alerted about a possible terrorist attack on a football stadium by using a drone carrying lethal chemicals.²² The Chinese designed blowfish drones can throw grenades, launch mortars and fire machine guns while an AI driven system determines the target.

Targeted assassinations

Drones are being used for targeted assassinations, mostly

"Today, state and non-state actors possess the ability to acquire drones and can assemble and operate commercial-off-the-shelf drone technology (COTS)."

by state actors but progressively by terrorists and criminals. In August 2018, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was the target of a failed assassination attempt. In 2021, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi escaped an assassination attempt. In 2021, a Taliban drone unit that strategically assassinated Piram Qul, an ethnic Uzbek warlord claimed to have helped win the war.²³

POLICY RESPONSE TO UAS

Building an international counter-UAS community

In 2017, the Security Council requested that action be taken to mitigate the threat of UAS falling into the hands of terrorists.²⁴ Multiple organizations cooperate on UAS²⁵ including: UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED), UNODC, UNIDIR, IOM, INTERPOL, the EU Commission, and the GCTF published the 'Berlin Memorandum on Good Practices for Countering Terrorist Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems'.²⁶ A joint UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, and CAR project is underway to assess global trends.²⁷

In 2022, the European Commission finalized the European Drone Strategy 2.0,²⁸ which builds a framework for operating and setting the technical requirements of drones. Academics are working on a robust Drone Technology Control Regime (or DTCR).²⁹


National approaches

National drone management structures will need to keep pace with commercial advances. Managing UAS requires a whole-of-government strategy including procurement and/or deployment of counter systems as well as the need to support partnerships with the private sector, academia, civil society.

The chart below outlines the multidimensional responses to threats posed by misuse of UAS. It highlights how states can reliably prevent terrorists from acquiring and using UAS. This model shows that by implementing effective upstream measures, fewer downstream measures will be required. This is further reinforced by a critical feedback loop through which downstream measures inform strengthened upstream measures.

FIGURE 1

Developing multidimensional responses to threats posed by UAS



Source: Author's figure based on UNCTED module³⁰

The ubiquity of UAS will lead to a third drone age with uncrewed aerial, ground and underwater vehicles and the risk of increased swarm attacks.³¹ New UAS technological innovations will require greater safeguards; including upholding international law and human rights and limiting proliferation.³²

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CHATGPT

Artificial Intelligence (AI) will have a heavy impact on security in the future. It works by mimicking human brain patterns including learning and making decisions. AI can work with uncertainty and make decisions and predictions based on large datasets and multiple conditions.

AI will allow adversaries to act quickly with micro-precision, but at macro-scale. AI will also enhance cyber-attacks and digital disinformation campaigns. AI is dual use, so no skills are needed to construct AI; adversaries will only need to manipulate existing AI systems. In development, such as the European Union's project to use AI drone swarms to protect borders.

OpenAI has recently launched a new coding architecture that is capable for specific tasks such as question-answering and text summarization called ChatGPT.³³ Launched in November 2022 - by January 2023, 500 million people have used it. ChatGPT carries with it potential risks in the areas of disinformation, cybercrime and terrorism. It will empower low skilled hackers to transform basic phishing schemes into professional attacks.³⁴ ChatGPT could write malware capable of mutating its appearance to dodge detection and help terrorists to "industrialize the creation and personalization of malicious web pages and social engineering reliant scams."³⁵

DeepMind is creating Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) to help build machines that can think, learn and be set to solve humanity's greatest problems. However, Hassabis warns that with AI's promise also comes peril, stressing the importance of building in guard rails, especially given that AI is at the cusp of being able to make tools that could be deeply damaging to human civilization.³⁶

A legal and regulatory framework is required almost immediately from both public and private institutions for AI and AGI. The European Union's AI Act can provide some guidance.

AI has the potential to be abused by terrorists to recruit, spread hatred and support their insurgencies. Technology has already shown to have long-term societal implications. As Patrikarakos has argued in his book *War in 140 Characters*,³⁷ that today a singular person can be empowered with the use social media to change the course of both the physical battle and the discourse around it.

CONCLUSION

Drones and AI will continue to evolve. Therefore, it is imperative that we deepen our understanding of how terrorists are harnessing technologies to increase their power in both the physical and psychological domains. The focus should not only be on disruption but also prevention, and the responsibility to act must be shared across government agencies, academic institutions and technology companies. We are finding ourselves in the trenches of an increasingly widening digital war and we have not yet mastered how to escape it while *terrorist digitalis* is marching ahead.

Climate Change, Terrorism and Potential Implications for P/CVE

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INTRODUCTION

How climate change and terrorism – two of the biggest global challenges of our time – intersect is an increasingly urgent question. The past eight years are on track to be the warmest on record, and 2022 saw yet more extreme heatwaves, drought and devastating flooding,¹ with knock-on effects on resource scarcity, agriculture, rural to urban migration and governance. These impacts are being felt in regions or sub-regions where terrorism is already prevalent and presenting significant challenges of its own.

There is, of course, no straightforward correlation between a country or region experiencing climate change impacts and experiencing terrorism. Germanwatch's Long-Term Climate Risk Index (2000-19)² of countries most affected by climate-related extreme events features both countries experiencing significant terrorism-related challenges – including The Philippines, Mozambique, Bangladesh and Pakistan – and countries such as Haiti, The Bahamas, and Nepal, where terrorism is a minimal issue.

This essay will therefore seek to better understand how climate change has impacted, and could impact, countries or regions where terrorism is an existing challenge, before exploring how counterterrorism and P/CVE responses could adapt to mitigate some of these impacts.

CURRENT IMPACT

So far, climate change and terrorism have intersected in two important and overlapping ways. Firstly, climate change has exacerbated the drivers and underlying conditions conducive to radicalisation. Secondly, it has also provided opportunities for terrorist actors to exploit extreme weather events or resource scarcity to propagandise, recruit and raise funds.

The ten most impacted countries by terrorism on Global Terrorism Index has consistently featured countries experiencing instability, poverty, weak governance and

conflict. Climate change can aggravate these conditions, and other inter-linked challenges including resource scarcity, and food and energy security. While the relationship between each of these conditions and climate change is not always causal (and in some instances, remains contested³), climate change acts as a threat multiplier. In turn, research shows that these conditions – particularly conflict, weak governance and instability – can act as strong drivers towards radicalization to terrorism.⁴

To take one example of this indirect but powerful relationship, extreme heat, droughts and flooding have impacted both the quality and quantity of water available in many parts of the world. These shortages have negative effects on agriculture, a major provider of jobs in many countries significantly impacted by both terrorism and climate change.⁵ This in turn, can act as an incentive for individuals in rural areas to join terrorist groups, who can offer higher wages than those obtainable through legal means.

The indirect nature of this relationship means there is limited data-driven evidence of climate change's impacts on radicalization so far. However, governments and civil society in various regions – including the Sahel,⁶ South Asia⁷ and Central Asia⁸ – have consistently reported that the impacts of drought, resource scarcity and challenging agricultural conditions have been contributing factors in recruitment by terrorist groups.

Climate change has also provided an opportunity for terrorist groups to fundraise, propagandise and recruit. Terrorist groups have exploited extreme weather events by stepping into the gap left by governments unable to provide humanitarian relief, often in remote locations. For example, in Pakistan, Jamaat-ud-Dawa – the then front organisation of terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba – provided significant humanitarian relief in the wake of devastating floods in 2010.⁹ In Somalia, by repeatedly undermining famine relief efforts, al-Shabaab forced the population in

areas under its control to rely on them as the sole service provider,¹⁰ undermining the Somali government's legitimacy and bolstering their own. In water-scarce northern Iraq, ISIS captured, controlled, sabotaged and looted water installations – in addition to controlling energy infrastructure – allowing them to “recruit” farmers no longer able to access water and electricity.¹¹ Although these examples are not uniquely driven by climate change, the increasing frequency of extreme weather events and increased competition for resources suggests that there will only be greater opportunities for terrorist groups to seek to exploit in the future.

FUTURE IMPACT

Looking ahead then, should we expect climate change to continue to play a largely indirect and difficult to quantify impact on terrorism? Although research in this space remains in its infancy, an increasing number of scholars are beginning to explore whether climate change could play a more direct role in the evolution of the terrorist threat.¹²

As yet, there is no evidence that the risks posed to humanity by climate change, or the global failure to address it in a timely fashion, is itself acting as a driver or pull factor for individuals to conduct acts of terrorism. Despite this, governments across the world have repeatedly used counter-terrorism legislation to counter peaceful but disruptive climate change protests,¹³ and labelled some of those behind them eco-terrorists.¹⁴

Climate change is however playing a growing role within the far-right, particularly within the so-called eco-fascist movement. In contrast to the pro-social narratives of mainstream climate change activists, the far-right does not hope to prevent man-made climate change. Instead, it sees an opportunity to exploit concerns around climate-driven migration to broaden support for far-right, racist narratives. Others within the far-right see climate change as the vehicle through which the destruction of Western governments can be accelerated, allowing nations to return to a “natural”, monocultural past. Variants of these narratives have featured in the manifestos and rhetoric of far-right actors and attackers, including the Christchurch and El Paso attackers.¹⁵

Given the salience of climate change, it is very likely to feature more prominently in future terrorist and violent extremist narratives and propaganda from across the ideological spectrum, as they seek to exploit media interest in both issues to spread their message as widely as possible.

RESPONSE

As yet, there have been limited attempts to more closely

integrate climate change and counter-terrorism responses, or indeed, climate change and broader peace and security efforts. At the UN, attempts to introduce climate change to the Security Council agenda faltered in late 2021, with key Member States arguing that climate change was a development not a security issue.¹⁶ Civil society has also warned that any attempt to more closely integrate the two runs the risk of securitizing the climate issue, increasing the likelihood of human rights abuses and fundamental freedoms being limited, including in relation to peaceful protest.¹⁷

There are however areas in which Member States and international or regional organisations could seek to integrate climate change within counter-terrorism and P/CVE, while being mindful of avoiding these negative impacts.

Firstly, counter-terrorism and P/CVE strategies and programmes should include an assessment of how climate change impacts on radicalization and its underlying drivers. In a macro sense, this could seek to identify regions or countries where climate change is more likely to have a disproportionate impact on conflict and other drivers to radicalization. This analysis could help to guide regional and international counter-terrorism responses, particularly capacity building and technical assistance efforts. In a micro sense, this assessment could focus on whether climate change and responses to it are playing a more direct role as a push factor towards radicalization to terrorism. In doing so, it is critical that the definitions of terrorism and violent extremism being used remain narrow and are not broadened to include and target activity by peaceful climate activists.

"Terrorist groups have exploited extreme weather events by stepping into the gap left by governments unable to provide humanitarian relief, often in remote locations."

More broadly though, there is an opportunity for a paradigm shift in how climate change and P/CVE activities could or should overlap. Instead of securitizing climate and development programming, can we make P/CVE programming greener?

A sizeable proportion of P/CVE programming focuses on providing recipients with vocational skills and training so that they can provide for themselves and their families. However, there is limited evidence that entities funding or

delivering this type of programming currently factor climate change into either their selection of recipients or the training being provided. Training individuals in vocations that are traditional to an area might seem intuitive, but if these vocations are either currently or likely to be negatively impacted by climate change, then the programme might not deliver long-lasting impact.

Where appropriate, this type of vocational or skills-based P/CVE programming could pivot towards activities that are either future-proofed against the impacts of climate change, or preferably, those directly related to climate change reduction or adaptation activities. In addition to seeking to prevent violent extremism, programmes could deliver broader benefits that help communities counter or adapt to the impacts of climate change, simultaneously addressing individual vulnerabilities and a macro factor that exacerbates the conditions conducive to radicalization.

By looking at P/CVE through a climate lens – instead of looking at climate change mitigation through a security lens – there is a real opportunity for P/CVE to deliver both security and climate-related benefits at the individual and community level, and support governments in achieving their own climate-related targets.

This comes with caveats. As with all P/CVE programming, the first priority should be the principle of do-no-harm. Blending security and development creates real risks that the latter is overwhelmed by the former, with all the attendant risks regarding human rights. As such, this issue must be addressed carefully, taking an evidence-based approach that prioritises human rights and seeks to integrate lessons learned from the development and climate mitigation and adaptation fields. But the urgency of both the climate change and terrorism challenges – and the strong intersection between the two in those countries most affected by terrorism – means that ignoring climate change is simply not an option for counter-terrorism and P/CVE policymakers moving forward.

Counterfeiting: An ABC of Terrorist Financing

SÉNATRICE NATHALIE GOULET,
SENATE OF FRANCE, REPRESENTING THE ORNE DEPARTMENT
(NORMANDY)

According to the European Union Intellectual Property Office, the counterfeiting trade costs European manufacturers €26 billion a year, including €3.5 billion for French luxury goods manufacturers¹. Like all criminal activities, counterfeiting can be a way of financing terrorism. Subject to fewer crackdowns than other forms of trafficking, it provides an immediate source of cash that is untraceable.

Counterfeiting is a crime that pays. “Terrorists, gangsters and the like soon realised that counterfeiting was a useful way of financing their other crimes,” explains Delphine Sarfati-Sobreira, Director General of Unifab, the union that promotes and defends manufacturers’ intellectual property rights².

The French National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) addressed the theme of “Counterfeiting and Terrorism” in its 2016 report³. French parliamentarian Bernard Brochand raised a question on the subject in July 2016, which remains unanswered:

Written question no. 98100 from Mr Bernard Brochand, published in France’s Official Journal on 26 July 2016

“Mr Bernard Brochand draws the attention of the Minister of Finance and Public Accounts to counterfeiting as a new source of funding for terrorism. Unifab recently submitted a report which clearly states that the sale of counterfeit goods funds terrorist organisations. Counterfeiting has become a threat for two main reasons: it is difficult to track down in a global economy and it is the most lucrative and least severely sanctioned criminal activity. Indeed, counterfeiting is currently the second largest source of criminal revenue in the world and terrorist networks now oversee the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit goods to finance their operations. During the investigation into the January 2015 attacks in Paris, it was proven that the Kouachi brothers had been involved in the trafficking of sports shoes to fund their attacks. Similarly, the Molenbeek district, the focus of investigations into the attacks of 13 November 2015, is the scene of frequent

seizures of counterfeit goods and has served as a major hub for this kind of trafficking for several years now. Today, the profile of terrorists has changed and any delinquent can fall rapidly into terrorism. For these sometimes isolated terrorists, counterfeit trafficking can be a quick way of generating funds while remaining firmly under the radar, making it an easy choice for them.

Firstly, counterfeiting is so appealing because it is one of the most lucrative criminal activities for terrorist organisations. Narcotics trafficking yields a 200% profit but counterfeiting pharmaceuticals generates a net return of 2,000%. Why get involved in risky drug trafficking when you can make ten times as much from counterfeit goods? Secondly, the penalties for counterfeiting are particularly lenient. The activity yields high profits for low investment, and the penalties issued are seldom enforced because they are so soft. What is more, counterfeiting is encouraged by the Internet and the permissive legislation. For all these reasons, he asks what measures the Government intends to take to combat counterfeiting effectively, particularly regarding its connections with terrorism.”

The Robert Schuman Foundation has also opened a debate on the issue⁴. On 11 April 2018, it held a conference at Egmont Palace in Brussels on the theme of “Smuggling, counterfeiting and the financing of terrorism – mobilising economic stakeholders”. The event brought together leading personalities and representatives from public organisations involved in the work to counter laundering (Tracfin, CTIF, Europol, the European Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and an array of stakeholders from industry.)

When buying a fake crocodile shirt in a Moroccan or Turkish market, a fake designer bag on a beach in southern Spain or branded sports shoes at an unbeatable price “off the back of a lorry”, you may unknowingly be funding a terrorist network and, in all events, encouraging criminal organisations to produce these counterfeit goods. “It takes two to tango”: without buyers, there are no sellers. Buyers of counterfeit goods are accomplices, subject to a

three-year prison sentence and a fine of €300,000 euros under French law (Articles L335-2-1 and L335-4 of the Intellectual Property Code).

Terrorists are increasingly turning to this as a source of funds: the Kouachi brothers, the Charlie Hebdo⁵ terrorists, made a living from drug trafficking and from dealing in counterfeit Nike sports shoes.

As terrorists' operating methods evolve and low-cost forms of terrorism emerge (see the chapter on Macro and Micro-financing), tougher measures are required to combat such trafficking. The issue has been addressed by the French Senate's Finance Committee, which published a prominent report⁶, the conclusions of which resulted in a bill⁷ adopted by both chambers and culminated in the Law of 11 March 2014 aimed at strengthening the fight against counterfeiting⁸.

The preparatory work clearly mentions the link between counterfeiting and the financing of organised crime and terrorism. Considering the cost of counterfeiting to the economy and the overall criminal repercussions, a bill⁹ was submitted to the French Parliament as a direct result of the report by MPs Christophe Blanchet and Pierre-Yves Bournazel, in which they sought to address these issues¹⁰.

It has been proven that ETA, the Basque separatist organisation, controls the trafficking of fake clothing and bags in southern Spain. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) specialise in fake CDs and cigarette trafficking, and the IRA also dealt in contraband cigarettes and counterfeit pharmaceuticals.

In its 2016 report mentioned above, UNIFAB drew a terrifying picture of terrorist financing through the trafficking of counterfeit goods:

Hezbollah

The role played by counterfeiting in funding Hezbollah has been repeatedly demonstrated, as has the interest the organisation shares in this traffic with terrorist group Al Barakat in Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.

In February 2000, an individual suspected of raising funds for Hezbollah was arrested for hacking. The authorities discovered that the defendant was also selling audio CDs and video games to fund an organisation affiliated with the terrorist group. Some of the discs found contained images and films of terrorist attacks and interviews with bombers and were used as propaganda for Hezbollah.

The counterfeit goods were initially sent by Hezbollah to a free trade zone in South America, then smuggled into a third country to avoid import duties. They were subsequently sold on through a network of supporters and activists from the Middle East. The profits generated by

this trade were finally handed over to Hezbollah.

In 2000, as part of Operation Smokescreen in the United States, the federal authorities dismantled a vast Hezbollah funding network based on cigarette smuggling and fiscal stamp counterfeiting. The network was set up by Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, a resident of North Carolina. The profits were passed on to Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon, a reported minimum \$8 million having been raised from this traffic.

In October 2003, the Lebanese authorities discovered containers filled with counterfeit brake pads and shock absorbers in Beirut, worth €1 million. The investigation revealed that profits from the shipment were destined for Hezbollah supporters.

In 2004, US Intelligence set about tracing profits from the sale of counterfeit goods originating in Paraguay and also found that a Hezbollah cell was involved.

Yves Mamou, writer and journalist for *Le Monde*, has written a book entitled *Une longue cuillère pour le diable* (= A Spoon for the Devil, Léo Scheer, 2010), in which he tells how the pharmaceutical industry has been battling on many fronts. Referring to Hezbollah's involvement in counterfeit trafficking, he reports that "Brital [a village in Lebanon] is at the heart of the Hezbollah empire: a village of ruffians, dealing in stolen cars, smuggling hashish, trafficking in spare parts. [...] To cover the cost of its free hospitals, clinics, food stamps and the salaries of its permanent staff, Hezbollah resorts to drug trafficking, fake goods, counterfeit money... If you buy a forged Madonna CD in Beirut, there is a good chance that it was pressed in Brital on behalf of Hezbollah."

Hezbollah is also frequently cited for its involvement in the counterfeit pharmaceuticals market. In March 2006, the US Joint Terrorism Task Forces, an inter-agency initiative led by the FBI, charged 19 individuals involved in a ring dealing in counterfeit sexual dysfunction medication and operating in Lebanon, Canada, China, Brazil, Paraguay and the United States. Five members of the network were Canadian, and according to the Vancouver Sun, which allegedly had access to the US indictment documents, a share of the \$500,000 earned monthly from trafficking went to Hezbollah.

An Israeli study also confirmed that Hezbollah was increasingly focused on developing counterfeiting activities. Counterfeiting is apparently considered less contrary to their religious values than other types of trafficking.

HAMAS

Corruption and counterfeiting feature among the main concerns of Palestinians in the West Bank. "The

counterfeiting of foodstuffs and drugs, tax evasion and the traffic of petrol, as well as unnecessary intermediaries, are on the rise in the Territories,” according to a report by Transparency Palestine.

The FBI revealed that Hamas raised funds and support from criminals who are either direct members of the terrorist group or who share the same ideology.

FBI investigations have uncovered an array of lucrative criminal activities, including drug trafficking, bank fraud and counterfeiting.

Hamas, Fatah and members of the Palestinian Authority are suspected of participating in these activities, particularly on the West Bank and in Gaza. The US authorities believe that some of the money raised by Middle Eastern terrorist groups come from illegal activities in the United States, including counterfeiting.

Ali Nizar Dahroug and his uncle Mohammad Dahroug, a Hamas activist, are suspected of financing Hamas with the proceeds from trafficking in counterfeit goods. When Ali Nizar was arrested in Paraguay in June 2002, the authorities found numerous counterfeited items in his possession.

AFGHAN TERRORIST NETWORKS, AL-QAEDA AND OTHER AFFILIATED GROUPS

In an interview published in *Le Monde*, Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, former director of the DST (French Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, now the DGSI, the General Directorate for Internal Security), said that Afghan terrorist networks existed “thanks to crime, robberies, credit card copying, [...] and the counterfeiting of designer clothes”.

Interpol also estimates that al-Qaeda and affiliated groups received between \$300 million and \$500 million from their “supporters” over the past decade. This includes funds from both legal and illegal activities, and especially the trade of counterfeit goods.

Documents from al-Qaeda propaganda recommend trading in counterfeit goods to generate more funds to finance terrorist operations. In November 2003, the dismantling of a counterfeit trafficking network led to the arrest of 13 members of the Takfirist branch. They were suspected of having supplied weapons and false papers to Algerian terrorists via a network financed by the sale of counterfeit garments.

Following the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, orchestrated by the Al Qaeda terrorist network, former Spanish Interior Minister Ángel Acebes pointed out that “one of the suspects arrested was a well-known counterfeiter”.

In April 2006, an AFP report indicated that a dozen people had been arrested simultaneously in the south of France and Italy as part of an investigation into funding terrorist activities. The investigation revealed that the suspects, close to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), got their resources from various criminal activities, including counterfeiting.

In 2007, US federal authorities dismantled an international counterfeit clothing ring based in New York. At least three of those arrested had links to the Islamist terrorist organisation Jamaat ul-Fuqra operating in the US.

In 2008, a Pakistani named Saifullah Anjum Ranjha, a resident of the United States involved in a network of drug trafficking, smuggling, cigarette counterfeiting and arms trafficking, was convicted of money laundering and terrorist financing.

From October 2003 to September 2007, a share of the profits from these transactions (\$2.2 million) was transferred to al-Qaeda members or supporters through a money transfer company called Hamza Inc.

Recently, the leader of a terrorist group affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqmi), Mokhtar Belmokhtar, involved in cross-border trafficking, was so successful in the counterfeit cigarette trade that he was nicknamed “Mr Marlboro” by the authorities. His involvement in terrorism has been reported on multiple occasions. Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks in Bamako on 7 March 2015 and those in Ouagadougou on 15 January 2016.

THE D-COMPANY OF INDIA

Originally, the D-Company was a criminal outfit that drew its profit from trafficking drugs, arms and precious metals, prostitution, counterfeiting and extortion. In the early 1990s, D-Company decided to infiltrate the Indian film industry. It now controls the bulk of the black market for counterfeit cultural products in Mumbai.

D-Company quickly developed links with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Kashmir. Its involvement in the 1993 Mumbai attacks, which killed 257 people, is widely acknowledged. According to observers, its transformation into a terrorist entity, supporting other terrorist groups, coincides with its entry into the counterfeit trade, which has enabled it to significantly increase its revenues.

LASHKAR-E-TOIBA IN PAKISTAN

This group was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. According to official Pakistani sources, 15-20% of the budget of these terrorist groups in Waziristan is said to be

derived from cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting. The pro-Taliban tribes in Waziristan actually control production centres in several districts of the Afghan border area, including Swabi, Mardan, Nowshera, Charsadda, Landi Kotal and Bara. The smuggling and counterfeit distribution channels are in the hands of the Pakistani Taliban and the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba.”

Things are quite similar closer to home: take, for example, the perpetrators of the 13 November 2015 attacks¹¹. As reported in newspaper *Marianne* on 3 November 2021: “In the underbelly of his hometown, Bakkali had a small cellar where he stored the counterfeit products he traded, the source of the largest slice of his income. The business was so successful that his friend Khalid El Bakraoui—believed to be one of the instigators of the Paris and Saint-Denis attacks—helped him to find a bigger garage.

The divorcee travelled to Egypt for Arabic lessons, then to Turkey to revive a branch of his counterfeit business. “In working-class circles, counterfeiting is pretty innocuous, it’s not just something thugs do,” pleaded Bakkali, using language picked up while studying sociology for three years in prison. “You cheat the benefits system, you sell counterfeit goods, we can raise questions about your attitude to the law,” the judge stated. Bakkali pocketed between €1,500 and €3,000 a month from these offences. He readily admits: “I lived well, I didn’t go without.”

In a letter dated 17 December 2021¹², Unifab provided a welcome update to its 2016 report: “Counterfeiting Today

The volume of international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods amounted to \$464 billion, equal to 2.5% of world trade in 2019 (OECD/EUIPO). In the same year, imports of counterfeit goods into the European Union were worth almost \$134 billion, or 6% of all imports into Europe (World Trademark Review). In 2020, the number of counterfeit goods seized by customs was 5.6 million items (French Customs 2020 Review).

Facts, examples and figures

The connection between terrorist networks and organised crime depends on the local context, the political environment, the availability of certain resources, the sanctions applied in the country in which these groups operate, along with other factors.

– For example, in Africa, al-Qaeda has exploited weak national policies and used corruption to its advantage to engage in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom and selling counterfeit goods. Criminals have used the Covid-19 pandemic to further develop their illegal activities, “from the creation of websites and social media accounts claiming to sell PPE

and medical supplies, to the manufacture and distribution of fake vaccines [...]” (President of Interpol, 14th International Law Enforcement Conference on Intellectual Property Crime, October 2021).

The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) generated tens of thousands of pounds each month from the sale of fake clothing at Christmas markets in 2019. Prior to that in July and February of the same year, the INLA had firearms and around 30,000 illicit cigarettes seized (*Belfast Telegraph*).

Then there is the rise of mafia terrorism with, for example, a criminal organisation linked to the Camorra, discovered by the French and Italian police in a case where a significant share of the revenues came from the trafficking of sophisticated counterfeit products across Europe (most notably, counterfeit branded digital cameras) (*Le Monde*);

The risks have increased with the use of cryptocurrencies, as Louise Shelley, Virginia University Professor and Director of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, explains: “Terrorist groups are technically adept and have relied recently more heavily on technology and cryptocurrencies to facilitate the operations of their illicit trade in arms, drugs and counterfeits, increase anonymity, and reduce risk.” Furthermore, in a recent study, the Rand group has demonstrated that cryptocurrencies facilitate the funding of terrorist groups’ operations and their illegal trade in goods.

Unifab works to raise awareness among French and European institutions with the aim of having crimes related to intellectual property, the counterfeiting of goods and currencies, criminal finance and money laundering included in the Empact priorities (European Union priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime for 2022-2025). A major consumer awareness campaign has been launched to highlight the effects and consequences of trafficking in fake goods, often linked to organised crime, via billboards and ads in local and online media. This vast information campaign covers various sectors of activity, depending on the region. This year, a pilot operation has been launched in Lyon because of the significant number of counterfeit cigarettes found in the city. It is also worth noting the huge increase in counterfeit cigarette consumption in 2020, soaring by 609% across France, a key arena for criminal organisations. Counterfeit cigarettes account for tax revenue losses of €2.5 billion and provide illegal income of €1.5 billion a year—income often used to finance other illegal activities¹³.



GTI Ranks & Scores, 2022

GTI Rank	Country	2022 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2021-2022)
1	Afghanistan	8.822	-0.308
2	Burkina Faso	8.564	0.283
3	Somalia	8.463	0.034
4	Mali	8.412	0.243
5	Syria	8.161	-0.100
6	Pakistan	8.160	0.308
7	Iraq	8.139	-0.385
8	Nigeria	8.065	-0.205
9	Myanmar	7.977	0.408
10	Niger	7.616	-0.242
11	Cameroon	7.347	-0.120
12	Mozambique	7.330	-0.153
13	India	7.175	-0.259
14	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.872	-0.024
15	Colombia	6.697	-0.391
16	Egypt	6.632	-0.321
17	Chile	6.619	0.085
18	Philippines	6.328	-0.458
19	Chad	6.168	-0.202
20	Kenya	6.163	-0.068
21	Iran	5.688	0.544
22	Yemen	5.616	-0.270
23	Türkiye	5.600	-0.078
24	Indonesia	5.502	0.010
25	Israel	5.489	0.714
26	Thailand	5.430	-0.296
27	Togo	4.915	3.673
28	Benin	4.840	1.240
29	Sri Lanka	4.839	-0.598
30	United States of America	4.799	-0.220
31	Greece	4.793	-0.098
32	Libya	4.730	-0.393
33	Palestine	4.611	-0.125
34	France	4.419	-0.154
35	Germany	4.242	-0.503

GTI Rank	Country	2022 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2021-2022)
36	Nepal	4.134	-0.578
37	Algeria	4.083	-0.343
38	Tanzania	4.065	-0.595
39	Burundi	4.051	-0.666
40	Tunisia	3.989	-0.468
41	Peru	3.856	-0.608
42	United Kingdom	3.840	-0.713
43	Bangladesh	3.827	-0.579
44	Djibouti	3.800	3.800
45	Russia	3.799	-0.419
46	New Zealand	3.776	-0.594
47	Côte d'Ivoire	3.747	-0.556
48	Uganda	3.599	-0.593
49	Norway	3.514	2.407
50	Tajikistan	3.438	-0.544
51	Venezuela	3.409	-0.591
52	Lebanon	3.400	-0.180
53	Italy	3.290	-0.391
54	Canada	3.275	-0.663
55	Central African Republic	3.194	1.294
56	Ethiopia	3.044	-0.714
57	Argentina	2.875	0.102
58	Slovakia	2.784	2.784
59	Belgium	2.763	1.020
60	Spain	2.712	-0.145
61	Austria	2.677	-0.580
62	Japan	2.398	0.939
63	Saudi Arabia	2.387	-0.719
64	Sweden	2.307	0.701
65	Switzerland	2.205	-0.572
66	Ecuador	2.198	-0.565
67	Netherlands	2.120	-0.592
68	Jordan	2.033	-0.557
69	Australia	1.830	-0.605
70	Uzbekistan	1.731	1.731
71	Paraguay	1.605	-0.544

GTI Rank	Country	2022 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2021-2022)
72	Mexico	1.578	-0.825
73	Ukraine	1.535	-0.766
73	Cyprus	1.392	-0.537
73	Malaysia	1.357	-0.504
76	United Arab Emirates	1.241	1.241
77	Senegal	1.108	-0.470
78	Eswatini	1.058	-0.462
78	Bahrain	0.826	-1.315
80	Rwanda	0.826	-0.415
81	Uruguay	0.826	-0.493
82	South Africa	0.826	-0.415
83	Morocco	0.757	-0.397
84	Romania	0.682	-0.376
85	Brazil	0.599	-0.351
86	Lithuania	0.508	-0.318
86	Ireland	0.291	-0.217
86	Mauritania	0.291	-0.217
86	Vietnam	0.227	-0.180
86	Angola	0.158	-0.133
86	Denmark	0.158	-0.133
92	Kosovo	0.158	-0.133
93	Albania	0.000	0.000
93	Armenia	0.000	0.000
93	Azerbaijan	0.000	0.000
93	Bulgaria	0.000	0.000
93	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.000	0.000
93	Belarus	0.000	0.000
93	Bolivia	0.000	0.000
93	Bhutan	0.000	0.000
93	Botswana	0.000	0.000
93	China	0.000	-1.861
93	Republic of the Congo	0.000	0.000
93	Costa Rica	0.000	0.000
93	Cuba	0.000	0.000
93	Czech Republic	0.000	-0.291
93	Dominican Republic	0.000	0.000
93	Eritrea	0.000	0.000
93	Estonia	0.000	0.000
93	Finland	0.000	-1.006
93	Gabon	0.000	-0.291
93	Georgia	0.000	0.000
93	Ghana	0.000	0.000
93	Guinea	0.000	0.000
93	The Gambia	0.000	0.000
93	Guinea-Bissau	0.000	0.000
93	Equatorial Guinea	0.000	0.000

GTI Rank	Country	2022 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2021-2022)
93	Guatemala	0.000	0.000
93	Guyana	0.000	0.000
93	Honduras	0.000	0.000
93	Croatia	0.000	0.000
93	Haiti	0.000	0.000
93	Hungary	0.000	0.000
93	Iceland	0.000	0.000
93	Jamaica	0.000	0.000
93	Kazakhstan	0.000	0.000
93	Kyrgyz Republic	0.000	0.000
93	Cambodia	0.000	0.000
93	South Korea	0.000	0.000
93	Kuwait	0.000	0.000
93	Laos	0.000	0.000
93	Liberia	0.000	0.000
93	Lesotho	0.000	0.000
93	Latvia	0.000	0.000
93	Moldova	0.000	0.000
93	Madagascar	0.000	0.000
93	Macedonia (FYR)	0.000	-0.158
93	Montenegro	0.000	0.000
93	Mongolia	0.000	0.000
93	Mauritius	0.000	0.000
93	Malawi	0.000	0.000
93	Namibia	0.000	0.000
93	Nicaragua	0.000	0.000
93	Oman	0.000	0.000
93	Panama	0.000	0.000
93	Papua New Guinea	0.000	0.000
93	Poland	0.000	0.000
93	North Korea	0.000	0.000
93	Portugal	0.000	0.000
93	Qatar	0.000	0.000
93	Sudan	0.000	-0.890
93	Singapore	0.000	0.000
93	Sierra Leone	0.000	0.000
93	El Salvador	0.000	0.000
93	Serbia	0.000	0.000
93	South Sudan	0.000	0.000
93	Slovenia	0.000	0.000
93	Turkmenistan	0.000	0.000
93	Timor-Leste	0.000	0.000
93	Trinidad and Tobago	0.000	0.000
93	Taiwan	0.000	-0.227
93	Zambia	0.000	0.000
93	Zimbabwe	0.000	0.000

B

50 Worst Terrorist Attacks in 2022

Rank	Country	Date	State/Province	Organisation	Fatalities	Attack type
1	Pakistan	2/2/2022	Balochistan	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	195	Explosives
2	Syria	20/1/2022	Al-Hasakah	Islamic State (IS)	154	Explosives
3	Somalia	29/10/2022	Banaadir	Al-Shabaab	120	Explosives
4	Burkina Faso	12/6/2022	Sahel	Unknown - Jihadists	116	Firearms
5	Mali	19/6/2022	Mopti	Unknown - Jihadists	110	Firearms
6	Mali	7/12/2022	Gao	Islamic State (IS)	100	Firearms
7	Mali	5/12/2022	Gao	Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)	70	Firearms
8	Somalia	3/5/2022	Shabeellaha Dhexe	Al-Shabaab	59	Firearms
9	Pakistan	4/3/2022	Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	56	Explosives
10	Afghanistan	21/4/2022	Balkh	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	50	Explosives
11	Afghanistan	29/4/2022	Kabul	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	50	Explosives
12	Nigeria	22/5/2022	Borno	Islamic State West Africa (ISWA)	50	Firearms
13	Burkina Faso	25/5/2022	Est	Unknown - Jihadists	50	Firearms
14	Mali	7/8/2022	Gao	Unknown - Jihadists	42	Firearms
15	Nigeria	22/5/2022	Borno	Boko Haram	40	Firearms
16	Burkina Faso	26/9/2022	Sahel	Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)	37	Firearms
17	Burkina Faso	5/9/2022	Centre-Nord	Unknown - Jihadists	35	Explosives
18	Mali	13/2/2022	Gao	Unknown - Jihadists	30	Firearms
19	Nigeria	21/5/2022	Borno	Islamic State West Africa (ISWA)	30	Firearms
20	Afghanistan	18/6/2022	Kabul	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	30	Explosives
21	Mali	9/9/2022	Gao	Islamic State (IS)	30	Firearms
22	Mali	4/3/2022	Mopti	Unknown - Jihadists	27	Explosives
23	Democratic Republic of the Congo	5/6/2022	Ituri	Islamic State (IS)	27	Firearms
24	Nigeria	7/7/2022	Borno	Islamic State West Africa (ISWA)	23	Firearms
25	Mali	12/6/2022	Gao	Islamic State (IS)	22	Firearms

Rank	Country	Date	State/Province	Organisation	Fatalities	Attack type
26	Niger	8/3/2022	Diffa	Boko Haram	21	Firearms
27	Burkina Faso	14/5/2022	Sahel	Unknown - Jihadists	21	Firearms
28	Democratic Republic of the Congo	29/5/2022	Nord-Kivu	Islamic State (IS)	21	Firearms
29	Somalia	19/8/2022	Banaadir	Al-Shabaab	21	Explosives
30	Burkina Faso	25/12/2022	Est	Unknown - Jihadists	21	Explosives
31	Burkina Faso	1/4/2022	Centre-Nord	Unknown - Jihadists	20	Firearms
32	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3/4/2022	Nord-Kivu	Islamic State (IS)	20	Firearms
33	Nigeria	4/4/2022	Kaduna	Unknown	20	Firearms
34	Afghanistan	19/4/2022	Kabul	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	20	Explosives
35	Mali	19/6/2022	Gao	Unknown - Jihadists	20	Firearms
36	Burkina Faso	3/7/2022	Centre-Nord	Unknown - Jihadists	20	Firearms
37	Mali	6/8/2022	Gao	Islamic State (IS)	20	Firearms
38	Mali	12/8/2022	Gao	Islamic State (IS)	20	Firearms
39	Afghanistan	17/8/2022	Kabul	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	20	Explosives
40	Niger	16/3/2022	Tillabéry	Unknown - Jihadists	19	Firearms
41	Afghanistan	30/9/2022	Kabul	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	19	Explosives
42	Iran	30/9/2022	Sistan and Baluchestan	Unknown - Separatists/Nationalists	19	Firearms
43	Niger	20/2/2022	Tillabéry	Unknown - Jihadists	18	Firearms
44	Burkina Faso	3/7/2022	Boucle du Mouhoun	Unknown - Jihadists	18	Firearms
45	Afghanistan	2/9/2022	Hirat	Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK)	18	Explosives
46	Syria	13/10/2022	Rif Dimashq	Unknown - Jihadists	18	Explosives
47	Burkina Faso	7/12/2022	Centre-Nord	Unknown - Jihadists	18	Firearms
48	Democratic Republic of the Congo	11/4/2022	Ituri	Islamic State (IS)	17	Firearms
49	Burkina Faso	15/5/2022	Est	Unknown - Jihadists	17	Firearms
50	Togo	24/11/2022	Savanes	Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)	17	Firearms



GTI Methodology

The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years. A country's annual GTI score is based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. The four factors counted in each country's yearly score are:

- ▶ total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
- ▶ total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year
- ▶ total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year
- ▶ total number of hostages caused by terrorists in a given year

Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three, and a five year weighted average is applied in a bid to reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The weightings shown in Table C.1 were determined through consultation with the GPI Expert Panel.

The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY'S GTI SCORE

To assign a score to a country each incident is rated according to the four measures. The measures are then multiplied by their weighting factor and aggregated. This is done for all incidents and then all incidents for each country are aggregated to give the country score. To illustrate, Table C.2 depicts a hypothetical country's record for a given year.

TABLE C.1

Indicator weights used in the Global Terrorism Index

Dimension	Weight
Total number of incidents	1
Total number of fatalities	3
Total number of injuries	0.5
Total number of hostages	0.5

TABLE C.2

Hypothetical country terrorist attacks in a given year

Dimension	Weight	Number of incidents for the given year	Calculated raw score
Total number of incidents	1	21	21
Total number of fatalities	3	36	108
Total number of injuries	0.5	53	26.5
Total number of hostages	0.5	20	10
Total raw score			166.5

Given these indicator values, this hypothetical country for that year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of

$$(1 \times 21) + (3 \times 36) + (0.5 \times 53) + (0.5 \times 20) = 166.5.$$

FIVE-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE

To account for the after effects of trauma that terrorist attacks have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as having a bearing on a country's current score. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will continue to have a psychological impact on the population for many years to come. To account for the lingering effects of terrorism, the prior four years are also included in the scoring with a decreasing weight each year. Table C.3 highlights the weights used for each year.

TABLE C.3

Time weighting of historical scores

Year	Weight	% of Score
Current year	16	52
Previous year	8	26
Two years ago	4	13
Three years ago	2	6
Four years ago	1	3

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the world. There are a handful of countries with very high levels of terrorism compared to most countries which experience only low levels or no terrorism. To produce a more equally distributed index, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals.

As shown in table C.4 this mapping method yields a total number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores, the following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score 10.
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and calculate 'r' by:
 - a. $\text{root} = 2 \times (\text{Highest GTI Banded Score} - \text{Lowest GTI Banded Score}) = 2 \times (10 - 0) = 20$
 - b. $\text{Range} = 2 \times (\text{Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score} - \text{Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score})$
 - c. $r = \sqrt[\text{root}]{\text{range}} - 1$ for all values of root between 1 to 21

This method produces the set of bands used in the GTI listed in table C.4.

TABLE C.4

Bands used in the GTI

Band number	Bands	Band cut off values	Band number	Bands	Band cut off values
1	0	0	12	5.5	578.19
2	0.5	1.78	13	6	1030.79
3	1	3.18	14	6.5	1837.66
4	1.5	5.67	15	7	3276.14
5	2	10.1	16	7.5	5840.64
6	2.5	18.01	17	8	10412.57
7	3	32.11	18	8.5	18563.3
8	3.5	57.24	19	9	33094.25
9	4	102.04	20	9.5	58999.71
10	4.5	181.92	21	10	105183.4
11	5	324.32			

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
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