Rommel in North Africa: Quest for the Nile
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David Mitchelhill-Green
David Mitchelhill-Green is a freelance military author and photographer. His areas of interest include the Second World War and Japanese castles. Previous books in this series include: Fighting in Ukraine: A Photographer at War, With Rommel in the Desert: Tripoli to El Alamein and Rommel in North Africa: Quest for the Nile.
Read more from David Mitchelhill Green
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Rommel in North Africa - David Mitchelhill-Green
Introduction
Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! Does anything else count except beating him?’ an exasperated Winston Churchill vented in an incident later quoted in his memoirs. Noting the importance Britain’s military leadership was placing on Rommel, Adolf Hitler remarked how they were ‘able to explain their defeat to their nation more easily by focusing on Rommel.’ Several days later Germany’s Führer cited Churchill’s speeches in the House of Commons which, ‘for political reasons’, ‘repeatedly presented [Rommel] as a general with genius-like capabilities.’ Hitler also questioned whether such praise was designed to ‘foster discord between the Italians and us by emphasising Rommel…Consequently he has acknowledged Rommel’s achievements many times to the world…This fact shows how dangerous it is to put so much emphasis on a capable opponent’s man as Churchill has done in the case of Rommel. A name suddenly begins to acquire a meaning this way that is equal in value to several divisions.’ To this end Erwin Rommel achieved the extraordinary feat of becoming a legend – on both sides – during his own lifetime. Today he remains the most well-known German general of the Second World War.
To gain a deeper understanding of Rommel’s character and the merits of his leadership in North Africa, we begin with a series of firsthand accounts written by officers who served with him in the desert, a theme continued throughout the book. Rather than a chronological retelling of the fighting across Libya and Egypt, this work is a pictorial examination of Rommel’s quest to reach the Nile during 1941-42. We start with a post-war report by Rainer Karl-Theodore Kriebel, former Deutsches Afrikakorps (DAK) staff officer, written for US military intelligence:‘In the year 1941 the African Desert was a new world not only for the German Command and the German troops. Desert warfare as a form of fighting was something new for the entire modern science of war. It was found that the desert offered undreamt-of possibilities for the decisive weapons of modern war, viz. the armour and the air force. On the African war theatre more than on other theatres of war, modern command methods found all the scope to show what could be done. In other directions too, the African campaign is of particular interest. For the first time the Axis powers were faced by the problems of a confederate war. For the student of military history, the African campaign offers fascinating themes such as General Rommel’s leadership and how he had been able to develop into a leading personality of first class order, a personality soaring to ever greater heights of achievement as the tasks grew more formidable and his experience – dearly bought – grew richer. For the German rank and file, it is particularly the first year of the African campaign which will be unforgettable. In no other theatre did the superb soldierly qualities of the German fighting troops show up so brilliantly as in Africa. Separated from home by thousands of kilometres, cut off from any reinforcements and supplies for months by huge stretches of ocean ruled by the enemy, the German soldier has done his duty without fail and has adapted himself in a surprisingly short time to the unusual and difficult conditions of climate and terrain. But justice demands that the achievements of the Italian armed forces do not go without recognition; they have done their very best in conditions much less favourable and equipped with inferior materials, never have they fought more valiantly than under Rommel’s leadership. These qualities of the German and the Italian soldier had the opportunities to show themselves in a brilliant way because in the North African campaign they found a brave and fair enemy in the British soldier. In this century of soulless mass warfare, the African campaign stands out as an uplifting exception where two chivalrous opponents borne by mutual respect fought decently and cleanly.
Writing after the war, Generalleutnant Alfred Gause wrote of Rommel’s command techniques and eventual defeat in Africa: ‘The conditions of the African theatre enabled Rommel to employ methods different from those he would have had to employ in Europe in commanding an army flanked by other units and under some superior command. In Africa he was completely independent in his conduct of operations. His next superior, the Governor General of Libya, was usually hundreds of miles distant, and most of the time no telephone communications existed. Directives concerning the conduct of operations arrived only rarely and then were usually in accordance with his own recommendations. Whenever his opinion on matters of fundamental importance differed from that held at higher headquarters, he succeeded in having his way. As Kesselring complains: Neither discussions nor orders could influence Rommel.
In the absence of rearward telephone lines, no telephone messages requiring sudden decisions were to be expected and Rommel therefore in his command placed main emphasis on his own mobility. Leaving the forward echelon of his army headquarters staff in an established command post, Rommel established himself and a very small staff, which usually included me and a number of messenger officers, on vehicles…For his own protection Rommel took along only two armoured reconnaissance cars, and it must be remembered that he was usually in the foremost lines, sometimes even further ahead, and sometimes in the area on the open flank. This small staff was always on the move and it was from here that Rommel conducted operations. Radio messages were sent and received frequently while in movement. Since Rommel as a matter of principle directed operations personally from the area of main effort and based his decisions on his own observations, no time was lost in waiting for reports.
‘It must be admitted that that the method described here was inconvenient for some subordinate commanders because Rommel used to interfere in the control of individual units if he thought it necessary. On the other hand, however, he also accepted exclusive responsibility for all tactical and strategic action taken. Basic decisions on the field of battle he left to no other person. Every unit commander and every man knew that in the most difficult situations, and no matter how heavy the fire was, Rommel would appear in person and would master the situation. He never allowed any slack in the reins of control. Nobody ever had the feeling that he was forsaken. It was in this way that his indefinable sway developed, which also influenced the enemy, and which enabled him even after serious reverses to maintain the morale and spirit of the troops, evidenced by his recapture of the Cyrenaica in February 1942 although he had received no reinforcements after his difficult winter retreat. In this case of his retreat from El Alamein to Tunisia the morale of the approximately 70,000 troops involved remained unimpaired.
‘As Mussolini put it: Your withdrawal was a masterpiece, Field Marshal.
These methods of command presuppose a robust constitution, disdain for personal safety, and an almost ascetic frugality. During operations Rommel slept only a few hours each day out in the desert, without any tent or trailer, and ate only cold food without even leaving his car for meals. No cooking utensils were taken along. …While conducting operations in this highly flexible and mobile manner Rommel at no time lost sight of the overall situation, in spite of being away from his established command post. He was kept currently informed by means of brief radio messages and did not base his decisions exclusively on fleeting local impressions.
‘In consonance with the principles generally valid in the German Armed Forces, Rommel conducted operations with extreme dash and free from any stereotype rules. To retain the initiative was one of the cardinal laws. The general strength ratios and the supply situation compelled him to always attack numerically stronger forces…’
Against the Bir Hacheim/Gazala line in 1942: ‘Determination and flexibility of command had to compensate for what was lacking in matériel. He could not afford to attempt to break through the heavily mined British positions, because he lacked the necessary tanks and ammunition for this purpose. His decision to outflank the positions in the south was a grave risk, particularly since all supplies had to be moved forward around the British flank. Defeat in this battle might have involved the loss of Africa. However, Rommel was compelled to attack in order to anticipate offensive action by the British Eighth Army and retain the initiative.
‘In all operations he was compelled to employ his numerically inferior forces in tight concentration in order at least to achieve a certain measure of local superiority in the area of the main effort. He was called the Master in the Art of Poor-Man Warfare.
Any single reverse could have resulted in a complete catastrophe, and the whole situation in Libya hinged upon the Panzer Army. There could be no hope in a crisis of speedily receiving reinforcements by sea.
‘In spite of his boldness Rommel was not rash. While requiring the utmost personal effort from himself and from every officer and man under his command, he at no time made excessive demands on his troops. His constant close contact with the troops on combat enabled him to recognise in time not only the limits of the units in action but also of the entire army and of the entire military potential available in Northern Africa.
‘The question of whether Rommel’s command methods were sound must be answered in the affirmative so far as Africa was concerned. They are vindicated by his successes…In Africa Rommel developed his methods of command unrestrictedly in consonance with his nature. These methods would be difficult to teach and can hardly be applied under general circumstances. In spite of uniform training every commander develops his own particular methods consonant with his mentality.
‘The campaign in Africa required exceptionally strong nerves to weather the numerous crises which developed. Rommel believed in his good fortune but it did not allow local successes to mislead or failures to discourage him. The fate of Northern Africa hinged upon him personally and when the British Eighth Army launched its attack in October 1942 he had to leave Semering, where he was under medical treatment, in order to resume command over his army, although his health was not yet fully restored.
‘What was the basis of Rommel’s influence over his troops? Fundamentally, Rommel was hard, uncompromising, and impersonal. He judged persons solely by their performances and sought favour neither with his superiors not with those subordinate to him…His maxim was that the best way to take care of the troops was to give them the best possible training. What earned him the respect, devotion and loyalty of his troops was his personal courage and his absolute reliability in the conduct of operations. His men were proud and had blind confidence in him.
‘In spite of the performances and sacrifices he extracted from them. Rommel felt personally responsible for each and every individual serving under him and demanded this same attitude in his sub-commanders in their attitude towards their troops. Any unit commander who failed to measure up to his high