Raised under Stalin: Young Communists and the Defense of Socialism

Introduction

THE FIRST SOCIALIST GENERATION

The day after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Nina Kosterina wrote in her diary, Do you remember, Nina Alekseevna, how you secretly dreamed of living through big, important events, through tumult and danger? Well here you go—war! Born in 1921, Kosterina was a devoted activist in the Young Communist League (Komsomol) during the formative period of Soviet socialism. Her enthusiasm endured the Great Terror despite her father’s arrest and her regrets over denouncing a friend whose parents were enemies of the people. The Komsomol taught her how to be a cultured Soviet young person and rewarded her with higher education, access to recreation, even food. As war in Europe and Asia threatened, her role as an ideal Soviet citizen increasingly included training marches and firearms practice. She and other Soviet young people knew that war was coming. Soon after the invasion, Kosterina volunteered for a partisan battalion and, like so many of her peers, perished before the end of 1941.¹

This book is a study of young communists like Nina Kosterina, who grew up in the wake of revolution and in the midst of war. They might have heard about prerevolutionary times but had never experienced life without Soviet rule. Only the oldest could recall a period when Joseph Stalin was not the absolute leader of the country. By the end of the 1930s, nearly a third of all young people joined the Komsomol, the vanguard organization of politically engaged Soviet youth (see Table 1 in appendix). The decade was a turbulent period of mass violence but also a time when people believed in a brighter future. After years of upheaval, Stalin declared in 1934 that the country had become the most advanced political entity in the world—the first socialist state. It seemed possible that within their lifetime, the children of the revolution might build the communist state that Marx had predicted.

As preparation for the socialist present and the communist future, the country’s leaders called for a new program of moral socialization, communist upbringing. Party leaders and Komsomol activists believed they were building a new society, but there was no blueprint for raising the first socialist generation. Decisions about how to create the ideal youth were filled with tensions: How should the regime channel enthusiasm without unleashing radicalism? Was the Komsomol a political organization of activists or a mass organization for socialization? What divided irredeemable enemies of the people from wayward youth? Stalinist youth leaders resolved these questions based on the problems of the day. Above all, socialist youth culture and Stalinist socialism more broadly were shaped by war. As the USSR prepared for conflict and experienced World War II, youth leaders discovered that building a socialist society meant to discipline and militarize young people.

Examining Soviet youth culture across the 1941 divide highlights the continuities between the prewar and wartime periods. Undoubtedly, Germany’s invasion of the USSR transformed the lives of Soviet citizens. The war was a life and death struggle that touched virtually every person in the USSR. Yet the entire period from 1929 to 1945 can be seen as an unbroken time of crisis that provided young people with opportunities even as it surrounded them with violence. Socialist practices of reward and terror evolved, growing into wartime practices of mass mobilization and coercion. When the war arrived, there was no shift from building socialism to defending it. The two goals were inseparable.

In virtually every country, young people represent hopes for the future. This was particularly so in the USSR, where youth was at the center of Soviet leaders’ attempts to transform society. Soviet people born around the time of the Bolshevik Revolution felt epochal changes that that shaped their identities as a generation. The formation of the first Soviet generation was also inseparable from Bolshevik conceptions about how youth should develop. Soviet leaders believed they had created a regime unlike any the world had seen and anticipated that the postrevolutionary state would produce new people from the young. Under the control of a Marxist regime, these new people were supposed to become physically and morally stronger than the older generations as they built the communist future.² At the same time, party leaders, like their counterparts throughout the modern world, felt anxiety over the malleability of youth and its seeming vulnerability to harmful influences.³ The Bolsheviks’ perceived enemies—domestic capitalists, foreign agents, and hooligans, among others—threatened to corrupt the future of the Soviet Union. Youth’s development into new people or their transformation into enemies became a measure of the Bolshevik regime’s success in its mission to fulfill the aspirations of the October Revolution.

In addition to youth’s figurative importance, young people played an important role as supporters of the new state. In the first years of Soviet rule, only a fraction of the population belonged to the Communist Party and the regime could count on just a small number of nonparty supporters as well. Among both groups, young people made up a large proportion. The Bolsheviks’ desperate need for loyalists to govern an enormous country thrust politically active youth into posts whose significance was unprecedented for young people in the modern world.⁴ The regime’s reliance on the young throughout the interwar period and during World War II increased concerns over their reliability, lack of experience, and turbulent nature. Anxieties over the future and the present of youth motivated the regime to cultivate the children of the revolution through discipline, terror, and reward.

The Komsomol was the regime’s main instrument in its efforts to shape and mobilize the young generation. Founded in the midst of the Russian civil war in 1918, it was a unique youth organization in several key respects. The league formed from the merger of various pro-Bolshevik young workers’ unions and student organizations. Its mission was to aid the new Soviet regime by generating support among young men and women and organizing them to work on its behalf. Unlike nearly all other contemporary, adult-led organizations, young people were the driving force in the Komsomol. Although the Communist Party had substantial control over the league, at the local level youth cells often enjoyed autonomy.⁵ Komsomol members were usually older than participants in similar youth organizations in other countries. During the 1930s, their average age was around twenty, with members’ ages spanning from fourteen well into their thirties.

The relative independence of pro-Soviet youth culture was a source of concern for the country’s leaders. During the 1920s, party leaders loathed the political indifference of some Komsomol youth. Non-Soviet culture coexisted uneasily with the new regime under the semi-market economy of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Bolsheviks feared that young people would imbibe the anti-Soviet attitudes of bourgeois life.⁶ At the same time, the opposite danger existed of young radicalism. A significant subculture of young activists became disillusioned with the relatively moderate NEP regime and advocated a renewal of class warfare on behalf of proletarians. Young civil war veterans, in particular, asked why they had fought for the Bolsheviks if the regime would not create a true workers’ state.⁷ The strong support Lev Trotsky and other oppositionists enjoyed among young people in the 1920s only made Stalin and his allies warier of the demographic.⁸ Compounding this independence was a sense of moral superiority to the older cohorts. Youth’s status as new people fostered a consciousness of their special generational destiny.⁹

As Stalin and his supporters rejected the relative moderation of NEP in the late 1920s, the regime’s relationship to youth culture also altered. The threat of a war with neighboring states motivated Stalin to push for radical, state-led modernization. He declared 1929 the year of the Great Turn, when the country would begin its transformation through forced-pace industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. Although many young people did not support these policies, a significant portion of radicals believed the Great Turn marked the continuation of the 1917 revolution that would create a workers’ state. As Stalin’s revolution from above unleashed young radicals, it destroyed the relatively independent political culture that had enabled their subculture to thrive. By the end of the 1920s, Komsomol cells transformed from semi-independent supporters of the Soviet state into a wholly dependent resource for the regime.¹⁰ The revolution from above created a virtual civil war between the regime and the countryside.¹¹ The key cause of conflict was the broad coercive license that leaders gave to police and activists of all ages to repress those who resisted Stalinist policies. Nonetheless, Stalin’s extraordinary dependence on youth activists intensified intergenerational conflict and exacerbated the explosion of violence in the country. By 1933, Stalin’s regime had won its war in the countryside but at a tremendous cost of lives and turmoil.

A central story of the creation of Stalinist socialism in the 1930s was the regime’s attempt to stabilize the country as war loomed. Japan threatened the Soviet Far East, while the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany appeared to make war in Europe inevitable. At the same time, Soviet officials obsessed over the potential fifth column of supposed domestic enemies among former oppositionists and class aliens. The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), Stalin’s secret police, repressed these perceived enemies mercilessly. The connected problems of a looming war and domestic repression created dangers and opportunities for Soviet youth. Stalinist leaders remained wary of youth as an impressionable, volatile population that threatened social order. At the same time, the regime continued to rely on young people, who were better educated than the previous generation at a time when the country needed competent workers and soldiers.

Stalinist leaders turned to official youth culture in their attempts to create a stable, loyal generation. Through the Komsomol, they enacted a cultural revolution from above, an intervention in the social and political behavior of young citizens that was meant to accompany the economic transformation of socialism. Like an honors society or a church group, the Komsomol organized activities meant to create a sense of community through recreation and moral socialization. The development of communist upbringing, though, was inextricable from the pragmatic search for social stability. By promoting conventional education, refined behavior, and a militarized discipline, the cultured behavior that the Komsomol promoted in the 1930s opposed the iconoclastic attitudes of young radicals of the 1920s.¹² Youth leaders supported traditional gender roles and hoped to incorporate young mothers and their families into the big family of Stalinist socialism.¹³ Over the course of the decade, the league’s membership more than tripled, exposing millions of new members to this program (see Table 1 in appendix).

The flood of youth into the Komsomol highlighted the tension between the inclusionary and the exclusionary aspects of Stalinism. Until the mid-1930s, the league had favored the Bolsheviks’ class allies and their children—workers and, to a lesser extent, peasants. As Komsomol and regime leaders envisioned the future of a classless communist society, though, membership criteria in the Komsomol increasingly focused on the meritocratic measures of education and professional achievements. Although these new membership policies reignited conflicts over the dilution of the Komsomol’s proletarian identity, the central anxiety in youth culture lay in the regime’s treatment of enemies of the people.¹⁴ The presence of millions of young people whose families had been marginalized in various campaigns of repression raised uncomfortable questions about the future of Soviet society. In a time when war loomed, was it safer to socialize the children of enemies in official youth culture or to deny them the opportunity to sabotage the regime from within the Komsomol? The answer to this question was always ambiguous and contested.

Anxieties about who could be a young communist provide an important window onto Stalinist concepts of redemption. As the Komsomol transformed into a mass youth organization, its leaders increasingly relied on corrective punishments for youth who transgressed the intertwined rules of political and polite society. It was never clear, though, when young people crossed the line from misbehavior to being an enemy of the people. For acts of drunkenness, sexual misbehavior, and vulgar verses of poetry, thousands of youth would face punishments that blurred the boundary between discipline and repression. When police determined that young people had broken the law, youth became criminals whose unlikely return to society lay in hard labor in the Gulag.¹⁵ Terror was not only a destructive force, however, but one that shaped Stalinist society. Most young communists were not arrested and instead experienced repression as a disciplinary process, amplified by the moral panic over hooliganism and degeneracy in the Soviet press.¹⁶ The threat of corruption convinced Komsomol leaders that it was crucial to retain young people within the bounds of Soviet political culture, where they might be reformed into worthy defenders of the USSR.

Repression was inextricable from young communists’ experience of Stalinism as a time of opportunity. The Great Terror of 1937–38, in particular, created a large number of empty positions now open to young cadres.¹⁷ The expansion of the industrial economy in the 1930s also generated a demand for educated workers. During wartime, these aspects of Stalinist social mobility merged. Mass violence on the Eastern Front created even more demand for young people as soldiers and ensured that those who survived would rise rapidly. Although social mobility was a result of upheaval, it was also the product of deliberate policies. Komsomol leaders advertised that devotion to the regime and efforts to perform well in school, on the job, or on the battlefield would provide tangible advantages. In turn, Komsomol members increasingly expected that their activism would result in rewards.

Material incentives were just one reason youth became young communists. Undoubtedly, a large number of young people joined the Komsomol to gain access to higher education or a better job. Others felt coerced into joining by superiors or their peers. Still others became what scholars have called Stalinist subjects, internalizing the regime’s goal to build socialism and their own place within this historical mission.¹⁸ These motivations frequently coexisted and overlapped. A young person could believe in the mission to transform the Soviet Union into a communist state and see their admission to university as proof of its righteousness. Gauging the relative importance of these factors is difficult because evidence about young people’s motivations is necessarily anecdotal. It is clear, though, that youth leaders in the late 1930s primarily strove to forge reliable, pliant subjects rather than self-reflective historical actors. In a period of increasing tensions, youth leaders wanted to create an army—figuratively and literally—of young loyalists.

Soviet youth culture’s origins in the revolution and civil war made it unique in the modern world, but the atmosphere of crisis in the 1930s created similarities with contemporary organizations in authoritarian states. Stalin’s Soviet Union, like other authoritarian regimes, sought a total claim over the public socialization of youth. Germany’s Hitler Youth and League of German Girls were especially successful at incorporating a large majority of age-eligible ethnic German youth and inculcating them with Nazi racial ideology.¹⁹ Mussolini’s National Boys Organization (Opera Nazionale Balilla) and its successor the Gioventù Italiana del Littorio similarly claimed to have included a majority of Italian youth in their ranks, although they exercised a lesser influence than the youth organizations of Germany.²⁰ The Komsomol would not include a majority of age-eligible youth until well after Stalin’s death. Nonetheless, the authoritarian urge to raise youth for the regime transformed the Komsomol from a relatively small league dominated by activists into a mass organization for cultivating youth with a broad pan-Soviet identity.²¹

In the USSR and contemporary states, the threat of war shaped the basic assumption that youth organizations should militarize the young for the state. Soviet practices of militarization intensified over the interwar period, partially in concert with its would-be enemies. Of course, the Soviet state had always been militaristic, meaning that it glorified the military and the victories of the civil war.²² In contrast to militarism, the historian Michael Geyer defines militarization as the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.²³ In the USSR, groups like the Komsomol provided a regime-approved substitute for civil society organizations and a vehicle for militarizing programs. While the Komsomol engaged in militarism during celebrations of the Red Army, it also prepared youth in overt and subtle ways for the never-ending task of defending socialism. Practices of social discipline, mobilization, and paramilitary training evolved in the prewar years and continued after the German invasion.

The increasing importance of militarization in youth culture reveals the adaptability of Stalinism. Like the years of World War I and civil war, when wartime practices became ingrained in Bolshevik conceptions of how to rule a state, the early period of socialism was a formative period in the USSR.²⁴ There was no roadmap from socialism to communism, because there had been no other socialist country. By the 1930s, some aspects of socialism, like the planned economy and the dominant role of the Communist Party, were taken as a given. In other areas, though, socialism was an experiment with trial and error. The central crisis of socialism was one of impending war with the associated necessities of eliminating potential enemies and preparing society in advance of conflict.²⁵ When Soviet leaders and people militarized socialism in the tense atmosphere of the prewar decade, they interpreted it as a natural development of Marxist historical progress.

Stalin was the central figure in defining what socialism would be after the revolution from above, but young activists played an important role in designating youth’s role in socialism at the local level. The leading figures in the party could not and would not provide directives for every aspect of life under socialism. The ambiguities of socialism’s direction forced organizers to read signals from various sources: from the pages of Pravda; from rumors they heard when the NKVD arrested local party officials; or from their own notions of what was right and necessary. Sometimes youth activists’ interpretations inspired excesses of ideological fervor and so-called political hooliganism, while uncertainty led to passivity among others. Understandings of what a young communist should be shifted over time. Emblematic of this flexibility was Aleksandr Kosarev, the leader of the Komsomol from 1929 to 1938. In the 1920s, he was a firebrand proletarian who had fought in the civil war and mocked the bourgeois fashions of NEP-era capitalists. After the advent of socialism, though, he donned a suit and became an advocate of discipline and refinement. He explained, Our party does not recognize eternal laws…. The Komsomol, too, must change its goals.²⁶

During the crisis-filled early years of socialism, Soviet leaders transformed society. Commentators in the interwar period often called the USSR a young state referring to its recent founding but also to its reliance on the young. When the Soviet Union emerged from World War II, it was no longer a young state. The victory came at a terrible cost for the first Soviet generation. Fighting on the front lines decimated those born in the years after the revolution. According to Soviet leaders, though, the victory validated the way the country had raised its youth during the interwar period—above all during the formative years of socialism. The challenge of the postwar years would be to rebuild and expand Stalin’s socialism on the model of the 1930s.

A Note on Sources

This book examines youth culture in various geographical and hierarchical contexts of the Soviet Union. The main actors are the young activists who shaped and implemented official youth culture. Their viewpoint is preserved in the archives of the Communist Party and Komsomol in Russia (RGASPI) and Ukraine (TsDAHO), the records of related administrations in Soviet sport and education at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), in the Soviet youth press, and in films of the time. Archival materials include stenographic records of meetings, bureaucratic correspondence, statistical records, summary reports, and letters from ground-level activists. These central records contain information not only from Moscow but from all regions of the country, providing an all-Soviet perspective on the spread of Stalinist youth culture. Materials from the archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reveal the important viewpoint of Stalin’s security services on the danger that youth supposedly posed and faced.

Although the primary focus of this book is organizers, it also explores the experiences of ordinary youth under Stalinism as far as source limitations allow. Because so many young people born after the revolution died in World War II, sources like memoirs and diaries are relatively scarce. Many memoirists survived the war because the regime had classified them as anti-Soviet, and they were thus excluded from military service. They provide a significant part of the story of Soviet youth under Stalin, but one that reflects a particular experience. Similarly, the recollections of those who left the USSR during or after the war were influenced by the Cold War divide. Besides ego sources, this study uses archival records of local youth groups in and around Kiev, Moscow, Petrozavodsk, Riazan, and Smolensk. Studies that rely on individual accounts or regional sources often face the choice of creating case studies or weaving these materials into a broader narrative. This book opts for the latter, integrating the stories of individual, regional, and central actors in Soviet youth culture into a wider account of Stalinism.

1. Kosterina, Diaries, June 23, 1941.

2. The classic treatment of generations is Karl Mannheim, Problem of Generations. See 304, in particular, for the definition of a generation as a cohort of youth whose collective identity coalesced based on the experience of similar, novel problems. For a discussion of generational thinking in the USSR, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 14–16.

3. On youth broadly, see Gillis, Youth and History, 182–83. On the Soviet politics of generation during the 1920s, see Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 12–15.

4. Tirado, Young Guard!, 89, 93.

5. Guillory, We Shall Refashion Life on Earth!, 5.

6. Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 22–26.

7. Guillory, We Shall Refashion Life on Earth!, 57–59.

8. Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 80–95.

9. Krylova, Soviet Modernity in Life and Fiction: The Generation of the ‘New Soviet Person’ in the 1930s, xiii.

10. See Neumann, Communist Youth League, 206–9.

11. Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin, 13–44.

12. On Stalinist promotion of kul′turnost′ (culturedness) see Fitzpatrick, Becoming Cultured, in Cultural Front; and Kelly, Refining Russia, especially chapter 4.

13. On the Stalinist turn to traditional gender norms, see Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution, 296–344. For the argument that women could find multiple gender roles in Stalinist socialism, see Shulman, Stalinism on the Frontiers of Empire, 12–24; and Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat, 60.

14. For the argument that proletarian anxiety was still a key factor in the 1930s, see Krylova, Identity, Agency, and the ‘First Soviet Generation’ in Generations in Twentieth Century Europe, ed. Lovell, 104–11.

15. Barnes, Death and Redemption, 2.

16. This work draws on the sociologist Stanley Cohen’s conception of moral panics, where the interaction of media, police, politicians, and society produce a cohesive narrative about a deviant subculture from incoherent or nonexistent groups. See Cohen, Moral Panics and Folk Devils, 1–12.

17. See Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility, 242–43; and Hough, Soviet Prefects, 38–55.

18. Halfin, From Darkness to Light, 1–38; Krylova, Soviet Modernity in Life and Fiction, 1–40; Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind, 9–10.

19. Kater, Hitler Youth, 15.

20. Koon, Believe, Obey, Fight, 31–32, 234.

21. Even as Soviet leaders sought to create a pan-Soviet identity, national politics still existed in the USSR. As Yuri Slezkine, USSR as a Communal Apartment, 415, argues, Soviet nationalities policy carved out a national identity and territory for each group that complemented the pan-Soviet identity that the Komsomol hoped to foster.

22. Gillis, Introduction, in Militarization of the Western World, ed. Gillis, 1–2.

23. Geyer, The Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945, in Militarization of the Western World, ed. Gillis, 79.

24. On Bolshevik adoption of civil war-era governing practices, see Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution, 6–7.

25. For a similar argument about the impact of war on the development of Stalinist policing, see Shearer, Elements Near and Alien, 841–42.

26. RGASPI, f. 1m, op. 2, d. 115, l. 14.

1

YOUTH IN THE STALIN REVOLUTION

Revolutions overthrow not only political regimes but also generational hierarchies. They demand organizers, supporters, and soldiers, giving young people opportunities beyond traditional age-based social orders. After the October Revolution, the enormous needs of the Soviet state meant that young activists gained an unusual amount of authority as they were funneled into the army and administration of the new regime.¹ The Bolshevik Revolution not only invested youth with influence, it inspired them with revolutionary ideals about the construction of a socialist workers’ state. The first decade and a half of Soviet power unleashed young people’s enthusiasm, and their empowerment brought them into conflict with their elders inside and outside the regime.

In the 1920s, the spirit of the 1917 revolutions and the sense that the new regime was not fulfilling its promises made many into radicals during a time of relative moderation. In 1921, with the economy in shambles after seven years of war, Lenin instituted the New Economic Policy, a period of economic breathing space that allowed limited autonomy in the peasant economy and in industry following the nationalization of many sectors and use of coercion during War Communism.² Not all young people became radicals even in the Komsomol, but a fervent base of young organizers grew disillusioned with the relative moderation of NEP. They were mostly male, urban factory workers, the emblematic constituency of the youth league.³ The Bolsheviks had promised a paradise for proletarians after the overthrow of prerevolutionary elites. Instead, young workers found themselves suffering from high levels of unemployment in the cities while cultural and educational institutions were still dominated by non-Bolshevik elites.⁴ These factors and the relative autonomy local youth organizations enjoyed during NEP fostered an internal cultural revolution—a process of radicalization among activists that occurred throughout the 1920s.⁵ As much as young radicals directed their anger against workers’ supposed class enemies, they also targeted their elders broadly, claiming the mantle of revolution for youth.

When Stalin’s regime abandoned NEP for a radical solution to lackluster industrial growth at the end of the decade, it encouraged young people to protest openly against voices of moderation.⁶ Although they empowered young radicals, Stalin and his inner circle did not share their iconoclastic outlook. Instead, the country’s leadership enabled young zealots to turn their cultural revolution outward as a cudgel against common enemies in various spheres of the country’s political, cultural, and economic life.⁷ Although some activists volunteered, the regime pressed millions of other young people into service through the Komsomol, mobilizing them toward the transformation of the country.

A core component of Stalin’s revolution was the collectivization of agriculture and its exploitation to pay for industrialization. Stalin had become convinced that rich peasants (so-called kulaks) were impeding food supplies to the cities. He responded to grain crises by sending outside activists, including large numbers of youth organizers, to the countryside to extract grain by force. When Stalin initiated the collectivization of the entire countryside in late 1929, the violence of the campaign and the license the regime gave its agents led to inescapable abuses of power—excesses, in the language of Stalinism. The perpetrators of these excesses were not only young, just as opponents of collectivization were not always old. When young people spoke out, though, their actions often bore the signs of youthful maximalism and generational conflict.

Stalin’s revolution succeeded in remaking the Soviet economy, but its effects were also devastating. By 1932, the large majority of households in grain-growing regions had joined collective farms.⁸ In spite of agriculture’s increased pliancy to grain extraction, though, there was a severe shortfall in requisitions in 1932–33. When state representatives fulfilled party leaders’ demands to take supposed excess grain from the peasantry, the result was a famine that killed millions. In the midst of famine, Stalinist leaders assumed that many activists had been disloyal to the regime and had shown their true colors as kulak saboteurs. The Komsomol, like the party, undertook a membership purge following collectivization that expelled a large proportion of its membership for supposed opposition to collectivization. The purge punctuated the end of a tumultuous period for Soviet youth. The relative independence of youth culture in the 1920s had given young radicals the space to form as a group and gave license to generational conflict. During the turmoil of the revolution from above, though, pro-Soviet youth culture came entirely under the control of Stalin’s regime.

From Radical Activists to State Radicalism

The tenth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1927 was a time for celebration, reflection, and dissent. Amid parades and films commemorating the Bolshevik victory, discord about the future path of the Soviet Union lurked.⁹ Soon after the celebrations, the party’s Central Committee expelled a number of Stalin’s opponents, including prominent figures like Lev Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, and Grigorii Zinov′ev. Although Kamenev and Zinov′ev were one-time allies of Stalin, they had joined Trotsky in the so-called United Opposition, hoping to overturn the semicapitalist NEP economy and Stalin’s creeping domination of the country. Beaten by Stalin, the leadership of the opposition went into exile or recanted. Even as the organized opposition dissolved, though, the radical challenge from below continued, often led by youth. High urban unemployment—20 percent in January 1925, and nearly 50 percent among young adults in 1928—contributed to popular dissatisfaction with the NEP system among young people.¹⁰ It seemed to many that the new regime was failing to improve conditions for workers.

Although they lived in the supposed dictatorship of the proletariat, many youth felt that Soviet officials were helping everyone but young proletarians. At the end of the civil war, Lenin and other Soviet leaders had concluded that there were not enough party-loyal technical specialists to support the economy. The new state needed the nonparty technical intelligentsia to rebuild the country’s industrial sector. For this reason, until the late 1920s regime leaders defended technical professionals from specialist baiting (spetseedstvo), verbal and even physical attacks by radicals.¹¹ Activists also targeted segments