Pebble Island: The Falklands War 1982

The issue of sovereignty of the Malvinas lies deep within the Argentinian psyche and their ‘recovery’ has haunted generations of politicians, patriots and ordinary people. As a result the Argentinian military have long planned a landing on the Falklands – and so, once, did the British. During the 1920s the Royal Navy Staff College, Greenwich, ran a paper-exercise featuring an amphibious landing on the Falklands. Nothing sinister, just a locale unfamiliar to the players but well mapped and reasonably well charted, with abundant copies of each lying to hand in an adjacent military map store. The players selected San Carlos Water as the landing site, but fortunately no Argentinian defence analyst unearthed the papers – neither did a British one until the 1990s!

In 1981 the Argentinian Junta Militar, three senior officers with little grasp of politics or diplomacy, were hugely unpopular with their restive people. In an attempt to regain, or, rather, to acquire, popular acclaim they decided to play the Malvinas card, and directed their high command, the Comando Militar (COMIL) to prepare a coup-de-main, Operation Rosario. The planning group comprised officers from all three armed services, albeit mainly from the Armada, Infanteria, CANA (naval aviation), and FAA (air force) given the nature of the intended operation; the Ejercito Argentina (army) was also represented. As the aim of the operation was integration (incorrectly proclaimed as ‘re-integration’ by ardent nationalists) of the islands into Argentina, the national police and land frontier protection force, the Gendarmerie Nacional, (GN), and the coastguard, the Prefectura Naval Argentina (PNA) were also involved.

Operation ROSARIO. Landing the Landing Force, LST Cabo San Antonio at Yorke Bay, 2 April 1982. Infanteria de Marina Argentina

Infanteria de Marina and RM/FIDF surrendered personnel, Stanley. Infanteria de Marina Argentina

In early 1982, the Junta issued Directiva Estrategica Nacional 1/82, initiating the operation. The invasion fleet sailed in late March. The spearhead of the almost bloodless assault, delayed by bad weather at sea until 2 April 1982 consisted of elite teams from the Armada and the Infanteria de Marina. It was hailed by the Junta’s publicity aparatus as a major victory.

The British responded quickly, and starkly; one man killed and more than a hundred captured on South Georgia, whilst 321 died in an attack on the ARA Belgrano.

Not all responses were so brutal. On 14 May a daring British raid disabled an entire group of Argentinian aircraft without loss to either side. The raid, Operation PRELIM, was the first purely SAS airfield attack since late 1944, and possibly the largest assault mounted by the Regiment since that on the Jebel Akhdar in 1956. (Who can say what may have happened since then?) ¹

The raid was an extremely high-risk venture for the British Task Force. It imperilled most of the British transport helicopters, around one third of the Special Forces personnel, the chief Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) officer plus one of only five Naval Gunfire Forward Observers (NGFOs) in the South Atlantic and two warships. Above all, it endangered HMS Hermes, the Task Force’s ‘Mission Essential Unit’ -‘Lose Hermes, lose the war’. ²

To launch the raid this ageing but militarily priceless helicopter carrier was deliberately deployed into an area probably patrolled by Argentinian submarines.³ At the same time it would come within range of missile-armed aircraft which had recently sunk the first major British warship to be lost to enemy action since 1945.⁴

So why had PRELIM been mounted and why, despite the obvious risks, was it initiated by Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, endorsed by Commodore Michael Clapp and Brigadier Julian Thompson and sanctioned by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse and Brigadier Peter de la Billiere? This book attempts to answer that question by describing the threat posed by an Argentinian force on Pebble Island, its elimination and the subsequent tragic events, including the loss of HMS Coventry and MV Atlantic Conveyor, both, it is argued, as a direct result of the SAS raid.

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

Operation PRELIM was the code name allocated to the SAS Pebble Island raid. It was technically part of Operation SUTTON, the amphibious landings and subsequent land battle conducted as part of Operation CORPORATE, the restoration of British sovereignty of various territories in the South Atlantic.

The Argentinians call the Falkland Islands ‘Islas Malvinas’; homesick French explorers from St. Malo christened the archipelago Iles Malouines, in Spanish Islas Malvinas.

The Armada Republica Argentina (ARA - Navy) designated the Pebble Island Forward Operating Base (the airfield, garrison and fortified settlement) as either Estacion Aeronavale Bahia Elefante or Base Aeronavale Caldéron. The Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA-Argentinian Air Force) preferred Estacion Aero Caldéron or Base Aero Militar Caldéron; sometimes La Payanca from the radio call sign. The Infanteria de Marina (Marines) used Aerodromo de Campana [Field] Aeronaval de Isla de Borbón. The soldiery simply called it Borbón; so will the authors.

In the same way the Marine garrison is variously described as the Destacada De Cuerpo De Infanteria De Marina a Borbon; Equipo de Combate Marega; Equipo de Combate Borbón; Equipo de Combate Caldéron, Equipo de Combate H Companga Batalon de Infanteria de Marina No 3 and Eq. Comb/H/BIM3. Here it is just Equipo Marega.

The Armada Republica Argentina is rendered here as the Armada, and its Cuerpo de Infanteria de Marina as the Infanteria. That force has Sections, not (British 1982) Rifle or Machine Gun Groups within Sections, and Groups, not (British) Sections. Two Groups and HQ team form a ‘Peleton’ a Squad. A 32-man Squad could be carried by a single LVTP7 amphibious landing vehicle. The Armada and Infanteria have three subaltern ranks; Lieutenant, Sub-Lieutenant and Midshipman, all used to fill command appointments such as Squad or Supply Section commander.

To simplify the text for the reader from now on accents have been omitted from Spanish words.

FALKLANDS PEBBLE ISLAND

THE THREAT

Amphibious warfare operations require, amongst other things, exceptionally careful planning and accurate intelligence. Operation ROSARIO was no exception. The Argentinian planning staff developed an interest in Pebble Island as they reasoned it would make a useful Forward Operating Base (FOB) – not only for themselves but also for the British if they gained control.

Apart from planning the invasion the COMIL considered possible British responses, including an amphibious counter-attack; the Royal Navy certainly had the necessary experience, training and equipment. This notion was initially discounted by the Junta, and hence by the COMIL. However, several senior officers in the planning group, graduates of command and staff colleges at home and abroad, argued the case for contingency planning. Eventually their views were reluctantly accepted by the Junta, and a secret post-invasion defence plan, known as La Planication de Operaciones 2/82 Mantenimiento de la Soberania, was discretely prepared.

Some Armada officers were convinced that, given the distance between the Falklands and the UK, the British would try to establish a FOB on South Georgia or the Falklands. This ‘stone frigate’ could provide supply, communications and maintenance sites. Also, if sited on the Falklands, it could house an airfield for airdefence and attack aircraft and helicopters in addition to a lair for raiding forces; a concept tested by NATO for the forward defence of sensitive coastal locations.

Wideawake Airfield, Ascension Island.

From the British point of view such a base could be used as a political bargaining chip. Island-based fighter aircraft, (Sea Harriers or RAF Phantoms), surface to air missiles, Royal Navy ship-borne Sea Dart and Sea Slug and RAF air-transportable Bloodhound could all be used to interdict Argentinian air lines of communication from the mainland while British submarines neutralised the sea lines of communication, effectively marooning the Falklands garrison. The Argentinians knew that RAF Harrier squadrons in Germany frequently exercised from dispersed hides. They also knew that Hercules squadrons habitually operated from rough airstrips around the world. And, if fitted with US-style refuelling probes for use with Victor K2 tankers, RAF Hercules could supply the FOB from Ascension Island.

FOBs ON WEST FALKLAND

Admiral Sandy Woodward.

The idea of establishing a FOB on West Falkland or an outer island occurred to at least one British officer before the landings at San Carlos. Admiral Woodward wanted to have a large airfield for Hercules transports, Phantom air-defence fighters, Harrier ground and maritime attack aircraft, and various types of helicopter.¹ A number of locations on the Falklands seemed suitable especially that of Pebble Island. The Admiral also considered establishing a special forces base on Kidney Island, close to Stanley although his advisers dissuaded him from pursuing those ideas. ²

However, Special Boat Squadron (SBS) patrols manned observation posts (OPs) across the Falkland group during the campaign. These included Carcass Island, west of Pebble - named after a RN ship which had surveyed it in Nelson’s time and aboard which Nelson had himself served in 1776 - and even the remote Weddell Island in the far south east, just in case the enemy tried to establish FOBs on them. ³

A British FOB would pose a serious problem to the Argentinians, who also needed one on West Falkland as a radar site. Irrespective of any British counter-offensive the Argentinians intended to extend their national Airspace Surveillance and Air Traffic Control system to cover the ‘reintegrated’ province of the Islas Malvinas. Immediate post-invasion cover would be provided by a mobile unit, Grupo 2 Vigilancia y Control Aereo. It had been formed in 1980 as part of an Escuadron Aereos Moviles, following a period of tension, verging on transition to war, with Chile, over control of three islands in a seaway between the two nations. The highly mobile Grupo could ostensibly control air operations by the Escuadron from any location in southern Patagonia/Tierra del Fuego. However, as the Beagle Channel event took place in 1978 the Escuadron was probably formed with the Falklands in mind. (Argentina laid claim to all of the huge island of Tierra del Fuego as well as the Falklands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, hence the existence of four stars on some military patches and badges.)

FAA Pucara Squadron arm patch.

The Grupo included not only a surveillance radar unit but also a Fighter-Control Station (Estacion de Interceptacion, or EI) and a Centro de Informacion y Control (CIC). The need for radar on West Falkland became more urgent when, during planning for post-invasion defences, it became obvious that the hills to the north and west of Stanley would restrict radar reception from equipment anywhere in the town. Stanley’s modest road network was the only way of moving and mounting the Argentinians’ heavy US radar sets and generators. The Grupo was equipped with Westinghouse TPS-44 and TPS-43 radar systems, each with a range of about 150 miles. If sited around Stanley airfield the hills would restrict cover to a 10°-210° arc, and the low elevation of the only accessible sites would restrict the range to 130 miles to the north-east and east, but only 45-80 to the south due to more hills. That left an uncomfortably large sector uncovered for air-traffic control purposes and also left it open to enemy incursion. The ideal solution was to place a radar site on the north coast of West Falkland, preferably in a FOB.

TPS-43 radar.

In the event of a British counterstroke the FOB could be protected by mobile surface to air missiles such as the Infanteria’s British-built Tigercat and the FAA and Ejercito’s radarcontrolled anti-aircraft guns. The FOB could also have an offensive role, accommodating Armada Fast Attack Craft, and special forces, and light reconnaissance/attack aircraft and helicopters from all of the