Salvation and Sovereignty

Keathley

INTRODUCTION

THE CASE FOR ROSES WITHIN A MONLINIST FRAMEWORK

Whoever makes a whole judgment and does not lay the counter-Scriptures on the same scale next to it, to him a half-truth is more damaging than a whole lie.

—Balthasar Hubmaier,

Anabaptist theologian and martyr¹

WHAT SHALL A CHRISTIAN do who is convinced of certain central tenets of Calvinism but not its corollaries? Specifically, what if I am convinced that God elects individuals to salvation but I am also compelled by the evidence of Scripture to reject the notion that Christ died only for the elect? What if I am also convinced that the Calvinist doctrine of irresistible grace—that God gives saving grace only to the elect while withholding it from others—has little or no biblical foundation? Like someone who comes to embrace premillennialism but remains unimpressed with the standard Dispensational eschatology generally associated with it, I see salvation as a sovereign work of grace but suspect that the usual Calvinist understanding of sovereignty (that God is the cause of all things) is not sustained by the biblical witness as a whole.

Most Christians are familiar with the five points of Calvinism generally denoted by the TULIP acronym:

T Total depravity

U Unconditional election

L Limited atonement

I Irresistible grace

P Perseverance of the saints

I agree with three of the points of TULIP: total depravity, unconditional election, and perseverance of the saints. The biblical evidence seems clear enough. But the Bible also presents a genuine desire on the part of God for the salvation of all humanity and declares a real offer of the gospel to everyone who hears it. In addition, the biblical case for limited atonement and irresistible grace is shockingly weak. This means that L and I must go. Limited atonement and irresistible grace cannot be found in the Scriptures unless one first puts them there.

EVERYTHING IS COMING UP ROSES

In addition to arguing that only three of the five points of TULIP can be defended scripturally, I also argue that the T, U, and P need to undergo some retooling. So the next obvious step is to recast the TULIP acronym itself. Timothy George has presented the ROSES acronym as a replacement for TULIP, and I intend to build upon it.² I do not claim that Dr. George and I prune roses exactly the same way (he favors reformed theology). However, we both agree that the use of the TULIP acronym tends to obscure as much as it illuminates.

There is reason to believe that the framers of the Canons of Dort would not like the TULIP formulation. The five points of Dort were an ad hoc response to the five complaints presented by the followers of Arminius (called the Remonstrants) in Holland during the early seventeenth century. TULIP was not intended to be a summary of the Calvinist doctrine on salvation, and it certainly does not encapsulate Reformed theology, which is much broader and more nuanced than the TULIP formulation. Some of the terms that make up the TULIP acronym are not even in the Canons of Dort. For example, one will search in vain to find the term total depravity in the typical English translation of the Canons. When one reads the Canons, it becomes immediately apparent that the terms that make up the acronym in many ways misrepresent the positions taken by the Synod—this is particularly true of the term limited atonement. In some places the misrepresentation is so severe as to be a caricature.

Even those who describe themselves as five point Calvinists express regret about one or several of the terms.³ A modern proponent of Calvinism will often subscribe to the points only after clarifying (or in some instances completely redefining) what a particular point means. In light of these facts, I suggest that the acronym has outlived its usefulness. If a set of terms must constantly be redefined, or if they tend to mislead and misinform as much as they inform and clarify, then surely those terms need to be replaced. Dr. George has done this with his proposed alternative acronym. Instead of TULIP, he offers ROSES, and I believe his approach warrants further attention.

So what are the tenets of ROSES? Without defending them at this point, let me explain them briefly as follows:

Radical depravity: The old term, total depravity, gives the impression that fallen humanity always is as bad as it possibly can be. The new term, radical depravity, more correctly emphasizes that every aspect of our being is affected by the fall and renders us incapable of saving ourselves or even of wanting to be saved.

Overcoming grace: The old term, irresistible grace, seems to imply that God saves a person against his will. The new term, overcoming grace, highlights that it is God’s persistent beckoning that overcomes our wicked obstinacy.

Sovereign election: Often the term unconditional election is presented in such a way as to give the impression that those who die without receiving Christ did so because God never desired their salvation in the first place. The replacement label, sovereign election, affirms that God desires the salvation of all, yet accentuates that our salvation is not based on us choosing God but on God choosing us.

Eternal life: The old term, perseverance of the saints, leads to the notion that a believer’s assurance is based on his ability to persevere rather than on the fact he is declared righteous in Christ. The purpose of the new term, eternal life, is to stress that believers enjoy a transformed life that is preserved and we are given a faith which will remain.

Singular redemption: A particularly unfortunate concept, limited atonement, teaches that Christ died only for the elect and gives the impression that there is something lacking in the atonement. As we will see, many Calvinists prefer terms such as definite atonement or particular redemption. We will use the label singular redemption to emphasize that Christ died sufficiently for every person, although efficiently only for those who believe.

SO WHAT IS MOLINISM?

Calvinism has at least three dilemmas: (1) reconciling God’s sovereign election of individuals with his genuine desire for the salvation of all; (2) adhering to a deterministic view of sovereignty without blaming God for the fall of Adam; and (3) adhering to limited atonement and irresistible grace while also affirming that the gospel is genuinely offered to everyone. There is an alternative to Calvinism—called Molinism—which provides answers to these three quandaries that are both biblical and logically consistent.

Most Christians have heard about Calvinism, but not as many are familiar with Molinism. I suspect some who embrace Calvinism do so because they recognize the Bible teaches that God is sovereign and Calvinism is the only theological system of which they are aware that attempts to do justice to God’s sovereignty. Calvinism often wins by default, especially when Arminianism is understood to be the alternative. Simply put, Molinism argues that God perfectly accomplishes His will in free creatures through the use of His omniscience. It reconciles two crucial biblical truths: (1) God exercises sovereign control over all His creation, and (2) human beings make free choices and decisions for which they must give account.

So what is Molinism? Named after its first proponent, Luis Molina (1535–1600), a sixteenth-century Jesuit priest, Molinism holds to a strong notion of God’s control and an equally firm affirmation of human freedom.⁴ In other words Molinism simultaneously holds to a Calvinistic view of a comprehensive divine sovereignty and to a version of free will (called libertarianism) generally associated with Arminianism. As Doug Geivett argues, the fact that Molinism is the one proposal that tries to hold simultaneously to both is a point in its favor, since both "are prima facie true."⁵

Molinism teaches that God exercises His sovereignty primarily through His omniscience, and that He infallibly knows what free creatures would do in any given situation. In this way God sovereignly controls all things, while humans are also genuinely free. God is able to accomplish His will through the use of what Molinists label His middle knowledge. We will look at the Molinist model of God’s knowledge and providence in chapter 1 and in the chapter on sovereign election (chap. 5).

So Molinism formulates a radical compatibilism—a Calvinist view of divine sovereignty and an Arminian view of human freedom—and for this reason is often attacked from both sides of the aisle. Calvinists such as Bruce Ware and Richard Muller consider Molinism to be a type of Arminianism, while Roger Olsen and Robert Picirilli (both card-carrying Arminians) reject Molinism for being too Calvinistic.⁶ However, Molinism is attractive to many leading Christian philosophers of our day, such as Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint, and William Lane Craig. One of the main reasons is that it demonstrates it is logically possible to affirm divine sovereignty and human freedom in a consistent manner.⁷ Even open theist William Hasker, who is no friend to Molinism, admits, If you are committed to a ‘strong’ view of providence, according to which, down to the smallest detail, ‘things are as they are because God knowingly decided to create such a world,’ and yet you also wish to maintain a libertarian conception of free will—if this is what you want, then Molinism is the only game in town.⁸

As a matter of fact, that is exactly what I want because I believe Molinism is faithful to the biblical witness. The Molinist model is the only game in town for anyone who wishes to affirm a high view of God’s sovereignty while holding to a genuine definition of human choice, freedom, and responsibility. William Lane Craig goes so far as to describe the Molinist notion of middle knowledge as the single most fruitful theological concept I have ever encountered.⁹ As we apply Molinism to the vexing questions of predestination and election, the reasons for his enthusiasm will become evident.

So why do I embrace Molinism? Because, like the Calvinist, I am convinced the Bible teaches that (1) God is sovereign and His control is meticulous; (2) man is incapable of contributing to his salvation or of even desiring to be saved; (3) God through Christ is Author, Accomplisher, and Completer of salvation (i.e., salvation is a work of grace from beginning to end); (4) individual election is unconditional; and (5) the believer is secure in Christ.

However, like the Arminian, I am also convinced the Bible teaches that (6) God is not the Author, Origin, or Cause of sin (and to say that He is, is not just hyper-Calvinism but blasphemy); (7) God genuinely desires the salvation of all humanity; (8) Christ genuinely died for all people; (9) God’s grace is resistible (this means that regeneration does not precede conversion); and (10) humans genuinely choose, are causal agents, and are responsible for the sin of rejecting Christ (this means that the alternative of accepting salvation was genuinely available to the unbeliever). As we will see, there is only one position that coherently holds to all ten affirmations, and that is Molinism.

THE ARGUMENT OF THIS BOOK

Two arguments will be made throughout this book: (1) the Molinist paradigm presents the best model for understanding the relationship between God’s sovereignty and human responsibility, and (2) the ROSES framework provides the best way of applying Molinism to the doctrines of salvation.¹⁰

In addition I will argue against two concepts generally associated with Reformed theology: that (1) God’s perfections and infinite attributes require that all events and choices are understood in terms of necessity, and that (2) God’s sovereignty and/or man’s depravity require that all choices, decisions, and actions are understood in terms of causal determinism. Necessity, as it relates to the matter of human choice, is the notion that since God knows beforehand whatever decisions a person will make, the possibility of choosing otherwise is never available. Causal determinism is a specific type of necessity that argues that the choices made by a person are determined by his particular make-up and his given setting. In other words, a person’s choices are determined by his nature and environment, so he does not have the ability to choose otherwise. This work will argue that God’s omniscience does not forbid contingency, and in fact, the concept of possibility is clearly a biblical notion. In addition, the Bible teaches that because we are created in the image of God, we are causal agents—we are the origin of our respective decisions for which we are morally responsible.

The Reformed view of providence which embraces causal determinism has been given the (rather misleading) label of compatibilism (also often called soft determinism). Compatibilism views human freedom as compatible with causal determinism (hence the term compatibilism), but only after redefining free will. Human freedom is understood merely to be the freedom of inclination (i.e., the freedom to do what you want). Therefore many Calvinists argue for casual determinism, through which God’s will is the cause of all things.

Against compatibilism, I argue for a Molinist understanding of the interaction between God’s sovereignty and human choice. Molinism understands God to carry out His sovereign plans through His exhaustive foreknowledge. It views man’s freedom as the freedom to refrain (i.e., the freedom to choose something or refrain from choosing that thing) and sees him as the causal agent of his decisions. This is known as soft libertarianism or concurrence. The attractiveness of Molinism is that it presents a logically coherent view of providence, which holds that God is meticulously sovereign, while at the same time humans are genuinely free. In short, this book affirms divine sovereignty but rejects universal necessity; it affirms the reality of human depravity but rejects causal determinism. We will discuss these matters further in the chapter on radical depravity (chap. 3).

As the quote by Balthasar Hubmaier which began this introduction points out, to emphasize one biblical truth to the exclusion of others is to embrace a half-truth. If one focuses on the electing decree of divine sovereignty to the exclusion of human choice, then the result is a type of Calvinism of the double-predestination variety. If one decides that human moral responsibility requires the absolute ability to choose to the contrary, then this results in a radical form of Arminianism called Open Theism, which denies that God always knows what free creatures will decide to do. The Molinist reconciliation of divine sovereignty and human freedom provides a model for affirming six pairs of twin truths that the Bible presents in tandem. And it does so in such a way that does not eclipse one truth with the other. The first pair of truths—that God is both good and great—operates as an interpretive or hermeneutical principle which necessitates the next five pairs.

First, God is both good and great. The fact that not all are saved raises the question of why this is so. Did God not want them saved? Was He not able to save all? Some might try to answer this question by arguing that we cannot apply human definitions of goodness to God. I agree in principle. However, that is not what we are doing when we argue that one cannot sacrifice God’s character on the altar of His attributes and vice versa. God is the One who reveals Himself as good, and in addition He reveals what divine goodness is through both the Scriptures and His Son. In fact, the Incarnation indicates that we may have a better understanding of God’s goodness than we have about His greatness. The Bible reveals to us much more about God’s character than it does about how God’s infinite attributes operate. Since we were created in His image, by grace we can bear some semblance to God’s character—His love, mercy, and integrity—in spite of the fall. However, as for His omnipresence, omniscience, and other infinite attributes, we have no real way to relate to or comprehend them. In short, we cannot subsume God’s love to His sovereignty and vice versa. We address the proper handling of this first pair of truths in the chapter on God’s universal salvific will (chap 2).

Second, human freedom is both derived and genuinely ours. Scripture does not present human freedom as something absolute, unlimited, or autonomous. However, God fashioned us in His image, and one important aspect of the imago dei is the real ability to choose. The Bible presents freedom in two ways—as a permission and as a power. Liberty is permission to make certain choices, while free will is the ability or power to make those choices. We will examine the nature of human freedom and how the fall has drastically affected our freedom in the chapter on radical depravity (chap 3).

Third, God’s grace is both monergistic and resistible. Now monergism is an important term with which many may not be familiar. Basically it means that God is the only worker and accomplisher of our redemption. The concept emphasizes the complete graciousness of our salvation. Yet generally those who hold to monergism have had a difficult time explaining why many reject the gospel or why Christians continue to commit sins after they are born again without making it appear that God secretly desires the unbelief of the Christ-rejecter or the disobedience of the Christian. In the chapter on overcoming grace (chap 4), we will look at a model that proposes that God’s grace simultaneously is unilateral and resistible. God is entirely responsible for salvation; humans are entirely responsible for sin.

Fourth, God’s election is both unconditional and according to foreknowledge. Most Calvinists affirm that God actively ordains the salvation of the elect but merely permits the damnation of the unbeliever. This book will argue that any Calvinist who uses the concept of permission is in practice already a Molinist, even if he does not know it, or else he uses permission in such a way that renders the term meaningless. Molinism argues that God’s sovereign choice is informed by foreknowledge but not determined by it. Even Calvinists believe that foreknowledge plays some role in predestination. As Reformed theologian John Frame points out, God did not foreordain this world while in a state of ignorance.¹¹ Molinists agree with Calvinists that it is crucial to maintain that God did not elect on account of foreknown merit or foreseen faith. A number of self-described Arminians also identify themselves as Molinists, but when we look at how Molina dealt with election in his interpretation of Romans 9, it will be clear that Molinism is not merely a variation of Arminianism. In the chapter on sovereign election (chap 5), I argue that, relating to the difficult matter of predestination, Molinism has advantages over both Calvinism and Arminianism.

Fifth, the saved are both preserved and will persevere. The Bible teaches that not all who claim to be a Christian go to heaven. As we will see, formulating a doctrine of assurance of salvation which takes this fact into account is a challenge that bedevils both Calvinists and Arminians. In the chapter on eternal life (chap 6), this book proposes a model of assurance that affirms that everyone who trusts Christ for salvation is securely preserved and that every saved person possesses a faith that is guaranteed to remain.

Sixth, Christ’s atonement is both unlimited in its provision and limited in its application. Often, the debate over the extent of the atonement has been cast as being between the general and particular views (i.e., that Christ died universally for everyone in general or that he paid only for the specific sins of each individual believer). Usually, general atonement is associated with Arminianism while Calvinism is understood to require the particular view. However, not all Calvinists hold to limited atonement. Many Calvinists believe Christ died provisionally for the specific and particular sins of all, but that the benefits are applied only to those who believe. Generally, Calvinists of this stripe distinguish their position from the Arminian view of general atonement by calling their position unlimited atonement. The chapter on singular redemption (chap 7) will argue for the unlimited atonement of Christ, and that it is sufficient for all but efficient only for those who believe.

As we said, the first pair of twin truths—of God’s goodness and greatness—operates as a hermeneutical principle for interpreting what the Bible teaches about salvation. This book is about salvation and the sovereignty of God: the sovereign Creator lovingly saves the fallen creature by paying the creature’s sin-debt on a cruel tree. The remaining five pairs of truths are the result of the application of the first pair and establish the ROSES paradigm.

SOME CAVEATS AS WE BEGIN

A Word about Mystery

I do not claim that this book is the final answer to every question concerning the mystery of salvation. Molinism is a model, a possible explanation that has abundant scriptural support. As we will see, the way it effectively synchronizes some of the most difficult biblical concepts makes Molinism very attractive. But the goal is not to explain that which God has left unrevealed, but to demonstrate that it is not irrational to believe in the simultaneous existence of the sovereign God of the Bible and creatures endowed with genuine, responsible freedom.

At points, I will have to appeal to mystery. There is nothing wrong with that since the Bible leaves many aspects of salvation unexplained, and all approaches to soteriology eventually make the same appeal. The big difference is in where they locate mystery. There are limits to our explorations, but we cannot use our theological conclusions to negate the clear revelation of Scripture. On this both Calvinists and Molinists agree.

I concede to a number of mysteries pertaining to the matters covered in this book that will still be with us at the end. First, the mystery of evil remains. I provide no explanation for the origin of wickedness and unbelief, or why, when the real opportunity for redemption and righteousness avails itself, the majority of humanity turns it down. Unbelief amazed Jesus (Mark 6:6), so why should you and I expect to understand it?

Second, we do not know why God chose to create, or to actualize, this particular world. Molinism posits that an infinite number of feasible worlds were available for God to create, but it provides no explanation for why He chose this one. There is good reason to believe we will have a better understanding of this mystery in the new heavens and the new earth. In the meantime, we trust in the wisdom and goodness of our Creator and Redeemer in His sovereign choice.

Third, how exactly God knows what free creatures will decide and choose remains unknown.¹² Some are bothered by this mystery, but I am not. God knows all things and omniscience is an attribute of God. God innately knows our free choices by His very nature—by the very fact that He is God. Thus asking how God knows what genuinely free creatures will choose is the same as asking how it is that God is God. The mystery of God’s omniscience simply does not keep me awake at night.

However, as the approach taken by the early Church to the Christological controversies demonstrates, affirming mystery is not the same as embracing illogical contradictions. In his book, The Logic of God Incarnate, Thomas Morris showed that the Councils were careful to describe the mystery of the hypostatic union of Christ in such a way that did not involve a logical contradiction.¹³ For example, the early Fathers declared Jesus to truly and genuinely possess the essential attributes of each nature, rather than saying that Christ was totally and completely human or divine. Such nuances are necessary to avoid gibberish. There is a place for mystery. However, in the divine