Confederate Cavalry At Chickamauga - What Went Wrong?

 This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – [email protected]

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 1990 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

CONFEDERATE CAVALRY AT CHICKAMAUGA—

WHAT WENT WRONG?

by

LAWYN C. EDWARDS, MAJ, USA

B.S., United States Military Academy, 1975

M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology, 1987

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

LIST OF MAPS 6

SOURCES 6

LIST OF TABLES 7

SOURCES 7

LIST OF FIGURES 8

DEDICATION 9

INTRODUCTION 10

CHAPTER ONE — American Cavalry Tradition and Tactics 14

CHAPTER TWO — Confederate Cavalry 26

CHAPTER THREE — Tullahoma Campaign 51

CHAPTER FOUR — Chickamauga Campaign 69

CHAPTER FIVE — Battle of Chickamauga 98

CHAPTER SIX — Conclusions 118

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 133

APPENDICES 134

APPENDIX A — JUNE 23 - JULY 7, 1863. —The Middle Tennessee, or Tullahoma, Campaign. 134

APPENDIX B — August 16 - September 22, 1863. — The Chickamauga Campaign. 136

BIBLIOGRAPHY 139

ABSTRACT

CONFEDERATE CAVALRY AT CHICKAMAUGA -WHAT WENT WRONG? By MAJ Lawyn C. Edwards, USA

This study investigates General Braxton Bragg’s use of cavalry during the pivotal Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. As army commander, Bragg was responsible for organizing units, selecting commanders, and assigning missions. His decisions had significant impact upon the tactical and operational fortunes of the Army of Tennessee and on Confederate strategy.

First, this investigation defines the unique heritage of American cavalry. Second, it addresses the actual employment of cavalry in the United States of America. Did these roles coincide with those of European cavalry? Did available army and cavalry leadership play a crucial part in the successes and failures of Confederate plans? Do the careers of Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and Forrest offer clues to their efforts at Chickamauga? Also, how did the elements of national power (political, military, economic, geographic, and national will), contribute to Confederate cavalry performance?

This study concludes that blame is to be shared between the commanders involved and the system within which they fought. This study presents an in depth view of the performance of Confederate cavalry in this victory at the River of Death.

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1.—Theater of Operations

Map 2.—Area of Interest

Map 3.—Chickamauga Campaign

Map 4.—Battle of Chickamauga

SOURCES

Map 3:

H.V. Boynton, The National Military Park, Chickamauga-Chattanooga. An Historical Guide (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke Co., 1895), p. 22.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1—Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 10 June 1863

Table 2—Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 20 July 1863

Table 3—Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 31 July 1863

Table 4—Confederate Cavalry Order of Battle, 31 July 1863, Army of Tennessee

Table 5—Abstract from Return and Cavalry Order of Battle, 31 July 1863, Department of East Tennessee

Table 6—Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee and Department of East Tennessee, 10 August 1863

Table 7—Confederate Cavalry Order of Battle, 10 August 1863, Army of Tennessee

Table 8—Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 20 August 1863

Table 9—Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863

SOURCES

The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 vols. , Washington, DC: War Department, 1880-1901.

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1—Regimental Armored Cavalry Squadrons

Figure 2—Divisional Cavalry Squadrons

SOURCES

U.S. Army, FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986)

DEDICATION

I am dedicating this work to the American soldier. Not only to the soldier of today, or the blue or the gray, but to all of them. My final conclusion in this work does not lay any guilt upon the private soldier of the Army of Tennessee. I truly believe it is up to the leadership to assist and allow the American fighting man to win this nation’s wars. As a member of that leadership element, I am always reminded of a quote from a past president of Washington College, R.E. Lee. He said, Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more. You should never wish to do less.

I also will allow myself the belief that the armies of the United States and the Confederate States in the field during the Spring and Summer of 1863, Americans all, were good enough to have walked across the face of Europe if they had been of a mind to do so. No matter what General von Moltke thought about these being two armed mobs rather than armies, they would have knocked his Prussians off the field. Since this is merely a personal feeling, I need not defend it here. I hope to do better in the thesis on its subject.

I thank my wife for the untold assistance in this work and the patience to put up with me. She motivated me several times. I also will now go play ball with my twins, just like I promised them. I thank my mother and father for the help they rendered also. The final work was worth the hassle.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis has deep roots in a life-long thirst for knowledge on the War Between the States, the American Civil War. For my family, this was not a Civil War. No one fought or sided with the North in any of my four ancestral lineages. Interestingly enough, my wife’s family can say the same. These people lived so far back in the Georgia and Alabama woods that they probably did not even know any Yankees, much less understand Yankee ideas and ways. In my great-great grandfather Louis Trawick’s family, ten brothers went off to war. One came home; it was not Louis.

Also, in today’s modern army, I am a cavalryman, having served both in the air and on the ground. I have spent my career learning the employment of light, fast-moving, hard-hitting cavalry forces whether they consist of M551 Sheridan Assault vehicles, M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles, OH-58 Scout helicopters, or AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. Though a small part of the US Army’s forces, cavalry units guard the forward deployed forces and will most likely be the first to fight in a full-scale war. Whether or not they are properly manned, equipped, organized, and led will certainly play a large part in US Army success in any such war. Learning from operations of the past may prepare me for those of the future. Certainly at the level where cavalry plays its largest role, the US Corps, the operational art of battle is in effect.

Cavalry units have historically been, and still are, almost always vastly outnumbered. Nevertheless, cavalry units today must successfully play their role in the battle with the ultimate goal being to win the battle in the covering force area. We must win from the outset.

Cavalry units did play a role in the great Civil War battle of the Western Theater, Chickamauga. Cavalry units were available for employment before the active fighting started in the campaign, through the battle, and during its aftermath. Chickamauga, however, was an infantry fight. The tangled undergrowth and woods kept use of artillery and mounted cavalry options very restricted. Glenn Tucker said that Chickamauga was mere ground that few had ever heard of, much of it near worthless ground that lay uncultivated, vine-strewn, thicket-matted,—stretches that had never known a saw or heard the ring of the axe of man.{1} Looking at a map of the battlefield and recalling this statement makes one wonder whether there were a cavalry mission here. yet, Confederate cavalry units were present and made a contribution. Did their presence contribute to Union defeat? Could they have given more? Why were their uses and accomplishments so limited if they could have done better?

General James M. Gavin of World War II fame wrote in 1954 that he was not convinced that the army knew what it was doing with current cavalry operations. He said, What we now need, as a nation, is an understanding of the past that can be converted into tactics and battle hardware, and give its soul back to the cavalry.{2} However, the trend which has culminated in the current J-Series Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) in the US Army, has been away -From General Gavin’s desired objective. Current doctrine has emasculated the divisional cavalry squadrons with the intent of making them light-weight reconnaissance units only. Many suspect that their ability to develop the situation is limited, thereby restricting their usefulness to a division commander.

Conversely, at the operational level, the armored cavalry regiment of an army corps is one of the strongest, most versatile organizations in the history of warfare. This organization is not only well manned and equipped but it honestly has the ability to hurt an enemy.

The US Army adopted the doctrine of Air Land Battle in the 1980’s.{3} The idea was to gain and maintain the initiative. The intention was to hit the enemy hard on the battlefield and deep behind the lines. He must be hit continually until he can no longer hold his army together. This doctrine called for a commander of strong fiber who had his ultimate goal in mind and who, by personal leadership, imbued his whole army with his confidence and will to win. Continuous operations require almost superhuman effort, because winners get just as tired as losers. However, when using tactical maneuver and effort to gain the national objective, extra effort even when tired pays off with great reward.

Chickamauga was a battle in which the Confederate army was the clear victor on the field. The Chickamauga campaigns, however, were not a Confederate victory. Retreats, tactical setbacks, and losses of territory demonstrated the poor Confederate performance in the maneuver phase of the battle. The aftermath was even worse. Chickamauga, the clear battlefield victory, was nothing but a hollow victory, wasted because the commander cast away its successes. Tactically, Chickamauga was a superb victory. Operationally, Chickamauga was a loss. Confederate leadership lost sight of its goals and its cavalry played a large role in the defeat.

The operational level of war, campaigns as opposed to just battles, is the level at which the Confederacy lost the battle of Chickamauga. The operational art of war takes the goals and political aims of a country and converts resources available into plans and orders for military campaigns.{4} In the Chickamauga campaigns, the military forces of the Army of Tennessee should have been employed in a series of maneuvers or battles designed to fulfill the well-planned goals of the army commander. As one campaign neared completion, whether defensive or offensive, the commander should have known what to do next to further his goals. These rapidly executed follow-on campaigns should cause the greatest possible hurt to the enemy.

While the commander plans his campaigns, he should also decide when he will give battle and on what terrain. If he feels the need, he can decline battle at any point, planning to fight on his own terms and terrain at a later date. He should strenuously identify the strengths and weaknesses of his enemy, as well as those of his own army. He should protect his weaknesses and exploit his strengths. He should go for the enemy’s jugular — his center of gravity — and avoid his enemy’s strengths.

To accomplish his goals, the commander must plan constantly. He must keep himself well informed and protected. Information gathering and security are the job of the cavalry. The commander must organize, equip, and train his cavalry to accomplish what he desires and then let them go do the job. He must also put to use what they bring him.

According to FM 100-5 in May 1986, the operational level of war "requires the commander to answer three questions:

1) What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?

2) What sequence of actions