* Tobacco control efforts in California during the 2001-2002 legislative session were hampered by the resurgence of the tobacco industry and a lack of commitment from the Davis Administration.

* During the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco industry spent a total of $5.95 million in political expenditures, which is an increase of $1.3 million over the previous legislative session.

* Campaign contributions from the tobacco industry to legislators, legislative candidates, political parties and constitutional officers totaled $1.66 million, a 13% increase over the previous election cycle.

* Tobacco industry to campaign contributions continue to favor Republicans over Democrats, although the divide is not as great as in previous years. Thus, of the $1,153,466 that was contributed to an identifiable party (including candidates, constitutional officers, legislators and political parties) during the 2001-2002 legislative session, $706,150 went to Republicans (61%) compared to $447,316 to Democrats (39%). This is an increase from the previous election cycle, when Republicans received 58% ($857,023) of the tobacco industry’s contributions in California and Democrats received 42% ($613,587).

* An additional $513,000 was contributed to non-partisan committees in 2001-2002.

* The largest recipients of tobacco industry funds during the 2001-2002 legislative session were Assemblyman Tony Strickland (R-Dist.37), who received $63,000 and Senator James Brulte (R-Dist.31) who received $67,500.

* On average, for every one point increase in a legislator's tobacco policy score, tobacco industry campaign contributions decreased by $3,270. This is a slight decrease from the 1997-1998 legislative session when a one point increase in the policy score resulted in a $3,690 decrease in tobacco industry campaign contributions

*During the 2001-2002 legislative session, 74 candidates and elected officials did not accept contributions from the tobacco industry; 16 Republicans (23% of 69 Republicans) and 59 Democrats (59% of 100 Democrats).

* Among the committees that review tobacco control policy, members of the Assembly Governmental Organizations Committee received the highest average tobacco industry campaign contribution among those recipients who accepted tobacco industry funding: $16,988 per member accepting tobacco funds. The Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee ranked a close second ($16,750 per accepting member), followed by the Senate Governmental Organizations Committee ($14,694 per accepting member) and the Assembly Health Committee ($12,778 per accepting member). With the exception of the Assembly Budget and Appropriations Committees, all of the Republican members of these committees accepted tobacco industry campaign contributions.

* The tobacco industry spent $4.29 million on lobbying expenditures during the 2001-2002 legislative session, including $3.64 million paid directly to lobbying firms and an additional $649,076 on activities and other expenditures to influence policy making in California. Excluding activity and other expenditures, the tobacco industry increased its lobbying expenditures by $1.05 million (a 41% increase) between the 1999-2000 and 2001-2002 legislative sessions.

* The tobacco industry has adopted a new strategy of using independent expenditure committees, which are not required to report political expenditures, to attack and discredit policy makers sympathetic to tobacco control in California.

* Of the 10 tobacco-related bills that were enacted during the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco lobbying firms reported lobbying against seven of them. The three bills not lobbied on included: a) AB2205 which increases the penalty for knowingly holding or selling tobacco products without having paid the appropriate tobacco tax, b) AB 1867 which expands the area around totlots in which smoking is prohibited and c) SB 322 which prohibits the sale of bidis.

* Of the 17 tobacco-related bills that were not enacted during the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco lobbying firms reported lobbying against 12.

* The tobacco industry has also made efforts to gain legitimacy in the public’s eye through youth prevention programs and image changes, such as Philip Morris changing its name to Altria and renewing its efforts to donate funds to community projects. The result is that policy makers, such as Carole Migden, are starting to state that the tobacco industry has changed as a justification for accepting tobacco industry campaign contributions.

* The effectiveness of California’s tobacco control efforts were recognized by the tobacco industry in September 2002 when R.J. Reynolds filed suit against the California Tobacco Education Media Campaign, claiming that the media campaign made it impossible for the tobacco companies to receive a fair trial with an unbiased jury. Judge Michael T. Garcia ruled against the tobacco company.

* R.J. Reynolds made a second attempt at legitimacy in the court of public opinion, this time in conjunction with Lorillard, by returning to the California Courts in April 2003, filing allegations of vilification by the Media Campaign.

* The tobacco industry spends more than $1.2 billion annually on advertising and promotions in California alone. At the same time, California’s Tobacco Control Program was funded at only about 12% of the tobacco industry’s expenditures on advertising and promotions.

* The Tobacco Control Program’s budget has continued to erode at the hands of the Davis Administration. The Governor’s Proposal for the 2003-2004 Budget appropriates approximately $86 million for the program, which is a decrease from $108 million in 2002-2003 and $154 million in 2001-2002. The decline in revenues is due to a decrease in Proposition 99 revenues as a result of decreased tobacco consumption and a lack of new funds dedicated to the Tobacco Control Program. At the same time, inflation has reduced the purchasing power of the funds that are available.

* In 2001, Governor Davis increased funding for the Media Campaign $19 million in FY1999-2000 to $45 million for FY2000-2001 and FY2001-2002. In 2001, Governor Davis also allocated $20 million from the state’s share of MSA revenues for a youth anti-smoking campaign. However, this commitment to the Tobacco Control Program was short-lived, as Governor Davis withdrew the additional funds in 2002.

* While rates of tobacco use in California have remained stable at about 17% between 2000 and 2001, the prevalence decreased to 16.6% in 2002. This drop may be a reflection of the additional funds provided in 2000 and 2001.

* In 2002, there were three proposals introduced to increase the cigarette excise tax. Governor Davis introduced a 50 cent increase which was changed to a 63 cent increase in the Senate’s revision of the budget, Senator Deborah Ortiz introduced a 65 cent increase, and Speaker Herb Wesson proposed a $2.13 increase. While Senator Ortiz intended the revenues from a tax increase to go to tobacco control and access to health care programs, neither the Governor nor Speaker Wesson earmarked any portion of the tax for tobacco control efforts. None of these proposals were enacted.

* In January 2003, Governor Davis included a $1.10 cigarette tax increase in his 2003-2004 Budget proposal, but these funds were intended to bridge the $34.6 billion budget deficit and as of April 2003, none of the revenues were earmarked for tobacco control efforts.

* In his May 2003 budget revision, Governor Davis proposed only a 23 cent tax increase in 2003-2004 and an additional 40 cent tax increase in 2004-2005. This decision was made despite a 61% public approval for a cigarette tax increase of $2.00 and a 68% approval for a cigarette tax increase of 75 cents.

* While state officials decided to securitize $2.5 billion in Master Settlement Agreement revenues in January 2003, the Governor's May 2003 budget revision indicated that the state would not securitize its remaining share of funds. Instead, the $173 million expected for the next fiscal year would be used to cover General Fund expenditures for the Healthy Families Program.

*. While the Governor's May revision of the 2003-2004 Budget did not reflect the Tobacco Education and Research Oversight Committee’s funding recommendations, funding for the Tobacco Control Program was increased by 6% as opposed to a decrease or a diversion of funds as a result of a one time increase in the Proposition 10 backfill.

* While the Davis Administration has not exhibited the hostility to the Tobacco Control Program evidenced during the Wilson years, it has also failed to give an effective program a priority. Progress only took place when the administration was faced with external pressures, either mounted by health advocates or, in one case, a legal challenge by the tobacco industry.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• In 2002, 22.7% of Nebraskans over the age of 18 were current smokers, accounting for approximately 389,000 smokers.

• Since 1995, the prevalence of adult tobacco use in Nebraska has remained about 1 percentage point below the national average, but per capita tobacco consumption in Nebraska has been falling more slowly than the Unites States as whole.

• The tobacco industry has directly been a major political force in Nebraska through lobbying and campaign contributions. The tobacco industry spent over $1,027,000 on lobbying from 1997-2002. The tobacco industry made direct campaign contributions to the members of the 2003- 2004 Nebraska Legislature totaling almost $93,000 over the course of their legislative careers.

• Only 20 of the 49 members of the 2003-2004 Legislature have never accepted money from the tobacco industry.

• The tobacco industry has also worked to increase its political influence in Nebraska by recruiting, often through financial contributions, third-party allies such as the Nebraska Restaurant Association, the Nebraska Chamber of Commerce, the Nebraska Retail Grocers Association, the Nebraska Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association, the Nebraska Retail Federation, the Nebraska Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors and the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association.

• Despite opposition from the tobacco industry and its allies and the lack of a well-established grassroots tobacco control community, Nebraska was an early leader in passing statewide clean indoor air laws. Due largely to the efforts of state Senator Shirley Marsh, the Nebraska Legislature passed its first clean indoor air law in 1974, only one year after Arizona passed the first law in the nation that required smoking restrictions in some public places.

• In 1979, the Nebraska Legislature passed the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act, which was sponsored by state Senator Larry Stoney. The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was stronger than similar legislation that was proposed in New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts at the same time. The tobacco industry and its allies responded by mobilizing against the implementing rules and regulations for the Act and succeeded in weakened these regulations.

• The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was not strengthened for 20 years until 1999 when the Legislature passed a bill that required that almost all state buildings and vehicles become smokefree.

• From 2000 -2003, the Legislature also strengthened the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act by requiring that commercial daycare facilities be smokefree and extending its enforcement provisions to include business owners. • From 1999-2004, the Nebraska Legislature has rejected three different attempts by state Senator Nancy Thompson to make restaurants throughout Nebraska smokefree. • Using tobacco settlement money, in 2000, the Nebraska Legislature approved $7 million per year for three years to increase funding for a preexisting state tobacco control program, Tobacco Free Nebraska.

• Due to pressure from tobacco control advocates, the Nebraska Legislature approved a $0.30 cigarette excise tax increase in 2002, but the Legislature was only willing to pass this increase during a budget crisis and no earmark was provided for tobacco control.

• Citing budget concerns in 2003, the Legislature cut funding for Tobacco Free Nebraska from $7 million per year to $405,000, despite several different options for continuing funding for tobacco control.

• In 2003, the Lincoln-Lancaster County Health Department led the push to pass Nebraska first comprehensive smokefree workplaces ordinances, but due to pressure from the tobacco industry and its allies, the Lincoln City Council passed a weakened and confusing ordinance that exempted bars and allowed separately ventilated “smoking rooms.”

• Tobacco control advocates have made progress in Nebraska, but they have not yet mobilized the political resources necessary to avoid suffering significant defeats at the hands of the tobacco industry.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Dakota has a long history of tobacco-related legislation dating back to the late 1800's, well before the formal organization of health advocates for tobacco control. Citizens of North Dakota recognized the negative health effects of tobacco smoke before most of the nation and made attempts to regulate the sale and use of tobacco products throughout the early 1900's. In 1913, the North Dakota legislature went as far as prohibiting the use of tobacco products in the state. However, all this early tobacco control legislation has since been repealed. From 1975-1983, clean indoor air legislation was introduced by legislators in North Dakota due to constituent requests and personal dislike of secondhand smoke exposure by some legislators. This legislation was consistently supported by GASP and the American Lung Association of North Dakota. These organizations were unable to pass strong clean indoor air legislation on their own.

The mobilization of health advocates for tobacco control policy did not begin until the late 1980's when Dr. Stephen McDonough joined the State Health Department as the Head of the Preventive Health Section and Director of Maternal and Child Health. In 1985, Dr. McDonough joined forces with Marcie Andre of the North Dakota Lung Association to form the first tobacco control coalition in the state, Tobacco Free North Dakota. Tobacco Free North Dakota successfully brought together the State Health Department, voluntary health agencies, and other health organizations to work for tobacco control policy in the state. Tobacco Free North Dakota was in existence throughout the 1990's but became progressively less effective in promoting state level tobacco control policy due to increased tobacco industry involvement in state level politics. Through the efforts of Dr. McDonough and Tobacco Free North Dakota the first North Dakota state tobacco plan, "Tobacco, Health, and the Bottom Line" was developed in 1986. At the time the plan was one of only six that had been developed in the country. Through the leadership provided by McDonough, the active coalition of Tobacco Free North Dakota, and the well-developed plan tobacco control advocates were able to strengthen clean indoor air legislation (HB 1272) and pass a tobacco tax increase in 1987. The passage of clean indoor air legislation which required the designation of a smoking area in places of public assembly was similar to the 1975 Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act which had been passed 12 years earlier. Although weak by 2004 standards and well behind Minnesota, HB 1272 strengthened clear indoor air law in North Dakota.

The mobilization of health advocates for tobacco control led to an increase in tobacco industry involvement in state politics and subsequent decrease in state level tobacco control policy. The tobacco industry has built and strengthened networks of third party allies, including the Tobacco Wholesalers Association, North Dakota Grocers Association, ND Petroleum Marketers Association, North Dakota Retail Association, and the Greater North Dakota Association to fight the public battles against tobacco control policy allowing the tobacco industry to remain behind the scenes.

Although the path of tobacco industry money in North Dakota is difficult to trace due to poor reporting requirements, piecing together reported political contributions, tobacco industry budgets, and media reports provides evidence that tobacco industry funds have influenced the political process in North Dakota. The tobacco industry successfully halted the passage of tobacco control policy at the state level. The only state level legislative successes for health advocates beyond the 1987 legislative session was the prevention of the passage of preemptive legislation supported by the tobacco industry.

In the early 1990's tobacco control advocates recognized the stall in state level tobacco control policy due to the infiltration of the political process by the tobacco industry. Wisely, tobacco control leadership at the State Health Department including Dr. McDonough and Jeanne Prom, State Health Department Tobacco Prevention and Control Administrator(1992-2001), shifted the focus to local level politics where the force of the tobacco industry was less powerful. In 1992, the State Health Department began funding local public health units for coalition building and the passage of youth access ordinances. Local tobacco control policy flourished throughout the 1990's with a total of 38 youth access ordinances enacted.

The most significant local policy success in North Dakota was the passage of a smokefree restaurant ordinance in Minot, North Dakota on April 2, 2001. The STAMP coalition with the leadership of Kelly Buettner-Schmidt working in collaboration with City Council members Andy Bertsch and Stephan Podrygula secured the passage of the ordinance by the Minot City Council. As has happened in many other states following first passage of a smoke-free restaurant ordinance (with undisclosed backing from the tobacco industry), four days after the passage of the ordinance a referendum was forced and the smoke-free ordinance was subsequently brought to a vote of the people. Due to the efforts of the STAMP coalition the ordinance was successfully upheld by a vote of the people and became effective January 1, 2002.

On the state level, State Health Officer Murray Sagsveen, under the direction of Republican Governor Edward Schafer, set the stage for the allocation of minimal Master Settlement Agreement funds to tobacco control in North Dakota. Prior to the 1999 legislative session health advocates failed to effectively advocate for the allocation of the funds to tobacco control. Therefore, the Governor and legislature determined that only 10% of the funds would be directed to a Community Health Trust Fund. Prior to the 2001 legislative session health advocates lost the leadership previously provided by Dr. Stephen McDonough and Attorney General Heidi Heitkamp and did not unify behind a plan for the allocation of the funds in the Community Health Trust Fund. The determination of the implementing legislation was largely left to the legislature. However, health advocates did play a role in shaping the Community Health Grants Program. The Community Health Grants Program directed the funds in the Community Health Trust Fund to the local public health units where tobacco control advocates have traditionally been the most successful in North Dakota.

In the late 1990's the tobacco control infrastructure built by Tobacco Free North Dakota in the late 1980's crumbled due to loss of leadership and an adverse environment for tobacco control within the State Health Department. In 2003, health advocates in North Dakota were in the process of rebuilding this infrastructure in order to move forward with state level tobacco control policy.

Minnesota was a pioneer in the tobacco control movement in the United States. Minnesota enjoyed early success with the passage of the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act in 1975 which created nonsmoking sections in public places, including workplaces and restaurants throughout the state. While modest by 2003 standards, this act represented a major step forward at the time. It was enacted without any overt opposition from the tobacco industry, something that would never happen again.

Between 1975 and 2003, there have been victories in tobacco control, particularly when political figures have shown leadership. Individuals and organizations outside government have often rallied to support this leadership that is necessary to sustain an effective tobacco control program in the long run in the face of strong opposition from the tobacco industry and its allies. These organizations, however, have not developed an independent leadership and agenda-setting capability. As a result, when the politicians in power adopt positions hostile to tobacco control and supportive of the tobacco industry, the “advocates” for tobacco control tend to retreat in the face of political attack. The series of victories and defeats are often associated with a sense of complacency that success was accomplished, rather than a vigilant preparation for the next attack.