The United States has waged low-grade economic warfare against China for at least four years now—firing volley after volley of tariffs, export controls, investment blocks, visa limits, and much more. But Washington’s endgame for this conflict has always been hazy. Does it seek to compel specific changes in Beijing’s behavior or to challenge the Chinese system itself? To protect core security interests or to retain hegemony by any means? To strengthen the United States or to hobble its chief rival? Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s scattershot regulation and erratic public statements offered little clarity to allies, adversaries, and companies around the world. Joe Biden’s actions as president have been more systematic, but long-term U.S. goals remain hidden beneath bureaucratic opacity and cautious platitudes.
Last October, however, a dense regulatory filing from a little-known federal agency gave the strongest hint yet of U.S. intentions. The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new extraterritorial limits on the export to China of advanced semiconductors, chipmaking equipment, and supercomputer components. The controls, more so than any earlier U.S. action, reveal a single-minded focus on thwarting Chinese capabilities at a broad and fundamental level. Although the limits were framed as a national security measure, the primary damage to China will be economic, on a scale well out of proportion to Washington’s cited military and intelligence concerns. The U.S. government imposed the new
