Moral Laboratories: Family Peril and the Struggle for a Good Life

Moral Laboratories

The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the General Endowment Fund of the University of California Press Foundation.

Moral Laboratories

Family Peril and the Struggle for a Good Life

Cheryl Mattingly

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

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University of California Press

Oakland, California

© 2014 by The Regents of the University of California

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mattingly, Cheryl, 1951-

    Moral laboratories : family peril and the struggle for a good life / Cheryl Mattingly.

        p.    cm.

    Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-520-28119-6 (hardback)

ISBN 978-0-520-28120-2 (paper)

ISBN 978-0-520-95953-8 (e-book)

    1. Chronically ill children—Medical care—Moral and ethical aspects—California—Los Angeles County.    2. Children with disabilities—Medical care—Moral and ethical aspects—California—Los Angeles County.    3. African American families—California—Los Angeles County.    4. Medical anthropology—California—Los Angeles County.    5. Medical ethics—California—Los Angeles County.    I. Title.

RJ380.M28 2014

    362.19892009794 93—dc232014006568

Manufactured in the United States of America

23  22  21  20  19  18  17  16  15  14

10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1

In keeping with a commitment to support environmentally responsible and sustainable printing practices, UC Press has printed this book on Natures Natural, a fiber that contains 30% post-consumer waste and meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992 (R 1997) (Permanence of Paper).

To Steven, again

Contents

Acknowledgments

Prologue

PART ONE. FIRST PERSON VIRTUE ETHICS

1. Experimental Soccer and the Good Life

2. First Person Virtue Ethics and the Anthropology of Morality

PART TWO. MORAL BECOMING AND THE EVERYDAY

3. Home Experiments: Scenes from the Moral Ordinary

4. Luck, Friendship, and the Narrative Self

5. Moral Tragedy: The Perils of a Superstrong Black Mother

6. The Flight of the Blue Balloons: Narrative Suspense and the Play of Possible Selves

PART THREE. MORAL PLURALISM AS CULTURAL POSSIBILITY

7. Rival Moral Traditions and the Miracle Baby

8. Dueling Confessions: Revolution in the First Person

9. Tragedy, Possibility, and Philosophical Anthropology

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Acknowledgments

This is the second book to emerge from an ethnographic project that has followed African American families and their children in the Los Angeles area. It represents nearly fifteen years of research and the efforts of many people. It has grown out of the work of many partners over the years, including colleagues, former students, and friends. Mary Lawlor, my long-term research partner, is the most important person to mention. Together, we have served as principal and coprincipal investigators on a series of grants that have funded this research. Mary’s insights into the moral struggles that families face have continued to influence my own thoughts. Lanita Jacobs, a linguistic anthropologist, joined our team as a coinvestigator in 1999. The nuanced way she speaks and writes about race, her own first person perspective on how it is lived, have continued to haunt my thinking.

Then there are the many researchers, graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and research faculty who have spent some years on the project. Not only have these colleagues been an essential part of ethnographic fieldwork, they have also contributed numerous conceptual insights over the years through our data interpretation groups. Although no one has been involved for the duration of the project except Mary and me, many were part of it for three years or more, reflecting shifts in our funding and people’s personal lives. Core researchers have been Jeanne Adams, Kim Wilkinson, Nancy Bagatelle, Kevin Groark, Olga Solomon, Melissa Park, Teresa Kuan, Nancy Bagatelle, Erica Angert, Carolyn Rouse, Alice Kibele, Janine Blanchard, and Courtney Mykytyn. Several other colleagues have been part of the data analysis or have substantially contributed to other forms of research support (literature reviews and the like) that I have benefited from directly. These include Katy Sanders, Juleon Rabbani, Anita Kumar, Teresa Kuan, Melissa Park, Jason Throop, Aaron Bonsall, Michelle Elliot, Daylan Riggs, Cynthia Strathman, and Lindsay Miller. But there are many others who have worked on this study over the years, graduate and undergraduate students at the University of Southern California who have supported this research in invaluable ways: transcribing interviews and videotapes of clinic and home sessions, videotaping the Collective Narrative Groups, providing computer support, or taking care of children while parents talked to the research team. Although I can’t name them all here, I offer a heartfelt thanks to this dedicated crew.

And then there are the readers, people inside and outside the project who have read various versions of this book manuscript over the years. They have helped me see what I was saying when I myself was unclear. This is another long list. The most central are friends as well as colleagues: Mary Lawlor, Lone Grøn, Melissa Park, Teresa Kuan, and Lotte Meinert and Uffe Juul Jensen. They have played special roles over the years as a friends and sympathetic challengers, asking me essential and critical questions from their own philosophical positions. Finally, there are the readers who helped me to shape the book in the end. These include Art Frank and Jason Throop, reviewers whose comments and suggestions were so apt that they made the daunting task of revision more bearable. Reed Malcolm, University of California Press editor, has played a crucial role in helping to move this book along.

None of the chapters in this book, as they now stand, has appeared anywhere else in print. However, versions of some of the cases, and bits and pieces of previously published work, have been integrated within these book chapters. (Often I have changed pseudonyms in various publications to help protect the confidentiality of research participants.) Earlier published work in which some materials from this book have appeared includes: Love’s Imperfection: Moral Becoming, Friendship and Family Life (Mattingly [in press]), The Moral Perils of a Superstrong Black Mother (Mattingly 2014), What Can We Hope For? An Exploration in Cosmopolitan Philosophical Anthropology (Mattingly and Jensen [in press]), Moral Selves and Moral Scenes: Narrative Experiments in Everyday Life (Mattingly 2013), Two Virtue Ethics and the Anthropology of Morality (Mattingly 2012), The Machine Body as Contested Metaphor in Clinical Care (Mattingly 2011), I/We Narratives among African American Families Raising Children with Disabilities (Jacobs, Lawlor, and Mattingly 2011), Chronic Homework in Emerging Borderlands of Healthcare (Mattingly, Grøn, and Meinert, 2011), Reading Medicine: Mind, Body, and Meditation in One Interpretive Community (Mattingly 2006a), and Suffering and Narrative Re-envisioning (Mattingly 2006b).

I have presented earlier versions of some of these chapters—or parts of them—in many places and to a range of academic and clinical groups, both in the United States and in Europe, especially Denmark. Such presentations, and the discussions they have engendered from the audience, have helped immeasurably in the formulation of my arguments. Although I could give a long list of conferences, I single out several communities that, at different times, have played the most significant role—outside the research team, of course—in providing me a space to think things through.

One is a community of Danish researchers, primarily in anthropology and philosophy, at the University of Aarhus. The Center for Health, Humanity and Culture, Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, under the direction of Uffe Juul Jensen, has offered a crucial intellectual home, even when visits have been sporadic. In the fall of 2009, a joint guest professorship in the Department of Philosophy and the History of Ideas and the Department of Anthropology and Ethnography at the University of Aarhus provided financial support and an invaluable source of discussions as I revised the book manuscript—especially chapter 2. More recently, a Danish group of philosophers and anthropologists, especially Thomas Wentzer and Rasmus Dyring, interested in developing a new kind of philosophical anthropology focusing upon the phenomenology of morality, has contributed enormously to my thinking. The work on this book could not have been completed without the support of the Division of Occupational Science under Dr. Florence Clark, and the Dale T. Mortensen research fellowship I have received from Aarhus University’s Institute of Advanced Studies under Professor Morten Kyndrup. In one sense, this book is also part of a future that will continue to involve collaborations with colleagues associated with the Institute and Aarhus University.

A second is the Mind, Medicine, and Culture Seminar, a space where a group of medical, psychological, and linguistic anthropologists at the University of California, Los Angeles, regularly talk. I have presented to this seminar on occasion and attended when I could. Several members of this group, graduate students and faculty, have read earlier versions of various manuscripts that have (in some form or another) found their way into chapters in this book. This seminar has been one place that has fostered scholars interested in cultivating person-centered and phenomenological perspectives in their anthropological fieldwork and theorizing.

Though it has been some years since we got together, a third community I mention is one that Linda Garro and I organized—we called it the Narrative Group. Anthropology faculty from both the University of Southern California and University of California, Los Angeles with wide-ranging interests in narrative met about once a month to discuss working papers. Participants were Candy Goodwin, Janet Hoskins, Nancy Lutkehaus, Geyla Frank, Mary Lawlor, and Elinor Ochs.

My husband, Steven Heth, deserves special mention, not only as a source of support and as a listener to half-formed ideas, but for helping me in all kinds of practical ways, including his inspired idea for the cover art. It is difficult to convey how much his presence has meant in my life or how deeply it has influenced my understanding of the ethics of care, commitment and love that is also friendship.

I step back in time to thank some communities and individuals who have played such a vital role in shaping my work on narrative and the phenomenology of illness and healing. A Harvard group of medical anthropologists (funded for many years by the National Institutes of Mental Health), under the direction of Arthur Kleinman, Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, and Byron Good, offered me a first entrance into the world of medical anthropology. Glenn Bidwell and I had conversations in philosophy thirty years ago that, in a number of ways, provided a beginning for the ideas I continue to develop and write about here.

This ethnographic study has been made possible by several major federally funded grants, and I acknowledge them here: (1) Crossing Cultural Boundaries: An Ethnographic Study, funded from 1997 to 1999 by Maternal and Child Health in the Department of Health and Human Services; (2) Boundary Crossing: An Ethnographic and Longitudinal Study, funded from 2000 to 2004 (#1 R01-HD38878) by National Center for Medical Rehabilitation Research in the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, National Institutes of Health; and (3) Boundary Crossings: RE-Situating Cultural Competence, funded from 2005 to 2011 (#2 R01-HD38878), again by the National Center for Medical Rehabilitation Research in the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, National Institutes of Health. The National Institutes of Health also provided supplemental grants that supported two vital members of the research team: Lanita Jacobs (#3 R01 HD38878–01A1S1) and Ann Neville-Jan. Additional support has been provided over the years by the Division of Occupational Science and Occupational Therapy under the direction of Dr. Florence Clark.

The artist, Maggie Michaels, has graciously allowed me to use one of her wonderful works for my cover art. I thank her as well.

Finally, I thank the many clinicians, children, and family members who have allowed us such access to their lives. There has been such generosity. People have given time, a willingness to speak frankly, often about difficult matters, and—in the case of families—invitations to all manner of family events. I have never carried out research where people invited me in to this extent. It would not have been possible for me to write this kind of book, to tackle the questions I do, without such openness. Although, to protect confidentiality I cannot name them personally, I hope that my gratitude can be heard.

Prologue

Once in the late 1980s (more or less), when I was still an unsure graduate student, I attended a panel at one of the annual American Anthropology Association meetings. It was one of those panels whose audience fills an entire hotel conference ballroom. I’ve long since forgotten the topic. The important thing was that extremely influential scholars from both anthropology and philosophy spoke on the panel. Two of my favorite philosophers were there—Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus. They each discussed Heidegger and the significance of his phenomenology for anthropology. They amicably referred to one another’s work in their talks. I was no expert, but I had read both Dreyfus and Taylor on Heidegger and it seemed to me they should be disagreeing. I had also been to various philosophy conferences in the past and had heard philosophers in heated debate. I knew they liked to be contentious, and I’d always found this very educational. (I had once scrounged money early in my graduate career to attend a critical theory conference in Dubrovnik—in what was then Yugoslavia—where Gadamer and Habermas were promised to debate.)

But at this anthropology panel, there sat Dreyfus and Taylor chatting agreeably with one another on stage. I was puzzled. Finally, near the very end of the session, just as Dreyfus, led by Paul Rabinow, left the conference table and was heading down the aisle wheeling his suitcase, I screwed up my courage to stand up and ask a question. I know you have to leave, Professor Dreyfus, I ventured timidly, nodding in his departing direction and then turning to face Taylor, still on stage. But as I have read both of you, it has seemed to me that you each have very different interpretations of Heidegger’s phenomenology. Have I got that wrong? Dreyfus broke into a great grin, turned around and energetically wheeled his suitcase back toward the stage. Rabinow followed him in surprise. You are absolutely right, he said, returning to his seat. Taylor nodded. And the two of them spent another fifteen minutes or so defending their versions of Heidegger in cheerful dispute.

Their conversation has stayed with me not only because I admired their fondness for discussion but also because I was trying to understand how to think with phenomenology. I could see that one approach tended to focus on practices themselves. This seemed to me what Dreyfus was most concerned with. His Heidegger offered new ways to consider our practical understandings and activities in phenomenological terms, experientially, as an immersion in the world through our engagement with it. Taylor especially took from Heidegger a way to consider human life, even individual selves. He was drawing from Heidegger’s phenomenology of temporality because Taylor was interested in moral becoming from an experiential perspective.

There were obvious overlaps between these two Heideggers, but there was also something not only different, but vitally different, in their approaches. All these years later, I would now put it this way. Taylor was committed to a thick first person phenomenology of action, motive, intention, and moral evaluation. Dreyfus was not. His focal concern was practice itself—no strong first person claims of the sort Taylor was advancing were necessary to his phenomenological inquiry. My own moral framework outlined in this book follows Taylor’s line of thought much more closely than Dreyfus’s. This difference, though apparently subtle, is worth exploring ethnographically as well as theoretically. Or so it seems to me. I also tell this story because this book is filled with debate. In fact, I have never written something so frankly fractious. I write about African American families facing peril, often on many fronts. They are raising children who are seriously, sometimes desperately, ill or disabled. They are very often poor. Many live in dangerous neighborhoods and are presented with an onslaught of disasters. And yet I insist upon an anthropology of morality grounded in a first person virtue ethics that takes disempowered people’s moral projects and their beliefs about the good seriously. I do so in a way that regularly puts me at odds with some of the most influential contemporary trends in social theory. I speak of individuals more than about social groups and social categories, the singularities of experience more than its reproductive features, inner emotion and selfhood more often than public personhood. I am primarily concerned with moral possibility and, sometimes, revolutionary transformation, but I rarely explore these in the context of large-scale historical events or transgressive social movements. Rather, I direct my gaze to the humbler moments of everyday life among people who are primarily trying to get by and make do with the (mostly bad) lot that has been handed them. I offer mundane moments of family life as high drama. I look at what seems from an outside (read: middle-class) perspective, like an extraordinary event (a murder, an incarceration), as part of ordinary life. I look at how extraordinary body treacheries (a young child’s rare form of brain cancer) are folded into the everyday. Sometimes I catalogue the kinds of social oppression visited upon people, but even here, I attend more to how they creatively and stoically respond to unjust or otherwise miserable social forces than to their underlying causes.

In trying to clear a path for a first person virtue ethics I have admittedly often taken a more contentious route than might seem necessary. Where I might find points of connection, I have often stressed points of disagreement. Where I might have relied upon conciliatory voices, I have opted to highlight those most opinionated and articulate about exactly the points with which I disagree. I hope putting them into debate is of some value, heuristically. I have always preferred a good intellectual fight for its clarifying qualities, though I have tended to prefer it from a seat in the audience. The positions and scholars I have challenged are ones I deeply respect, representing theoretical points of view of great merit that deserve to be taken seriously. They have commanded attention in the academy for good reason. Foucault and what can loosely be called the Foucauldian tradition serve as my favored adversaries. Foucault’s legacy is of monumental importance. It’s fair to say that he has radically altered the way we now think about the workings of institutional and neoliberal power. Certainly he is the single most influential twentieth-century philosopher in anthropology, and his late works on ethics constitute the most significant voice shaping the new anthropology of morality. He—and some scholars inspired by him—are good to think with, and also, at times, good to argue with. In one sense, my debating style throughout reflects an ongoing and troubled love affair with Foucault. His genius has shone such a brilliant light on things that matter a great deal to my own work, including suffering and ethics, that alternative perspectives can be hard to discern, cast as they are into the gloom.

The stories I tell have emerged from many years of research among African American families in Los Angeles. This book has a partner, a work that came out in 2010 (The Paradox of Hope) and is also based upon this long-term research. I return to some of the same families that I first introduced in The Paradox of Hope. I say less here than perhaps I could have about the research process and the many researchers who have been part of it. For those who would like more details, I refer them to the earlier work.

Although Moral Laboratories is not fashionably pessimistic or deconstructive, it is not very optimistic either. If it suffers from a certain Job-like bleakness, this is not only because so many bad things happen to those I write about but also because I treat the idea of miracles with great respect. The people I describe are struggling for good lives against the odds. Even just getting by can mean fighting to bring about something new, what Arendt has called the miracle of natality. This kind of striving is short on happy endings, though it is not short on suspense.

PART ONE

First Person Virtue Ethics

CHAPTER 1

Experimental Soccer and the Good Life

THE SOCCER GAME

It could be one of a thousand soccer fields scattered throughout the United States. Grade-school children in their uniforms running up and down the grass shouting to one another as parents cheer them on. An ordinary Saturday afternoon event repeated in countless American towns. Except that in the center of this field, surrounded by screaming children who fly by him, is a boy in a wheelchair propelled by another boy, and they, too, head in the direction of the ball. The boy’s father and mother stand at the sidelines watching the action. Tanya and Frank have three children, two girls and a boy who is their oldest. Their son Andy was born with cerebral palsy, an extremely severe case that not only leaves him physically disabled but very cognitively impaired as well. Despite this, Tanya especially knows how to communicate with him and reads his expressions easily. In fact, he shows his temper in no uncertain terms—smiling or glowering with an intensity that is hard to ignore. Tanya is determined to fight for her son’s rights to good schooling, and she is fierce in her determination to stand up to school board members, principals, and other public officials to try to get good care for her son. It’s my Jamaican blood, she laughs in justifying her willingness to battle authorities.

But it was her husband Frank who she credits with opening her eyes about her son’s capabilities to participate in everyday children’s activities that she would have shielded him from. Her husband is an athlete. When the economy was better, he was a personal trainer at a gym, and he is a natural at many sports. A son, his son, should love sports as much as he does, he maintained. Even when Andy was quite young, Frank devised a host of creative ways to bring him into favorite family sports played with his two younger sisters. He installed a basketball hoop in the backyard, and he and Andy would shoot hoops together as he lifted him out of the wheelchair high enough above the rim so that Andy could drop the ball and score a goal.

When Andy got older and bigger, Frank decided that he should get Andy involved in the local children’s soccer team. Although it was a special needs soccer team, the children had cognitive disabilities rather than physical ones. Certainly none used wheelchairs or had the physical frailties Andy did. Tanya was terrified and absolutely refused. She and her husband fought about this for several years. What if he falls? she worried. Soccer can be a rough sport. He is so medically fragile—what can he do in his wheelchair? But her husband prevailed and she let her son go on the field. During one of those games, just as she feared, children accidentally knocked over his wheelchair and he toppled down. But, to her great surprise, he was not only okay; he didn’t even seem to mind. He didn’t act frightened at all. Oh I was scared to death, she recounts. But I guess my husband was right. I didn’t realize I was holding Andy back, not letting him be the kid he should get to be. This is a story she has told more than once. It moves her every time. It catches her up short, this realization that despite all her determination that others see her son as capable, she herself underestimated him.

CARE AND ITS MORAL COMPLEXITIES

How might we think of Tanya’s situation as an ethical problem? How, more specifically, does it pose a problem for her as related to her practices of care? Tanya is one of the parents I have come to know through the years as my colleagues and I have carried out an ethnographic study of African American families in Los Angeles who are raising children with severe disabilities and chronic illnesses. Parents are called upon to try to ascertain what is best for their children and for themselves in the changing circumstances of everyday life and in midst of the many other tasks and problems that they must simultaneously address. This is, in other words, a complex reasoning task that engenders ongoing moral deliberations, evaluations, and experiments in how to live.

In the face of the suffering and challenges of their children, parents often find themselves propelled in a quest to imagine a new sort of life for themselves or to become different kinds of persons. They are propelled into a new, often unexpected and unwanted project of becoming. Suffering can engender new or intensified moral responsibilities. These, too, may demand a transformative effort to reimagine not only what will happen, but also what ought to happen, or how one ought to respond not only to difficulties and suffering but also to unexpected possibilities (Mattingly 2010a). The work of care, in other words, demands the work of cultivating virtues to be, for example, a good enough parent. As one father put it, you have to step up to the plate to raise a very sick child, and this can prove an almost impossible feat. Parents’ ability to respond to the call or needs of their vulnerable children, and to create a social world in which their children can be better cared for, become primary moral projects, often superseding their own personal dreams and goals. Furthermore, these are social moral projects that change shape over time, requiring the development of communities of care, an expanding we that brings together an array of people outside the immediate family, including neighbors and friends, other parents, and clinical professionals.

Such moral work can provoke a critical examination of one’s life and one’s character, an attempt to transform the practical engagements and commitments of oneself, one’s family, even one’s community. It can also precipitate efforts to transform not only oneself but also the social and material spaces in which one lives. The moral (or ethical) engine of these efforts of transformation is a ground project (as the philosopher Bernard Williams [1981] speaks of it) that I am simply calling care of the intimate other. I explore the moral complexity of ground projects, practices of care that parents (using the term broadly to include all parenting kin in a family) undertake in circumstances that are fraught and uncertain, when it often seems impossible to find any best good that is worth acting upon, but where, nonetheless, people continue to care about and struggle to obtain some version of a good life. I use the terms moral and ethical interchangeably throughout. There are theoretical reasons for my doing so, just as – for different theoretical reasons—many scholars differentiate the two. I won’t say more at this stage; this is a matter for discussion further down the road. (Especially in chapters 2 and 3.)

The ethnographic heart of this book has emerged from a research project that began in January 1997 and continued until 2011. It has followed African American families residing in Los Angeles County, many from South Central LA. The research has been carried out by a larger, interdisciplinary research team under the direction of Mary Lawlor and myself. I have described the parameters and key questions motivating the research elsewhere (see especially Mattingly 2010b), and I do not go into much detail here. The study is officially over, though a number of us who constituted the core research team continue to be in contact with these families. There have been close to fifty families in the study altogether (and approximately thirty at any one time). Twenty of them participated for more than ten years. Because I have known the families I write about for so many years, I have had the chance to consider, from many angles and over time, what it has meant for various members of the family to undertake these arduous projects of care. Although I rely upon what I have learned from this wide range of participants, in this book I concentrate primarily upon five families. Mostly I speak of mothers or grandmothers, because in our study they have been the ones most involved in bringing up the children (Lawler 2004). However, not only mothers but also fathers, aunts, older siblings, even cousins can play a central role in providing care. Their voices too are periodically heard.

The work of raising good children is a universal function of the family, anthropologists have argued (Ochs and Kremer-Sadlit 2007). Focus upon the family as a primary moral site is especially pertinent within the African American community, where, for many historical, political, and economic reasons, including systematic exclusion from the public life of work and career, the domestic space of the family and the care of children have served as essential ground projects. Many factors, including poverty, have also propelled African American families to be flexible and creative in their kinship arrangements. The importance of family, with a mother or grandmother often functioning as the ethical lynchpin, is a well-known feature of African American life and moral discourse.¹

In the context of African American families, one cannot overemphasize the centrality of what Collins (2000) has called the Superstrong Black Mother as a highly valued moral ideal around which a whole constellation of virtues have been extolled and, in the hands of black feminist scholars, also problematized.² This ideal type centers upon the primary task of care for and protecting others, especially one’s children.³ These qualities and virtues include being self-reliant and resourceful,⁴ assertive,⁵ self-sacrificing,⁶ and, above all, as the name implies, strong. This overarching quality of strength so often associated with the stereotypical black woman encompasses a range of other related or synonymous attributes, including being authoritarian, compelling, competent, courageous, decisive, emphatic, fiery, firm, loud, persistent, powerful, tenacious, vigorous, and zealous (Blackman 1999:60). Although not all of these characteristics may seem to be virtues, scholars of African American experience have argued their historical necessity from slavery onward and note that they continue to be essential attributes for black women living within a contemporary and still racist America.⁷ Strength, in all its many forms, is needed, because the task of caring for and protecting oneself and one’s family demands struggle—or to borrow an old expression once used by formerly enslaved black women—it demands one straggle, which means to struggle, strive and drag all at once (Miles 2008:101). Feminists have emphasized that this portrait of good motherhood equates it with a relentless willingness to strive and struggle, even a kind of martyrdom.⁸ Strength has operated as a cultural mandate, a moral imperative to exhibit an automatic endurance to a life perceived as filled with obstacles, unfairness, and tellingly, a lack of assistance from others (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2007:31). As a Superstrong Black Woman, one is inevitably guilty, already sentenced. Life itself is a matter of doing hard time.⁹

Feminists have challenged morally idealized representations of the Superstrong Black Mother even when acknowledging that it represents important qualities African American women have had to cultivate. There are resonances between this critical feminist perspective and the views expressed by many of the parents. They would generally concur that being a strong black mother (or father) has meant unrelenting sacrifice and the postponement or abandonment of personal dreams. It has also meant confronting the ways they fall short of this ideal. But I suggest throughout this book that the moral demands these parents face are not adequately captured by the difficulties of living up to the performative requirements of this subject position. It is not merely (though this is no small thing) that they may feel imprisoned by a position that is too difficult to attain, or by the need to perform a role against their own inner feelings or desires. Moral life poses even worse difficulties than this. Performative troubles often pale against the life-and-death struggles so many of their children face and the kind of demands this places upon parents. Again and again, I return to the moral perils parents encounter as they undertake the task of trying to become Superstrong Black Parents. I look especially at how often their lives are threatened by moral tragedy.

The home is obviously a crucial site in which parenting occurs and family life is created, but it is only one of the many moral spaces families traverse in their practices of care. Schools, parks, churches, clinics, neighborhoods—all these are central. Each such social and institutional world is characterized