Mosquitoes to Wolves: The Evolution of the Forward Air Controller

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MOSQUITOES TO WOLVES

THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRBORNE FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER

BY

GARY ROBERT LESTER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

Illustrations 5

Photographs 6

About the Author 7

Preface 8

Chapter 1—Evolution of Close Air Support 10

World War I 11

Between the Wars 13

The American Experience, 1918-42 15

World War II 17

Chapter 2—Close Air Support Doctrine 20

Early Navy-Marine Close Air Support 20

Close Air Support in Korea 21

Air Force Philosophy in Korea 22

Navy/Marine Air in Vietnam 25

Chapter 3—Korea 26

Forward Air Controllers Emerge 26

The Fight for Air Superiority 27

Phase One—Retreat to Pusan 30

Phase Two—Advance to the Yalu 30

Phase Three—Second Retreat 30

Phase Four—Main Line of Resistance Stabilized 31

Phase Five—Air Pressure for Peace 31

A Substitute for Artillery 31

Close Air Support in Korea 32

The Extemporized Air War 33

The Need for Airborne FACs 34

Command and Control Support 37

6132nd Tactical Air Control Group 38

6147th Squadron Organized 38

Immediate Air Requests 39

Mosquitoes Assigned to Divisions 40

Mosquito Mission Expands 40

The 502nd Tactical Control Group 41

Chapter 4—Mosquito Operations in Korea 43

The Role of the Mosquito 43

Forward Air Controller Equipment 45

Visual Reconnaissance 47

The Tactical Air Control System 48

Mosquito Mellow 49

Strike Control Procedures 49

Problems Encountered 52

Forward Air Controller Training 55

Chapter 5—Korea 57

The Stagnant War 57

The Argument for Interdiction 57

CAS along a Stabilized Front 57

Radar-Controlled Air Strikes 58

Communications Upgrades 58

T-6 Upgrades 58

Operation Thunderbolt 59

Operation Ripper 60

Communist Losses in the First Year 61

Strategy Changes 61

Pathfinder Operations 63

The Truce Ceremony 63

6147th TCG Deactivated 64

Joint Air-Ground Doctrine 64

Post Korea 65

Chapter 6—Vietnam 68

The Advisory Years 68

Wars of National Liberation 68

Developing the Counterinsurgency Force 68

Farm Gate 69

Command Structure 75

Air Operations in 1962 77

Air Operations in 1963 80

Air Operations in 1964 83

The Gulf of Tonkin 85

New Demands 87

Chapter 7—Vietnam 89

Slow FAC Operations 89

FACs Come of Age 89

FAC Aircraft 90

Personnel Requirements 93

Seventh Air Force 95

504th Tactical Air Support Group 95

Increased Manning Requirements 96

Qualifications 97

Rules of Engagement 99

Locating the Enemy 99

Visual Reconnaissance Process 100

In-Country Operations, 1965-72 103

Employing the FAC Force 106

Gunships: An Alternative To Quick Response 107

Navy Participation 108

The Battle of Khe Sanh 108

The Tet Offensive 110

Cleared in Wet! 110

Chapter 8—Expanding Missions 115

Night Operations 115

Air Operations in Laos 119

USAF Controllers in Cambodia 126

Chapter 9—The Fast Forward Air Controllers 130

Out-Country Operations, 1964-65 130

Commando Sabre 133

Chapter 10—Vietnamization and American Withdrawal 155

Vietnamization and Close Air Support 156

The South Vietnamese Air Force 158

Cambodia 160

Lam Son 719 162

Interdiction in Route Packages I and II 164

The 1972 Spring Offensive 165

Linebacker 166

Chapter 11—A Perspective on Close Air Support 172

Interservice Cooperation 172

Airpower in Regional Conflicts 178

Conclusion 182

Bibliography 184

Cited References 185

Books 185

Articles and Periodicals 187

Official Documents 189

Corona Harvest Reports 190

RAND Reports 191

Unit Histories 192

Letters 194

Memorandums 196

Messages 197

Manuals and Regulations 199

Other Documents 200

Unpublished Materials 201

End of Tour Reports 203

Other Documents 204

Related Sources 205

Books 205

Articles and Periodicals 205

Official Documents 205

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 205

Illustrations

1. Korean Peninsula

2. Vietnam

Photographs

T-6 Mosquito

C-47 Mosquito Mellow

Farm Gate Aircraft—T-28

Farm Gate Aircraft—B-26

Farm Gate Aircraft—A-19

Farm Gate Aircraft—C-47

O-1 Bird Dog

O-2 Skymaster

OV-10 Bronco

F-100 Misty

F-4D

F-4E

RF-4C

A-10 Thunderbolt II

About the Author

Lt.-Col. Gary Robert Lester was born in Bristol, Connecticut, on 3 August 1947. He retired from the US Air Force in 1992 after a 23-year career. He accrued three thousand hours as an F-4 weapons systems officer flying F-4 Phantom II fighters. Colonel Lester served two combat tours in Southeast Asia as a Fast-FAC. Beginning in 1981, he flew operational test and evaluation missions for advanced weapons and aircraft systems and was an instructor at both of Air Combat Command’s test centers. He completed his career as director, Tactics and Test Division, 79th Test and Evaluation Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

After retirement, Colonel Lester served as associate assistant professor of World Civilization at Okaloosa-Walton Community College and associate assistant professor of American History and Western Civilization for Troy State University, Florida Region.

Lester holds a bachelor’s degree in journalism from Wichita State University (1969), a Master of Public Administration degree from Golden Gate University (1985), and a PhD in history from Florida State University (1994). He is also a graduate of Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Colonel Lester is a member of the Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association, the Retired Officer Association, the American Historical Association, and the Pensacola Civil War Round Table. He currently resides in Prescott, Arizona, with his wife Penny.

Preface

Comparable to twentieth century cavalry, early forward air controllers (FAC) probed, observed, and reported enemy activity. Flying rickety, underpowered, and unarmed aircraft, they operated on the leading edge of ground combat. The efficient use of airborne FACs never developed in a meaningful way in World War II, with the possible exception of their use in Marine amphibious operations in the Pacific. But the rugged terrain of Korea and the jungle mazes of Vietnam restricted the capabilities of ground controllers to identify targets, thus expanding the need for eyes in the air. FAC roles changed from those of probing, observing, and reporting, to those of locating targets, marking them for air strikes, and taking an active role in their destruction. This expanded mission resulted in the inevitable evolution of FAC equipment and responsibilities.

Interservice differences regarding the definition of close air support (CAS) caused controversies which clouded ground-support operations in both Korea and Vietnam. The Navy and the Marines saw CAS as the primary mission for airpower. The Air Force and the Army saw CAS as the last priority, to be employed after air superiority has been gained and maintained, supplies have been interdicted, and the enemy’s infrastructure has been damaged.

Even the definition of what constitutes CAS was not resolved by the services. In both Korea and Vietnam, these interservice differences were resolved in favor of the Air Force; a Tactical Air Control System was designed to support the Air Force’s concept of CAS, and the FAC became a critical component of that system.

In Korea, the FAC’s role began as an observer. It quickly became apparent that the lack of heavy artillery early in the conflict made aircraft bombardment necessary to support friendly ground troops. Getting the observer above the battlefield seemed the best way to identify threats to friendly forces. As the North Koreans swept down the peninsula, targets of opportunity were plentiful behind their rapidly advancing forces—and United Nations airpower was often the only force slowing their advance. Mosquitoes were concerned with controlling the airborne artillery necessary to protect UN forces in retreat.

Entrenched UN forces at Pusan presented a new problem for the controllers: destroy enemy equipment and supplies before they arrived at the stagnant front. Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s successful invasion at Inchon and Eighth Army’s breakout at the Pusan perimeter represented additional challenges to FACs. The rapid offensive advance made identification of friendly and enemy forces more difficult, and FAC responsibilities were extended to a greater range. Lack of a defined bomb-line made close control of airpower more important.

Intervention by the Red Chinese in November 1950 turned the conflict into a see-saw slugfest that eventually stagnated along the 38th parallel. The trench warfare in Korea between 1951 and 1953 presented other challenges to airpower as the battle lines became fixed and enemy men and equipment were entrenched. Interdiction became airpower’s primary mission as CAS became less effective.

Forward air controllers were disbanded during the interwar years (1954-61) as each service competed for defense dollars during the cold war. Strategic weapons and nuclear war on a grand scale occupied Department of Defense thinking for nearly a decade. If the notion of close air support and FACs existed at all, it was a very low priority. The services competed for nuclear submarines, strategic ballistic missile systems, intercontinental bombers, and aircraft carriers. The concept of a conventional confrontation in Europe was approached as being only the beginning of what would become a global nuclear conflict. In this environment, funding for low-technology, light, observer-type aircraft was a low priority indeed.

Preparing for unconventional war finally received attention under the Kennedy administration. Soviet wars of national liberation, announced by Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev in 1960, were recognized as the most probable type of conflict. In 1961, a host of World War II and Korean War aircraft were reactivated in a Vietnamese aid program known as Farm Gate. These relics were soon replaced by more modern, yet equally unsophisticated, aircraft.

The absence of both a clearly defined enemy and classic front lines made FAC use mandatory for air strikes in South Vietnam. FACs became the eyes of province chiefs, who had the authority to authorize air strikes into their areas. Air controllers became more important than ever in defining the tactical objectives on the battlefield. The FAC motto, We control violence, took on even more significance. A new command and control network evolved to achieve objectives and protect friendly forces from mistaken air attack.

In the north, however, sophisticated air defenses made light, slow-moving aircraft impractical. Fast-FACs therefore took up the mission of interdicting enemy supplies in areas where lack of air superiority restricted the traditional slow movers. Modern fighter aircraft now took up a FAC role and, although not well suited for this mission, they adapted quite well. By the end of the Vietnam War, advances in technology allowed these FACs to control strikes against targets at night, in bad weather, and with improved precision. Laser-guided weapons systems, new computer navigation equipment, and advanced ground radars combined to provide an effective and lethal capability. If the Mosquitoes were an annoyance in Korea, the Wolves of Vietnam proved to be a deadly addition to the concept of FAC.

Chapter 1—Evolution of Close Air Support

Close air support (CAS) of ground operations has become a recognized element of modern warfare. As the authoritative Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines it, CAS comprises air attacks against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. This doctrine is also accepted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This aspect of warfare is the modern version of one of the oldest air combat missions; it also has become one of the most divisive topics between soldiers and airmen.{1}

The use of airplanes in close support of ground troops appeared early in aviation history, but there were problems. The earliest attempts at influencing the outcome of a ground battle from the air were limited by the fragility of the aircraft and a lack of coherent ideas on its effective use. Taken virtually for granted by troops and aviators today, the employment of airpower in this manner has been controversial from the time bombs were first dropped on ground combatants during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12.{2}

The air-to-ground potential of the airplane was tested in several small wars before World War I. After an Italian pilot dropped three small bombs on Turkish positions on 1 November 1911, the Italians continued bombing from aircraft and airships.{3} Bombing also occurred during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. In those wars, however, the bombing was random, incidental, and often at the initiative of the individual aviator.{4} At about the same time, the French Army used aircraft against rebellious tribesmen in Morocco and gained its first experience in cooperation between air units and ground troops.{5}

Since the emergence of strategic bombardment during World War I, few airmen have willingly embraced what the British called army cooperation; that is, to provide direct support for the infantry. American and British aviators in particular wanted to perform missions that did not involve complicated liaison with ground forces, subordination of air forces to ground requirements, or attrition of air resources in unrewarding missions. They believed their contribution should be through strategic bombardment, air superiority, and interdiction.{6}

The history of CAS during the first four decades of the twentieth century can be divided into three phases. The first—World War I, especially the years 1917 and 1918—was characterized by airpower’s rapid development and its increasing combat potential. The second phase (the interwar period to about 1935) was marked by limited doctrinal discussion, restricted development, and a virtual absence of meaningful battlefield application. During the final phase, which continued into the opening campaigns of World War II, there was renewed interest, considerable experimentation, and operational experience in several minor conflicts.{7}

World War I

Trench warfare removed the need for the kind of air reconnaissance that had been crucial in the early months of World War I. The need for accurate trench maps and for corroborating the eyewitness reports of airmen led to a rapid development in aerial photography; the camera became as much a part of the observation airplane as the observer’s notebook. Extensive use of aerial reconnaissance led to the camouflaging of important military installations—which led, in turn, to the art of photographic interpretation.{8}

Trench warfare also led to the artillery-spotting airplane. Since indiscriminate artillery barrage did comparatively little harm to a well-sheltered enemy, a way to direct the fire onto specific targets was sought—and the radio-equipped airplane proved ideal. The Germans, quick to realize the specialized nature of this work, formed 14 units exclusively for this task. They wanted each frontline division to have its own artillery-spotting unit. By August 1916, these units comprised 45 of 81 German observation groups.

The airplane also proved useful in determining how far the troops had advanced during an offensive. Communications between forward troops and their rear headquarters were often completely severed when an attack went over the top—and even when information did filter back from the fighting area, it was often out-of-date.{9}

In the first part of World War I, military aviation had only one official function: serve as the eyes of the army. During the first weeks, however, aviators from both sides attacked marching columns on their own initiative with whatever weapons they happened to have. By October 1914, officials had begun to sanction and encourage the offensive use of aircraft.{10}

Air-ground communication was difficult at best. Even though aircraft used for artillery spotting often carried wireless transmitters, pilots commonly found it more feasible to drop messages—and ground troops used flares and visual displays (such as arrows laid out on the ground) to signal aircraft.{11}

In 1915, a new tactical reconnaissance aircraft appeared. Called the infantry contact patrol plane, it led to air support along the cutting edge of the battle. It was charged with following the progress of the friendly infantry and filling the communications gaps that developed when landlines were cut by bombardment and when backup systems (runners, dogs, pigeons) failed. By 1916, infantry contact patrol systems were serving both Allied and German armies.{12}

Early attempts at air-ground liaison on the battlefield were plagued by a number of difficulties, most of them stemming from the ground troops’ fear that use of flares and smoke would advertise their position to enemy artillery. There was less resistance to the use of panels, but compliance was far from perfect; units exhausted from heavy engagement rarely displayed panels.{13}

Since patrol pilots approaching the battlefield could identify enemy as well as friendly positions, they soon began attacking resistance points. Low-level air attacks gained official sanction at the Battle of the Somme, which the British opened in July 1916. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) assigned 18 contact aircraft for low-altitude trench flights with the dual purpose of close reconnaissance and destructive bombardment.{14}

Low-flying attack units were working in close coordination with the infantry when the great German offensive began in March 1918.{15} By the time of the Armistice, CAS experience had yielded a number of lessons and problems, many of which reappeared 20 years later. A major lesson was that aircraft use had a significant effect on the morale of ground troops. An RFC policy paper drafted in September 1916 noted that hostile aircraft over the front affected morale all out of proportion to the damage the aircraft could inflict.{16}

Emphasis on the airplane’s psychological impact slowed the development of weapons that were especially suitable to ground attack. Aircraft usually carried small bombs (under 10 pounds) and grenades, and they strafed with machine guns in the .30-caliber/8 millimeter range. The damage these weapons could inflict on field fortifications was negligible. Cannon and rockets appeared in 1918, but there was little effort to exploit their air-to-ground capabilities.{17}

Royal Flying Corps losses were heavy during the German offensive of March 1918 and in the heavy fighting around Amiens five months later. RFC Wing commander Sir John Slessor cited the case of 80 Squadron, which conducted CAS missions almost continuously from March 1918 until the end of the war: Their average strength was 22 officers, and in the last 10 months of the war no less than 168 officers were struck off the strength from all causes—an average of about 75 percent per month, of whom little less than half were killed.{18} The increased danger to ground-attack aircraft led to a search for models of aircraft that were better suited for such combat.

Air support aircraft in 1918 had two categories of targets: objectives along the enemy’s heavily defended front (the crust) and a range of objectives extending 20 miles behind the crust. By the end of the Great War, a considerable body of opinion held that the chief contribution of aircraft should be against those objectives behind the crust. Additionally, excellent targets often lay beyond effective artillery range—only the airplane could reach them.{19}

While airpower could rapidly be shifted and concentrated, it could not easily be used on a battlefield that was unfamiliar to the pilots or when the battle lines were shifting and fluctuating. Experiments in centralized command encountered opposition from ground forces—the air staff tended to see the benefits of centralized control while the army staff tended to focus on its shortcomings. This fundamental difference remained one of the key problems in CAS.{20} By the end of World War I, much valuable experience had been gained in ground-support operations. Unfortunately, many of these hard-earned lessons were forgotten during the years of comparative peace which followed.{21}

Between the Wars

Technological progress continued during the post-war period. All-metal airframes and more efficient engines were developed. The airplane of 1939 could boast a performance far exceeding that of earlier aircraft; yet many of the world’s air forces had difficulty incorporating these innovations.

Air doctrine in the interwar period rested largely on World War I lessons. There was general agreement that the air force now had at least two fundamental missions: win air battles and support ground forces. However, the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the US Army Air Corps (AAC) became convinced that strategic bombardment was their most important mission and they believed it could be decisive in future wars. They viewed air superiority as desirable for intervention in a land battle, but they did not see it as an absolute prerequisite. However, they agreed that the overriding obligation of the air force was to throw its strength into the ground battle at critical times.{22}

The emphasis on indirect (interdiction) rather than close or direct support resulted from two factors: (1) the perception of the battlefield and the targets it offered and (2) the limited offensive capability of airpower in the 1930s. The battlefield offered small targets that were widely dispersed and usually dug into the ground to protect them against artillery fire.{23} Bombers of the day could attack only broad areas, hoping to hit the specific targets within them. Most authorities concluded that artillery could provide better accuracy, but they agreed that a bomber force was better suited in a surprise offensive because artillery build-ups were usually detected by the enemy.

Advocates of separate ground attack aviation argued that only specially trained pilots, flying aircraft designed and armed specifically for low-level attack, could offer effective close support. Opponents argued that such units would suffer prohibitive losses. Whether an air force provided air support through special units or through fighter and bomber aircraft, there was relatively little contact between the Army’s ground forces and its Air Corps—and no day-to-day exchange on problems that required cooperation. The mechanics of arranging air support in peacetime often proved cumbersome once a war began.{24}

In the late thirties, proponents of ground attack held that neither air superiority nor fighter escort was a prerequisite for rapid, shallow incursions. Low-level flight, they argued, offered sufficient guarantee that a CAS plane could carry out its mission and return safely.{25} Diving attacks were also under discussion, since tests conducted by the Navy suggested that they could achieve greater bombing accuracy.{26}

Technological innovation had a greater impact on weapons than on aircraft. British wing commander Slessor, for example, maintained that the bomb was the weapon to use every time.{27} Bombs used in CAS were typically small, fragmentation-type explosives that were effective at a range of 40 to 50 yards from point of detonation. The machine gun and the fragmentation bomb were effective against soft targets, such as personnel. They could be used to harass enemy gunners, but they could rarely knock out the guns themselves—and they were of little value against tanks and armored cars.

One important piece of equipment carried by CAS aircraft was the wireless or radio set. Between the wars, the radio telephone was increasingly used in preference to wireless telegraphy. Still, radio communications left much to be desired due to unreliability and limited range. Moreover, the heavy and bulky sets were especially cumbersome to aircraft, where weight was critical. These shortcomings showed up quickly when the US Army Air Corps sought to perfect CAS at the beginning of World War II.{28}

The American Experience, 1918-42

The US Army Air Service, a late arrival to the fighting in France, nevertheless played a significant role at Saint Mihiel in September 1918. In that battle, American and French air forces concentrated 1,500 combat planes to support the ground attack. Col William Billy Mitchell, Chief of Air Service for the First Army, directed the air operations. Mitchell listed attack on ground troops as a special mission sometimes assigned to pursuit squadrons. The most attractive targets were reserve troops massing for major military operations. Mitchell believed that bombing and strafing attacks on well-constructed positions had very little effect on either morale or materiel.{29}

The notion of a specialized ground attack branch of aviation found its most emphatic champion in Mitchell. The concept of attack aviation led to a close identity between attack and CAS, the practical result of which was the creation in 1921 of the 3rd attack group. The idea still persisted that all aircraft might have to be committed directly to the land battle.{30} Attack aviation was a post-war creation; it had no past, no combat tradition, and no backlog of practical experience.

In the late twenties, the US Marine Corps flew a number of air support missions in Nicaragua. The operation was described during a 1929 lecture at the Army War College.{31} Airplanes served as artillery, intervened in sieges and battles where very little space separated the contending forces, flew escort missions for columns, and broke up enemy attempts at ambush. In subsequent campaigns and exercises, the Marines were to build up a sizable fund of expertise on CAS, particularly as related to amphibious operations.{32} This experience led to adoption of a different philosophy of air support—a difference that would manifest itself early in the Korean War and persist into the Vietnam conflict.

When Brig Gen. Henry H. Arnold addressed the US Army War College on air warfare in the fall of 1937, he praised Japan because she has not assigned her air force to operate against frontline trenches, as have the Spaniards.{33} Arnold said that high aircraft losses result when aircraft are used "promiscuously and indiscriminately to supplement artillery actions on